

The Summa Halensis: Sources and Context

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Veröffentlichungsversion / Published Version

Sammelwerk / collection

Empfohlene Zitierung / Suggested Citation:

Schumacher, L. (Ed.). (2020). *The Summa Halensis: Sources and Context* (Veröffentlichungen des Grabmann-Institutes zur Erforschung der mittelalterlichen Theologie und Philosophie, 65). Berlin: De Gruyter. <https://doi.org/10.1515/9783110685022>

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The Summa Halensis

Veröffentlichungen des Grabmann-Institutes zur Erforschung der mittelalterlichen Theologie und Philosophie



Münchener Universitätsschriften
Katholisch-Theologische Fakultät

Founded by
Michael Schmaus †, Werner Dettloff †
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Continued in collaboration with Ulrich Horst

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Volume 65

The Summa Halensis

Sources and Context

Edited by
Lydia Schumacher

DE GRUYTER

ISBN 978-3-11-068492-6
e-ISBN (PDF) 978-3-11-068502-2
e-ISBN (EPUB) 978-3-11-068510-7
ISSN 0580-2091



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Bibliographic information published by the Deutsche Nationalbibliothek

The Deutsche Nationalbibliothek lists this publication in the Deutsche Nationalbibliografie;
Detailed bibliographic data are available in the Internet at <http://dnb.dnb.de>.

© 2020 Lydia Schumacher, published by Walter de Gruyter GmbH, Berlin/Boston
Printing and binding: CPI books GmbH, Leck

www.degruyter.com

Acknowledgements

This volume contains some of the proceeds of a series of conferences held in 2018 which received funding from the European Research Council (ERC) under the European Union's Horizon 2020 research and innovation programme (grant agreement 714427: 'Authority and Innovation in Early Franciscan Thought').

The conferences were held in Trinity College and All Soul's College, Oxford, and I am grateful to the staff at these colleges for providing us with such exceptional hospitality and the right environment for discussion and debate.

I am especially grateful Dr Simon Maria Kopf, Research Assistant on the ERC project, who devoted an extraordinary amount of time and energy to ensuring the orderliness and consistency of the volumes. In particular, he carefully checked and supplemented references in the footnotes. I owe him a huge debt of gratitude for his investment in the project and willingly acknowledge that all faults that may remain in the text are my responsibility. I am deeply grateful also to Dr Mark Lee for joining us at the end of this project to check the consistency of formatting in the main body of the text. This volume would not exist in its current form without the work of these two scholars.

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Simon Maria Kopf and Lydia Schumacher

A Guide to Citing the *Summa Halensis*

When citing the Quaracchi edition of the Franciscan Fathers, we suggest and use in this volume the following form as a standardized way of citing the *Summa Halensis*:

Alexander of Hales, *Doctoris irrefragabilis Alexandri de Hales Ordinis minorum Summa theologica* (SH), 4 vols (Quaracchi: Collegium S. Bonaventurae, 1924–48), Vol III, In2, Tr2, S2, Q1, Ti1, C7, Ar3, Pr1, Pa2 (n. 162), Solutio, p. 179.

The relevant text divisions of the Quaracchi edition include, in the following order:

Vol—	Volume (<i>tomus</i>)
P—	Part (<i>pars</i>)
In—	Inquiry (<i>inquisitio</i>)
Tr—	Tract (<i>tractatus</i>)
S—	Section (<i>sectio</i>)
Q—	Question (<i>quaestio</i>)
Ti—	Title (<i>titulus</i>)
D—	Distinction (<i>distinctio</i>)
M—	Member (<i>membrum</i>)
C—	Chapter (<i>caput</i>)
Ar—	Article (<i>articulus</i>)
Pr—	Problem (<i>problema</i>)
Pa—	Particular Particle (<i>particula</i>)
(n[n].)—	Paragraph number[s]

A further specification of the thus determined entity (to be cited as given in the edition) might, at this point, include:

[arg.]—	Objections
Respondeo/Solutio—	Answer
(Sed) Contra—	On the Contrary
Ad obiecta—	Answers to Objections
p[p]—	Page number[s].

The second instance of citation should read as follows (including all relevant text divisions):

SH III, In2, Tr2, S2, Q1, Ti1, C7, Ar3, Pr1, Pa2 (n. 162), Solutio, p. 179.

Note that according to our proposal the number after *SH* indicates the volume number (*tomus*) of the Quaracchi edition—and not the book (*liber*) of the *Summa Halensis*. Hence *SH* I refers to Book 1, *SH* II to Book 2.1, *SH* III to Book 2.2, and *SH* IV to Book 3, respectively. The unedited Book 4, which is not part of the Quaracchi edition, will be cited, with reference to the respective edition, as *SH* Bk IV.

Where it would not lead to confusion, a shorthand could be used for further citations:

SH III (n. 162), p. 179.

Please note that all translations of the *Summa Halensis* and other texts belong to the author, unless otherwise noted.

Lydia Schumacher

The *Summa Halensis*: Sources and Context

Introduction

The Franciscan intellectual tradition as it developed before Bonaventure, and above all, Duns Scotus, has not been the subject of much scholarly attention over the years. By most accounts, Bonaventure's forebears, and even Bonaventure himself, worked primarily to systematize the intellectual tradition of Augustine that had prevailed for most of the earlier Middle Ages.¹ In contrast, Scotus is supposed to have broken with past precedent to develop innovative philosophical and theological positions that anticipated the rise of modern thought. Thus, Scotus and his successors have been the focus of many studies, while his predecessors are deemed largely insignificant for the further history of thought.²

This volume and another that accompanies it will make a case for the innovativeness of early Franciscan thought, which the editor has also advanced elsewhere.³ The contributions are based on proceedings from four conferences which were held over the course of 2018 and sponsored by the European Research Council. While these conferences concerned the early Franciscan tradition in general, their more specific focus was the so-called *Summa Halensis*, a massive text that was collaboratively authored by the founding members of the Franciscan school at Paris between 1236 and 1245, in an attempt to lay down a distinctly Franciscan intellectual tradition for the very first time. Although some final additions to the text were made in 1255–6, the *Summa* was mostly composed during the second quarter of the thirteenth century and thus within first 50 years of the existence of the University of Paris, which was founded around 1200 and served as the centre for theological study at the time. In countless respects, it laid the foundation for the further development of the Franciscan intellectual tradition

The need for a text like the *Summa* was precipitated in part by the rapid growth of the Franciscan order—from 12 members in 1209 to as many as 20,000 by 1250—the

1 Ignatius Brady, 'The *Summa Theologica* of Alexander of Hales (1242–1248),' *Archivum Franciscanum Historicum* 70 (1977): 437–47; Étienne Gilson, *The Philosophy of St Bonaventure* (Chicago: Franciscan Press, 1965). See also A.-M. Hamelin, *L'école franciscaine de ses débuts jusqu'à l'occamisme*, *Analecta mediaevalia Namurcensia*, 12 (Louvain: Nauwelaerts, 1961); Christopher Cullen, *Bonaventure* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006).

2 Olivier Boulnois, *Être et représentation: Une généalogie de la métaphysique moderne à l'époque de Duns Scot* (Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 1999); Ludger Honnefelder, *Scientia transcendens: Die formale Bestimmung der Seiendheit und Realität in der Metaphysik des Mittelalters und der Neuzeit* (Hamburg: Felix Meiner, 1990).

3 The accompanying edited volume is published by De Gruyter under the title, *The Summa Halensis: Doctrines and Debates*. Lydia Schumacher, *Early Franciscan Theology: Between Authority and Innovation* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2019).

most gifted of whom required a basis for their scholarly formation. As a matter of fact, the *Summa* was the text on which the likes of Bonaventure and Scotus were inducted into their order's intellectual tradition.⁴ Bonaventure, for one, credits everything he learned to his 'master and father' Alexander of Hales, which is scarcely an exaggeration.⁵ As is well documented, the rapid emergence of a scholarly division within the order quickly gave rise to considerable controversy both within and outside of its membership. While some largely lay Franciscans, particularly those who had known Francis, questioned the compatibility of studies with the Franciscan ideal of poverty, the 'secular' masters at the young university, namely, those who were not associated with a religious order, perceived the friars as competitors for students, prestige, and ultimately a threat to their personal salaries.

One of the ways that the Franciscans sought to defend their stake in university life involved attempts to 'out-do' the secular masters in terms of the scope and extent of the theological texts they produced. The Franciscans were aided in this regard by the entrance of Alexander of Hales into the order in 1236, which instigated the production of the *Summa Halensis* itself. In his already long and distinguished career, Alexander had been celebrated as one of the most sophisticated and significant theologians in the Parisian Faculty of Theology.⁶ As is well known, he championed the effort to give a central place in the university timetable to lectures on Lombard's *Sentences*, in addition to the Bible. Furthermore, he composed one of the earliest *Sentences* Commentaries, eventually establishing this practice as the key to obtaining the license to teach theology, the medieval equivalent to the doctoral degree.⁷ By acquiring such a distinguished scholar amongst their ranks, the Franciscans captured their place in the university at a time when higher education was fast becoming the precondition for religious and spiritual authority and thus essential to the very survival of the order.⁸ More immediately, they gained the human resource needed to oversee the project that ultimately resulted in the *Summa* that bears Hales' name.

Although Alexander certainly oversaw the work of the *Summa* and contributed a great deal to it, whether indirectly or directly, the editors of the fourth tome, led by Victorin Doucet, eventually clarified that other Franciscans were involved in its composition as well.⁹ This was something that the editors of tomes 1–3, overseen by Ber-

⁴ Bert Roest, *A History of Franciscan Education* (Leiden: Brill, 2000), 126.

⁵ Bonaventure, *Commentaria in quattuor libros Sententiarum Magistri Petri Lombardi: in librum II* (Turnhout: Brepols, 2011), Prologue, Lib II, d 23, a 2, q e (II, 547).

⁶ Keenan B. Osborne, 'Alexander of Hales,' in *The History of Franciscan Theology*, ed. Kenan B. Osborne (St Bonaventure: The Franciscan Institute, 2007) 1-38.

⁷ Philipp W. Rosemann, *The Story of a Great Medieval Book: Peter Lombard's Sentences* (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2007).

⁸ Neslihan Senocak, *The Poor and the Perfect: The Rise of Learning in the Franciscan Order 1209–1310* (Ithaca: Cornell, 2012).

⁹ Victorin Doucet, 'Prolegomena in librum III necnon in libros I et II "Summa Fratris Alexandri",' in *Doctoris irrefragabilis Alexandri de Hales Ordinis minorum Summa theologica*, vol. 4 (Quaracchi: Collegium S. Bonaventurae, 1948); Victorin Doucet, 'The History of the Problem of the Summa,' *Francis-*

nard Klumper, had insisted on denying, in the face of mounting evidence against a single author. As Doucet showed, however, the first and fourth tomes were likely authored primarily by Alexander's chief collaborator, John of La Rochelle, who had plans to prepare a *Summa* of his own before Alexander entered the order and his services became otherwise enlisted. Most probably, tomes 2 and 3 were prepared by a third redactor, who worked on the basis of John and Alexander's authentic works but did not always follow them exactly.

The multiple authorship has been one reason for the *Summa*'s neglect, as modern scholars have tended to focus on single-authored works by a known author. However, the *Summa Halensis* is significant precisely because it represents the 'collective mind' of the founders of the Franciscan intellectual tradition at Paris and their attempt to articulate the contours of this tradition for the very first time.¹⁰ Far from a compilation of relatively disjointed sections, the *Summa* exhibits remarkable coherence and an overarching vision, and it contains many ideas that would quickly become defining features of Franciscan thought.

This is confirmed by manuscript evidence, which illustrates that the first three volumes were received as a whole following the deaths of John and Alexander in 1245.¹¹ Such evidence is strengthened by the fact that only two small additions and no major corrections were made to these volumes in 1255–6, when Pope Alexander IV ordered William of Melitona, then head of the Franciscan school at Paris, to enlist any help he needed from learned friars to complete the last volume on the sacraments, which was not composed by Alexander and John and has yet to be prepared in a modern critical edition.¹²

Because of its collaborative nature, the *Summa* ultimately resulted in an entirely unprecedented intellectual achievement. There were of course other great works of a systematic nature that did precede it, including many Commentaries on Lombard's *Sentences* and other early *Summae* like the *Summa aurea* of William of Auxerre and the *Summa de bono* of Philip the Chancellor. However, the text that is by far the largest among these, namely, the *Summa aurea*, contains only 818 questions for discussion by comparison to the *Summa*'s 3,408, as Ayelet Even-Ezra shows in her contribution to these volumes. There is virtually no comparison between the *Summa* and earlier texts.

can Studies 7 (1947): 26–41; Victorin Doucet, 'The History of the Problem of the *Summa* (Continued),' *Franciscan Studies* 7 (1947), 274–312.

¹⁰ Etienne Gilson, *History of Christian Philosophy in the Middle Ages* (London: Sheed and Ward, 1955), 327–31.

¹¹ Victorin Doucet, 'The History of the Problem of the *Summa*,' 296–302. See also Palemon Glorieux, 'Les années 1242–1247 à la Faculté de Théologie de Paris,' *Recherches de théologie ancienne et médiévale* 29 (1962), 234–49.

¹² Robert Prentice, O.F.M., 'The *De fontibus paradisi* of Alexander IV on the *Summa Theologica* of Alexander of Hales,' *Franciscan Studies* 5 (1945), 350–1. The additions include *SH* 1, *De missione visibili*, 514–18; 2: *De corpore humano*, 501–630; *De coniuncto humano*, 631–784.

In many respects, it was the first major contribution to the *Summa* genre for which scholasticism became famous and a prototype for further instalments in the genre, such as Thomas Aquinas' magisterial *Summa Theologiae*, which only began to be composed twenty years after the *Summa Halensis* was completed. Although Thomas Aquinas took a different view from his Franciscan counterparts on many issues, a comparison of the two texts shows that he adopted many topics of discussion from them which indeed became common topics of scholastic discussion more generally. For example, he inherited the idea for his famous 'five ways' to prove God's existence, the notion of eternal law, his account of the passions, and a structure for dealing with questions on the soul.

A major reason for the unprecedented size and scope of the *Summa* is that it incorporated an unmatched number of sources into its discussions. These included the traditional patristic sources that can be found in Peter Lombard's *Sentences*, along with the newly translated Greek patristic sources of Pseudo-Dionysius and John of Damascus, whom Lombard had begun to use in a preliminary way. The Summists also engage with more recent sources from the 11th and 12th centuries, including Anselm of Canterbury, whose works had largely been neglected until Alexander and his colleagues took an interest in them, as well as Hugh and Richard of St Victor and Bernard of Clairvaux. The *Summa* even maintains a dialogue with earlier contemporaries like William and Philip the Chancellor.

Of special note amongst the *Summa's* sources are many philosophical texts that had recently become available in the West in Latin translations. This in fact is one reason why the size of the *Summa* mushroomed so significantly, namely, because it was the first systematic treatise comprehensively to incorporate philosophical questions—about the nature of reality and knowledge for instance—into its treatment of how the world comes from and relates to its divine source. This is also a significant respect in which it set the agenda and terms of further scholastic debate. A common misperception of the scholastic period is that the incorporation of philosophy into the scope of theological inquiry was due largely to the rediscovery of Aristotle. This may have been true for the generation of Aquinas, but there was a period of about 100 years, between 1150 and 1250, when Latin access to Aristotle was patchy and riddled with problems.

A basic problem concerned the fact that the Aristotelian translations from Greek were not perceived to be of a high quality, and they were sometimes partial and were not produced all at once. For this reason, scholars during this period tended to rely much more heavily on the readily available work of the Islamic scholar Avicenna, whose writings translated from Arabic were of a much higher quality and became available all, between 1152 and 1166. Although Avicenna took Aristotle's texts as a point of departure, he proceeded from there to develop a system of thought that is nonetheless incommensurable with Aristotle's and in many respects advances beyond it, not least by incorporating a Neo-Platonic dimension. At the time, the Neo-Platonist reading of Aristotle was not uncommon, as it had long been proffered

in the Greek and Arabic commentary traditions on Aristotle, not least on the basis of spurious Aristotelian works like *The Theology of Aristotle*.

Although Latin thinkers did not have this work until the Renaissance, they possessed a variation on it in the *Liber de causis*, which Aquinas realized in 1268 was actually a compilation based on Proclus' *Elements of Theology* rather than an authentic work of Aristotle himself. Such Neo-Platonizing works legitimized the reading of Aristotle in line with Avicenna. Furthermore, they justified projecting ideas from Avicenna on to Christian Neo-Platonists like Augustine, who was reconciled with Aristotle by means of Avicenna as well. In this connection, early scholastics and especially Franciscans relied particularly heavily on spurious Augustinian works, such as *De spiritu et anima*, *De fide ad Petram*, *De ecclesiasticis dogmatibus*, which lent themselves to interpretation in terms of Avicenna's thinking.

While the Franciscans were by no means exceptional in making use of Avicenna at the time, they were by far the most predominant school of thought to do so; and indeed, their incorporation of Avicennian themes was far more extensive than many of their contemporaries. In the case of the Franciscans particularly, there appears to have been a sort of happy coincidence between the Avicennian materials that were available and popular at the time and what was well-suited to articulating a distinctly Franciscan form of thought. Francis had been more emphatic than most in insisting on the radical dependence of all things on God and the necessity of his guidance in human knowing. Avicenna aided the first Franciscan intellectuals to give an account of philosophical and theological matters that respected his values. This presumably went a long way towards justifying to members of the order itself that there was a place for high-level intellectual pursuits in their life.¹³

That is not to say that Franciscan thought is a function of Avicenna or any other authority. While Avicenna in many cases provided important philosophical resources for Franciscan thinking, these were always adapted to suit Franciscan and more broadly Christian purposes, as well as supplemented with insights from other sources in the Christian and even the Islamic and Jewish traditions that resonated with the Franciscan ethos. The ultimate product of these synthesising efforts was a systematic framework for thinking that was entirely the invention of early Franciscans. Although it incorporates many authorities, consequently, the *Summa* cannot rightly be described as a mere attempt to rehearse or systematize any authority, including the authority of authorities, Augustine.

¹³ According to the early 20th-century medievalist, Étienne Gilson, the appropriation of Avicenna was the key to Franciscan efforts to 'systematize' the work of Augustine, whose intellectual tradition had prevailed for most of the earlier Middle Ages. The Franciscans sought to do this, in Gilson's opinion, in order to give Augustine's legacy a chance of surviving the competition that was increasingly posed by the popularization of works by Aristotle. See Étienne Gilson, 'Les sources Greco-arabes de l'augustinisme avicennisant,' *Archives d'histoire doctrinale et littéraire du Moyen Age* 4 (1929): 5–107; Étienne Gilson, 'Pourquoi saint Thomas a critiqué saint Augustin,' *Archives d'histoire doctrinale et littéraire du Moyen Age* 1 (1926–7): 5–127.

In this connection, it is worth noting that the *Summa* is not exceptional in making extensive use of Augustine. All major thinkers at the time, from Anselm and Hugh of St Victor to Peter Lombard and Thomas Aquinas, also gave disproportional weight to Augustine's authority. The reason for citing Augustine in such cases was not simply to interpret or bolster his own views, however. Rather, references to Augustine were marshalled as proof texts to lend support to the author's own perspectives, regardless of whether those coincided with authentic views of Augustine. This was standard and even required practice at a period in time when the accepted method of advancing one's own arguments involved situating them in relation to a broader, if loosely defined, tradition or authority for thought.

As Mary Carruthers rightly notes, authorities in this period were not so much thinkers but texts; and texts were subject to interpretation, with their meanings always capable of being brought out in new ways in new contexts. What rendered any given text authoritative was precisely whether it gave rise to such new readings, which in turn became part of the meaning or tradition of the text.¹⁴ Although scholastic authors generally invoked authorities with a view to bolstering their own agendas, that does not mean there were not cases, including in the *Summa*, where they sought to represent the position of a particular authority fairly accurately.¹⁵ In such cases, however, there was generally a coincidence between the views presented by an authority and those of the scholastic author, who was still working for his own intellectual ends, which remained the ultimate arbiter of his use of sources. In spite of this, a tendency remains to take scholastic quotations from authorities at face value, thus interpreting texts like the *Summa Halensis* as more or less the sum or function of their sources.

The Objectives of this Volume

This volume offers a corrective to that tendency in the form of contributions which examine in detail how the *Summa* reckons with some of the most significant sources of the time, including the Bible (Gies), Augustine (Schumacher), Pseudo-Dionysius (Edwards), John of Damascus (Cross, Zachhuber), Anselm of Canterbury and the Victorines (Canty, Rosato, Coolman), as well as some more covert influences like the 9th century thinker John Scotus Eriugena (Kavanagh) and above all Avicenna (Bertolacci, Schumacher). Further contributions situate the *Summa* in its historical and intellec-

¹⁴ As Mary Carruthers has observed in *The Book of Memory: A Study of Memory in Medieval Culture* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990), 262.

¹⁵ Mary Carruthers, *The Book of Memory*, 235. Marcia L. Colish, 'The Sentence Collection and the Education of Professional Theologians in the Twelfth Century,' in *The Intellectual Climate of the Early University: Essays in Honor of Otto Grundler*, ed. Nancy Van Deusen (Kalamazoo: Western Michigan University, 1997), 1–26, esp. 11; Marcia L. Colish, 'Authority and Interpretation in Scholastic Theology,' in Marcia L. Colish, *Studies in Scholasticism* (Aldershot: Ashgate, 2006), 5.

tual context, in some cases by locating it with reference to contemporaries like William of Auxerre and other early Summa authors (Brown, Even-Ezra), William of Auvergne (Smith), or even associates of the English Franciscan school (Gaspar).

Finally, the *Summa* is placed in relation to later contributors to early Franciscan thought like Odo Rigaldus (Delmas) and to the Franciscan religious order and rule more generally (Şenocak). From different perspectives, consequently, these contributions highlight what an exceptional text the *Summa* was in its context and how it deployed sources to construct what was at the time an entirely novel Franciscan intellectual tradition, which laid the foundation for the work of Franciscans for generations to follow. By illustrating the *Summa*'s novelties, in fact, this study provides grounds for identifying continuity where scholars have always seen a break between the earlier Franciscan tradition and the new departures of John Duns Scotus and his generation.

This not only shifts the credit for some of Scotus' innovations back on to his predecessors but also highlights more clearly the Franciscan ethos that underlies his work, which shines most clearly through the study of early Franciscan thought. In that sense, the study of the *Summa Halensis* clearly demarcates Franciscan thought from any modern developments in intellectual history which took place outside the order, exonerating it of the charges some have laid before them of causing all the alleged ills of modernity. At the same time, this study helps to clarify how Franciscan ideas were meant to be construed and employed on their own terms and the promise they might hold for reckoning with philosophical and theological problems today. To make such a recovery of the Franciscan intellectual tradition possible in future is one ultimate objective of this project to highlight the tensions between authorities and innovation in early Franciscan thought.

Part 1: **The Sources of Early Franciscan Thought**

Aaron Gies

Biblical Exegesis in the *Summa Halensis*

Abstract: This essay analyzes the theory, structures, procedures and methods of biblical exegesis employed in the *Summa Halensis*. Like Peter Lombard's *Sentences*, whose form it adapts, the *Summa* is pervaded by biblical material, but it innovates by placing this material in an explicit theoretical relation to the human reflection surrounding it. After briefly examining the theory of interpretation contained in the *Summa*'s first question, the essay surveys exegetical structures, procedures and methods. A final section compares a biblical question on John 3:23–4 from the *Summa* with contemporary John lectures by contributors Alexander of Hales and John of La Rochelle. Like those lectures, the *Summa* is fundamentally an exposition of 'theology's doctrine', which takes its rise from Scripture, but its professional literary context and mode of exposition differ.

My task in this paper is to consider the *Summa Halensis* as an exercise in interpreting the Scriptures. But what are the Scriptures, so far as the *Summa* is concerned? What is their source, their extent, their subject, their method, their purpose? How are they to be distinguished from other writings, and particularly from other forms of theological reflection? Finally, how are they to be used in a dogmatic exercise like the *Summa*? These are the questions that immediately occur to one attempting to problematize the *Summa* as an exegetical exercise. But they are not precisely the questions the Summists set themselves to answer in the introductory question, 'On the teaching of theology' (*De doctrina theologiae*). Their concern is for the body of teaching, or rather revelation, 'from God, about God and leading to God', which has Christ, the Incarnate Word at its core, the Scriptures as its mantle, conciliar, liturgical and patristic interpretation as its crust, and the shifting inquiries and disputations of the moderns as its surface and atmosphere.¹

There was, in fact, no firm separation between the teaching of theology (*doctrina theologiae*) and the teaching of Sacred Scripture (*doctrina sacrae scripturae*) for the early Franciscans.² For this reason, those terms and several others are used inter-

1 Alexander of Hales, *Doctoris irrefragabilis Alexandri de Hales Ordinis minorum Summa theologica (SH)* (Quaracchi: Collegium S. Bonaventurae, 1924–48), Vol I, TrInt, Q1, C2 (n. 3), Ad obiecta 1–4, p. 5: 'a Deo et de Deo et ductiva ad Deum' (English translations are the author's unless otherwise noted).

2 Heinrich Denifle, 'Quel livre servait de base à l'enseignement des maîtres en théologie dans l'Université de Paris?', *Revue Thomiste* 2 (1894): 149–61; James R. Ginther, 'There is a text in this classroom: the Bible and theology in the medieval university,' in *Essays in Medieval Philosophy and Theology in Memory of Walter H. Principe*, CSB, ed. James R. Ginther and Carl N. Sill (Burlington, VT: Ashgate, 2005), 31–51. See also John Van Engen, 'Studying Scripture in the Early University,' in

changeably in the question, ‘On the teaching of theology’. However, the aims of a *Summa* and the disputations which make it up remain quite different than the aims of biblical commentary. The *Summa* attempts to take the teaching of Scripture and develop a systematic, comprehensive view of doctrine. The result incorporates a large amount of biblical exegesis. The *Summa* both passively appropriates the results of biblical interpretation from other sources and, to a lesser degree, actively parses the biblical text to assess its dogmatic import. This is very different from the exercise of the biblical lecture, where the master brings a variety of resources to bear for the purpose of interpreting the biblical book in hand line by line. At the end of this paper, I will demonstrate this difference by means of an exemplary comparison of the *Summa* to exegesis from the same period.

Although they looked to more contemporary *Summae* such as those of Praepositinus, William of Auxerre and William of Auvergne to shape their approach to theological topics, the basic literary structure adopted by the Summists came from Peter Lombard’s *Four Books of the Sentences*. Happily, the historian of medieval exegesis Gilbert Dahan, in 2008, published an article entitled ‘Le Livre des Sentences et l’exégèse biblique’.³ I have therefore adapted Professeur Dahan’s model to this new, closely-related context. This article will analyze the *Summa* as an exegetical exercise, attending to its use of the theory, structures, procedures and methods of biblical exegesis. Like the *Sentences*, it is pervaded by biblical material, but it innovates by placing this material in an explicit theoretical relation to the non-biblical reflection surrounding it.

Scripture as Source: Parameters and Distinctions

The Bible is the fundamental written source of all Christian theological reflection, and therefore the most important source for the *Summa*. Although Jerome’s Vulgate was the standard way of referring to Sacred Scripture for the Summists, they also make occasional reference to other versions: the Hebrew, Syriac and Septuagint Greek versions of the Old Testament, the Greek New Testament and the Old Latin versions of each.⁴

Neue Richtungen in der hoch- und spätmittelalterlichen Biblexegese, ed. Robert E. Lerner (Munich: Oldenbourg Verlag, 1996), 17–38.

³ Gilbert Dahan, ‘Le Livre des Sentences et l’exégèse biblique,’ in *Pietro Lombardo: atti del XLIII Convegno storico internazionale, Todi, 8–10 ottobre 2006* (Spoleto: Centro Italiano di studi sull’alto medioevo, 2007), 333–60.

⁴ See for example *SH* I, TrInt, Q1, C1 (n. 1), Ad objecta 3, p. 3 (Is 7:9 (Lxx)); *SH* I, P1, In2, Tr5, S2, Q4, Ti5, M4, C3, Ar2 (n. 265), arg. 1, p. 359 (Is 26:10 (Lxx)); *SH* II, In1, Tr1, S1, Q1, C3, Ar1 (n. 3), arg. 6, p. 6 (Ge 1:2 (SyR)); *SH* III, In2, Tr2, S1, Q1, Ti1, C1, Ar3 (n. 70), arg. 1, p. 86 (Job 40:14 (Lxx)); *SH* III, In2, Tr3, Q1, Ti2, M2, C2, Ar1 (n. 217), p. 228 (Ge 3:18 (VL)).

The text and canon of Scripture assumed by the *Summa* appears to be that of the Paris Vulgate.⁵ These bibles, produced especially in Paris, but also in Oxford and Cambridge from about 1230, were among the first to employ the system of chapter numbers devised in the late 12th century and associated with the name of Stephen Langton.⁶ Since there is no critical edition of the Paris Bible, its use in the *Summa* is inferred from two typological considerations: canon and chapter numbers. This canon contained the 66 books of the Old and New Testaments included in the English Bible, along with eight deuterocanonical books: the parabolic books of Tobit and Judith, the wisdom books of The Wisdom of Solomon and Ecclesiasticus (without the Prayer of Solomon at the end), the prophetic book of Baruch and three books of historiography: the third book of the Ezra-Nehemiah cycle, called 2 Ezra, and the first two books of the Maccabees.⁷

The overall biblical citation pattern of the *Summa* was also shaped by liturgical use. This explains the preeminence of Matthew among the other Gospels in the *Summa*, since Matthew predominated among the Gospel readings for Mass, and would have been most fully committed to memory. It also helps to explain the large proportion of references to Genesis and to the Psalms, although this is obviously balanced by their doctrinal importance. Books less frequently cited by the *Summa* I-III, such as Esther or Numbers, or altogether omitted, as are Jonah, Zephaniah, and 3 John, also occur infrequently in the liturgy.

The liturgy not only helped to determine what biblical texts are cited, but formed part of the authoritative tradition of secondary sources.⁸ Central parts of the liturgy, the Creeds (Apostolic and Athanasian) and the Canon of the Mass in particular, were

5 On the Paris text see Paulin Martin, 'La Vulgate latin au XIII^e siècle,' *Muséon* 7 (1888): 88–107, 169–96, 278–91, 381–93; Paulin Martin, 'Le Texte parisien de la Vulgate latine,' *Muséon* 8 (1889): 444–66; Paulin Martin, 'Le Texte parisien de la Vulgate latine,' *Muséon* 9 (1890): 55–70, 301–16; Robert Branner, *Manuscript Painting in Paris During the Reign of Saint Louis* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1977), appendix I; Christopher De Hamel, *The Book: A History of the Bible* (New York: Phaidon, 2001), 114–39; Laura Light, 'Versions et révisions du texte biblique,' in *Le moyen âge et la Bible*, ed. Pierre Riché and Guy Lobrichon (Paris: Beauchesne, 1984): 55–93; Laura Light, 'French Bibles 1200–1300: A New Look at the Origins of the Paris Bible,' in *The Early Medieval Bible: Its Production, Decoration and Use*, ed. Richard Gameson (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994), 155–76.

6 Laura Light and Eyal Poleg, 'Introduction,' in *Form and Function of the Late Medieval Bible*, ed. Eyal Poleg and Laura Light (Boston: Brill, 2013), 1–7; typological description in Neil R. Ker, *Medieval Manuscripts in British Libraries*, vol. 1 (Oxford: Clarendon, 1969), vii–viii.

7 There are also additions to 2 Chr 33 and Dn 13–14. See Ker, *Medieval Manuscripts*, 96–8; De Hamel, *The Book*, 120.

8 Victorin Doucet, 'Prolegomena in librum III necnon in libros I et II "Summae Fratris Alexandri",' in *Doctoris irrefragabilis Alexandri de Hales Ordinis minorum Summa theologica*, vol. 4 (Quaracchi: Collegium S. Bonaventurae, 1948), xciv. See *Doctoris irrefragabilis Alexandri de Hales Ordinis minorum Summa theologica: Indices in tom. I-IV* (Grottaferrata: Collegium S. Bonaventurae, 1979), 119: Breviary, 154: Missal, 164: Ritual, 165: Creeds. Note that Book 4, on the sacraments, is not included in the index.

so important that they are themselves the subjects of exegesis within the *Summa*.⁹ The fact that the *Summa Halensis*, like other works of medieval systematic theology, was composed by people living a life arranged around formal communal prayer cannot be overemphasized.

But while prayer was fundamental to the Franciscan vocation, the primary professional task of the university theology master was to lecture on Sacred Scripture. Those lectures, particularly those by the *Summa*'s known authors and redactors, are therefore fundamental for assessing its exegesis. We will therefore refer to the *John Postils* of John of La Rochelle and Alexander of Hales in order to draw some comparisons between the early Franciscan systematic and exegetical contexts.¹⁰

The set text for biblical lectures would not have been a one-volume Bible, but a volume of the book being lectured, accompanied by its traditional prolog(ues) and glossed throughout. The teaching of Scripture using glossed books accounts for the ubiquity of the *Glossa ordinaria* and *Glossa Lombardi* in the *Summa Halensis*.¹¹ The *Glosses* codified an exegetical tradition based on a relatively small number of patristic commentaries for each book (for example, Augustine on Genesis, the Psalms and John, Jerome on Matthew, Gregory on Job), whose interpretations of the primary text were memorized, highly valued and only set aside with great reluctance. In assessing the *Summa*'s interpretation of a biblical passage, therefore, a scholar's first reference must be to these *Glosses*, even if they are not explicitly cited.

All of this material as found in the *Summa*, whether biblical, liturgical or exegetical, has been transferred from its original context for the purposes of disputation. The literature of theological argument, as found in disputed questions, lectures on the *Sentences* and earlier *Summae*, forms the primary *urtext* of the *Summa Halensis*.

⁹ SH IV, P3, In2, Tr2, Q2, Ti1–3 (nn. 704–7), p. 1122–44; Alexander of Hales, *Alexandri de Ales, Angli, Doct. Irrefragibilis, Ordinis Minorum, Summae Theologiae: Pars Quarta* (hereafter cited as SH Bk IV), Q10, M5, Ar2 (Venice: Francesco Francesi, 1575), fols 152v–182v: *Tractatus de officio missae*; SH Bk IV, Q2, M2, Ar3, contra, fol. 13r.

¹⁰ John of La Rochelle, *Postilla super Iohannem euangelistam* (Ioh. hereafter) (Vatican City, Biblioteca Apostolica Vaticana, Vat. Lat. 7595, fols 1ra–96rb [Pref.·Jn 13:38]); see Appendix below; Alexander of Hales, *Postilla in Iohannis euangelium*, partial edition by Aaron Gies, 'Alexander of Hales on the Gospel of John: An Epitome of *Sacra Doctrina*' (PhD thesis, The Catholic University of America, 2017), 363–520 (*In Ioh.* hereafter).

¹¹ See De Hamel, *The Book*, 136–37; *Biblia latina cum glossa ordinaria*, 4 vols (Strassburg: Adolf Rusch, 1480–1), Exemplars in Erfurt, Universität Forschungsbibliothek, Erfurt/Gotha Inc. 83 (1): urn:nbn:de:urmel-16903e29–15cd-40c4-a194-f9a2d553f634; Inc. 83 (2): urn:nbn:de:urmel-948998bb-64d5–4eea-ae04–9d33957568589; Inc. 83 (3): urn:nbn:de:urmel-ebc3b6ea-d074–4b4c-8504–5c8e4e6d70795; Mon. Typ. s. l. et a. 2° 11 (4): urn:nbn:de:urmel-c2ffaaa4-bae5–4e78-b5e6–89a31106253b6 (*Gl. ord.* in [*biblical book, ref. & in marg./interlin.*] hereafter). See also the partial electronic edition *Glossae scripturae sacrae-electronicae*, ed. Martin Morard et al. (Paris: Centre national de la recherche scientifique/Institut de recherche et d'histoire de textes, 2016): <http://gloss-e.irht.cnrs.fr/php/livres-liste.php>; Peter Lombard, *Collectanea in omnes D. Pauli apostoli Epistulas* (also known as *Magna glossatura*) (PL 191:1297–1696; PL 192:9–520); Peter Lombard, *Commentarium in Psalmos* (PL 191:55–1296) (*Gl. Lombardi* in [*biblical book & ref.*] hereafter).

Therefore, as we now comment on sections of Question 1 which seem to bear directly on biblical exegesis, their limitations as a global assessment of the *Summa*'s approach must be borne in mind.

Hermeneutical Reflection in the *Summa Halensis*

Until the emergence of university theology faculties at the end of the 12th century, Latin biblical hermeneutics seem to have been mostly the province of standalone treatises, above all Augustine's *On Christian Teaching*, developed in the 12th century by Hugh of St Victor's *Didascalicon*, *On the Holy Scriptures and their Authors* and *The Diligent Examiner*.¹² In its first question, 'On the teaching of theology', the *Summa Halensis* follows the advance beyond the *Sentences* made by William of Auxerre and Roland of Cremona by explicitly calling into question the nature and status of the teaching of theology. In the process, the question makes many remarks that relate to Sacred Scripture specifically, and sketches its role in dogmatic argument. Most importantly for our purposes, it addresses Scripture's suitability to be a universal means of instruction and the possibility of deriving certain knowledge from it.

The purpose of Scripture, according to the 'Question on the teaching of theology', is 'instruction in those things that pertain to salvation'.¹³ This purpose is explicitly drawn from Rom. 15:4: 'For whatever was written previously was written for our instruction.'¹⁴ This purpose appears to be somewhat at odds with the contents of the Bible, since its books convey meaning in a wide variety of ways, whereas, as the *contra* of this article states, paraphrased from Aristotle's *Topics*: 'A uniform mode [of proceeding] is more suited to our instruction than a multiform [mode], because in a multiform [mode] understandings are confused.'¹⁵ Three kinds of 'multiformity' are being addressed here. The first is the multiformity of literary genres, since the Bible

¹² Augustine, *De doctrina christiana*, ed. Joseph P. Martin (Turnhout: Brepols, 1962); Hugh of St Victor, *Didascalicon de studio legendi*, ed. Charles Henry Buttner (Washington, DC: The Catholic University of America Press, 1939); English translation Hugh of Saint Victor, 'Didascalicon on the Study of Reading,' trans. Franklin T. Harkins, in *Interpretation of Scripture: Theory*, ed. Franklin T. Harkins and Frans van Liere, Victorine Texts in Translation 3 (Hyde Park, NY: New City, 2013), 81–201; Hugh of St Victor, *De Scripturis et scriptoribus sacris* (PL 175:9–28); Hugh of St Victor, *Diligens scrutator*, ed. Ralf M.W. Stammerberger, 'Diligens scrutator sacri eloquii: An Introduction to Scriptural Exegesis by Hugh of Saint Victor Preserved at Admont Library (MS 672),' in *Manuscripts and Monastic Culture: Reform and Renewal in Twelfth-Century Germany*, ed. Alison I. Beach (Turnhout: Brepols, 2007), 241–83; See Gilbert Dahan, *L'Exégèse chrétienne de la Bible en Occident médiéval, XIII-XIV siècle* (Paris: Cerf, 1999), 390–415.

¹³ *SH* I, TrInt, Q1, C4, Ar3 (n. 6), Respondeo, p. 11: 'instructio in iis quae pertinent ad salutem.'

¹⁴ *SH* I, TrInt, Q1, C4, Ar3 (n. 6), Contra 1, p. 10: 'quaecumque scripta sunt ad nostram doctrinam scripta sunt.'

¹⁵ *SH* I, TrInt, Q1, C4, Ar3 (n. 6) Contra 1, p. 10: 'ad nostram doctrinam magis est modus uniformis quam multiformis, quia in multiformi confunduntur intellectus.'

contains not only logical arguments, but also historical and exemplary narratives, exhortations, prayers, commands, advice, prophecy, etc. The second are the traditional ‘spiritual senses of Scripture’, or, in the *Summa*’s words, the ‘fourfold sense’: History, morality, allegory and anagogy, through which one and the same text can take on several nested meanings.¹⁶ The third is the mode whereby similar and dissimilar created symbols are dialectically applied to God in an attempt to more nearly express what is inexpressible.

The *Summa* defends Scripture’s multiformity as especially suited for its purpose. While it is true that ‘the intellect is more instructed by a few things’, and that ‘the uniform mode is plainer and easier than a multiform mode’,¹⁷ this only applies when speaking of one particular learner. Because the primary efficient cause of Scripture (the Holy Spirit), and its material cause, the wisdom of God, are ‘manifold’ (Wis. 7:22; Eph. 3:10), it is fitting that the mode of Scripture is also manifold.¹⁸

The *Summa* then defends Scripture’s multiformity as optimized for its universal purpose:

Since there are manifold states of human beings, under the Law, after the Law, in the time of prophets, in the time of grace; and also manifold states of human beings within these, since some are dull in what pertains to faith, others obstinate in what pertains to good morals; and also in different ways, since some live life in prosperity, some in adversity, some in good works, others in sins, it follows that the instruction of Sacred Scripture, which is ordered to the salvation of human beings, must have a multiform mode [of proceeding], so that the mode might correspond to the purpose.¹⁹

The *Summa* shows here a kind of awareness of author, circumstances and audience as informing biblical interpretation. These commitments will be observable in the exegetical methods and procedures it employs. At the same time, by acknowledging the

16 SH I, TrInt, Q1, C4, Ar3 (n. 6), arg. c, p. 10: ‘quadruplex sensus’. On spiritual exegesis and the fourfold sense, see Henri de Lubac, *L’Exégèse médiévale: Les quatre sens de l’Écriture*, 3 vols (Paris: Éditions Montague, 1959–61); English translation Henri de Lubac, *Medieval Exegesis: The Four Senses of Scripture*, trans. Mark Sebanc and E.M. Macierowski, 3 vols (Grand Rapids, MI: Eerdmans, 1998–2009); Manlio Simonetti, *Profilo storico dell’esegesi patristica* (Rome: Istituto patristico Augustinianum, 1981); Frances M. Young, *Biblical Exegesis and the Formation of a Christian Culture* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1997); Dahan, *L’Exégèse chrétienne*, 37–74, 299–358.

17 SH I, TrInt, Q1, C4, Ar3 (n. 6), Ad objecta 2–3, p. 11: ‘intellectus magis instruitur per pauciora (...) planior et facilius est uniformis quam multiformis.’

18 SH I, TrInt, Q1, C4, Ar3 (n. 6), Respondeo, p. 11.

19 SH I, TrInt, Q1, C4, Ar3 (n. 6), Respondeo, p. 11: ‘cum ergo sint multiformes status hominum: in Lege, post Legem, tempore prophetiae, tempore gratiae; et etiam in iis status multiformis hominum: quia alii hebetes in iis quae ad fidem, alii difficiles in iis quae ad bonos mores; et differentibus modis: alii in prosperis, alii in adversis vitam agunt, alii in bonis, alii in peccatis: relinquitur quod instructio sacrae Scripturae, quae est ordinata ad hominis salutem, debet habere modum multiformem, ut modus respondeat fini.’

superiority of the uniform mode for instructing particular intellects, it defends the legitimacy of its own systematic mode of discourse.

The problem of deriving certain knowledge from Scripture is a problem with a specific type of multiformity: biblical narratives are made up of individual facts, of which there can be no universal knowledge, since it can never be self-evident that agent (A) did act (B) at time (C). The *Summa* solves this conundrum by asserting that those narratives, taken as a whole, express moral and theological universals, often by means of the fourfold sense. Reciprocally, those general realities elucidate and connect the diverse individual realities of Scripture and nature. Therefore, despite the uniform mode of proceeding proper to a *Summa*, biblical narratives and their spiritual interpretation retain a legitimate place among its sources.²⁰ Let us now move on to consider the exegetical structures employed by the *Summa* in the course of its attempt to construct a systematic exposition of Christian doctrine.

Exegetical Structures in the *Summa Halensis*

When studying the *Sentences*, Gilbert Dahan proposed a twofold taxonomy of exegetical structures in systematic texts, corresponding to the dynamic of divine condescension in the pedagogy of human language and human ascension through the anagogy of theological interpretation.²¹ Corresponding to these descending and ascending movements, there are exegetical structures of ‘passive exploitation’, such as biblical *testimonia* and *exempla*, and structures of ‘active exploitation’, such as biblically-based questions and treatise-as-commentary. At the outset, it must be said that no exhaustive account of the exegetical phenomena in the *Summa Halensis* could be presented in so brief a space. The aim here is rather to present representative examples of each phenomenon for the student of the *Summa*, so that when similar instances are encountered elsewhere, they may be quickly identified and so more readily understood.

Testimonia

Biblical *testimonia* are the predominant form of exegetical structure in the *Summa Halensis*. They are structures of passive exploitation because as proofs, they bring along a tradition of interpretation which is often not even referred to, let alone argued, but assumed. They are of two basic types: chains of texts and distinctions.

²⁰ *SH* I, TrInt, Q1, C1 (n. 1), Ad obiecta 3, p. 3.

²¹ Dahan, ‘Le Livre des *Sentences*,’ 344–5: ‘l’exploitation passive (...) l’exploitation active’.

Chains of texts are the oldest form of dogmatic argument, going back, in the Latin West, to Cyprian of Carthage.²² They consist of lists of biblical quotations introduced as authorities supporting a particular viewpoint.²³ Although chains of texts might grow to great length in patristic polemics, the *Summa* rarely cites more than three in a row. A good example is furnished by *Summa* III's question, 'whether the passion of Christ befits divine justice', where three texts—Phil. 2:8, Heb. 5:8, and Rom. 8:32—drive home the third objection, from Anselm, that Christ's suffering was not merely permitted, but commanded by the Father.²⁴ In the *Summa*, they should be categorized as a microstructure, rather than a structure, since they are always part of a larger question, contributing one or more sides of an argument to be resolved by a biblical distinction.

Since biblical authority could not be contradicted or simply ignored, the first and most important use of distinctions in scholastic theology was not to resolve philosophical propositions, but to resolve these apparently contradictory biblical *testimonia*.²⁵ The distinction explains the difference, either by means of another authority, a rationale, or both. A good example of the basic mechanism is furnished by Chapter 1 of the question on divine immensity, 'whether the divine essence is comprehensible or incomprehensible'.²⁶ It appears so, but the first objection comes from Jer. 32:19: 'great in counsel, incomprehensible in thought'. This objection is supported by three more, from John Damascene, Augustine and Boethius. The *sed contra* of the argument cites four biblical texts that use *comprehendere/comprehensibilis*: Rom. 1:20: 'the invisible things of God (...) are clearly seen, being understood by the things that are made', Phil. 3:12: 'I follow, if I may by any means apprehend (*comprehendam*), wherein I am also apprehended (*comprehensus sum*)', Eph. 3:18: 'so that you may be able to comprehend with all the saints what is the length, width, height and depth', and 1 Cor. 2:10: 'the Spirit searches all things, even the deep things of God', adding, on the authority of the *Glossa ordinaria*, 'that is, makes us know'. The Summists have opposed Jeremiah's 'incomprehensibility' to optimistic statements about God's knowability from the New Testament, all of which seem to be taken in a limited sense. The solution proposes a basic twofold distinction: 'the cognition of the intellect of one who apprehends or clings to the truth can be called comprehension, or the cognition of the intellect that encloses (the subject considered)

²² Cyprian, *Testimonium libri tres*, in *Sancti Cypriani Episcopi Opera*, ed. Robert Weber and M. Bévénat, Corpus Christianorum Series Latina, 3 (Turnhout: Brepols, 1972), 1–179.

²³ See Dahan, 'Le Livre des Sentences,' 345–48; citing Jean Daniélou, *Études d'exégèse judéo-chrétienne (Les Testimonia)* (Paris: Cerf, 1966); Jean Daniélou, *Les origines du christianisme latin* (Paris: Cerf, 1978), 217–39.

²⁴ SH IV, P1, In1, Tr5, Q1, M4, C1, Ar1 (n. 151), arg. 3, p. 212. See Anselm of Canterbury, *Cur Deus homo* 1.8 (PL 158:370).

²⁵ Dahan, *L'Exégèse chrétienne*, 134–8.

²⁶ SH I, P1, In1, Tr2, Q2, C1 (n. 36), pp. 58–62: 'Utrum divine essentia sit comprehensibilis vel incomprehensibilis.'

can be called comprehension.²⁷ The divine essence is comprehensible by the human intellect according to the first definition, but not according to the second.

A more controversial example, opposing ‘error’ by *testimonia*, comes from *Summa* I’s question, ‘from whom is the procession of the Holy Spirit?’—the famous dispute over the *filioque*.²⁸ The objections of the Greek Fathers are granted very scant biblical authority. Although there are 16 (!) objections, there are only three biblical citations.²⁹ The *contra* of the argument, itself 14 articles long, cites nine.³⁰ The responses to the objections cite three further passages in support of the *filioque*.³¹ Obviously, the preferred position, bolstered by the best arguments available, is also given the strongest possible testimony from Scripture. Examples of such resolutions of conflicting *testimonia* by means of distinctions could be almost endlessly multiplied.

Exempla

Exempla are the second kind of passive exploitation of Scripture. An *exemplum*, according to Jacques Le Goff, is: ‘a brief story given as truthful and destined to be inserted into a discourse (in general a sermon) in order to convince a hearer of a salutary lesson.’³² To this, Dahan adds four criteria by which we may distinguish a biblical *exemplum* from other sorts of biblical exploitation: it must 1. play a secondary role, 2. not be itself the subject of exegesis, 3. be employed as an illustration, and 4. have a narrative character. It is an aside, a biblical story employed as a Rabbi would *midrashim*, recounted for the sake of the moral lesson, perhaps adding a few extra details which are not strictly historical, but offered with no intention to mislead.³³

In the *Summa*, biblical *exempla* are frequently reported as occurring in the authorities quoted, as in, ‘Augustine gives the example of the rapture of Paul, I Corin-

27 SH I, P1, In1, Tr2, Q2, C1 (n. 36), Solutio, p. 59: ‘potest appellari comprehensio cognitio intellectus apprehendentis sive adhaerentis veritati, vel potest appellari comprehensio cognitio intellectus includentis.’

28 SH I, P1, In2, Tr1, Q1, Ti2, C4 (n. 310), pp. 447–52.

29 Jn 15:26b (cited twice); Heb 1:3.

30 Mk 5:30; Lk 1:35; Jn 14:26; 15:26a; 16:13 (cited twice); 16:14; 20:22; Gal 4:6.

31 SH I, P1, In2, Tr1, Q1, Ti2, C4 (n. 310), p. 450, citing Jn 5:26; Gal 1:8; 1 Thes 3:10.

32 Claude Brémont, Jacques Le Goff, and Jean-Claude Schmitt, *L'exemplum*, Typologie des sources du Moyen Âge occidental, 40 (Turnhout: Brepols, 1982), 37–8; quoted in Gilbert Dahan, ‘Quelques Reflexions Sur Les Exempla Bibliques,’ in *Le Tonnere des Exemples*, ed. Marie Ann Polo de Beaulieu, Pascal Colomb, and Jacques Berlioz (Rennes: Presses Universitaires de Rennes, 2010), 19: ‘un récit bref donné comme véridique et destiné à être inséré dans un discours (en général un sermon) pour convaincre un auditoire par un leçon salutaire.’

33 Dahan, ‘Quelques reflexions,’ 23, 25.

thians 12.’³⁴ However, this is not, strictly speaking, a biblical *exemplum*. Quick references to biblical stories as proofs are common, but these do not have a narrative character, nor are they asides.³⁵ To date, I have found only one example which I believe meets these criteria: In *Summa* III’s discussion of sacrifice, there is a question asking ‘whether sacrifice is to be offered to God alone?’³⁶ One objection comes from Judg. 6:19: ‘we read that Gideon “cooked a kid and unleavened bread and took it all and presented it to” the angel. Therefore Gideon presented a sacrifice to an angel.’³⁷ Two items in the *sed contra* are also narrative:

Also, in Acts 14:12, 17, when “the priest of Zeus” wished “to sacrifice bulls” to Paul and Barnabas, they were prohibited by them with wailing, “lest they sacrifice to them” such things, from which they were obviously insisting that sacrifice is to be offered only to God.

Also, in Judges 13:16, an angel who was speaking with Manoah, said to him: “if you want to make a sacrifice, offer it to the Lord”, in which he showed openly that sacrifice is to be offered to God, not to angels.³⁸

The three examples are all brief narrative asides, not themselves the subject of exegesis, which support the main point by teaching a moral lesson. That Paul and Barnabas prohibited the men of Lystra ‘with wailing’ even furnishes a midrashic detail which is not in the text. However, the nature of the question, turning on the character of actions which are most conveniently described by means of a narrative, calls forth a mode of proceeding which is unusual in the *Summa*. Indeed, the brevity imposed by systematic argument is not conducive to this sort of passive exploitation, just as it is not conducive to long lists of *testimonia*.

Biblically-based questions

Moving on to consider structures of active exploitation, there are two that deserve particular consideration: biblically-based questions and treatise-as-commentary. Biblically-based questions turn on an issue of doctrinal coherence raised by a particular biblical passage. For example, the question ‘on the sin of the first parents’,

³⁴ SH I, Tr Int, Q2, M1, C5 (n. 12), Contra b, pp. 21–2: ‘[Augustinus] point exemplum de Paulo in raptu, II Cor. 12.’

³⁵ Dahan’s only instance from the *Sentences* hardly seems to meet his own criteria. See Dahan, ‘Le Livre des Sentences,’ 348–9.

³⁶ SH IV, P2, In3, Tr 2, S3, Q5, C5 (n. 259), pp. 804–6: ‘Utrum soli Deo sit sacrificium offerendum.’

³⁷ SH IV, P2, In3, Tr 2, S3, Q5, C5 (n. 259), arg. 3, p. 805: ‘legitur quod Gedeon “coxit hoedum et azy-mos panes, et tulit omnia et obtulit angelo”. Ergo Gedeon obtulit angelo sacrificium.’

³⁸ SH IV, P2, In3, Tr 2, S3, Q5, C5 (n. 259), Contra e, f, p. 805: ‘Item, Act. 14, 12, 17, cum “sacerdos Iovis” vellet “tauros” Paulo et Barnabae “sacrificare”, cum eiulatione prohibiti sunt ab eis, “ne sibi” talia “immolarent”. Ex quo manifeste protestabantur soli Deo esse sacrificandum. Item, Iudic. 13, 16, angelus, qui loquebatur ad Manue, dixit ei: “Si vis sacrificium facere, offer illud Domino.” In quo manifeste monstravit Deo, non angelis, esse sacrificium offerendum.’

which covers 25 folio pages, depends mostly on exegesis of Gen. 3.³⁹ A biblically-based question may also be structured around the reconciliation of a central doctrinal commitment, attested by many passages, with one particularly difficult passage, as with the question, ‘Whether Christ paid tithes in Abraham’, which attempts to reconcile the statement of Heb. 7:9 that ‘Levi (...) paid tithes in Abraham’ with that book’s own doctrine of the greater perfection of Christ’s priesthood, which would seem to be diminished by this kind of subordination.⁴⁰

Certain biblical passages raise a number of closely-related questions, which are resolved one after another, resulting in what Dahan calls a ‘treatise-as-commentary’. Prominent examples are *Summa* IIa’s third inquiry, ‘on corporal creation’, which is essentially a commentary on the six days of creation, Gen. 1:1–2:25.⁴¹ Looking at the apparatus of this section, one observes that integral commentaries—Augustine’s *Literal Commentary on Genesis* and *On Genesis Against the Manichees*, Bede’s *Hexameron*, the *Glossa ordinaria*—are present in thick profusion. Another important treatise-as-commentary is *Summa* III’s section, *On the Decalogue*, whose 185 folio pages are an extended treatment of Exod. 20:1–17.⁴² The predominant authorities here, the *Glossa ordinaria* and *Lombardi*, are also exegetical in character.

As mentioned above, the Mass and the Creed are also the subjects of line-by-line, even word-by-word exegesis. As might be expected, these texts being so closely related to Scripture, this exegesis does not confine itself to literal interpretation, but also extends into the spiritual senses.⁴³ Having considered exegetical structures, let us go on to consider exegetical procedures.

Exegetical Procedures in the *Summa Halensis*

Literal exegesis

Exegetical procedures are methods by which exegesis is carried out, and occur in the *Summa* anywhere the biblical text is interpreted.⁴⁴ Such procedures may be literal or spiritual. The most common literal procedures belong to the categories of textual analysis, literary analysis and contextual analysis. The tools of textual analysis include the determination of reference,⁴⁵ the harmonization of texts, etymologies, lex-

39 *SH* III, In2, Tr3, Q1 (nn. 193–219), pp. 204–29: ‘De peccato primorum parentum in se.’

40 *SH* IV, In1, Tr2, Q2, M4, C1 (n. 85), pp. 126–9: ‘Utrum Christus decimatus sit in Abraham’; see esp. the Contra a, b, c, citing Heb 7:1–10; Ge 14:20; 14:18–19; Lk 15:8–9.

41 *SH* II, In3 (nn. 248–319), pp. 305–82: ‘De creatura corporali.’

42 *SH* IV, P2, In3, Tr2, S1 (nn. 276–410), pp. 413–598: ‘De praeceptis moralibus Decalogi.’

43 Spiritual interpretations of the liturgy were common in the Middle Ages; see Marcel Metzger, *History of the Liturgy: The Major Stages* (Collegeville, MN: Liturgical, 1997), 86–8.

44 See Dahan, ‘Le Livre des Sentences,’ 353–6; Dahan, *L’Exégèse chrétienne*, 239–358.

45 See Young, *Biblical Exegesis*, 137.

ical interpretations and reference to versions other than the Vulgate, number symbolism, analysis of grammar, sentence structure and rhetoric.⁴⁶ The tools of literary analysis are taken from the *accessus ad auctores* tradition, and include discussions of the text's author, genre, occasion, purpose, etc.⁴⁷ The tools of contextual analysis include divisions of the text, a certain amount of historical or archeological research, and recourse to science, philosophy and theology (distinguished here from that which arises from allegorical readings of the text).⁴⁸ The treatise-as-commentary on Genesis brings substantial outside expertise to bear on the biblical text, citing, among others, Aristotle's *Physics*, *On the Heavens*, *On the Meteors* and others for science, the *Metaphysics* for philosophy, Hugh of St Victor's *On the Sacraments* and Augustine's *City of God* for theology.

Spiritual exegesis

In the *Summa Halensis*, spiritual exegesis flows in principle out of historical or literal exegesis, but in practice often comes directly from authority. It is conducted according to the three traditional spiritual senses: tropological or moral, allegorical or Christological, and anagogical or prophetic.⁴⁹ Such spiritual exegesis depends on the theology of revelation set out in the *Summa*'s Introductory Treatise. As a spiritual reality, the fourfold sense is not to be reduced to a mechanical set of procedures. Rather, a number of discrete procedures are observable within the traditional categories, sometimes crisscrossing them.

Spiritual interpretations of Scripture may not always be left to stand, since they sometimes contradict one another. Usually the Summists simply omit the authority whose interpretation is to be rejected, but from time to time, there are determinations of authorities with explicit reference to spiritual exegesis. We see this procedure in the question, 'By which and how many figures the sacrament of the Eucharist was prefigured among the ancients?'⁵⁰ The question turns on allegory of the type that is sometimes called typology, but has been better described by Frances Young as 'mimetic exegesis'.⁵¹ That is, it is concerned with interpreting persons, objects and events as icons of the Christ Event. This particular question goes back to Peter Lombard, who enumerated only four: the paschal lamb, manna, the offering of Melchize-

⁴⁶ See Young, *Biblical Exegesis*, 208; Dahan, *L'Exégèse chrétienne*, 242–62.

⁴⁷ See Young, *Biblical Exegesis*, 206; Dahan, *L'Exégèse chrétienne*, 262–71.

⁴⁸ Dahan, *L'Exégèse chrétienne*, 271–97.

⁴⁹ *SH* I, TrInt, Q1, C4, Ar1 (n. 4), pp. 7–9; *SH* I, TrInt, Q1, C4, Ar4 (n. 7), pp. 11–3.

⁵⁰ *SH* Bk IV, Q10, M1, Ar2, fols 123r–124r.

⁵¹ Young, *Biblical Exegesis*, 209–15.

dech and the blood which flowed from Christ's side at the Cross.⁵² Noting first that some have objected that this short list is insufficient, the Summists draw many more possible figures from direct biblical testimony, the *Glossa Ordinaria*, Ambrose's *On the Mysteries*, Augustine's *On Christian Doctrine*, The Canon of the Mass and Hugh's *On the Sacraments*.⁵³ They retain eight: the Lombard's four, plus sacrifices, Gideon's offering of bread and meat, Jonathan's honeycomb, and the waters of Meribah.⁵⁴

The question may seem superfluous at first glance—so much counting of patristic allegories, some of them quite fanciful to the modern eye. But the serious nature of the question becomes apparent in the response to the first objection:

[A]lthough he may not name all of the figures, it does not follow from this that [the list] is insufficient; for it was sufficient to name those which symbolized the sacrament most emphatically (...). [I]n the Sentences, the Master names those figures which expressly signified those things which coincide with this sacrament.⁵⁵

The rationales for sufficiency are informative, but one need not choose from among them. Summists are really concerned to identify by means of mimetic exegesis, 'those things which coincide with this sacrament': what makes up the Eucharist itself. Choosing a set of symbols is a preliminary way to stake out a position on its significations. And indeed, the article that follows compares the eight figures with one another, whereupon the text moves on to consider the words of institution.

Summa III's question, 'whether personal tithes enter into the commandment to tithe', responds in the affirmative with two authorities: one from Gregory IX's *Decretals* supporting local determination of tithes for the support of the clergy, and the other an interpretation of Ps. 80:3 that would have been described as moral, but is better described by Young's taxonomy as oracular. After quoting the Psalm's command, 'take a psalm, and bring hither the timbrel', it gives Augustine's spiritual interpretation, as repeated by the *Glossa ordinaria*: 'this is said to laypeople, that is, take spiritual goods, and give temporal goods to the servants of God, so that they may be sustained.'⁵⁶ The Psalm is, in effect, understood as an oracle, intended by

52 Peter Lombard, *Sententiae in IV libris distinctae* 4, d. 8, c. 2, 2 vols, ed. Ignatius C. Brady, Spicilegium Bonaventurianum, 4–5 (Grottaferrata: Editiones Collegii S. Bonaventurae, 1971–81), 2:280–1; citing Ge 14:18–20; Ex 12; 16; Jn 19:34.

53 SH Bk IV, Q10, M1, Ar2, fol. 123r; citing Ge 4; Lv 1–2; Nm 20; 1 Cor 10:3–4.

54 Lv 1, 2; Jgs 6:17–24; 1 Sm 14:24–45; Nm 20; 1 Cor 10:3–4.

55 SH Bk IV, Q10, M1, Ar2, fol. 123v: 'licet non ennumeret omnes figuras; non sequitur ex hoc, quod sit insufficiens; sufficebat enim enumerare illas, quae expressius hoc sacramentum figurabant (...). Magister in Sententiis numerat illas figuras, quae expresse significabant ea, quae ad hoc sacramentum concurrunt.'

56 SH IV, P2, In3, Tr2, S2, Q3, Ti1, C4, Ar2 (n. 497), Respondeo, p. 735: 'dicitur laicis, hoc est sumite spiritualia a ministris Dei et date temporalia, unde sustententur'; citing *Gl. ord. in Ps. 80:3* (Rusch,

the Psalmist as a simple exhortation to praise, but by the Spirit as laying down an economic principle for the New Covenant to come. Exhortations to support the clergy, of course, could have been drawn from many other quarters in Scripture. Augustine cites many of them in the course of his exposition. But the authority of this oracular morality is, from the point of view of the Summists, adequate to anchor the response. Indeed, it is used again in the course of the question.⁵⁷

An entirely different form of spiritual interpretation, also oracular, but this time allegorical/theological rather than moral, is evident in the question, ‘how the articles are distinguished in the Apostle’s Creed’. Part of a larger section on the Articles of Faith taken directly from John of La Rochelle’s *Summa on the Articles of Faith*, the question divides the articles into 12 for the 12 Apostles, developing an extended allegorical exegesis on Josh. 4:2–3, where men chosen from each of the 12 Hebrew tribes construct an ebenezer out of stones picked from the middle of the Jordan river as they cross into Canaan.⁵⁸ John, seconded by the other Summists, writes:

[The 12 Apostles], gathered into one by the inspiration of the Holy Spirit, each set out single articles. Peter, the first among the Apostles, set out the first article, namely, “I believe in God the Father almighty, maker of heaven and earth”; John set out the second, namely, “and in Jesus Christ his only begotten Son, our Lord”.⁵⁹

The text continues until each Apostle has had his say. This is allegory of a kind highly developed by the Victorines at Paris. It elaborates the plan of a structure: a temple, an ark, or, in this case, a pile of stones, and by assigning a particular meaning to each part, creates a balanced dogmatic theology.⁶⁰ In the *Didascalicon*, Hugh of St Victor divides historical and spiritual exegesis by saying, ‘History follows the order of time. But the order of learning belongs more to allegory because, as we said above, teaching should always take its beginning from manifest rather than obscure realities and from those things that are more well known.’⁶¹ This division creates not

2:280v); see also *Gl. Lombardi in Ps.* 80:3 (PL 191:769); from Augustine, *Enarrationes in Psalmos* 80.4, ed. Eligius Dekkers and Jean Fraipont (Turnhout: Brepols, 2014), 1122–3.

57 *SH* IV, P2, In3, Tr2, S2, Q3, Ti1, C2 (n. 494), arg. 3, p. 730. See also *SH* IV, P2, In3, Tr2, S1, Q2, Ti4, C4, Ar4 (n. 350), *Contra* c, p. 519.

58 Jo 4:2–3; *SH* IV, P3, In2, Tr2, Q2, Ti1, C1 (n. 704), p. 1122; taken from John of La Rochelle, *Summa de articulis fidei* (Milan, Biblioteca Brera, AD. IX. 7), fols 78a–94b.

59 *SH* IV, P3, In2, Tr2, Q2, Ti1, C1 (n. 704), p. 1122: ‘per inspirationem Spiritus Sancti in unum congregati, singuli singulos apposuerunt articulos. Petrus, primus Apostolorum, primum apposuit articulum, scilicet “Credo in Deum Patrem omnipotentem, creatorem caeli et terrae”; Ioannes apposuit secundum, scilicet “Et in Iesum Christum Filium eius unicum, Dominum nostrum”.’

60 See De Lubac, *Medieval Exegesis*, 3:312–5.

61 Hugh of St Victor, *Didascalicon de studio legendi* 6.6 (Buttimer, 123): ‘Non idem ordo librorum in historica et allegorica lectione servandus est: historia ordinem temporis sequitur, ad allegoriam magis pertinet ordo cognitionis; quia, sicut supra dictum est, doctrina semper non ab obscuris, sed apertis, et ab is quae magis nota sunt exordium sumere debet’; cited in De Lubac, *Medieval Exegesis*, 3:312. English translation Hugh of Saint Victor, ‘Didascalicon on the Study of Reading,’ 173.

two orders, but one twofold order: salvation-historical and systematic. This way of thinking can easily be recognized in the *Summa*'s hermeneutics. Exegesis of Josh. 4:2, 3 invokes the 12 Apostles and the Creed by means of oracular allegory. Gathered together by the Holy Spirit in a scenario strongly reminiscent of Pentecost (Acts 2:1–4; Cf. John 17:22, 23), each Apostle utters an article of the Creed, forming a theological whole formed from literal and historical materials: the Articles of Faith.

Comparison with Contemporary Franciscan Exegesis: John 3:23, 24

To conclude our reflections, it will be useful to compare the exegetical practice of Alexander of Hales and John of La Rochelle with a biblically-based question from the *Summa*. *Summa* IV, Question 9, on the sacraments in general, includes two articles which ask 'whether the baptism of John had to cease', and 'when it ceased'.⁶² The answers turn on exegesis of John 3.

These theologians were chosen for comparison for very specific reasons. Alexander's name is closely associated with the *Summa* in many near-contemporary documents, and held the Franciscans' chair at Paris during the first years of its composition, ca. 1240–1245. His disputed questions underlie many of the *Summa*'s. John of La Rochelle was *de facto* co-regent with Alexander at the Franciscan *studium* from 1238 to 1245, when he also died. Many of his works are also incorporated into the *Summa*: we referred earlier to an included section of his *Summa on the Articles of Faith*.⁶³ Both also have surviving John commentaries, which is not believed to be the case for Odo Rigaldus or William of Middleton. They are therefore the most relevant possible figures for comparison to the *Summa*'s treatment of a passage of John's gospel.

The key authorities come from the *Glossa ordinaria* on the passage: John Scotus Eriugena's obscure and fragmentary *Commentary on John* (which the *Summa* and both postillators take to be Bede, possibly because of tagged *Glosses*, although the *Glosses* in the Rusch and Venice editions carry no attribution here), Augustine's *Tractates on John*, etymologies from Jerome's *Letter Seventy-three* and *Hebrew Names*.⁶⁴ Verse 23, 'John was baptizing in Ennon near Salem', forms the *contra* of the first article, which necessitates distinctions to explain why, after Christ's baptism, John for a time continued to baptize. The *contra* also cites 'Bede' (actually John Scotus Eriuge-

⁶² SH Bk IV, Q6, M9, fols 61v–62r.

⁶³ See above, p. 22.

⁶⁴ John Scotus Eriugena, *Commentarius in S. Evangelium secundum Ioannem (fragmenta iii)* (PL 122:297–346), (*Comm. in Ioh.* hereafter); Jerome, *Epistula* 73, in *Epistulae*, ed. Isidore Hilberg, *Corpus Scriptorum Ecclesiasticorum Latinorum*, 55 (Vienna: F. Tempsky, 1912, repr. 1961), 13–23; Jerome, *Liber interpretationis hebraicorum nominum*, ed. Paul LaGarde (Turnholt: Brepols, 1959), 59–161, (*Nom. hebr.* hereafter).

na), through the *Gloss*, who compares John's baptism to catechesis, which also continues after Christ's baptism.⁶⁵ The second article uses a slightly longer selection of verses 23 and 24 to show that Christ's disciples baptized at the same time as John and his disciples, necessitating further distinctions to explain when and why John's baptism ceased.

In the *Postilla super Iohannem euangelistam*, John of La Rochelle breaks down the verse into four points, corresponding to four *lemmata*.⁶⁶ First, he discusses John's ministry compared with that of Christ. He uses the authorities of 'Bede' and John Chrysostom to adduce reasons that baptism did not immediately cease when Christ began his ministry.⁶⁷ Second, he discusses the place, *Ennon near Salem*, using 'Bede' and Jerome's comments, first on the actual location referred to, and then on the etymology of the words.⁶⁸ John does not construct a moral interpretation from the etymologies. He takes Salim to be a village across the Jordan, as Eriugena and the *Gloss* say, but hesitates to identify it with Melchizedech's Salem, as Eriugena and the *Gloss* do, because of Jerome's warning about Hebrew's habitual omission of interior vowels. Ennon means 'waters'.⁶⁹ Third, he discusses what followed John's baptism, comparing it, again with 'Bede's' authority, to catechesis. Interestingly, he allows this authority to stand uncorrected, where the *Summa* limits the comparison in the response, because John's baptism is not necessary for those baptized, but continued catechesis is.⁷⁰ Fourth, he discusses the time of the incident, still following

65 SH Bk IV, Q6, M9, Ar1, contra, fol. 61v; citing *Gl. ord. in Ioh.* [3:23] in marg. (Rusch, 4:1036ra); not found in Bede, but see John Scotus Eriugena, *Comm. in Ioh.* 3:24 (PL 122:323).

66 The *Postilla super Iohannem euangelistam* is a complete unedited set of gospel lectures by John of La Rochelle, probably dating to the 1230s or early 1240s, and extant in at least 14 manuscripts: Berlin, Staatsbibliothek Theologica Q. 40 [olim Rose 462], fols 1–122; Bologna, Archiginnasio A. 565; Danzig, Stadtbibliothek 1931, fols 1–159; Florence, Biblioteca Laurenziana Santa Croce X dext. 7; Krakow, Uniwersytet 1185 [AA X 27], fols 1–129 (1428); 1186 [AA X 26]; 1187 [AA X 28], fols 1–220 (1450); 1188 [AA X 29]; Oxford, Merton College 80 (early 1400s); Padua, Biblioteca Antoniana 359; Vatican City, Biblioteca Apostolica Vaticana, Vat. Lat. 7595, fols 1–94; Vatican City, Biblioteca Apostolica Vaticana, Palatina lat. 124, fols 37–301; Vienna, Schotten 188/146, fols 1–115 (1359). Two more, in Ferrara and Toledo, are reported by Giovanni Giacinto Sbaraglia, *Supplementum et castigatio ad scriptores Trium Ordinum Sancti Francisci a Waddingo aliisve descriptos* (Rome: S. Michaelis ad Ripam, 1806), 12. A third, Dresden, Sächsischen Landesbibliothek, P. 36, fols 102–135, was almost completely destroyed by the Allied bombing in 1945. See Friederich Stegmüller and Klaus Reinhardt, *Repertorium biblicum medii aevi* (Madrid: Consejo Superior de Investigaciones Científicas, 1949–80), 2:64, 8/2:267: <http://www.repbib.uni-trier.de/cgi-bin/rebihome.tcl>, n^o 1111; Ignatius C. Brady, 'Sacred Scripture in the Early Franciscan School,' in *La Sacra Scrittura e i francescani*, ed. Roberto Zavalloni (Rome: Antonianum, 1973): 65–82; Beryl Smalley, *The Gospels in the Schools, c. 1100–c.1280* (London: Hambledon, 1985), 74–6, 174–89.

67 *Gl. ord. in Ioh.* [3:23] in marg. (Rusch, 4:1036ra); from Eriugena, *Comm. in Ioh.* 3:23 (PL 122:322); John Chrysostom, *Homilia in Iohannem* 29.1 (*Hom. in Ioh.* hereafter) (PG 59:167).

68 *Gl. ord. in Ioh.* [3:23] in marg. (Rusch, 4:1036ra); from Eriugena, *Comm. in Ioh.* 3:23 (PL 122:323); Jerome, *Epistula* 73.8 (Hilberg, 21).

69 *Gl. ord. in Ioh.* [3:23] in marg. (Rusch, 4:1036ra); from Eriugena, *Comm. in Ioh.* 3:23 (PL 122:322).

70 See above, n. 65.

‘Bede’, noting that John the Evangelist begins his treatment of Christ’s ministry earlier than the other gospels, since the Baptist was not yet in prison.⁷¹

In the *Postilla in Iohannis euangelium*,⁷² Alexander begins his exegesis with a summary paragraph, saying that the verse discusses the baptism of John, noting first the time, then the cause.⁷³ The reason for this passage, he says, is to show that the baptism of John ceased after Christ began his ministry, although, like circumcision, it ran concurrently for a time.⁷⁴ He moves on to the place, moralizing on the etymologies, so that Ennon, ‘waters’, becomes ‘eye of weeping or fount’, signifying the penitential tears appropriate to John’s baptism. ‘Salim’ becomes ‘taking’, and Melchizedech, ‘the sending forth of death’, thus signifying Christ’s baptism, which takes away sin with its guilt and punishment.⁷⁵

Alexander also takes his first reason for the cessation of John’s baptism from ‘Bede’,⁷⁶ but then moves directly to John’s chronology relative to the Synoptics and explains John’s imprisonment spiritually as the fulfillment of the Law with the coming of grace through Christ, following exactly the order of exposition in the *Glossa ordinaria*. He then digresses for Chrysostom’s reason, introduced as a spiritual interpretation: John’s baptism (i.e. the Law) continued for a time to better announce Christ’s baptism (i.e. grace), and so that no one would believe it ceased out of zeal or anger.⁷⁷

Both commentaries ask and answer questions, resolving apparent contradictions in the biblical text, mostly by expanding on the *Glossa ordinaria*, supplemented by Chrysostom’s *Homilies*, which do not appear in the *Summa*’s exegesis of this passage.⁷⁸ Like the *Summa*, they both explain the text under consideration and offer theological interpretation. But, unlike the *Summa*, both early Franciscan masters

71 *Gl. ord. in Ioh.* [3:23] in *marg.* (Rusch, 4:1036ra); not found in Bede or Eriugena.

72 See Stegmüller and Reinhardt, *Repertorium biblicum*, nn^o 1151–4, 9960, 10521; Brady, ‘Sacred Scripture,’ 65–82; Smalley, *Gospels*, 230–54, 298–369; Abigail Ann Young, ‘Accessus ad Alexandrum: the *Prefatio* to the *Postilla in Iohannis Euangelium* of Alexander of Hales (1186?-1245),’ *Mediaeval Studies* 52 (1990): 1–23; Gies, ‘Alexander of Hales on the Gospel of John,’ 297–362.

73 Alexander of Hales, *In Ioh.* [3:23], §51 (Gies, 507).

74 Alexander of Hales, *In Ioh.* [3:23], §54–6 (Gies, 507–8).

75 Alexander of Hales, *In Ioh.* [3:23], §57–8 (Gies, 508); from Jerome, *Nom. hebr.* (LaGarde, 18, 66); Pseudo-Bede, *Liber de interpretatione nominum hebraicorum* (Basel: Johan Herwagen, 1563), col. 620; cf. *Gl. ord. in Ioh.* [3:23] (Rusch, 4:1036ra).

76 Alexander of Hales, *In Ioh.* [3:23], §59 (Gies, 509); *Gl. ord. in Ioh.* [3:23] in *marg.* (Rusch, 4:1036ra); from Eriugena, *Comm. in Ioh.* 3:23 (PL 122:322).

77 Alexander of Hales, *In Ioh.* [3:23], §60 (Gies, 509); John Chrysostom, *Hom. in Ioh.* 29.1 (PG 59:167).

78 John Chrysostom’s apophatic teaching on the beatific vision, especially as stated in *Hom. in Ioh.* 15.1 (PG 59:98), was condemned in 1241. *SH* II, In4, Tr3, Q4, M2, C1, Ar1 (n. 517), Respondeo, p. 764, explicitly denounces this view. Still, the indices to the *SH* attest reference to him throughout, although this reference is very unevenly distributed. Doucet, ‘Prologomena,’ LXXXIV, LXXXIX, counted the references: *SH* I (3), *SH* II (5), *SH* III (173), *SH* IV (56). Book 4 has not been indexed, but Chrysostom is also cited there, for example *SH* Bk IV, Q4, M7, Ar1, resp., fol. 40v; citing John Chrysostom, *In Hebraeos* 2.1 (PG 63:20).

focus on the respective purposes of the baptisms of John and of Jesus. Neither exegete explicitly solves the question of timing, but the *Summa* clinches it with Augustine's comment on John 1:29, 'The Lord was baptized in the baptism of John, and when John was put into prison, thereupon John's baptism ceased.'⁷⁹ This is perhaps because the aims of the two texts are different. The exegetes are giving an exposition of the Gospel, which is offering an account of the consummation of John's ministry in that of Jesus, whereas the *Summa* is attempting to render an orderly and consistent account of the sacraments.

Conclusion

While adapting the overall structure of the Lombard's *Sentences*, the *Summa Halensis* advances beyond them by offering an account of its own hermeneutic, the way in which the teaching of theology arises in Scripture and proceeds so as to instruct people of all ages and conditions in the knowledge necessary for salvation. While the *Summa*'s purpose differs from that of biblical commentary in attempting to offer a systematic account of Christian doctrine, it is still pervaded by exegetical material. Indeed, we have been able to detect every exegetical device enumerated by Dahan in connection with the *Sentences*. Even the most philosophically-rigorous theology in the early Franciscan school is aimed at the practical purpose of salvation. Nonetheless, the distinction between the systematic and exegetical modes of theological instruction implies a distinction in proximal purpose. This becomes visible when we attend to the actual differences in the questions raised and conclusions reached by early Franciscan biblical commentaries and the *Summa*. While the *Summa* aims to render an orderly account of dogma so that it does not always treat every relevant passage of Scripture, but always (or nearly always) answers the question raised, the commentaries attempt to follow the purposes of the Holy Spirit speaking through the human author(s) as made explicit in their division of the text, so that not every question which may be of interest to the student of dogmatic theology is asked and answered. Perhaps the most important conclusion for this provisional look at exegesis in the *Summa Halensis* is that there is much to do before any definitive statement can be made. Not only *Summa* IV, but the exegesis of the Lombard and his school, as well as that of the early Paris Franciscans and Dominicans, must be edited if we are to trace the relationship between *lectio* and *disputatio* with greater precision. We have noticed, particularly with respect to *testimonia* and *exempla*, that Dahan's taxonomy does not perfectly fit the *Summa*. It may need to be revised as we learn more about exegesis in the period of the *Summa*'s composition. Still, what can be seen at present

⁷⁹ SH Bk IV, Q6, M9, Ar2, resp., fol. 62r: 'Baptizatus est Dominus baptismo Ioannis, et cessavit baptismus Ioannis inde missus est in carcerem Ioannes'; citing Augustine, *In Iohannis evangelium tractatus* 4.14, ed. D.R. Willems (Turnhout: Brepols, 1954), 38.

is sufficient to show that Scripture, the primary locus of authority in the Christian tradition, was also a locus of innovation in early Franciscan thought.

Appendix: John of La Rochelle, Postilla super Iohannem euangelistam [3:23, 24]

Vatican City, Biblioteca Apostolica Vaticana, Vat. Lat. 7595, fol. 26vb, ln. 4–46

Erat autem Iohannes. Introducitur baptisma/ Iohannis et primo quidam nobis occurrit persona baptizantis cum dicitur/ Erat autem Iohannes baptizans, ubi aduertendum quod secundum Augustinum ¶ baptizabat Iohannes quia oportebat ut Christus ab eo bap-/ -tizaretur. Non solum autem Christi ab eo baptizatus est, sed multi alii, ne baptismus Iohannis melior baptismate Do-/ -mini uideretur. Si enim solus Christus fuisset baptizatus a Iohanne,/ non deessent qui⁸⁰ dicerent usque adeo magnus erat baptis-/ -mus quem habuit Iohannes ut solus Christus illo fuerit dignus/ baptizari. ¶ Notandum est quod Christo baptizante adhuc Iohannes/ baptizat, cuius prima ratio, secundum Bedam, est quia nondum precursor ces-/ -sare donec ueritas perfecte manifestetur. Secunda ratio, secundum Chrysostomum,/ est quia si Iohannes statim cessasset, posset existimari a mul-/ -tis quod hoc fecisset zelo uel ira. Et ideo non statim cessauit, sed/ baptizans non sibi gloriam acquirebat, sed Christo auditores multipli-/ -cabat,⁸¹ et multo efficacius hec faciebat quam discipuli Christi./ Secundo nobis occurrit locus in quo Iohannes baptizabat, et ideo dicitur/ quod erat baptizans in Enon iuxta Salim, ubi aduertendum/ est primo quod Salim, secundum Bedam, opidum est iuxta Iordanem/ situm ubi olim Melchisedech regnauit. Secundum Iero-/ -nimum autem non refert uniuersaliter Salem aut Salim nominetur/ cum uocalibus⁸² in medio litteris, raro utantur Hebrei et/ pro uoluntate lectorum et regionum uariante eadem uocabula/ diuersis sonis atque accentibus proferantur. Secundum notandum quod/ Enos hebraice dicitur aqua, et ideo Euangelista hanc inter-/ -pretationem aperiens subdit quia multe aque erant illic./ Tercio nobis occurrit fructus quid sequitur ex baptismo Iohannis,/ et ideo dicitur in litteram quod ueniebant et baptizabantur. ¶ Notandum/ est secundum Bedam quod ita se habebat tunc baptismus Iohannis ad bap-/ -tismam Christi, sicut nunc cathezismus in quo baptizandi/ instruuntur in fide et properantur ad baptismam se habunt ad/ baptismam uerum. Sicut enim Iohannes predicabat primam et/ baptismam Christi prenuntiabat, et in cognitionem ueritatis que/ in mundo apparuit attrahebat, sic ministri ecclesie/ primo erudiunt uenientes ad fidem. Prima peccata eorum redar-/ -guunt, demum in Christi baptismo peccatorum remissio-/ -nem promotunt. Et sic ~~Iohannes~~ attrahunt homines ad cog-/ -nitionem ueritatis et amorem. Quarto nobis occurrit ~~ipse~~ tempus⁸³/ quo hec facta sunt quando dicitur, nondum enim missus fuerat Iohannes/ in carcerem, ubi secundum Bedam aduertere possumus quod Iohannes/ Euangelista cepit

⁸⁰ qui] que *ms.*

⁸¹ multiplicabat] multiplicebat *ms.*

⁸² uocalibus] uocalibus *corr. in marg. a. m.*

⁸³ tempus] ipse *ms.* sed *corr. a. m.*

narrare facta Christi ante Iohannem incarce-/ -ratum, que alii euangeliste pretulerunt, incipientes ab/ hiis que post Iohannem missum in carcerem facta sunt.

Lydia Schumacher

The *Summa Halensis* and Augustine

Abstract: Augustine of Hippo is, without a doubt, the authority that the *Summa Halensis* invokes most frequently. This has led the editors of the *Summa* and many other scholars subsequently to conclude that this text and the early Franciscan tradition more generally is little but an effort to systematize the tradition of Augustine that had prevailed for most of the earlier Middle Ages. In turn, that assumption has led to a tendency to downplay the significance of early Franciscan thought and to its neglect in scholarship. This chapter will highlight some significant ways in which the *Summa* departs from Augustine in the process of innovation. In the first of three case studies, I will show how the *Summa* employs a methodology, in fact, scholastic methodology, which invokes invoking authorities like Augustine with a view to advancing its own opinions which are not necessarily found in Augustine himself. In two further studies, I will examine how the *Summa* departs from Augustine on two of its most fundamental theological doctrines concerning the nature of God as one and as Triune.

Augustine of Hippo is, without a doubt, the authority that the *Summa Halensis* invokes most frequently.¹ According to its Prolegomena, this multi-volume Franciscan text which was initially overseen by Alexander of Hales cites over 100 works by Augustine, some spurious but most of them genuine. In total, it contains 4,814 explicit and 1,372 implicit quotations to Augustine, which amounts to more than one quarter of the texts cited in the body of the *Summa*.²

Although the Prolegomena acknowledge that ‘the whole Western Christian tradition was nourished by his [Augustine’s] writings until the introduction of Aristotle’, it describes the *Summa Halensis* as particularly significant in this regard for one main reason, namely, ‘that both its theology and philosophy collate the tradition of Augustine, and are ordained to its defense’, in a world where Aristotle’s recently rediscovered works were rapidly rising in popularity. For this reason, the Prolegomena con-

1 See Victorin Doucet, ‘Prolegomena in librum III necnon in libros I et II “Summae Fratris Alexandri”’, in *Doctoris irrefragabilis Alexandri de Hales Ordinis minorum Summa theologica*, vol. 4 (Quaracchi: Collegium S. Bonaventurae, 1948), LXXXVIII: ‘Patres Latini’; cf. Jacques-Guy Bougerol, ‘The Church Fathers and *authoritates* in Scholastic Theology to Bonaventure,’ in *The Reception of the Church Fathers in the West*, ed. Irena Backus (Leiden: Brill, 1996), 289–335, esp. 301. For more information on the relationship between Alexander’s works and the *Summa*, see Victorin Doucet, ‘A New Source of the *Summa fratris Alexandri*,’ *Franciscan Studies* 6 (1946): 403–17; Victorin Doucet, ‘The History of the Problem of the Authenticity of the *Summa*,’ *Franciscan Studies* 7 (1947): 26–41; Victorin Doucet, ‘The History of the Problem of the Authenticity of the *Summa* (Continued),’ *Franciscan Studies* 7 (1947): 274–312.

2 Doucet, ‘Prolegomena,’ LXXXVIII.

cludes, the *Summa* 'is universally and rightly seen as the foundation of the Augustinian-Franciscan school in the 13th century'.³

For the authors of the *Summa*, its editors assumed, there was consequently little major difference between the Augustinian and Franciscan schools other than that the latter was more systematically and comprehensively expressed. Thus, one of the first modern medievalists, Franz Ehrle, defined the Franciscan school as 'neo-Augustinian' in a way that influenced many subsequent scholars, to the present day.⁴ By most accounts, this school of thought is one that Alexander's prize student Bonaventure articulated in its mature form.⁵ Moreover, it is the school of thought from which later Franciscans like John Duns Scotus eventually departed in favour of following the new Aristotelian—and modern—intellectual trends.⁶

Although prevalent and longstanding, scholarly assumptions about the Augustinian character of early Franciscan thought have not been subjected to the test of sustained research, in part because this tradition of thought has been dismissed from the start as a mere attempt to bolster an Augustinian tradition whose authority supposedly began to diminish in the times of early Franciscans themselves. In the process of researching the work of their school, however, significant reasons emerge to re-think their relationship to Augustine. Some of these reasons pertain to the methodology they employed in developing their arguments, which, on closer examination, complicate a straightforward reading of quotations to Augustine as indicators

3 Doucet, 'Prolegomena,' LXXXVIII.

4 Franz Ehrle, *Grundsätzliches zur Charakteristik der neueren und neuesten Scholastik* (Freiburg im Breisgau: Herder, 1918). Bernard Vogt followed Ehrle's reading in an important article, 'Der Ursprung und die Entwicklung der Franziskanerschule,' *Franziskanische Studien* 9 (1922). Étienne Gilson argues that Aquinas critiqued a Franciscan rendering of Augustine in his landmark article, 'Pourquoi saint Thomas a critiqué saint Augustin,' *Archives d'histoire doctrinale et littéraire du Moyen Age* 1 (1926–7): 5–127. More recent scholars who have supported the Augustinian reading of early Franciscans include the following: A.-M. Hamelin, *L'école franciscaine de ses débuts jusqu'à l'occasionalisme*, *Analecta mediaevalia Namurcensia*, 12 (Louvain: Nauwelaerts, 1961); Leone Veuthy, *Scuola Franciscana: filosofia, teologia, spiritualità* (Rome: Miscellanea Franciscana, 1996); Leonardo Sileo, 'I primi maestri francescani di Parigi e di Oxford,' in *Storia della teologia nel Medioevo*, ed. G. D'Onofrio (Casale Monferrato: Piemme, 1996), 645–97.

5 Étienne Gilson, *The Philosophy of St Bonaventure* (New York: Sheed and Ward, 1938); Joshua Benson, 'Augustine and Bonaventure,' in *The T&T Clark Companion to Modern Theology*, ed. C.C. Pecknold and Tarmo Toom (London: T&T Clark, 2013). Bonaventure names Alexander of Hales as his 'master and father' and claims to add nothing new to what he learned from his teacher in *Doctoris Seraphici S. Bonaventurae opera omnia*, 10 vols (Quaracchi: Collegii S. Bonaventurae, 1882–1902), 2:1–3.

6 Olivier Boulnois, *Être et représentation: Une généalogie de la métaphysique moderne à l'époque de Duns Scot* (Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 1999); Hans Blumenberg, *The Legitimacy of the Modern Age* (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1985); Ludger Honnefelder, *Scientia transcendens: Die formale Bestimmung der Seiendheit und Realität in der Metaphysik des Mittelalters und der Neuzeit (Duns Scotus, Suárez, Wolff, Kant, Peirce)* (Hamburg: Felix Meiner Verlag, 1990); Michael Allen Gillespie, *Theological Origins of Modernity* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2008).

of exact allegiance to his opinions. Other reasons concern certain key theological concepts they developed, which clearly diverge from Augustine's own views.

Although I cannot discuss all the methodological or conceptual moves the Summists make that call for the reconsideration of their relationship to Augustine, I will present three case studies, which collectively provide a basis for doing so in the many cases where they use Augustine. The first will illuminate their methodology in ways that require us to think more critically about the meaning they attribute to quotations from Augustine.⁷ The second and third will assess the doctrines they endorse concerning the one God and the Trinity, which represent two clear cases—and arguably the most central aspects of early Franciscan theology—in which they depart from Augustine in obvious ways.

The *Summa's* Methodology

The period in which Alexander and his colleagues worked was one in which the scholastic method, as high medieval scholars came to employ it in the 13th century particularly, was only beginning to develop. As many readers will be aware, this method required scholars to marshal authorities for and against a certain position before developing their own opinion about it, also in conversation with authorities. Although it was the common method for advancing both written and oral arguments in the medieval university, the way in which the scholastic method was deployed—and how to interpret its uses of authoritative sources—has rarely been the subject of extensive research, especially for the early period in question.

This may be because scholars of medieval thought have simply tended to assume that scholastic thinkers quoted authorities in much the same way that scholars do so today, that is, in the effort accurately to present and interpret their views. As we have seen, this assumption has led scholars to conclude that early Franciscans operated in a primarily Augustinian cast of mind. Although modern scholars have admittedly recognized other influences and nuances as relevant in the case of different thinkers, they have drawn a similar inference about earlier figures like Anselm and Hugh of St Victor, both of whom have been called an *alter Augustinus*, and even Peter Lombard, around half of whose Sentences are quotations to Augustine.⁸

What the 'Augustinian' reading of such thinkers neglects to appreciate is the extent to which every scholar at this time was constrained on some level to position themselves with reference to the key representative of the Western Christian tradi-

⁷ For more on this see Lydia Schumacher, 'The Early Franciscan Doctrine of the Knowledge of God: Between Augustine's Authority and Innovation,' *The Medieval Journal* 6 (2016): 1–28.

⁸ See the entries on these thinkers in *The Oxford Guide to the Historical Reception of Augustine*, 3 vols, ed. Karla Pollman et al. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013); Jacques-Guy Bougerol, 'The Church Fathers and the Sentences of Peter Lombard,' in *The Reception of the Church Fathers in the West*, ed. Irena Backus (Leiden: Brill, 1996), 113–64.

tion, namely, Augustine, not to mention other authorities. Furthermore, such a reductive or ‘face value’ reading of medieval texts overlooks the unique ways in which different figures manipulated Augustine and other authorities in unique ways that rendered them distinctive thinkers in their own right, rather than mere perpetrators of a monolithic past tradition.

While it would be impossible in this context to untangle the many ways in which different thinkers developed different ‘Augustines’, I will endeavour in the case study that follows to offer a window into the sophisticated and even unusual way that early Franciscan thinkers like Alexander invoked Augustine’s authority. To this end, I have selected a section from the *Summa Halensis* on the nature of human knowledge of God, in which Augustine is heralded as the main authority.⁹ After analysing this text, it will be clear that it offers far more than a straightforward re-iteration of any Augustinian theory. Indeed, it enlists Augustine in supporting a project he never envisaged or attempted, namely, the development of a distinctly Franciscan understanding of what it means to know God.

The Doctrine of the Knowledge of God in the *Summa Halensis*

The article on the cognition of God ‘on the way’ (*De cognitione Dei in via*) or in the present life in the *Summa Halensis* starts by inquiring whether God is knowable by the human soul or mind (I.1). In this connection, the *Summa* enumerates some reasons why one might argue that God is not knowable by the human soul. Quoting Augustine’s *De videndo Deo* (‘On Seeing God’; *Epistula* 147.8.20), it states that:

“God is by nature invisible, not only the Father, but also the Trinity itself, one God.” But this is what it is for him to be visible, namely, to be knowable. For as it is said in the same book (*Epistula* 147.2.7): “There is a difference between seeing and believing, because present things are seen, while things believed are absent. However, we understand present things here as those things which are present to the senses of the soul or the body (...).” However every knowable thing is visible to the senses of the soul or body; as therefore God is invisible, therefore he is also incognizable.¹⁰

The second reason cited also makes reference to Augustine’s *Epistula* 147.15.37:

⁹ Christopher M. Cullen, ‘Alexander of Hales,’ in *A Companion to Philosophy in the Middle Ages*, ed. Jorge J.E. Gracia and Timothy B. Noone (Oxford: Blackwell, 2006), 104–9.

¹⁰ Alexander of Hales, *Doctoris irrefragabilis Alexandri de Hales Ordinis minorum Summa theologica*, 4 vols (Quaracchi: Collegium S. Bonaventurae, 1924–48). All translations mine. *SH* I, TrInt, Q2, M1, C1 (n. 8), arg. 1, p. 15: “Invisibilis est natura Deus, non tantum Pater, sed et ipsa Trinitas, unus Deus”; sed hoc est ei esse visibilem, quod cognoscibilem. Sicut enim dicitur in eodem libro: “Hoc distat inter videre et credere, quia praesentia videntur, creduntur absentia. Praesentia autem hoc loco intelligimus quae praesto sunt sensibus sive animi sive corporis (...).” Omne autem cognoscibile est visibile sensibus animi vel corporis; cum ergo Deus sit invisibilis, ergo et incognoscibilis.’

“No one has ever seen nor will be able to see God, because God inhabits light inaccessible” (1 Tim. 6:16), and as invisible things are by nature also incorruptible, and as that which is now incorruptible does not later become corruptible, so not only now but also always, God is invisible.¹¹

The third reason cites John of Damascus’ *De fide orthodoxa* 1.4: “God is infinite and incomprehensible”, but all that is known by the soul is understood by the intellect; therefore God is not knowable.”¹² Similarly, the author states his own opinion in giving the fourth reason:

Every cognition of the infinite, inasmuch as it is in this same mode, is infinite, because if it were finite, it would not measure up to the infinite. As therefore the divine substance is infinite, it is not known unless by an infinite cognition; but a finite power cannot have an infinite cognition, because an infinite act cannot be achieved by a finite power; as therefore every power of the rational soul is finite, it cannot attain to that action which is the cognition of the substance of the infinite God.¹³

After enumerating a variety of reasons why God is not knowable, the Summist moves into the *contra* section of his article, presenting opinions on the other side of the argument, in typical scholastic fashion. The first mentioned is that of Augustine, who writes in his *Soliloquies* 1.8.15: ‘the earth is visible and light is visible, but the earth cannot be seen unless it is brightened by light. Similarly, the mark of the disciplines or sciences is that they cannot be understood, unless they are illumined by their own sun, namely God.’¹⁴

Another reason is given as follows:

as the power of the affective reason is ordered towards loving the good, so the power of the cognitive reason is aimed at knowing truth. If therefore the highest good is desirable on the part of the affective reason, therefore also the highest truth is knowable by the cognitive reason.¹⁵

11 SH I, TrInt, Q2, M1, C1 (n. 8), arg. 2, p. 15: “Deum nemo vidit unquam nec videre poterit, quoniam lucem habitat inaccessibilem” [1 Tim. 6:16], et est natura invisibilis sicut et incorruptibilis, et sicut nunc incorruptibilis nec postea corruptibilis, ita non solum nunc, sed et semper invisibilis.’

12 SH I, TrInt, Q2, M1, C1 (n. 8), arg. 3, p. 15: “Infinitus est Deus et incomprehensibilis”; sed omne quod cognoscitur animo, comprehenditur intellectu; Deus ergo non est cognoscibilis.’

13 SH I, TrInt, Q2, M1, C1 (n. 8), arg. 4, p. 15: ‘Omnis cognitio infiniti, in quantum huiusmodi, est infinita, quia si esset finita, non transiret super infinitum. Cum ergo substantia divina sit infinita, non cognoscetur nisi cognitione infinita; sed cognitio infinita non potest esse a potentia finita, quia actio infinita non egreditur a potentia finita; cum ergo omnis potentia rationalis animae sit finita, non egredietur ab ipsa actio quae sit cognitio substantiae Dei infinitae.’

14 SH I, TrInt, Q2, M1, C1 (n. 8), Contra a, p. 15: “Nam terra visibilis est et lux, sed terra, nisi luce illustrata, videri non potest; similiter disciplinarum spectamina videri non possunt, nisi aliquo velut suo sole illustrentur”, videlicet Deo.’

15 SH I, TrInt, Q2, M1, C1 (n. 8), Contra c, p. 15: ‘Sicut virtus affectivae rationalis est ad amandum bonum, sic virtus cognitivae rationalis ad cognoscendum verum. Si ergo summum bonum est appetibile ab affectiva rationali, ergo et summum verum cognoscibile a cognitiva rationali.’

In the attempt to resolve the dilemma described above in his own response (*respon-deo*) section of the article, the Summist quotes Augustine's *Epistula* 147.15.37: 'if you inquire whether God can be known, I respond: he can. If you inquire how I know this, I respond: because in the most true Scriptures, it is read: "blessed are the pure of heart, because they will see God" (Mt. 5:8).'¹⁶

In classic scholastic fashion, the Summist then proceeds to respond in the light of the above to the initial objections raised to this conclusion. Here again, he cites Augustine (*Epistula* 147.15.37):

"If you inquire by what mode God is said to be invisible, and if he can be seen, I respond, he is invisible by nature; however he can be seen, when and as he wills." From this, the following distinction is clear: that God is invisible by nature, but visible according to his will. According to this therefore the following distinction must be drawn, namely, between what is visible by necessity and what is visible by will. Things visible by necessity are corporeal and sensible. Things visible by the will are spiritual, such as they are in the mode of the angels and God himself. And this is what Augustine says in the same book (*Epistula* 147.6.18), claiming the authority of Ambrose (...): "sensible things are not seen similarly to God, whose nature it is not to be seen, but to be seen by the will; for if he does not will, he is not seen; if he wills, he is seen. For God appeared to Abraham, because he willed; and he did not appear to others, because he did not will."¹⁷

The response to the second argument by Augustine also cites Augustine's *Epistula* 147.20.48 back at itself:

"As invisible things are incorruptible by nature", so it must be said according to Augustine (...) that "bodies customarily speaking are called visible; for this reason, God is called invisible lest he be believed to be a body. However, he does not cheat the pure of heart of his substance by contemplation, as this highest reward is promised to those who diligently seek God."¹⁸

The author concludes this section by summarizing this point in a further quotation from Augustine's *De Trinitate* 14.8.11: 'the image of God is in that which is capable of

16 SH I, TrInt, Q2, M1, C1 (n. 8), Respondeo, p. 16: 'Si quaeris utrum possit Deus videri, respondeo: potest. Si quaeris unde hoc sciam, respondeo: quia in veracissima Scriptura legitur [Matt. 5:8]: "Beati mundo corde, quoniam ipsi Deum videbunt."

17 SH I, TrInt, Q2, M1, C1 (n. 8), Ad obiecta 1, p. 16: "'Si quaeris quomodo dictus sit invisibilis Deus, si videri potest, respondeo: invisibilem esse natura, videri autem potest, cum vult et sicut vult." Ex quo patet distinctio: quod Deus est invisibilis natura, visibilis vero voluntate. Secundum hoc ergo distinguendum: quod est visibile necessitate et est visibile voluntate. Visibilia necessitate sunt corporalia et sensibilia; visibilia vero voluntate sunt spiritualia, quemadmodum angeli et ipse Deus. Et hoc est quod dicit Augustinus, in eodem libro, sumens auctoritatem Ambrosii (...): "Non similiter sensibilia videntur et is, cuius naturae est non videri, voluntatis videri, nam si non vult, non videtur; si vult, videtur. Apperuit enim Deus Abrahae, quia voluit; aliis, qui noluit, non apparuit."

18 SH I, TrInt, Q2, M1, C1 (n. 8), Ad obiecta 2, p. 16: "'sic est natura invisibilis sicut incorruptibili", dicendum secundum Augustinum (...): "Corpora consuetudine loquendi visibilia nominatur; propterea Deus invisibilis dicitur ne corpus esse credatur, non quia munda corda suae substantiae contemplatione fraudavit, cum haec summa merces Deum diligentibus promittatur (...)."

him and is able to be a participant or sharer in his being: the capability is through cognition, the participation through love.¹⁹

In a further section, the *Summa* proceeds to consider how God is known (II.4), invoking a distinction drawn from the pseudo-Augustinian *De anima et spiritu* 13, between superior and inferior parts of reason: ‘The superior part is ordered towards the contemplation of God and eternal things, and the inferior part is for the contemplation of creatures and temporal things.’²⁰ According to the *Summa*, the innate knowledge of God and by implication all creaturely or temporal things, as creatures of God, is innately implanted in the human mind.

Although it is impossible to know God by inferior reason alone, the *Summa* allows, God can be known through creatures when inferior reason is informed by superior reason. Furthermore, he may be known in himself through reflection upon the innate knowledge of him that can be found precisely there. If the mind fails to access this knowledge, whether of God himself or of creatures, the *Summa* further contends, it is because of a stubborn will, which becomes preoccupied with the objects of inferior reason and thereby becomes ignorant of the knowledge of God implanted in superior reason. By repenting before God of this sin, and thus through the softening of the will out of love for God, however, the mind regains access to the knowledge that is always there.

Although I have only provided a small glimpse into the content of the *Summa*’s treatise on the knowledge of God above, the section I have discussed conveys the extent to which Augustine, or pseudo-Augustine, whose works Franciscan authors at this time regarded as authentic, was treated as authoritative on this topic. The treatise as a whole contains a total of 70 quotations from Augustine; 34 of these are to Augustine’s *Epistula* 147, which is by far the most-cited text in the section overall, with Scripture alone registering as a near rival; 31 further references are to works like *De libero arbitrio*, *De Genesi ad litteram*, *De vera religione*, *De Trinitate*, and *Soliloquia*, although some are drawn directly from the *Glossa Ordinaria*, a standard edition of the Vulgate Bible, which was widely referenced in the 13th century and contained many comments by Church Fathers and other Christian sources in the margins.

There are five additional references to pseudo-Augustinian works, such as *De spiritu et anima*. The quotations from authorities other than Augustine are less numerous, and often refer to the exact same passage. Thus, Boethius’ *Consolation of Philosophy* 4.4 is cited five times, John of Damascus’ *De fide orthodoxa* 1.4, three times, and excerpts from Ambrose’s Exposition on the Gospel of Luke 1:24–27, four times. Although the *Summa* as a whole does not always rely as heavily on Augustine as in

¹⁹ *SH* I, TrInt, Q2, M1, C1 (n. 8), Ad obiecta 5, p. 16: ‘Imago Dei est in hoc quod capax eius et particeps esse potest: capax per cognitionem, particeps per amorem.’

²⁰ *SH* I, TrInt, Q2, M2, C4 (n. 17), Respondeo, p. 28: ‘Superior pars est ad contemplandum Deum et aeterna, inferior ad contemplandas creaturas et temporalia. Ad superiorem pertinet sapientia, ad inferiorem scientia.’

this section, and selects other sources relevant to the different topics it considers, I have already noted that a tendency to engage extensively with Augustine on most topics was not uncommon, even when other authorities were involved.²¹ In this connection, what is perhaps most striking about the text examined above concerns the way that one and the same authority, namely, Augustine, is invoked to represent opposing sides of an argument, to articulate their resolution, and to supply replies to objections initially drawn from the work of Augustine himself.²²

What this suggests, I would submit, is that the primary concern of the Summists, to say nothing of scholastic authors in this period more generally, was not necessarily to interpret authoritative quotations accurately or even consistently, as modern scholars steeped in historical-critical methods might endeavour to do. Rather, the aim was evidently to isolate ‘proof texts’ which presented ideas the *Summa* itself wished to bolster or oppose, without much regard for the question of how to interpret the quotations in context.²³ As mentioned already, the reason particular authorities, above all, Augustine were often quoted had much to do with the traditions of thought they were perceived to represent.

Since Augustine presumably championed the Western understanding of knowledge of God, it is not surprising that Franciscans looked primarily to him in developing their own tradition of thought on this matter; were they writing on logic or soteriology, they might have turned instead to Boethius or Anselm, respectively. The authority of Augustine was all the more pertinent on this topic in light of the Condemnation of 1241, which addressed a growing tendency of Latin thinkers, working under the influence of new Greek patristic sources, to deny the cherished Augustinian affirmation of an ultimate, direct vision of God. To invoke Augustine more than anyone in treating the specific matter of knowledge of God was to situate the early Franciscan school on the right side of the condemnation.

By invoking an authority like Augustine in this context, however, the Summists to say nothing of scholastics did not operate in an entirely servile manner with reference to past authorities. Rather, they sought to lend legitimacy to their own ideas, which, on closer examination, emerge as quite unique and innovative in their time. In the case of their views of knowledge not least of God, these ideas bear a striking resemblance to those of the Arab scholar Avicenna, who was particularly influential

21 In the *Summa Halensis*, there are 4,814 explicit and 1,372 implicit references to Augustine; this amounts to more than one quarter of the texts cited in the body of the *Summa*, according to Bougerol, ‘The Church Fathers and *Auctoritates*,’ 301.

22 For other examples of the same phenomenon, as well as the medieval practice of attributing views to authorities that they did not hold, see Marcia L. Colish, *Faith, Fiction and Force in Medieval Baptismal Debates* (Washington, DC: The Catholic University of America Press, 2014).

23 Support for this contention can be found in Eric Saak, ‘Augustine and his Late Medieval Appropriations (1200–1500),’ in *The Oxford Guide to the Historical Reception of Augustine*, 1:39–50. See also Bougerol, ‘The Church Fathers and *auctoritates*,’ 334, which states that scholars at this time used authorities however they chose.

at the time the *Summa* was being written.²⁴ To take one example that is relevant here, the *Summa*'s rendering of the distinction between higher and lower reason and the epistemology that goes along with it, briefly described above, was originally a product of Avicenna.²⁵

According to Avicenna, higher reason, or the theoretical face of the soul is turned upwards toward the realm of universal forms, while the practical face is turned downwards. It uses the universals acquired by the theoretical faculty to deal with matters pertaining to bodily life. For this purpose, the higher reason is innately impressed with certain transcendental concepts, above all, that of Being—or God—which presupposes true understanding of all beings. Rather than providing the content of knowledge of those beings, however, the innate concept of Being regulates the mind's efforts to render experiences of them intelligible, thus ensuring that correct ideas about them are formed. This is precisely the account of knowledge that the *Summa* references in the question on the knowledge of God and develops further in other treatises, including its treatise on the rational soul, which is discussed in the other chapter I have contributed to this volume.

The lesson of this analysis is at least two-fold. First, the erratic and contradictory ways in which early Franciscans used Augustine suggest that they were more concerned with building their own case than Augustine's regarding the nature of knowledge of God, although Augustine was key to establishing the legitimacy of their endeavours. Secondly, when it came to constructing their viewpoints, they projected onto Augustine views that were not necessarily his own, even views derived from an Arab thinker that were deemed expedient in terms of elaborating their own vision. In this and other respects, they did not hesitate to manipulate Augustine's words in ways that betray a relative disregard for his authorial intent.

²⁴ Dag N. Hasse, *Avicenna's De anima in the Latin West* (London: The Warburg Institute, 2000), 63. In this work, Hasse explains in considerable detail how a diverse range of authors from this period, including Alexander of Hales and the authors of the *Summa*, employed Avicenna in their own ways. See Avicenna, *Avicenna's Psychology*, ed. and trans. Fazlur Rahman (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1952). This is a translation of Avicenna's abridgement of his original treatise, which appeared in his comprehensive philosophical encyclopedia, for which see *Avicenna Latinus, Liber de Anima seu Sextus de Naturalibus I-III*, ed. Simone van Riet (Leuven: Peeters, 1972). On other affinities between early Franciscan thought and that of Avicenna, see Gilson, 'Pourquoi saint Thomas a critiqué saint Augustin,' 5–127; Étienne Gilson, 'Les sources Greco-arabes de l'augustinisme avicennisant,' *Archives d'histoire doctrinale et littéraire du Moyen Age* 4 (1929): 5–107; Étienne Gilson, 'Alexander of Hales and John of La Rochelle,' in Étienne Gilson, *History of Christian Philosophy in the Middle Ages* (London: Sheed and Ward, 1955), 327–31. Although Étienne Gilson noticed many affinities between Avicenna and Augustine some time ago, he believed that most of the continuities between early Franciscans and Avicenna were compatible with the Franciscan effort to systematize Augustine's thought. Thus, the relationship between the Franciscans and Avicenna has not been extensively investigated since.

²⁵ Avicenna, *Avicenna's Psychology*, 32–3. See also Lydia Schumacher, *Divine Illumination: The History and Future of Augustine's Theory of Knowledge* (Oxford: Wiley-Blackwell, 2011), 90–100.

In this connection, I have argued elsewhere, one major guiding factor for early Franciscans was the spiritual and ministerial vision of Francis of Assisi to which Alexander and his colleagues may have sought to give systematic expression in the university context. A key to that effort, in turn, was seemingly the development of a novel doctrine of God, both as one and as Triune, from which further doctrines consistent with Francis' outlook apparently followed naturally. It was in developing these doctrines, I will now explain, that Alexander and his collaborators made some of their most radical shifts away from the tradition of Augustine.

The Doctrine of God

Since the time of Augustine, medieval thinkers in the West had largely identified 'simplicity' as the most fundamental feature of the divine nature. This doctrine was propounded by such noteworthy scholars as Anselm of Canterbury, Peter Lombard, and Thomas Aquinas, who offered a mature formulation of the standard teaching about God's simple nature. Although Alexander of Hales and his colleagues mention simplicity in passing in the treatise of the *Summa Halensis* on the doctrine of God, mainly to inquire whether it is compatible with affirming God as Triune, they depart radically from the longstanding and relatively continuous tradition of Augustine in stressing the immensity or infinity of the divine.²⁶

The Context of the *Summa's* Doctrine of God

Prior to the 12th century, there are only scant and relatively unremarkable references to divine immensity in Western Christian thought. The situation only appears to change in the 12th century itself, during which Hugh of St Victor popularized the works of Pseudo-Dionysius. Frequently throughout his corpus, Dionysius refers to the *immensurabilitas* (immesurability) of God. In his commentary on Dionysius' *Celestial Hierarchy*, Hugh picks up on this and translates it into comments on divine *imensitas* (immensity), which were further developed by Richard of St Victor, whose *De Trinitate* proved enormously influential for Alexander's doctrine of God.

In this work, Richard bemoans the fact that he finds in the preceding tradition no purely rational explanation that satisfies him fully as to how God can be both one and three, even though he finds these ideas everywhere affirmed on authoritative grounds. Thus, he sets out to provide such an explanation, which he subsequently

²⁶ Meldon C. Wass, *The Infinite God and the 'Summa fratris Alexandri'* (Chicago: Franciscan Herald Press, 1964).

works out entirely in terms that can be accessed by reason.²⁷ In the first instance, he seeks to defend the claim that God is one.²⁸ It is in this context that the doctrine of divine immensity quickly comes to the fore.

In the context of this discussion, Richard postulates three possible modes of being, seemingly drawn from the work of John Scotus Eriugena, whose translation of the Dionysian corpus would have been the one of several available translations which Richard might have consulted.²⁹ These modes of being are: from eternity and deriving its existence from itself; neither from eternity nor from itself; or from eternity but not from itself. According to Richard, a fourth possibility—the opposite of this last one—is impossible, because there cannot be any being that is not from eternity but is nevertheless from itself, otherwise there would have been a time when nothing existed that could have given rise to the existence of other things.

On Richard's account, two such non-identical beings cannot exist, otherwise one would have to be superior to the other and could not be the most powerful being.³⁰ On the basis of this four-fold distinction, consequently, Richard concludes that a single, supreme being, both eternal and from itself, necessarily exists, invoking Anselm's famous argument and thereby appropriating it for the purposes of defending divine necessity, in a way the Franciscans take up in their own discussion of this issue.³¹

In this connection, Richard further contends that since God is infinite in terms of his eternity, he must also be infinite in terms of his greatness.³² That is to say, he is immense—there is no measure to his goodness, which cannot be comprehended. As such a being, God is immutable: he cannot deteriorate or improve, since his greatness is unsurpassable.³³ Once again, Richard contends, there can only be one immense being, otherwise there would be multiple beings that cannot be comprehended by others, such that each would be superior to the others, which entails a contradiction.³⁴

Such a supreme being cannot lack any desirable attributes: his definition is to be all that is good.³⁵ In that sense, Richard follows a longstanding tradition, upheld by Anselm, which posits a unity of God's essence and his attributes.³⁶ According to this

27 Richard of St Victor, *De Trinitate* 3.1 (hereafter, *DT*), in Richard of St Victor, *De Trinitate: texte critique avec introduction, notes et tables*, ed. J. Ribaillier (Paris: Vrin, 1958), 115. Page numbers hereafter taken from Richard of Saint Victor, *On the Trinity*, trans. Ruben Angelici (Eugene: Cascade Books, 2011).

28 *DT* 1.5 (Angelici, 76).

29 *DT* 1.8 (Angelici, 79); cf. John Scotus Eriugena, *Divisione* 1.1 (PL 122:441B).

30 *DT* 1.14 (Angelici, 83).

31 *DT* 1.11 (Angelici, 81).

32 *DT* 2.5 (Angelici, 95).

33 *DT* 2.3 (Angelici, 93).

34 *DT* 2.6 (Angelici, 95).

35 *DT* 2.16, (Angelici, 104).

36 *DT* 2.16 (Angelici, 105).

tradition, God is or is the definition of the properties he has—he has them in their fullness—whereas creatures simply have those properties in limited or qualified ways. God is whatever it is best to be. As such, he is one thing, and simple, not subject to the complex components or alterations that characterize his creatures.³⁷

While Richard thus concludes his discussion with a brief nod to the doctrine of divine simplicity, that feature is mentioned only after much more attention has been given to the immensity of God. In Richard's work, therefore, we witness the beginnings of the shift in the doctrine of God, whereby simplicity and many other features are subjected to immensity rather than the other way around, which the Franciscans would pick up and popularize in their own way. This brings us to a discussion of the Franciscan doctrine itself, which I will contrast in the first instance with the traditional doctrine of divine simplicity, as articulated by Augustine.

In his *De Trinitate*, Augustine explains the doctrine of divine simplicity by offering examples of things that are not simple.³⁸ As he notes, bodily substances are not simple because they are comprised of parts that are subject to accidental changes, that is, changes in the properties of shape, color, etc. In his view, even the human soul is composed of parts in the sense that it is present throughout the body, while not located at any one place in the body, and it is subject to changes in thoughts or feelings. By contrast to embodied beings, God is incorporeal and thus invisible. As such, he is not composed of parts.³⁹

For the same reason, he is not changeable, given that change implies an alteration in the accidents or properties that are attributed to a substance or entity and a corresponding adjustment in the shape or size of its component parts. Thus, he cannot become more wise or more merciful, or become just where he previously was not. In fact, all of the properties that can be attributed to him are not attributed as accidents, which are subject to alteration, but to his substance. As many medieval authors following Augustine famously quipped, 'God is what he has: his essence is his accidents.'⁴⁰ This means that God is whatever it is best to be, and is always completely so. To sum up: God always completely is what he is, which is the essence and source of all that is good.

The *Summa Halensis* on God

As noted already, the Franciscan *Summa* treats the idea of divine simplicity, albeit in a mere four pages. Although the placement of this discussion just prior to that of divine immensity does suggest a certain deference to longstanding tradition, the *Summa's* approach to the question of simplicity represents quite an unusual theological

³⁷ DT 2.20 (Angelici, 107).

³⁸ DT 6.6 (Angelici, 209–10).

³⁹ DT 5.1–2 (Angelici, 171–3).

⁴⁰ DT 6.7 (Angelici, 210–1).

departure. His account focuses on a conceivable threat to the possibility of a simple God, namely, the Christian assertion that God subsists in multiple persons, which could be taken to imply that God is composed of parts and therefore fails to count as simple.⁴¹

With this threat in view, the Summist insists that the three persons in God do not undermine divine simplicity, because they do not represent diverse substances but rather diverse modes of relation in God, which actually enact his simplicity. In supporting this contention, the Summist appeals to Richard of St Victor—a key authority for early Franciscan Trinitarian theology. In his *De Trinitate*, Richard argued that a plurality of persons does not detract from the unity of the divine nature, just as a plurality of substances—specifically, body and soul—does not detract from the unity of a human person.⁴² Thus, we see that for early Franciscans, the doctrine of divine simplicity is not so much a statement about the fundamental nature of God but a ground-clearing exercise, whereby they showed how their belief in the Trinity could be reconciled with the unity of God.

When it comes to determining the most basic attribute of this one God, as noted already, the early Franciscans turn—straightaway from the discussion of simplicity—to elaborate on the immensity of God, in a treatise that runs nearly 60 pages. For all practical purposes, consequently, they defined the one God in terms of immensity and substituted the doctrine of simplicity for one concerning this very feature. Thus, it remains to consider what the founding fathers of the Franciscan school have to say about the immense nature of the divine.

The contours and importance of the doctrine of divine infinity to Franciscans like Alexander becomes especially clear in a section of the treatise on immensity, which discusses the existence of God in things (*existentia Dei in rebus*).⁴³ This section treats the way in which God is ‘inside and not included, outside and not excluded’ from things.⁴⁴ On this score, the *Summa* follows a longstanding tradition, stemming at least from Pseudo-Dionysius, of affirming that God is in things by essence, power, and presence.⁴⁵ While God is in things by essence insofar as he makes them to be what they are, he is in them by power in terms of the abilities he gives them, and by presence, through their corresponding acts or operations.⁴⁶

41 SH I, P1, In1, Tr1, Q3, C1 (n. 31), Ad objecta 2, p. 51.

42 SH I, P1, In1, Tr1, Q3, C2 (n. 32), Solutio, p. 52.

43 Peter Lombard also treats this topic in his *Sentences*, Book 1, Distinctions 36–7, which cover the presence of things in God and God in things: Peter Lombard, *Sententiae in IV libris distinctae* 1, dd. 36–7, 2 vols, ed. Ignatius C. Brady, Spicilegium Bonaventurianum, 4–5 (Grottaferrata: Editiones Collegii S. Bonaventurae, 1971–81): 1:258–275.

44 SH I, P1, In1, Tr2, Q3, Ti3, M1, C1 (n. 45), pp. 70–1.

45 SH I, P1, In1, Tr2, Q3, Ti3, M1, C2 (n. 46), arg. 1 a, b, c, p. 71; cf. Pseudo-Dionysius, *The Celestial Hierarchy* 11; DT 2.23; Anselm, *Monologion*, 13.

46 SH I, P1, In1, Tr2, Q3, Ti3, M1, C2 (n. 46), pp. 72–3.

On affirming this, the *Summa* stresses that things are not conversely in God by essence, otherwise the divine essence would depend upon the essences of creatures, which are not the cause of God but instead depend on him as their cause.⁴⁷ Nevertheless, it admits that they are in him by power, insofar as he is their cause, and by presence, insofar as he knows them. In the latter respect, the *Summa* lays a strong emphasis upon the specific terms in which God knows and can by the same token be known through created things.

As the artificer of all things great and small, the *Summa* insists, God knows not only universals but also singulars or individuals.⁴⁸ Thus, he has an individual idea for all things that can and do exist.⁴⁹ In that sense, his ideas are infinite in number, just as he is infinite in his being.⁵⁰ That said, the *Summa* asserts that the multiplicity of the divine ideas does not threaten the unity of God, on the grounds that his ideas ultimately simply reflect his supreme and singular goodness in a wide variety of ways.⁵¹ The diversity is on the side of creatures rather than God himself.

According to the *Summa*, God gives human minds a unique opportunity to connect with his ideas by bestowing upon them an innate knowledge of his Infinite Being.⁵² Though this knowledge does not provide the actual content of his ideas about finite creatures—let alone afford the full comprehension of the Infinite Being of God himself—it supervises human efforts to abstract universal concepts from sense experience in the Avicennian manner described above, thus ensuring that human concepts ultimately correlate to God's. By discerning this correspondence, human beings gain direct, albeit finite, insight into some aspect of the nature of God; they encounter him in a palpable way.

Of course, such knowledge is only accessible to those who have fulfilled the precondition for obtaining it. As the *Summa* makes clear in its very first section, on theology as a 'practical science', the conformity of the human will to the will of God,

⁴⁷ SH I, P1, In1, Tr2, Q3, Ti3, M1, C4 (n. 48), II. Respondeo, p. 75.

⁴⁸ See Rega Wood's article on Alexander's discussion of the divine ideas in his *Gloss on Lombard's Sentences and Disputed Questions*: Rega Wood, 'Distinct Ideas and Perfect Solitude: Alexander of Hales, Richard Rufus, and Odo Rigaldus,' *Franciscan Studies* 53 (1997): 7–31. See also Alexander of Hales, *Magistri Alexandri de Hales Glossa in quatuor libros Sententiarum Petri Lombardi*, 4 vols, Bibliotheca Franciscana Scholastica Medii Aevi, 12–5 (Quaracchi: Collegium S. Bonaventurae, 1951–7).

⁴⁹ SH I, P1, In1, Tr5, S1, Q1, M3, C1 (n. 168), Respondeo, pp. 250–1.

⁵⁰ SH I, P1, In1, Tr5, S1, Q1, M3, C2 (n. 169), Respondeo, p. 252.

⁵¹ SH I, P1, In1, Tr5, S1, Q1, M4, C1 (n. 175), II. Respondeo, p. 258.

⁵² SH I, P1, In1, Tr3, Q1, M1, C1 (n. 72), Respondeo, p. 113: '(...) "ens" sit primum intelligibile, eius intentio apud intellectum est nota [Avicenna, *Metaphysics* 1.6]; primae ergo determinationes entis sunt primae impressiones apud intellectum: eae sunt unum, verum, bonum, sic patebit; non poterunt ergo habere aliqua priora specialiter ad sui notificationem. Si ergo notificatio fiat eorum, hoc non erit nisi per posteriora, ut per abnegationem vel effectum consequentem' [Being is the first intelligible that is known to the intellect; therefore the first determinations of being are the first impressions on the intellect: these are unity, truth, goodness. And thus it is clear that these cannot have anything prior to them that is able to make them known. If therefore they are to be made known, this cannot happen except through posterior things, either through abnegation or through effects of a cause].

through piety or love for God, satisfies this pre-condition. It purifies the mind and thereby opens the door to the knowledge of Infinite Being whereby all finite beings can truly be known—and whereby God himself can be known through these beings to the limited extent that is currently possible.

The Trinity

In his magisterial history of Trinitarian doctrine, Theodore de Régnon defended the then novel thesis that the late Middle Ages witnessed the branching off of a new tradition of Trinitarian theological thinking from the previously relatively continuous tradition of Western Trinitarianism founded by Augustine.⁵³ From this time forward, he contends, there were two main traditions of Western Trinitarian thought, including the original tradition of Augustine, which was carried forward by the likes of Anselm and Peter Lombard, and which received mature expression in the work of Thomas Aquinas; and the new tradition, initially formulated by Richard of St Victor and later developed more fully by the Franciscans, who adhere to it to this day.⁵⁴

Augustine and Richard of St Victor on the Trinity

In order to throw the uniqueness of the Franciscan doctrine into relief, I will start by offering a brief synopsis of Augustine and Richard of St Victor's views on the Trinity.⁵⁵ For his part, Augustine draws a key distinction between terms applied to the essence of God and thus to all three persons—such as wise or omnipotent—and terms applied relatively to just one of the persons.⁵⁶ For instance, the Father is the beginning of the Trinity, whereas the Son is begotten or generated by him.⁵⁷ Likewise, the Spirit proceeds from the Father and the Son together.⁵⁸

In a later section of his famous *De Trinitate*, Augustine elaborates on what he means when he describes the relations between the three persons in this way. An analogy he finds especially apt for this purpose is that of the human mind, its knowledge and its will for knowledge. As the Father is the First Principle of the Trinity, so the mind is the beginning of all knowledge. Conversely, knowledge is what is gener-

53 Théodore De Régnon, *Études de théologie positive sur la Sainte Trinité*, 2 vols (Paris: Retaux, 1982).

54 See also Dominique Poirel, *Livre de la nature et débat trinitaire au XIIe siècle: le De tribus diebus de Hugues de Saint-Victor* (Turnhout: Brepols, 2002).

55 See especially Lewis Ayres, *Nicaea and Its Legacy* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004).

56 Augustine, *De Trinitate* 5.11 (hereafter, *trin.*); Lewis Ayres, *Augustine and the Trinity* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010).

57 *trin.* 5.13.

58 *trin.* 5.14.

ated by the mind as the Son is begotten by the Father. That very act of begetting—which requires the mind and knowledge together—implies a will or desire to know which serves as the impetus behind the act.

In the case of the Trinity, this love or desire consists in the Spirit, who is said to proceed from both the Father and the Son as the will or love that binds them together.⁵⁹ As the person that clinches the unity of the three persons of the Trinity, the Spirit acts in a manner not unlike the way a desire to know enacts a singular act of knowing on the part of the mind. Just as this act is ultimately one entity despite entailing mind, knowledge and love, consequently, so it is possible to affirm that the three persons in God, rather than undermining his unity, enact and uphold it.

Whereas Augustine seemingly took a psychological model as the foundation for his understanding of the Trinity, Richard proposes a communitarian or social model that is quite distinct from Augustine's, although he does uphold the crucial Latin doctrine of the *filioque*, that is, the procession of the Spirit from both the Father and the Son.⁶⁰ At the start of his discussion, Richard insists that God as the supreme good must be a God of love, since no being that is supremely good would withhold its goodness from another—or withhold love. Since love must be aimed at another, Richard concludes that there must be multiple persons in God.⁶¹

Because it is supremely perfect, however, God's love must be directed at someone of equal supremacy and dignity. Thus, there must be a second divine person who is equal in greatness to the first and who loves in an equally supreme way.⁶² Since the love of the first two persons must be the same in its nature, intensity and direction in order to achieve perfection on Richard's account, Richard concludes that perfect love consists in a 'shared love' on the part of the Father and Son for a third person, who is the full expression of their love.⁶³

Because the persons of the Trinity on this account 'possess an entirely single, identical and supremely simple being, it is not possible for them to differ from one another according to any qualitative distinction.'⁶⁴ Thus, Richard contends that the difference between the divine persons is not between their mode of relations, as in Augustine, but is instead entirely a question of their diverse origins. While the first person

is characterized by the fact that he does not proceed from any other person but he has another one proceeding from him, the second person is characterized by the fact that he proceeds from another person and that at the same time he has another person proceeding from him,

⁵⁹ *trin.* 10.11; cf. *trin.* 9.3 on self-knowledge.

⁶⁰ *trin.* 8.10.

⁶¹ *DT* 3.2 (Angelici, 116); cf. Nico den Bok, *Communicating the Most High: A Systematic Study of Person and Trinity in the Theology of Richard of St Victor (+1173)* (Paris: Brepols, 1996).

⁶² *DT* 3.3 (Angelici, 118).

⁶³ *DT* 3.19 (Angelici, 132).

⁶⁴ *DT* 4.15 (Angelici, 154).

though not in the primary sense that belongs to procession from the Father alone.⁶⁵

The third person proceeds from the first and the second persons, but does not himself give rise to another person. Put differently, the first person is characterized by a purely gratuitous or self-giving love; the second both gives and receives love; and the third is simply the object and reflection of divine love. In that sense, Richard posits, the relations of all three divine persons to one another are immediate: while this third person proceeds immediately from the first, insofar as the first is the initial source of divine love, he also proceeds immediately from the second, who directly expresses a love for the third that he himself receives also from the first person of the Trinity. As a result of the immediacy of their relations, each of the three persons is directly capable of loving the others as he himself is loved in a way that would not be possible were any additional persons added, and love thereby achieves its perfection.⁶⁶

The *Summa Halensis* on the Trinity

In developing its account of the Trinity, the *Summa* closely follows Richard's logic while expanding upon it even further. The central part of its work in this connection is conducted under the heading of two major sections on the generation of the Son and the procession of the Spirit from the Father which will be assessed at much greater length in Boyd Taylor Coolman's essay on the Trinity in a companion to this volume, *The Summa Halensis: Doctrines and Debates*. In arguing for the generation of the Son, the *Summa* follows Pseudo-Dionysius in arguing that good things are self-diffusive by nature, because what is good does not withhold itself.⁶⁷

⁶⁵ DT 5.13 (Angelici, 188).

⁶⁶ DT 5.11 (Angelici, 183).

⁶⁷ Pseudo-Dionysius, *De divinis nominibus*, 4.1; SH I, P1, In2, Tr1, Q1, Ti1, C1 (n. 295), arg. 1 b, p. 414: 'Bonum naturaliter et essentialiter est sui diffusivum; unde haec est laus boni, scilicet se diffundere, quia si poneretur duo bona in omnibus aequalia praeter quam in hoc quod unum suam bonitatem diffunderet, aliud non: constat quod bonum illud, quod se diffunderet, in hoc esset magis laudabile et melius alio bono quod se non diffunderet. Completa ergo ratio boni includit in se diffusionem; ergo ubi est summum bonum, ibi est summa diffusio; summa autem diffusio est qua maior excogitari non potest; maior autem diffusio cogitari non potest quam illa quae est secundum substantiam et maxime secundum totam; ergo summum bonum necessario se diffundit secundum substantiam totam, et in ipso naturaliter intelligitur haec diffusio; sed nihil aliud est virtus generativa nisi virtus diffusiva substantiae suae ad hoc ut producat simile in natura; ergo in summo intelligitur haec virtus summe et ab aeterno, cum illud bonum summum sit et aeternum; sed ubi est haec virtus est generatio; ergo generatio aeterna est' [The good is naturally and necessarily self-diffusive. Indeed, the glory of the good is to diffuse itself. Because if there are two goods which are equal in all respects, with the exception that one diffuses its goodness and the other does not, it is clear that the good that diffuses itself would in doing so be more praiseworthy and better than the other good that did not diffuse itself. Therefore, the full definition of the good entails self-diffusion. Therefore, where there is the highest good, there is the highest diffusion. However the highest diffusion is that than which a greater

In the greatest diffusion, it further contends, the whole substance of a being must be diffused. As the greatest being, consequently, God's power of diffusing is a power of producing something similar to himself in nature.⁶⁸ This is precisely what the generation of the Son involves, namely, what the *Summa* calls a procession by nature whereby the Father produces another like himself. Such a procession is also said to occur by intellect or knowledge insofar as the Father knows himself in the Son that is his image.

From this point, the *Summa* goes on to consider the procession of the Holy Spirit.⁶⁹ Building on its previous arguments concerning the naturally self-diffusive nature of the good, the *Summa* states that such self-giving essentially implies love. While the Father is the source of a purely gratuitous or self-giving love (*amor gratuitus*), the Son enjoys a love that is both received and given (*amor permixtus*). According to the *Summa*, however, the love they share cannot achieve perfection unless it is exactly the same in its nature, intensity, and direction.⁷⁰ On this basis, the *Summa* concludes that the Father and Son possess a common love for the Spirit, who is therefore the object of a purely receptive love (*amor debitus*). As such, the Spirit is the full and final expression of the shared love, or *condilectio*, of the first two persons of the Trinity and is consequently said to proceed from the Father and the Son not by nature but by desire or will.⁷¹

cannot be conceived. And a greater diffusion cannot be conceived than one that is according to substance and, even more, maximally according to the whole [substance]. Therefore the highest good necessarily diffuses itself according to its whole substance, and this [kind of] diffusion is naturally understood [to be] in it. But the power of generating is nothing other than the power of diffusing one's own substance so that something similar in nature is produced. Therefore the highest being is understood to possess this power in the highest degree from eternity, as that highest good is also eternal. But where there is this power, there is generation. Therefore there is eternal generation].

68 *SH* I, P1, In2, Tr1, Q1, Ti1, C1 (n. 295), arg. 1 b, p. 414.

69 *SH* I, P1, In2, Tr1, Q1, Ti2 (nn. 304–11), pp. 438–53.

70 *DT* 3.19, quoted in *SH* I, P1, In2, Tr1, Q1, Ti2, C5 (n. 311), Respondeo, p. 453: 'Quando unus alteri amorem impendit et solus solum diligit, dilectio quidem est, sed condilectio non est. Quando duo se mutuo diligunt et istius in illum, illius in istum affectus discurrit et quasi in diversa tendit, utrobique quidem dilectio est, sed condilectio non est. Condilectio vero est cum a duobus diligentibus tertius concorditer diligitur et socialiter amatur et duorum affectus tertii amoris incendio in unum conflatur. Ex iis itaque patet quod in ipsa divinitate condilectio locum non haberet, si duobus existentibus tertia persona deesset' [Thus, Richard says: 'when one loves another and is alone in doing so, there is *dilectio*, but not *condilectio*. What two mutually love each other however and reciprocally demonstrate intense desire, this affection, of the first for the second and the second for the first, is dispersed and turned in various directions. There is love on both sides but there is not co-love. Co-love occurs when a third is loved by the two in harmony and collectively (*concorditer et socialiter*) so that the two persons' affects are fused to become one because of the flame of love for the third'].

71 *DT* 3.15, quoted in *SH* I, P1, In2, Tr1, Q1, Ti2, C5 (n. 311), Respondeo, p. 453: 'Quamdiu enim iste ab alio solus diligitur, praecipuae dulcedinis suae delicias solus possidere videtur; similiter et alius, quamdiu condilectum non habet, praecipui gaudii communione caret; ut autem uterque possit istiusmodi delicias communicare, oportet eos condilectum habere' ['But as long as one is the sole person being loved by another, he alone enjoys the delights of this highest sweetness; similarly, even the

Although the *Summa* like Richard thus finds a way to incorporate Augustine's psychological analogy in which the Son and Spirit are likened to intellect and will, respectively, along with the *filioque*, it also clearly follows Richard in recasting these Augustinian principles within a completely different, social, framework. Within this framework, the persons of the Trinity share an identical—or univocal—sort of love. Thus, they are not distinguished as in Augustine's thought by the ways in which they communicate that love relative to one another. Instead, they are differentiated in terms of their varying points of origin, as happens in many Greek models of the Trinity. Thus, the Father is defined in terms of the fact that he does not derive from another principle, that he is innascible or unbegotten and ungenerate, precisely insofar as he is Father to the Son. In turn, the Son is defined in terms of the fact that he proceeds from the Father by way of filiation, while the Spirit does so by means of spiration or serving as the breath of life, which is love.⁷²

Reassessing the Relationship between Alexander and Augustine

As the foregoing analysis has demonstrated, there are reasons to re-think the theory that early Franciscans, particularly the authors of the *Summa Halensis*, are essentially Augustinian in their outlook. The first case study calls this theory into question by illustrating how they manipulated Augustinian quotations, took them out of context, and changed their meaning in order to achieve their own intellectual ends. In short, it shows that scholastics often had reasons for citing figures like Augustine which had little to do with presenting an authentic interpretation of Augustine—reasons to do with their efforts to align their own often novel perspectives to a longstanding tradition and thereby lend them authority in the way that was considered appropriate and standard practice at the time.

What, then, were the perspectives the Franciscans sought to bolster? As I have suggested elsewhere, one major concern of the mature Alexander may have been to translate Francis of Assisi's ministerial and spiritual vision into theological and philosophical terms that would justify the Franciscan involvement in the university context—although it would not have been customary to say as much in a university textbook like the *Summa Halensis*. Regardless, however, Alexander and his colleagues were Franciscans before they were readers of Augustine or any other authority.

other is deprived of the highest joy of communion as long as he does not have *condilectio*, or the ability to share his love with the first for a third. Thus, 'if both are to be able to communicate delights, it is necessary that they have *condilectio*, or a third person they can love together in the same manner. This of course is the Holy Spirit].

72 SH I, P2, In2, Tr3, S1, Q1, M3, C3 (n. 467), Respondeo, p. 668.

Their religious affiliation took priority over their affiliation to past authorities when it came to developing their system of thought.

What was central in this effort to render Francis' vision in an intellectual form was the development of relevant doctrines of God and of God as Triune, doctrines which we have seen depart significantly from the longstanding Augustinian tradition. These fundamental doctrines inevitably shaped all further ideas Franciscans developed about the nature of reality as created by God, the nature of the human being as an image of God—and thus the nature of human knowing and willing—what the loss of the image through sin and its recovery through the redemptive work of Christ entails. To articulate a doctrine of God that captured Francis' vision of God was therefore to set the stage for the development of further ideas that were consistent with that vision.

What then makes the doctrines pertaining to God outlined above compatible with Francis' vision?⁷³ In the first place, the doctrine of divine immensity or infinity made it possible for Franciscans to give an account of a God who loved and cared for all creatures great and small—the kind of God Francis worshipped. Although Augustine's doctrine of simplicity certainly did not undermine the reality of such a God, it tended to emphasize his total otherness or incommensurability with all known beings, making it slightly more difficult though certainly not impossible to explain the individual and specific sense in which they exist in him, and he manifests himself in them. Similarly, the related notion of an innate human knowledge of Being, which is in fact derived from Avicenna—made it possible for Franciscans to explain Francis' intuitive connection with God as well as his ability to find God in all things and thus to know those things with a sort of divine insight.

When it came to delineating the doctrine of the Trinity, Richard of St Victor's account presumably appealed to the Summists because the Father's total self-diffusiveness served effectively to portray Francis' vision of what God is like—and what human beings should be like who attempt to image God, namely, completely self-sacrificial and self-impoverishing.⁷⁴ The role of the Spirit in the Godhead further bespeaks the totally passive or receptive position creation and humanity must assume with reference to God: it stresses that creatures are entirely dependent upon his sustaining, gratuitous love in a way Francis himself always emphasized. Furthermore, the mediating role of the Son, who stands in the middle between the Father and the Son, plays well into a wider vision of the direct and complete way the Father

⁷³ The vision and values of Francis, as authors around this time understood them, become especially clear in the writings of Francis himself and in the early biographies by Thomas of Celano, which can be found in *St Francis of Assisi: Early Documents*, 3 vols, ed. Regis J. Armstrong, J.A. Wayne Hellman and William J. Short (New York: New City Press, 1999–2001). On the way in which early Franciscans understood their intellectual life, see the important recent work by Neslihan Senocak, *The Poor and the Perfect: The Rise of Learning in the Franciscan Order 1209–1310* (Ithaca: Cornell, 2012).

⁷⁴ Maria Calisi, *Trinitarian Perspectives in the Franciscan Theological Tradition* (St Bonaventure, NY: Franciscan Institute, 2008).

transfers his ideas to the Son, who in turn instantiates them in the Spirit in a similar manner. It reinforces the Franciscan perspective on all creatures as direct instantiations of a divine idea and thus divine love which should be understood and dealt with by humans in accordance with their elevated and indeed spiritual status.

As I have been trying to suggest, these two departures from Augustine on the most fundamental aspects of the Franciscan intellectual vision should lead us to be suspicious about arguments that describe Franciscans as purely Augustinian on any other matters they address. In the context of discussing other matters, such as the nature of human knowledge, we have learned, Franciscans may have been using Augustine in inauthentic ways—which were nonetheless regarded as appropriate use under the auspices of scholasticism—that do not necessarily indicate an allegiance to him.

Although I cannot in the space provided here go through every single major philosophical or theological issue where Augustine is treated as a central authority by Franciscans, I have endeavoured in the above to provide a point of departure for doing so. While the second and third case studies illustrate the ‘spirit’ behind the ‘letter’ of Franciscan writings which we must always bear in mind when reading Franciscans texts, the first case study sensitizes us to the complexities of the ‘letter’ of scholastic thought, predisposing us to be more discerning regarding the spirit it endeavours to convey through its complex modes of argumentation. What remains therefore is for scholars to deploy these tools in the effort to re-read the texts associated with Alexander and the early Franciscan intellectuals with regard to their relationship to Augustine. My own suspicion is that they will find that early Franciscans were some of if not the greatest innovators of the Franciscan order and even of the medieval tradition as a whole.

Mark Edwards

Evil in Dionysius the Areopagite, Alexander of Hales and Thomas Aquinas

Abstract: This paper examines Alexander of Hales' use and reconciliation of apparently dissonant quotations from Dionysius on two related questions, the knowability of God and the origin of evil. Noting that Alexander, as a junior colleague of Robert Grosseteste, was one of the first to make extensive use of Dionysius, it shows that he normally cites him in conjunction with Augustine and other Latin writers rather than according an independent authority to him. It is also argued that, although Alexander in some respects anticipates the conclusions of Aquinas, which are also reinforced by appeals to Dionysius, he is more inclined to admit the substantiality of evil.

Theology is distinguished from philosophy, not only by its loftier subject-matter, but by its principled subordination of reason to tradition in the investigation of that subject-matter. No professing Christian before the 18th century called the inerrancy of the Scriptures into question, and any church that purported to be catholic held fast to the decrees of at least four oecumenical councils, while according presumptive authority also to certain individuals whom it esteemed as fathers, doctors or apologists for the true faith. For the scholastics Augustine was the cynosure of a Latin constellation whose lesser stars were Hilary, Ambrose, Jerome, Gregory the Great, Isidore of Seville and (by about 1200) as recent a saint as Anselm; they too, if less often quoted, were not to be contradicted, and the same was true of the easterners John Chrysostom and John Damascene, who were now and then co-opted (through Latin versions) to give the stamp of universality to the same truths. We should not infer that all originality was precluded: authority might determine what the church was to believe, but not what means of proving it might be employed by a given exponent, while there were numerous corollaries and implications of these normative tenets on which it was possible for good Christians to differ. To be original meant not so much to establish new beliefs as to show, with unprecedented clarity and fullness, what had always been involved in the belief of the church from the time of the apostles.

We need not wonder, therefore, that the Dionysian corpus was adopted with such eagerness by the more innovative thinkers of the 12th century. The author by his own account was among the first neophytes of the apostle Paul, while in reality he was the very model of a scholastic, bringing forth thoughts that were new to the church of his epoch under cover of high antiquity, and mingling the discourses of Paul and Plato as his mediaeval admirers called on Aristotle to ratify pronouncements which had already met the test of orthodoxy. Among these latter-day pupils of the Stagirate, Dionysius sometimes claims an authority second only to that of Augustine; this is evident above all in their appeals to the Dionysian excursus on the nature of evil,

which is at once the author's most extensive plagiarism from the Greeks and one of his most seminal contributions to the speculative thought of the Middle Ages. As a preface to scrutiny of the relevant passages in the *Summa Halensis*, I shall briefly review the content of the Dionysian corpus and the history of its reception in the west before Alexander; the paper will conclude with a note on the application of the same texts to similar questions in Aquinas' essay on evil, which, while it is undoubtedly the work of a greater scholar and logician, might not have been the work that it is had he not been able to build on the groundwork laid by his predecessor.

The Dionysian Corpus

The Dionysian corpus is a body of Greek texts, consisting in its present form of five works, the *Divine Names*, the *Celestial Hierarchy*, the *Ecclesiastical Hierarchy*, the *Mystical Theology* and ten Epistles.¹ These works make occasional reference to other works by the same hand, which for all that we know are fictitious. Even those that remain are not what they purport to be, for while the author professes to be Dionysius (or Denys) the Areopagite, Paul's convert at Acts 17:34,² his lucubrations were entirely unknown before the first quarter of the 5th century. Moreover, both his vocabulary and his metaphysical premisses are patently indebted to Proclus, a Platonist of the 5th century, whose teaching on providence is at times transcribed almost word for word in an excursus on the origin of evil in the fourth book of the *Divine Names*.³ Recent scholarship has also brought to light his affinities with Damascius, another Athenian Platonist who is likely to have been an exact contemporary of the author.⁴ Ancient and modern readers who were able to make the comparison surmised that it was the Platonists who had embraced the theology of Dionysius; no modern commentator with any historical sense, however, will suppose that the

1 The standard modern edition is *Corpus Dionysiacum*, vol. 1, *De Divinis Nominibus* (hereafter, *DN*), ed. Beate Regina Suchla; vol. 2, *De Coelesti Hierarchia, De Ecclesiastica Hierarchia, De Mystica Theologia, Epistulae*, ed. Günter Heil and Adolf Martin Ritter, *Patristische Texte und Studien*, 33, 36 (Berlin: De Gruyter, 1990–1).

2 On the significance of the pseudonym in its relation to Acts 9:3, 2 Cor. 12:4 and above all Acts 17:23, see Charles M. Stang, *Apophysis and Pseudonymity in Dionysius the Areopagite* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2012).

3 Hugo Koch, *Pseudo-Dionysius Areopagita in seinen Beziehungen zum Neuplatonismus und Mysterienwesen* (Mainz: Kirschheim, 1900); and especially Josef Stiglmayr, 'Der Neuplatoniker Proklos als Vorlage des sog. Dionysius Areopagita in der Lehre von Übel,' *Historisches Jahrbuch* 16 (1895): 253–73.

4 Carlo Maria Mazzucchi, 'Damascio, autore del Corpus Dionysiacum, e il dialogo *Peri politikês epistēmês*,' *Aevum* 80 (2006): 299–34. For a more temperate estimate of the author's debt to the Athenian school, see Sarah Klitenic Wear and John M. Dillon, *Dionysius the Areopagite and the Neoplatonist Tradition* (Aldershot: Ashgate, 2007).

church was able to develop thoughts of such rigour and complexity in the 1st century, or that having done so it would have let them fall into 400 years of desuetude.

The author is by his own profession a Christian, quoting far more than anyone in the apostolic age would have been able to quote from the corpus that we now know as the New Testament, and lapsing into patent anachronism with his citations from Ignatius and from Clement of Alexandria. The corpus was none the less accepted as genuine in the Middle Ages, and Papal claims were partially grounded in the *Ecclesiastical Hierarchy*. John of Scythopolis added *Glosses*, which were often translated along with the corpus in the Western tradition.⁵ The commentaries of Maximus the Confessor were also frequently consulted. In the 9th century, John Scotus Eriugena translated the corpus into a language so heavily calqued on the Greek that it was at times barely recognisable as Latin.⁶ Abbot Hilduin of St Denys seems to have revised this version to render it more readable, but without personal knowledge of Greek.⁷ Between 1130 and 1160 John Sarracenus (probably a Greek speaker) translated the corpus into more lucid Latin, correcting some of Eriugena's errors. His translation was the basis of the *Glosses* of Thomas Gallus on the *Mystical Theology*,⁸ as well as of the English treatise of the 14th century, *Denys Hid Divinite*, which comes from the same hand as the *Cloud of Unknowing*.⁹

Five fatherless texts had thus become the cornerstone of Western mysticism, although no word for this phenomenon had yet been coined and the author himself would not now be regarded as one of its typical exemplars. So much was apparent already to the contemplative author of *Denys Hid Divinite* (most probably a Carthusian) who supplements the translation of Sarracenus with his own regimen for emptying the mind of its everyday lumber and attaining a transcendental mode of cognition. By contrast, the chief objective of the Dionysian corpus is not to give precepts for achieving immediate knowledge of God, but to reconcile the anthropomorphic language of Scripture with the philosophic principle that God is known best through negation of all predicates. This apophatic mode of apprehension must be balanced by the kataphatic mode, derived from Scripture, in which some terms represent qualities which God possesses 'super-eminently', while others must be understood sym-

5 Paul Rorem and John C. Lamoreaux, *John of Scythopolis and the Dionysian Corpus: Annotating the Areopagite* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1998).

6 On his habit of passing from 'word to word or even from syllable to syllable, without paying much heed to the drift of his author's argument', see Philip Levine, 'Two Early Latin Versions of St Gregory of Nyssa's *περί κατασκευῆς ἀνθρώπου*,' *Harvard Theological Review* 63 (1958): 480. I owe this reference to Lydia Schumacher.

7 G. Thery, 'Jean Sarrazin, traducteur de Scot Erigène,' in *Studia mediaevalia in honorem admodum reverendi patris R. Martin* (Bruges: Du Tempel, 1948), 359–81.

8 James McEvoy, *Mystical Theology: The Glosses by Thomas Gallus and the Commentary of Robert Grosseteste on 'De Mystica Theologia'* (Leuven: Peeters, 2003). See also Gallus, *Commentaire du Cantique des Cantiques*, ed. Jeanne Barbet (Paris: Vrin, 1967).

9 See further Cheryl Taylor, 'The *Cloud*-Author's Remaking of the Pseudo-Dionysius' *Mystical Theology*,' *Medium Aevum* 75 (2006): 202–18.

bologically. Modern research has stressed the liturgical context implied by the hierarchical treatises and the author's indebtedness to the ascetic tradition.¹⁰ Protestant readings have until recently concentrated on the 'mysticism' of the *Divine Names* and *Mystical Theology*, thereby exaggerating (with approval or disapproval) the common ground between its religiosity and that of the pagan schools.

We are less inclined to characterize this alleged disciple of Proclus as a philosopher, though this is the garb in which he was presented by Robert Grosseteste, one of Oxford's earliest teachers in theology, who probably encountered the corpus during his sojourn in Paris.¹¹ A man of great parts, who may have been Chancellor of the University and left it to become the Bishop of Lincoln, Grosseteste favoured the study of primary texts against the new custom of basing all disputation on the *Sentences* of Peter Lombard.¹² In an age when few were polyglots, he acquired a sufficient knowledge of Greek to translate not only the Dionysian writings but also the letters of Ignatius, thus preserving the substance of the most authentic recension of the latter for the 300 years during which the Greek was lost. For all his endeavours to grasp the whole scheme of things in one imaginative vision,¹³ Grosseteste was in the modern sense no mystic, and his rendering was less serviceable than that of Sarracenus to the interests of his Victorine friend Thomas Gallus. Where Gallus maintains in his *Commentary on the Song of Songs* that love supplants reason as we approach the ineffable, Grosseteste cannot deny reason a place in the apprehension of God. Certainly the quest entails the purgation of sense and intellect, but the darkness to which it escorts us is itself a mode of light, as Dionysius testifies at *Divine Names* 4.4. Thus he confirms the ubiquitous teaching of the English scholar, that the essence of the intellectual realm is a supernal light which passes through a series of devolutions to appear at last as a sensible emanation from the sun, by which we see both the sun itself and all other bodies. Although his translation did not come into immediate use,¹⁴ Grosseteste communicated his high esteem for the Areopagite to two other Englishmen, his friend Adam Marsh (the author, some think, of the *Glosses* on the *Mystical Theology* which are attributed to Gallus¹⁵), and his junior colleague at the university, the Greekless but indefatigable Alexander of Hales.¹⁶

10 Andrew Louth, *Denys the Areopagite* (London: Geoffrey Chapman, 1989); Alexander Golitzin, *Mystagogy: A Monastic reading of Dionysius Areopagita* (Dubuque, IA: Cistercian Publications, 2013).

11 See James McEvoy, *Robert Grosseteste* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000), 16, also 117–20 on Grosseteste as translator.

12 In this he was not followed by Alexander; see McEvoy, *Grosseteste*, 160–2.

13 See Robert Grosseteste, *Templum Dei*, ed. and trans. Josef Goering and Frank Anthony Carl Mantello (Toronto: Pontifical Institute of Medieval Studies, 1984).

14 Thus in *Summa Halensis* (see below, n. 18) Vol 3, In1, Tr1, Hales reads *adversaria* at DN 4.20, with Sarracenus, rather than *repugnantia*, as in Grosseteste.

15 See McEvoy, *Mystical Theology*, 125.

16 I use his name by courtesy, but the source for this part of the *Summa Halensis* appears to be John of La Rochelle's *Summa de Vitiis*: see D.O. Lottin, 'Alexandre de Halès et la "Summa de Vitiis" de Jean de la Rochelle,' *Recherches de théologie ancienne et médiévale* 1 (1929): 240–3.

The Great Questions

But what would an English scholar of the early 13th century gain by reading Dionysius, at a time when some still doubted whether one could read Aristotle and be saved? While Aristotle was the most esteemed of the Greek philosophers, the intellectual lodestar of the Western church was Augustine, who was also its permanent touchstone of orthodoxy. Dionysius, alone of the Eastern fathers, was a philosopher of comparable stature; his debt to Proclus, according to modern estimates, outweighed even that of Augustine to Plotinus, though it may be that Alexander's contemporaries, unaware that the *Liber de Causis* was based on the *Elements of Theology* by Proclus, were reading the latter unwittingly as an Aristotelian counterpoint to Augustine's Platonism. The Victorines of the 12th century, impressed above all by the *Celestial Hierarchies*, made Dionysius the bedrock of their mystical commentaries; the philosophical synthesis of Augustine and Dionysius was above all the work of Parisian theologians, culminating in the *Summa Theologiae* of Aquinas, together with his commentaries on the *Liber de Causis* and on the *Divine Names*. We must not underestimate the difficulties which lie in the way of such a synthesis. The very fact that Augustine is, if anything, more of a mystic than Dionysius—that is, more apt to dwell on the perturbations and ecstasies of the interior life—gives a more introspective character to his thought, whether he is meditating on his own acts of memory in the hope of bringing to light the nature of time or demonstrating that the first, and only free, transgression of Adam is the ineluctable cause of moral corruption in all his progeny save One. Just as he perfectly illustrates, and indeed is largely responsible for, the forensic tendency in Latin thought, so Dionysius exemplifies what we may call the doxological tendency of the Eastern tradition, for which the capital question is, not 'How can I be saved?' but 'Whom do I worship?'

We look in vain through the multitudinous writings of Augustine for the rich ecclesiology and the detailed angelology that occupy two of the five books in the Dionysian corpus;¹⁷ conversely, when we read Dionysius on evil, we may feel that he concedes everything to the Platonists who ascribe not only evil but our perception of it to ignorance, betraying no sense of the gravity of sin, and no experience of that struggle between the spirit and the flesh which had prompted Paul to cry out 'Wretched man that I am!' When all account is taken of the manifold adumbrations of his teaching in the liturgies, the ascetic disciplines and the theological reflections of the Eastern church, it can be argued without absurdity that the incarnation of Christ is of only passing interest to him, that he worships an impersonal Godhead rather than the one God in three persons, and that his apophatic theology permits him to make

¹⁷ Lydia Schumacher points out to me that the treatise *De Angelis* in the *Summa Halensis* draws heavily on the *Celestial Hierarchies* of Dionysius. See also Mark J. Edwards, 'Aquinas on Ephesians and Colossians,' in *Aquinas on Scripture*, ed. Thomas G. Weinandy, Daniel A. Keating, and John P. Yocum (London: A. and C. Black 2005), 149–65.

what he will of Scripture—in short, that he is essentially a Platonist, and that even his best thoughts, such as his apparent universalism, are rendered possible only by his refusal to bow, as Augustine does, to the ineluctable consequences of linear and literal exegesis. Again it can be argued that his most famous gift to Christian thought—his proclamation that God is not one being among other beings, to be circumscribed by any distension of the human intellect or by any word that human speech can furnish—was already a commonplace of the Latin tradition, from Novatian to Augustine. All this being true, it is clear none the less that once it entered Western thought the Dionysian strain could not be removed from it, not only because it gave apostolic warrant to the practice of philosophy but because it cemented the ratiocinative with the devotional faculties, the seeking of God with the service of his Word, in a manner that was rather foreshadowed than accomplished even in Augustine. In his determination to marry the two, Alexander laid the foundation for the work of and was a true precursor to Aquinas, and never more so than in his meditations on the nature of being and in the origin of that aberration from being to which Augustine and Dionysius alike had given the name of evil.

We shall now consider the role of Dionysius in the solution of three questions which are posed by Alexander. The first, as to whether evil has a principle, appears to have been conflated with the question whether evil *has* a principle. The second, which concerns the existence of evil, is partly anticipated by the negative reply to the first, while the third, regarding the provenance of evil, is as much a recapitulation of the two foregoing questions as a logical successor. While Alexander's division of his material no doubt requires some explication, the present paper sets itself the more limited object of illustrating his efforts to harmonize Dionysian teaching on the one hand with Aristotelian metaphysics and on the other with the Latin tradition stemming from Augustine.

Is Evil a Principle?¹⁸

Any attempt to explain the presence of evil in the created world must commence with an inquiry into the rationale of creation. Alexander undertakes this in Book 2 Part 1 Section 1 of the *Summa*: 'on creation according to cause'. The rubric of the first question is 'on the first cause according to substance'. We shall paraphrase the argument according to the heads under which it is divided in the *Summa*:

¹⁸ All citations of Alexander are from Alexander of Hales, *Doctoris irrefragabilis Alexandri de Hales Ordinis minorum Summa theologica (SH)*, 4 vols (Quaracchi: Collegium S. Bonaventurae, 1924–48).

Head 1: 'is there a principle of all things?'

The answer, as ever, is already determined at the outset, for the argument that the mutable must be grounded in the mutable is upheld by Isidore of Seville and by John Damascene, two authors of unimpeachable orthodoxy.¹⁹ The fact that both are encyclopaedists may explain why they, and not more innovative thinkers, have been summoned as witnesses to a universal platitude.

Head 2: 'what kind of thing is the first principle?'

This is a question more open to debate, and, while we have Damascene's testimony that the answer cannot be known *in via* (that is, under the conditions of a fallen world),²⁰ we must turn to Dionysius to learn the reason for this proviso. His major premiss,²¹ advanced as a tautology, is that any being which is beyond contemplation and comprehension must be inapprehensible by the senses; anyone familiar with his writings will be able to supply the minor premiss that the superessential God is such a being. Hence it follows that he must be inapprehensible to all sensory powers, just as it follows that, since he is the Good that surpasses all reason, he cannot be an object of reason. Alexander seems to assume that we know the first principle to be God: a second quotation from Dionysius reinforces the lesson that he or it is super-unknowable and cut off from all because he or it cannot be thought of, expressed or in any manner contemplated.²²

So far we have heard little more than asseveration. Alexander himself does the work of proof by showing that none of the five modes of predication acknowledged by Aristotle is applicable to the first cause. When he quotes Dionysius again, it is not to corroborate this reasoning but to bring up an objection: does not the great doctor witness against himself when he deduces from Rom. 1:20 that God is the being, the life, the cause and principle of all?²³ This intimation that God is knowable after all is verified by Augustine's description of him as the light who makes himself visible, while Aristotle (or rather Avicenna) completes the triad by characterizing being as that which makes the first impression on the intellect.²⁴ If we assume the identity

19 SH II (n. 1), p. 2a, citing Isidore, *Sentences* 1.1.13 and Damascene, *On the Orthodox Faith* 1.3. I do not ask here whether Alexander is always faithful to Isidore and Damascene in his citations; even his misrepresentations, of course, pay tribute to their authority.

20 SH II (n. 1), p. 2a, citing Damascene, *On the Orthodox Faith* 1.4, though the distinction between truth *in via* and truth *in patria* belongs to the scholastic era.

21 SH II (n. 2), p. 2b, citing DN 1.1.

22 DN 1.5 (Suchla, 115.11–15).

23 SH II (n. 2), p. 3b, citing DN 1.3 (Suchla, 111.12–13).

24 Augustine, *On the Trinity* 4.28; Avicenna, *Commentary on the Metaphysics* 1.5.

of God and being, it seems that the foremost philosophers agree in declaring him to be an object of cognition.

And yet, since they are the foremost, they must concur not only with one another, but with their own teachings elsewhere and with the received position of the church. The solution is that the one who is unknowable *in via* is none the less knowable *in patria*, that is, in our proper place: as Scripture itself assures us, a day will come when ‘we shall see him as he is’ (1 John 3:3). Because the knowledge of which Aristotle and Augustine speak is not immediately available to us *in via*, God is rightly said to be unknowable in substance. According to his affects, however, he can be known, as Dionysius explains.²⁵

Head 3, Article 1: ‘are there two principles, one of good and one of evil?’

This question is inspired by the dualistic theology—hostile, by report at least, to the world, the church and the body—to which the mediaeval inquisitors gave the name Catharism.²⁶ The crusade against the Albigensian Cathars took place in Alexander’s youth, and the Dominican order was founded in 1216 to give an intellectual funeral to the heresy which had already been refuted by the sword.²⁷ The Franciscans were equally faithful to the church in affirming the goodness of creation (notwithstanding their vows of poverty and celibacy) and in denouncing the Cathars as latter-day Manichaeans,²⁸ thus the voice of Augustine, which had silenced their progenitors, dictates that the answer to Alexander’s question must be ‘no’.²⁹ For the proof he returns to Aristotle’s five senses of the term ‘principle’.³⁰ Thus if we mean by a principle that which is more elementary in the order of knowledge, evil cannot be a principle in this sense, as it is always defined by contrast with the good. Again it cannot be a material principle, for evil has no characteristic matter. Nor can it be an initiator of motion, since evil is not an efficient cause but the consequence of deficiency. These three arguments presuppose the understanding of evil as a mutilation of being which has already been established on the authority of Augustine and Dionysius. The fourth argument—that evil cannot be a final cause because the object of willing is always the good—is wholly consonant with the teaching of Dionysius, and with the

25 SH II (n. 2), p. 4a.

26 See *Livre des deux principes*, ed. Christine Thouzellier, Sources Chrétiennes, 198 (Paris: Cerf, 1973). On the name Cathar see Jan N. Bremmer, *The Rise and Fall of the Afterlife* (London: Routledge, 2002), 67–70.

27 See Laurence W. Marvin, *The Occitan War* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2008).

28 The grounds of the accusation are explained in Steven Runciman, *The Mediaeval Manichee* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1947).

29 SH II (n. 3), p. 4b, citing Augustine, *On the Customs of the Manichees* 3.5.

30 SH II (n. 3), p. 5b.

Platonic strain in Augustine, but ignores those pathological cases of willing evil as evil which he cites as evidence of the *primaeval* corruption of human nature. Alexander does not, however, invoke Dionysius by name until he comes to the fifth and final sense of principle as first cause: the pronouncement in the *Divine Names* that evil is causeless³¹ is somewhat obscurely assumed to preclude its being a cause of other things.

Objections to this assertion of the non-being of evil are drawn from the fact that good and evil are antonyms, and that both are possible objects of volition. Augustine, when he writes with his Pauline rather than his Platonic hand, is the patron of the latter objection,³² and hence unanswerable where he himself appears to rebut it. Thus it is he, not Dionysius or Aristotle, whom Alexander repeatedly seeks as his ally when he contends that evil is at most a principle by deficit, and so not equipollent with the good.³³ Nevertheless, for all the rhetorical efficacy of drawing one's arguments chiefly from a recalcitrant interlocutor, it seems fair to say that Alexander assimilates Augustine to Dionysius (and hence to Aristotle, albeit interpreted in the light of Avicenna³⁴) not only because it would be impossible to reverse the manoeuvre but because his theodicy cannot allow any substance to evil, on pain of making God the author of sin.

What Then is Evil?

Although it might seem that the non-existence of evil has already been established, Alexander proceeds to a new heading, 'On evil considered absolutely'. His opening question is:³⁵

Book 2 Part 2 Inquiry 1 Treatise 1 Question 1: 'does evil exist?'

The foregoing arguments might be thought to imply a negative answer to this question, all the more so when Alexander interprets the Johannine dictum, 'without him nothing came into being', to mean that evil is that nothing which came into being without the Word. Statements of the same tenor are adduced from Augustine, Greg-

31 SH II (n. 3), p. 5b, citing DN 4.30 (Suchla, 175.16).

32 SH II (n. 3), p. 6a, citing Question 21 of Augustine's 83 Questions.

33 See especially SH II (n. 3), p. 6b, citing Augustine, *City of God* 12.7.

34 On the diffusion of Avicenna's works, and their arrival in Paris, see Amos Bertolacci, 'On the Latin Reception of Avicenna's Metaphysics before Albertus Magnus: An Attempt at Periodization,' in *The Arabic, Hebrew and Latin Reception of Avicenna's Metaphysics*, ed. Dag Nikolaus Hasse and Amos Bertolacci (Berlin: De Gruyter 2012), 197–218.

35 SH III (n. 1), p. 3.

ory the Great, Isidore and Anselm, but it is Dionysius who supplies a battery of authoritative testimonies to the non-existence of evil:

(a) 'nothing does what it does with the nature of evil as its end';³⁶

(b) 'everything that exists is good, insofar as it exists';

(c) 'evil has no substance but is contrary to substance'³⁷

and he proves that evil has no seat in any of the orders of being (angelic, animal, natural, corporeal, material).³⁸

But since the thesis that evil does not exist was introduced by the words 'it would seem', we know that we are awaiting the antithesis. Alexander's method, as always, is not to set one author against another but to set text against text from the writings of the same author. Thus Augustine, always the chief authority, bears witness against himself when he identifies the good with order, granting to evil a subordinate status which is something more than nullity, since it testifies to the supremacy of the good. The consilience of Augustine and Dionysius entails that each must echo the other even in his dissonances: we are thus not surprised to hear the latter declaring that 'if there is no evil, virtue and malignity are the same'³⁹—from which it follows, since they are evidently not the same, that evil must exist. Again, he asserts, as clearly as Augustine, that 'what is wholly destitute of good does not exist',⁴⁰ yet he is also at one with Augustine in his conviction that 'nothing evil is wholly destitute of good'. This does not in fact entail that evil exists, unless it is shown that *only* those things which are destitute of good are non-existent: in concluding that evil must in some sense exist, Alexander has surreptitiously translated a sufficient condition ('if x is wholly destitute of good, it does not exist') into a necessary condition ('if and only if x is wholly destitute of good, it does not exist'; or conversely, 'if and only if x does not exist, it must be wholly destitute of good').

He resolves his own dilemma with the characteristic maxim that there is a sense in which evil exists and another sense in which it does not. It may possess existence by reason, by nature or by custom. Existence in the first sense (*esse rationis*) is the adequation of a thing with the mind; inasmuch as the mind perceives evil as a deformity in creatures, it has this species of existence. Again, it has *esse naturae*, 'existence by nature', inasmuch as its natural effects are clearly perceived. On the other hand, inasmuch as it exists by custom, it does not exist, for it does not belong to the world as ordained by God. The meaning of existence by custom (*esse moris*) will be explained below, under Question 3, Member 1, Head 3.

³⁶ DN 4.19 (Suchla, 163.17–19, cf. 176.15)

³⁷ DN 4.20 (Suchla, 168.11); DN 4.31 (Suchla, 177.1).

³⁸ DN 4.22–30 (Suchla, 169.20–176.8).

³⁹ DN 4.19 (Suchla, 164.4–6).

⁴⁰ DN 4.33 (Suchla, 178.5–7).

The four negative assertions of Dionysius are thus to be understood as follows:

- (a) While evil does not exist as an end, we cannot deduce from this that it is non-existent in every other sense.
- (b) Dionysius means that a thing is deprived of being only inasmuch as it is deprived of goodness; the point appears to be that the quoted dictum allows for the existence of that which is evil so long as it contains some residual good.
- (c) 'Substance' is here to be understood as 'form', and while evil is contrary to form it does not follow that it lacks matter. The notion that matter can exist without form is ascribed by Alexander to Aristotle on the authority of Avicenna.
- (d) By 'seat' Dionysius means a natural habitation, and he is therefore saying only that evil has no natural place in any order of being, not that it is nowhere to be found.

Dionysius himself, according to Alexander, clearly acknowledges the ambivalent status of matter: 'it neither exists nor is the efficacious cause of things existent, but exists on account of matter, and is the efficacious cause of things that are good.'⁴¹ Alexander adds on his own account that it is one thing to say that evil corrupts and another to say that fire does so, because fire corrupts wood according to its form, i.e. its essence, whereas evil, as mere privation, has no essence and corrupts by impairing the form of another thing. Returning to Augustine's identification of the good with order, he observes that while Dionysius denies both order and place to evil,⁴² he also demonstrates that it is extrinsically subject to order inasmuch as it is made [by God] to be the cause of good. The strife between good and evil, adduced by some as proof that evil is real, is also explained by Dionysius when he observes that that which is opposed to the good opposes it by the power of the good itself.⁴³ Hence his considered opinion is that evil is neither in the existent nor in the non-existent but further from the good than the non-existent.⁴⁴ From this we may surmise that Alexander admits a scale of being, as there is a scale of goodness, and that he places evil a little above the bottom of this scale but well below the maximal point which is occupied by the absolute good.

In origin this is a broadly Platonic assumption, and all historians are aware that it reaches its most elaborate form in the writings of Proclus, which were transmitted to the Western church directly in the *Liber de Causis*,⁴⁵ but only under the name of Aristotle and only after a conduit had been opened surreptitiously by the author

⁴¹ Maybe a paraphrase of *DN* 4.28 (Suchla, 177.11 and 18).

⁴² *DN* 4.33 (Suchla, 178.3–4) and *DN* 4.34 (Suchla, 178.18).

⁴³ *DN* 4. 20 (Suchla, 166.7–8).

⁴⁴ *DN* 4.19 (Suchla, 164.1–3).

⁴⁵ See Adriaan Pattin, 'Le liber de causis,' *Tijdschrift voor Filosofie* 28 (1966): 90–203; Thomas Aquinas, *Commento al libro delle cause*, ed. Christina D'Ancona Costa (Milan: Ruscano, 1986). On the synergy of this text with the thought of Dionysius in Aquinas, see David Burrell and Isabelle Moulin, 'Albert, Aquinas and Dionysius,' *Modern Theology* 24 (2008).

who purports to be Dionysius. We cannot maintain that belief in degrees of being is either scriptural or essential to a Christian philosophy, unless we are to deny the Christianity of those who follow Scotus in affirming the univocity of being. It does not follow that the Dionysian strain in mediaeval thought is merely invasive, as though the church had failed to shake off a lingering influenza: like any other element of Christian thought that was not derived immediately from the Scriptures or common experience, it took root only because it was found to be serviceable in defence of scriptural teachings that were deemed to be fundamental, and because it enabled many to reconcile their experience with an intelligent faith in the goodness of God.

Whence Evil, if not From God?

This discussion is followed by an inquiry concerning the provenance of evil, which necessitates a return to questions already addressed in passing (and perhaps not pertinently) when Alexander asked whether evil can be ranked with good as a principle.

Book 2 Part 2 Inquiry 1 Treatise 1, Question 3 ('Whence is evil?'): Member 1 Head 1: 'does evil have a cause?'

Alexander begins by stipulating that if it has a cause, this must be either good or evil. The cause of evil, however, cannot be good, for Dionysius assures us that 'it pertains to the good to produce good effects'.⁴⁶ At the same time, the cause cannot be evil because, if evil is a deficiency, its existence must be dependent on something which is not deficient. That is to say, an evil cause must have its own cause, and so if the cause of evil were invariably an evil, we should fall into an infinite regress. Augustine has shown that such a regress can be avoided only by admitting that there is no cause for the abuse of freewill other than the freedom of the will;⁴⁷ Dionysius confirms the antinomy, declaring both that evil is causeless and that, whereas the good has one cause, the causes of evil are many.⁴⁸

⁴⁶ *SH* III (n. 3), p. 7a, citing *DN* 4.23 (Suchla, 171.2–3).

⁴⁷ *SH* III (n. 3), p. 7b.

⁴⁸ *DN* 4.31 (Suchla, 176.9–10).

Question 3 Member 1 Head 2: ‘is God or a creature the cause of evil?’

The former might seem to be true, Alexander observes, inasmuch as the cause of a cause of X is itself among the causes of X: hence if evil is caused by freewill, and God is the cause of freewill, it will follow that God himself is among the causes of evil. Again, it is stated by Anselm that God tempts us by not relieving us of temptation, hence it appears that he does indeed will, and therefore causes, evil.⁴⁹ Augustine, however, repeatedly denounces this error,⁵⁰ and so does Dionysius when he affirms that evil is not in God and not a thing moved by God.⁵¹ The solution is to distinguish between evil as sin and evil as punishment; God is the cause of evil in the latter sense only;⁵² Alexander adds that he may in fact be the cause of evil as sin, but only insofar as sin itself is its own punishment.⁵³

Question 3 Member 1 Head 3: ‘is evil from the creature as from nothing or as from something?’

It having been demonstrated that God is not the cause of evil, the blame must be laid at the door of the creature. Augustine repeatedly tells us that creatures are prone to evil insofar as they are from nothing and hence tend to fall back into it.⁵⁴ Dionysius too declares that ‘evil is not from good, and if from good it is not evil; for it is no more in the nature of good to produce what is not good than it is in the nature of fire to refrigerate.’⁵⁵

Should we infer that the creature is the cause of evil only inasmuch as the creature is nothing? Not so, for Anselm teaches that nothing can be the cause only of nothing. We are to understand that, since a creature is something only insofar as it is good, it does not produce evil as a formal or an efficient cause.⁵⁶ The cause is free will, in itself a good not an evil, which must always be exercised by a creaturely agent. Nevertheless, as the words already quoted from Dionysius imply, the freedom exercised here is not that of acting according to one’s nature, but that of failing to do so. Augustine would say that this is no true freedom, since it fails to realise the creature’s proper mode of being. If, with Alexander, we take the Franciscan view that our liberty is displayed both in choosing good and in choosing evil, we can argue that the

⁴⁹ SH III (n. 4), p. 8b, citing Anselm of Canterbury, *Fall of the Devil* 20.

⁵⁰ SH III (n. 4), p. 9b, citing Augustine’s *Question 3* from *83 Questions*.

⁵¹ SH III (n. 4), p. 9a, citing DN 4.21.

⁵² DN 4.22 (Suchla, 170.6–11).

⁵³ SH III (n. 4), p. 9a.

⁵⁴ Especially at Letter called Fundamental 30, cited at SH III (n. 4), p. 10a.

⁵⁵ SH III (n. 4), p. 10a, citing DN 4.19 (Suchla, 163.9–11).

⁵⁶ SH III (n. 4), pp. 10b-1a, citing Anselm of Canterbury, *Monologion* 8.

product of an evil choice is not exactly nothing: as we saw above, it has *esse moris*, 'existence by convention', rather than by God's design.

Aquinas and Dionysius on Evil⁵⁷

Thomas Aquinas, born half a century or somewhat less after Alexander, was in his early years a student of Albert the Great, whose commentary on the Dionysian corpus agrees with Grossesteste against Thomas Gallus in reserving a role for intellect even in the ultimate knowledge of and communion with God.⁵⁸ Aquinas, who acted as Albert's secretary in the composition of this book, went on to write his own commentary on the *Divine Names*,⁵⁹ which has been characterized as a summary of his 'teachings on the ineffable relation of creator to creatures'.⁶⁰ As he never names his preceptor Albert, nothing can be inferred from his silence regarding Alexander: the following observations on his use of Dionysius in the first three articles of his treatise *On Evil* are designed only to illustrate the persistence in his theological milieu of the questions raised by his predecessor and of the practice of answering them by setting Dionysius first against, then beside Augustine.

The method of Aquinas is the same as Alexander's, to put a question, advance the reasons that might support the false answer, and then to show why this answer cannot be upheld. The first article of the treatise *On Evil* is again one of Alexander's questions: 'Is evil an entity?' Two citations from Dionysius imply that it is, for if (as he and Damascene hold) evil is contrary to good as light to darkness, it ought to be as substantial as its contrary;⁶¹ and if, as he also asserts, it is its nature to corrupt, it must have both a characteristic activity and a proper end.⁶² Nevertheless, Augustine's statement that evil is not a nature but the privation of good, corroborated by his own *Glosses* on the Johannine affirmation that all that exists is the work of the Logos, suffices to prove that evil cannot be an entity, that is, a substance in its own right.⁶³ Thus, Aquinas concludes, we must reject not the words of Dionysius himself, but the fallacious inferences that have been drawn from them. Darkness is the contrary

⁵⁷ For the text discussed here see Thomas Aquinas, *On Evil*, trans. Richard Regan, ed. Brian Davies (New York: Oxford University Press, 2003).

⁵⁸ Albert the Great, *Super Dionysium de Divinis Nominibus*, in *Opera Omnia*, vol. 37/1, ed. Paulus Simon (Münster: Aschendorff, 1972).

⁵⁹ Thomas Aquinas, *In librum beati Dionysii de Divinis Nominibus expositio*, ed. Ceslas Pera (Turn: Marietti 1950). Aquinas knows, or cherishes, the *Divine Names* more than any other writing in the corpus.

⁶⁰ Burrell and Moulin, 'Albert, Aquinas and Dionysius,' 638.

⁶¹ Aquinas, *On Evil*, q. 1, a. 1, obj. 5 (Davies, 55).

⁶² Aquinas, *On Evil*, q. 1, a. 1, obj. 8 and obj. 10 (Davies, 56).

⁶³ Aquinas, *On Evil*, q. 1, a. 1, sed contra 1–3 (Davies, 57), citing Augustine, *City of God* 9.9 and *Tractates on John* 1.1. All the Augustinian citations noted here have been identified by Brian Davies in his notes.

of light only in the sense that we give that name to the potentiality for illumination which remains when the light is obscured; the cause of its obscuration is not the darkness itself, but some other entity.⁶⁴ It cannot be denied, on the other hand, that evil is a cause of corruption: whereas, however, an entity would be an efficient cause, whose effect would be to realise some natural end, the evil which corrupts is merely a formal cause (that is, the deformity of the natural thing which has suffered the corruption) and its consequence is 'not natural but an accident of nature'.⁶⁵ Hence the opinion of Dionysius, accurately stated, is that, while evil corrupts, it cannot bring anything into being except insofar as it exists, which means insofar as it retains some goodness.⁶⁶

In this case then, Dionysius is a recognised authority, though not a clear authority for the true answer. For this we rely on Augustine, and in the light of his words we arrive at a true understanding of two Dionysian maxims which might otherwise be misread. Without adducing the same quotations from the *Divine Names* as Alexander does, Aquinas has raised the same question as to whether the power to corrupt implies existence, and all three authors take it as an axiom that to exist is to participate in the good.

Aquinas goes on to put the question, 'Is there evil in good?', and immediately cites from Dionysius both a dictum and an argument in favour of the false thesis that there is not. Evil, declares the Greek saint, is neither an existent thing nor found in things existent, and the syllogism by which he proves it is: 'all that exists is good; there is no evil in good; hence there is no evil in anything that exists.'⁶⁷ Again he appears to be at a disadvantage to Augustine, whose argument that since evil is a privation of good, it exists only as a parasite to the good is clearly endorsed by Aquinas himself.⁶⁸ In the ensuing discussion, he hints that Dionysius may have been too ready to join the Platonists in identifying privation with matter and both of these with absolute non-being; his error would thus consist in failing to grasp that a material thing has its own concrete reality, and that evil, as privation of form, can be present in it only because it retains this concrete existence as a material thing.⁶⁹ In his conclusion, however, the apparent contradiction between Dionysius and Augustine is resolved by ascribing to both of them a distinction between the 'intrinsic' existence of a real entity and the accidental existence of that which is present in an entity as privation.⁷⁰ Once again, Augustine is sovereign; once again, he and

⁶⁴ Aquinas, *On Evil*, q. 1, a. 1, ad 6 (Davies, 60).

⁶⁵ Aquinas, *On Evil*, q. 1, a. 1, ad 10 (Davies, 60).

⁶⁶ Aquinas, *On Evil*, q. 1, a. 1, ad 16 (Davies, 62), citing *DN* 4.20 (Suchla, 165.6–8).

⁶⁷ Aquinas, *On Evil*, q. 1, a. 2, obj. 1 (Davies, 62), again citing *DN* 4.20 (Suchla, 166.9–10).

⁶⁸ Aquinas, *On Evil*, q. 1, a. 2, sed contra 1–2 (Davies, 62), citing *Enchiridion* 14 and 11. *Enchiridion* 12 has already been cited at a. 2, obj. 16 (Davies, 62) as an apparent testimony to the reality of evil as the power which opposes the good.

⁶⁹ Aquinas, *On Evil*, q. 1, a. 2, resp (Davies, 65).

⁷⁰ Aquinas, *On Evil*, q. 1, a. 2, ad 1 (Davies, 66); cf. ad 3, alluding to *DN* 4.21.

Dionysius are found to agree, this time at the expense of Plato. And once again, the quotation of Dionysius, though not its application by Aquinas, has a precedent in the *Summa Halensis*.

The third inquiry, ‘Is good the cause of evil?’, appears at first to be answered in the negative (and falsely) by a statement in the *Divine Names* that evil does not proceed from good and that whatever proceeds from good cannot be evil.⁷¹ In this case, however, he seems to make common cause against his own thesis with Augustine, for where the latter opines that only good can be the origin of evil, the *Divine Names* speaks of the good as both its origin and its end.⁷² The solution, as we might have foreseen, is that Dionysius holds good to be the source of evil accidentally rather than intrinsically; the distinction is elucidated by his own saying that the evil effects of an action lie outside the intention of the agent and outside the action itself, inasmuch as the evil is never a necessary result of the act considered simply as movement.⁷³ Here, therefore, Aquinas follows Alexander’s rule of citing Dionysius not only against but in favour of the true thesis; his agreement with Augustine is explicit, and implies, as in Alexander, that the Platonism of Dionysius sometimes corrects the Pauline strain in the Latin father just as in other cases the latter corrects the Platonism of Dionysius.

Coda

Aquinas, therefore, does not in all respects concur with Alexander either in his reading of Dionysius or in his solutions to questions concerning the reality of evil. He can say, for example, that evil is a formal but not an efficient cause, while Alexander locates the causality in the creature’s will. Evil, while it is not in the proper sense a nature, has some shadow of being inasmuch as it is the consequence of the misuse of rational freedom, which is in itself a good. While the causes of this misdirection remain obscure in Alexander as in Aquinas, they agree that it is rare to be a knowing and deliberate cause of that which one holds to be evil, and that no evil can be directly willed by God in his absolute goodness. It is not God who causes the wrongdoing that he foresees, but the willing agent, though the latter may act without the same degree of foresight and moral understanding; since agency implies existence, of which God alone is the author, it follows that the cause and precondition of evil is always in itself good.

71 Aquinas, *On Evil*, q. 1, a. 3, obj. 5 (Davies, 68), citing *DN* 4.19 (Suchla, 163.9–10).

72 Aquinas, *On Evil*, q. 1, a. 3, sed contra 1–2 (Davies, 70), citing *Enchiridion* 14 and *DN* 4.31 (Suchla, 176.14).

73 Aquinas, *On Evil*, q. 1, a. 3, ad 5 and ad 14 (Davies, 72–4), citing *DN* 4.31–2.

Richard Cross

The Reception of John of Damascus in the *Summa Halensis*

Abstract: John of Damascus was perhaps the most important Christian encyclopedist of late antiquity. His influence crops up in two distinct ways in the *Summa*. He is an authority to be cited in support of positions adopted in the *Summa*, and sometimes the inspiration of those teachings; and he is an authority whose apparently deviant positions need to be given acceptable interpretations. Of the times that John is mentioned, his name crops up in association with some very distinctive issues: on the positive side, the will and passions (and action theory more generally), and the accounts of providence, faith, and images; and on the negative side, divine simplicity and associated epistemic and semantic questions, the Trinity, and the prelapsarian human condition. This chapter, accordingly, divides the material up in two ways: first, examining cases in which John clearly influenced the authors of the *Summa*, albeit not always unproblematically; and, secondly, examining those problematic cases in which John presents a position apparently in conflict with that adopted by the authors of the *Summa*.

John of Damascus (d. c. 750) was perhaps the most important Christian encyclopedist of late antiquity.¹ He summarized, through extensive quotation, almost the whole of the dogmatic heritage of the Greek-speaking theologians from the Cappadocians to Maximus the Confessor, and was the chief source for knowledge of these theologians' thinking in the medieval west. As we shall see, texts from Gregory of Nazianzus, Nemesius of Emesa, and Maximus, mediated through John, turn out to be particularly significant for the *Summa Halensis*, as do John's own contributions to the Iconoclast controversy. John's *De fide orthodoxa* or *Expositio fidei*, the *Summa*'s source, exists in two Latin translations: a reasonably accurate one by Burgundio of Pisa, probably dating from 1153 to 1154, and an incomplete one (cc. 45–52 only, material on the metaphysics of the Incarnation) by Cerbanus the Hungarian, probably done some ten or more years before Burgundio's. Burgundio's immediately became the standard version.²

1 For an overview of John's life, work, and thought, see Andrew Louth, *John Damascene: Tradition and Originality in Byzantine Theology* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002).

2 See Eligius M. Buytaert, 'Introduction,' in John of Damascus, *De fide orthodoxa: Versions of Burgundio and Cerbanus*, ed. Eligius M. Buytaert, Franciscan Institute Publications, Text Series, 8 (St Bonaventure, NY: Franciscan Institute; Louvain: Nauwelaerts; Paderborn: Schöningh, 1955). For the Greek text, see John of Damascus, *Die Schriften des Johannes von Damaskos*, vol. 2, *Expositio fidei*, ed. Bonifatius Kotter, Patristische Texte und Studien, 12 (Berlin and New York: De Gruyter, 1973). There are

John crops up in two distinct ways in the *Summa*. He is an authority to be cited in support of positions adopted in the *Summa*, and sometimes indeed seemingly the inspiration of those teachings; and he is an authority whose apparently deviant (i.e. (frequently) non-Augustinian) positions need to be given acceptable interpretations. This dialectic often shows up in the positioning of the relevant texts: in the arguments *pro*, or in the *ad oppositum*; and not infrequently one of John's texts is used as a corrective of another. (There is nothing unusual about the *Summa* in this respect; we could find the same in any writer's use of John, and indeed of authorities in general, at least in the medieval west.)

John's presence is notable but not absolutely pervasive in the *Summa*: I counted over 700 mentions—somewhat comparable with Aristotle ('The Philosopher') at upwards of 500, but well below the 5,000 or so citations of Augustine. Of the times that John is mentioned, his name crops up in association with some very distinctive issues: on the positive side, the will and passions (and action theory more generally), and the accounts of providence, faith, and images; and on the negative side, divine simplicity and associated epistemic and semantic questions, the Trinity, and the prelapsarian human condition. In what follows, I shall accordingly divide the material up in two ways: first, examining cases in which John clearly influenced the authors of the *Summa*, albeit not always unproblematically; and, secondly, examining those problematic cases in which John presents a position apparently in conflict with that adopted by the authors of the *Summa*. John was an authority: the authors never simply reject what he writes.

Influence

Action Theory

Undeniably the most significant locus for John's influence on the *Summa* lies in the domain of action theory—in particular, theories of the will and the passions. John himself summarizes and adapts a vast range of earlier philosophical and theological traditions. Philosophically, what John provides represents an attempt to integrate what Aristotle had to say on action with the view that there is a will or rational appetite distinct from the various pre-rational appetites isolated by Aristotle.³ This led

various English translations; I refer to John of Damascus, *Writings*, trans. Frederic H. Chase, The Fathers of the Church, 37 (Washington, DC: Catholic University of America Press, 1958).

³ It is certainly possible to argue that Aristotle's account of appetite allows him to give an account that is functionally the same as one that includes a will. But it is not the standard reading. Michael Frede has recently argued that the origin of the notion of will is Stoic, originating in particular in Epictetus (see Michael Frede, *A Free Will: The Origin of the Notion in Ancient Thought*, ed. A.A. Long (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 2011), against the earlier claim that the notion is distinctively

John to posit a complex sequence of seven psychological events involved in deliberate activity—a sequence that was developed in great detail by Thomas Aquinas⁴—but the details of which the *Summa*'s authors largely ignore.⁵ The theological background to John's discussion is Christological: Maximus' attempt to defend the existence of two wills in Christ, a divine will and a human will, against his so-called 'monothe-lite' opponents whose position was eventually condemned at the Third Council of Constantinople.⁶ Here is the problem: given that the human will is a genuine will, how do we secure that it is necessarily good? I return to the Christological issue in a moment, once I have laid out the basic contours of the rather complex passage of ideas from Maximus to the *Summa*.

A number of medieval accounts of appetite in general attempt to bring together the view that there are pre-rational appetites with the view that there is a rational appetite. For example, Peter Lombard maintained—doubtless following insights from Augustine—that there are two kinds of appetite in a human being: a sensory one (*sensualitas*), and a rational one (*voluntas*—will).⁷ John himself uses a slightly different distinction between two kinds of appetite, one that he has borrowed from Maximus: *thelesis* and *boulesis*, roughly, a natural inclination to the good, and a rational desire for things subject to choice.⁸ The authors of the *Summa* use John's distinction as the starting point for their own discussion:

There is will as nature, and will as will, as John Damascene says: in other, Greek, words, θέλησις and βούλησις. Will as nature is a general and indeterminate appetite. (...) [It] is implanted into every power of the soul with respect to its act and object: so it is in the irascible power with respect to the arduous, in the concupiscible power with respect to the good, in the rational power with respect to the true.⁹

Here *thelesis* is the name of an inclination common to all the soul's powers—an inclination to the good. But it is also the name of a power, specifically a rational will

Christian, and found first in Augustine (see Albrecht Dihle, *The Theory of Will in Classical Antiquity* (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 1982)).

4 See Thomas Aquinas, *Summa theologiae* I-II, qq. 11–17. I use the edition of Aquinas' works edited by Robert Busa, found at <http://www.corpusthomicum.org/iopera.html>.

5 On this, Michael Frede, 'John of Damascus on Human Action, the Will, and Human Freedom,' in *Byzantine Philosophy and its Ancient Sources*, ed. Katerina Ierodiakonou (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 2002), 86–7.

6 See Maximus, *Ad Marinum* (PG 91:28B–37 A).

7 See Peter Lombard, *Sententiae in IV libris distinctae* (hereafter, *Sent.*) II, d. 24, cc. 3–4, 2 vols, ed. Ignatius C. Brady, Spicilegium Bonaventurianum, 4–5 (Grottaferrata: Editiones Collegii S. Bonaventurae, 1971–81), 1:452–3.

8 John of Damascus, *Expositio fidei*, c. 36, ll. 51–83 (Kotter, 89–91; Buytaert, 135–7; Chase, 249); for *thelesis*, see Maximus, *Ad Marinum* (PG 91:12B); for *boulesis*, see Maximus, *Ad Marinum* (PG 91:13B).

9 Alexander of Hales, *Doctoris irrefragabilis Alexandri de Hales Ordinis minorum Summa theologica* (SH), 4 vols (Quaracchi: Collegii S. Bonaventurae, 1924–48) Vol I, P1, In2, Tr1, Q4, C7 (n. 326), pp. 479b–80a.

that naturally inclines to the supreme good, distinct from the rational deliberative will.¹⁰ The authors use this distinction of rational wills to explain how wrongdoing is compatible with the Aristotelian view that human beings always will the supreme good (*eudaimonia*):

According to Damascene, we should distinguish between the natural will, according to which all rightly desire the supreme good, and the elective or deliberative will, according to which something is chosen that is not the supreme good, and is preferred to the supreme good, and for this reason is not a right [will]. In the wicked, the natural will is right, without error, but the elective will is not right, and is erroneous.¹¹

So we have a natural inclination to the supreme good, but can be mistaken about the identity of this good. Here, the ‘natural will’ is John’s *thelesis*, and the ‘elective or deliberative will’ is John’s *boulesis*.¹²

So *boulesis* is associated with the notion of free choice, and more generally with being a self-determining agent: in John’s language, being *autexousios* or (in Burgundio’s translation) having *liberum arbitrium*—language used by the *Summa* too.¹³ The authors of the *Summa* (following Augustine) construe *liberum arbitrium* as a distinct faculty.¹⁴ In John, the link between *boulesis* and being *autexousios* is complex, depending on his seven-step analysis of free choice mentioned above. Given that the authors believe the power for free choice to be a faculty, a natural question arises as to its relation to intellect and will. John associates *boulesis* with deliberation,¹⁵ and the authors of the *Summa* understand him to simply identify *boulesis* with *liberum arbitrium*.¹⁶ which is to say, I take it, that the functions that they associate with *liberum arbitrium* they understand John to associate with *boulesis*. But the authors clearly believe that this approach to the issue of free choice—the pared down version of John’s account that they report—is too simple. In particular, as I shall show, they believe that in fact *boulesis* is a power that is merely a part of the more complex power, *liberum arbitrium*.

According to the *Summa*, the internal or mental components underlying deliberate action involve practical reasoning (i.e. deliberation), willing, and commanding (i.e. deciding or choosing (*eligere*) between options).¹⁷ Willing is the function of *boul-*

¹⁰ SH IV, P1, In1, Tr4, Q1, C2 (n. 126), pp. 177b-8a; see SH I, P1, In2, Tr1, Q4, C7 (n. 326), p. 480a.

¹¹ SH I, P1, In1, Tr1, Q3, M2, C1 (n. 108), p. 169b.

¹² The authors use the Greek terms additionally at SH II, In4, Tr1, S2, Q3, Ti2, C2 (n. 388), p. 465b, and SH III, In2, Tr2, S2, Q1, Ti2, Ar2, Pr3 (n. 177), p. 192b. In this latter place, they get the terms the wrong way round.

¹³ John of Damascus, *Expositio fidei*, c. 58, l. 122 (Kotter, 142; Buytaert, 223; Chase, 301).

¹⁴ See Augustine, *De correptione et gratia*, c. 11, n. 32 (PL 44:935), quoted at SH II, In4, Tr1, Q3, Ti3, M2, C2 (n. 392), p. 471a-b, and in Peter Lombard, *Sent.* II, d. 24, c. 1, n. 3 (Brady, 1:451).

¹⁵ John of Damascus, *Expositio fidei*, c. 36, ll. 71–83 (Kotter, 90–1; Buytaert, 137; Chase, 249).

¹⁶ SH II, In4, Tr1, S2, Q2, Ti2, p. 464.

¹⁷ SH II, In4, Tr1, S2, Q2, Ti2, C2 (n. 388), pp. 465a-6b; for choosing, see SH II, In4, Tr1, S2, Q3, Ti3, M2, C1, Ar1 (n. 390), p. 468b; also SH II, In4, Tr1, S2, Q3, Ti3, M2, C1, Ar3 (n. 392), p. 471b.

esis, and commanding the function of *liberum arbitrium*.¹⁸ *Liberum arbitrium* is a power that is composed of other powers (it is ‘not many powers essentially, but of many powers’).¹⁹ The relevant powers in particular are reason and will (i.e. *boulesis*, I suppose, since that is the appetitive power pertinent in deliberate action): choosing ‘is elicited by reason and will’ such that *liberum arbitrium* is nevertheless ‘a power distinct from intellect and will’²⁰—I assume, by including them. The *Summa* uses John’s tools, but fits them into a context in which *liberum arbitrium* is seen as a power, not simply a mode of acting.²¹

Does God, given that he is free, have *boulesis* (and thus, *liberum arbitrium*)? On this question, the authors silently but sharply disagree with John. John maintains that God has *theosis* but not *boulesis* on the grounds that ‘God, given his goodness, will not and cannot make any other choices than he does.’²² ‘If providence is God’s will, then, according to right reason, everything that has come about through providence has quite necessarily come about in the best manner and that most befitting God, so that it could not have happened in a better way.’²³ (I return to the question of providence in a moment.) John argues that there is a sense in which God is αὐτεξούσιος—in which he has, in Burgundio’s translation, *liberum arbitrium* or free choice.²⁴ What John means is that God’s actions are not subject to external constraint.²⁵ He thus maintains that ‘free choice’ is homonymous, since it is found in God and creatures in very different ways.²⁶

The authors of the *Summa* agree that God has free choice, but they extend its scope far beyond John’s compatibilist understanding. As the authors see it, ‘deliberation’ (*consilium*), an activity of the intellect, has two possible senses: one which results in the desire to do what is known, and one which couples this with initial ignorance about the outcome. God has deliberation in the first sense.²⁷ Likewise, ‘choice’ (*electio*) as two corresponding senses: one according to which choice is simply the power to ‘determine between two’ options, and one which couples this with

18 SH II, In4, Tr1, S2, Q2, Ti2, C2 (n. 388), p. 465b.

19 SH II, In4, Tr1, S2, Q3, Ti3, M2, C1, Ar1 (n. 390), p. 469b.

20 SH II, In4, Tr1, S2, Q3, Ti3, M2, C1, Ar3 (n. 392), p. 471b.

21 To get a sense of the relative importance of the *theosis/boulesis* distinction for the *Summa*, compare its appearance in Aquinas’ *Summa*: just twice (*Summa theologiae* I, q. 82, a. 4, obj. 1 and ad 1; and *Summa theologiae* III, q. 18, a. 3); and just once in his *Sentences Commentary* (*Scriptum in sententiis* III, d. 17, q. 1, a. 1, q. 3). The latter two *loci* are both Christological. The distinction does no work for Aquinas: the discussions include it just to avoid possible misunderstandings.

22 Frede, ‘John of Damascus,’ 80.

23 John of Damascus, *Expositio fidei*, c. 48, ll. 4–6 (Kotter, 100; Buytaert, 155; Chase, 260).

24 John of Damascus, *Expositio fidei*, c. 58, ll. 122–4 (Kotter, 142; Buytaert, 223; Chase, 301).

25 See Frede, ‘John of Damascus,’ 80.

26 For the relevant text, see n. 25.

27 SH I, P1, In1, Tr5, S2, Q2, C1 (n. 188), p. 276a–b, discussing John of Damascus, *Expositio fidei*, c. 36, ll. 75–7 (Kotter, 90; Buytaert, 137; Chase, 249); see also SH I, P1, In1, Tr6, Q3, Ti1 (n. 272), p. 371b.

initial ignorance about the outcome. God has choice in the first sense.²⁸ So God can both deliberate and choose, and thus has *liberum arbitrium*. In making this claim the authors, like John, understand the terms homonymously—that is, ‘neither univocally nor wholly equivocally, but analogically: that is, *per prius et posterius*; it is said *per prius* of the creator, and *per posterius* of the creature’;²⁹ free choice belongs fundamentally to God, and in some derivative sense to creatures. But, of course, John and the *Summa Halensis* understand divine free choice in very different ways.

The same question arises in the case of Christ’s human will too, the original source of the whole discussion in Maximus, and the authors deal with the Christological case in exactly the same way as they dealt with the divine case:

“Choosing” (*eligere*) is said in two ways (...): in one way, “choosing” means to specify or determine between two things. And in this way choosing is in Christ. In the other way “choosing” means to determine or specify a thing that is previously unknown. (...) And because choosing in this sense implies ignorance, it is not said of Christ, just as deliberation (*consilium*) is not, as Damascene says.³⁰

Equally, the authors put these various distinctions to work to show (in an astonishingly brief discussion of the issue that provoked the original distinction in Maximus) how Christ did not have contrary wills—given, for instance, that Christ clearly in some sense wanted not to die. According to the authors, Christ’s rational will willed that his sensory appetite desired (e.g.) not to die.³¹

Another broadly psychological thesis that the *Summa*’s authors derive from John (and, ultimately, Nemesius of Emesa, who is John’s source) is an account of pain and suffering, something they discuss in the context of Christ’s suffering. As the authors read him, John highlights three senses of ‘passion’: a general one (any kind of undergoing, which the authors define in terms of the reception of a form³²), a more specific one (the reception of a form that is against the nature of the recipient³³), and a maximally specific one, to do with *feelings* (‘Not every movement of a passive recipient is called a passion, but those which are more violent and come within the range of sensation, because the little imperceptible ones are not passions.’³⁴). In this sense, the

28 SH II, In4, Tr1, S2, Q3, Ti3, M3, C1 (n. 402), p. 479b.

29 SH II, In4, Tr1, S2, Q3, Ti3, M3, C1 (n. 402), p. 479b.

30 SH II, In4, Tr1, S2, Q3, Ti3, M3, C5 (n. 406), Ad obiecta 1, p. 483b, referring to John of Damascus, *Expositio fidei*, c. 36, ll. 100–1 (Kotter, 91; Buytaert, 139; Chase, 250).

31 SH IV, P1, In1, Tr4, Q1, C2 (n. 126), Ad obiecta 2, p. 178b. On this, see Paul Gondreau, *The Passions of Christ’s Soul in the Theology of St. Thomas Aquinas*, Beiträge zur Geschichte der Philosophie und Theologie des Mittelalters: neue Folge, 61 (Münster: Aschendorff, 2002), 93.

32 SH IV, P1, In1, Tr1, Q4, Ti1, D3, M1 (n. 37), p. 59b, referring to John of Damascus, *Expositio fidei*, c. 36, ll. 13–14 (Kotter, 88; Buytaert, 132–3; Chase, 247).

33 SH IV, P1, In1, Tr1, Q4, Ti1, D3, M1 (n. 37), p. 60a, referring to John of Damascus, *Expositio fidei*, c. 36, l. 21 (Kotter, 88; Buytaert, 133; Chase, 247).

34 SH IV, P1, In1, Tr1, Q4, Ti1, D3, M1 (n. 37), p. 60a, quoting John of Damascus, *Expositio fidei*, c. 36, ll. 25–7 (Kotter, 88; Buytaert, 133; Chase, 247).

authors define ‘passion’ as ‘a perceptible movement against (*praeter*) nature’,³⁵ closely paralleling John’s own definition, which they also quote: ‘a passion is a motion of the soul through the apprehension of a good or evil.’³⁶ The idea is that the passion is the reception of something harmful to the body, provided that the harmful thing is sensed. Unlike John—who distinguishes passion and pain³⁷—the authors sometimes simply identify pain as the passion (given that ‘passion’ in this sense involves the perception of the harm): ‘pain is the unbearable perception of dissolution (*divisio-nis*).’³⁸ The account is atypical by the standards of the second half of the 13th century, when pain and sorrow are seen as specifically passions of the appetites.³⁹

Providence

It is John who gives the authors of the *Summa* the basis of their account of divine providence—though in developing both their own view and their reading of John, they rely at times on William of Auxerre’s *Summa aurea*, parts of whose account they simply copy out verbatim. (John, incidentally, again more or less repeats the account that he read in Nemesius.) The authors set up their discussion with two apparently conflicting quotations from John, one at the head of a sequence of arguments

35 *SH* IV, P1, In1, Tr1, Q4, Ti1, D3, M1 (n. 37), p. 60a.

36 *SH* IV, P1, In1, Tr1, Q4, Ti1, D3, M1 (n. 37), Ad objecta 2, p. 60b, quoting John of Damascus, *Expositio fidei*, c. 36, ll. 9–10 (Kotter, 88; Buytaert, 132; Chase, 246). The source of the definition is Nemesius, and the authors clearly show some knowledge of this since they ascribe the view to a certain ‘Remigius’ (*SH* IV, P1, In1, Tr1, Q4, Ti1, D3, M1 (n. 37), p. 60b). On this error, found in Albert and Aquinas too, see Ignatius Brady, ‘Remigius-Nemesius,’ *Franciscan Studies* 9 (1948): 275–84.

37 John of Damascus, *Expositio fidei*, c. 36, ll. 5–6 (Kotter, 88; Buytaert, 132; Chase, 246).

38 *SH* IV, P1, In1, Tr5, Q1, M5, C1 (n. 154), p. 214a; see too *SH* IV, P1, In1, Tr1, Q4, Ti1, D3, M1 (n. 37), Ad objecta 9, p. 61b, where the authors identify ‘pain’ and ‘sorrow’ as instances of passion.

39 In all the cases just discussed, the material that the authors derive from John does some serious theoretical work. This is not always so plain. A perennial problem for 13th-century theologians (and others) is the task of reconciling different authoritative definitions with each other. For example, the authors spend a great deal of time showing how the definitions of ‘faith’ found in Augustine, Pseudo-Dionysius, John, Hugh of St Victor are compatible (*SH* IV, P3, In2, Tr1, M5 (n. 677), pp. 1072a–4b). Likewise, they expend considerable effort showing that the various divisions of the mind’s intellectual powers proposed in Aristotle, Augustine, and John are consistent (because orthogonal to each other); see *SH* II, In4, Tr1, S2, Q3, Ti1, M1, C1 (n. 368), pp. 446a–9b. And the same is true of an attempt to associate John’s ‘thinking faculty’ (*vis excogitativa*) with Avicenna’s *vis aestimativa/cogitativa*—or, as the *Summa* divides up the territory, *vis imaginativa/cogitativa*: see *SH* II, In4, Tr1, S2, Q2, Ti1, M2, C1 (n. 357), pp. 434a–5b; for John—whose account is wholly derived from Nemesius—see John of Damascus, *Expositio fidei*, c. 33, ll. 1–9 (Kotter, 86; Buytaert, 129; Chase, 244–5). Something similar is going on in the *Summa*’s discussion of the distinction between the concupiscible and irascible appetites, which takes its lead from what it reads as problematic claims in John; see John of Damascus, *Expositio fidei*, c. 26, ll. 101–2 (Kotter, 79; Buytaert, 119; Chase, 238) and the discussion in *SH* II, In4, Tr1, S2, Q2, Ti1, M2 (n. 367), pp. 444a–5a. The task in all of these cases seems more a matter of saving the authorities than of deriving systematic insight from them.

to show that providence 'is wisdom',⁴⁰ and the other at the head of a sequence of arguments to show that providence 'is reduced to the will':⁴¹ 'Providence, then is the solicitude which God has for existing things. And, again, providence is that will of God by which all existing things receive suitable guidance through to their end.'⁴² The *Summa's* solution: providence is a kind of seeing (*videre*)—which involves 'cognition or knowledge'—to which there is added the notion of the 'causality of ordering or governing'—which 'implies God's good will'.⁴³

John (following Nemesius) divides providence into two kinds: 'providence by approval' and 'providence by permission',⁴⁴ and (using a distinction proposed by John Chrysostom)⁴⁵ he identifies the first with God's 'antecedent will', and the second with his 'consequent will'.⁴⁶ According to the Damascene, the former extends to what is 'undeniably good',⁴⁷ and according to the *Summa* too it extends to such things ('in-contradictive (...) bona'):⁴⁸ for example, salvation, and things that 'lack resistance', such as 'natural things which are ordered and cannot be otherwise'.⁴⁹ (It is, I assume, this sense of providence which is relevant to John's claim that God's willing is such that things 'could not have happened in a better way', noted above.) According to John the latter extends both to actual and merely apparent evils;⁵⁰ according to the *Summa*, it extends to things which are 'liable to resist'—for example, free will, which God 'permits to do whatever it does'.⁵¹ Equally, John (i.e. Nemesius) proposes a total of seven kinds of objects of permission, as counted by William of Auxerre, and, following him, the authors of the *Summa*.⁵² The details need not concern us

40 SH I, P1, In1, Tr5, S2, Q3, Ti1, C2 (n. 196), p. 285a.

41 SH I, P1, In1, Tr5, S2, Q3, Ti1, C2 (n. 196), p. 285b.

42 John of Damascus, *Expositio fidei*, c. 43, l. 26 (Kotter, 101; Buytaert, 157; Chase, 261), quoted at the head of the two sequences respectively.

43 SH I, P1, In1, Tr5, S2, Q3, Ti1, C2 (n. 196), p. 287a.

44 John of Damascus, *Expositio fidei*, c. 43, l. 26 (Kotter, 101; Buytaert, 157; Chase, 261), quoted at SH I, P1, In1, Tr5, S2, Q3, Ti1, C4, Ar3 (n. 202), p. 294b; see William of Auxerre, *Summa aurea* I, tr. 10, ll. 20–5, 7 vols, ed. Jean Ribailier, Spicilegium Bonaventurianum, 16–20 (Paris: Editions du Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique (CNRS); Grottaferrata: Editiones Collegii S. Bonaventurae, 1980–7), 1:199. For the text in Nemesius, see *Nemesii Emeseni De natura hominis*, § 43, ed. Moreno Morani, Bibliotheca Scriptorum Graecorum et Romanorum Teubneriana (Leipzig: Teubner, 1987), 134.3–4.

45 See John Chrysostom, *In epistola ad Ephesios commentaria*, Homilia I, § 3 (PG 62:13–14).

46 John of Damascus, *Expositio fidei*, c. 43, ll. 71–5 (Kotter, 102–3; Buytaert, 160; Chase, 263); see William of Auxerre, *Summa aurea* I, tr. 10, ll. 25, 42–5 (Ribailier, 1:199–200); SH I, P1, In1, Tr5, S2, Q3, Ti1, C6 (n. 207), p. 299a-b and p. 300b.

47 John of Damascus, *Expositio fidei*, c. 43, l. 27 (Kotter, 101; Buytaert, 157; Chase, 261).

48 SH I, P1, In1 Tr5, S2, Q3, Ti1, C6 (n. 207), p. 298a.

49 SH I, P1, In1, Tr5, S2, Q3, Ti1, C4, Ar3 (n. 202), p. 294b.

50 John of Damascus, *Expositio fidei*, c. 43, ll. 28–35 (Kotter, 101; Buytaert, 157; Chase, 261).

51 SH I, P1, In1, Tr5, S2, Q3, Ti1, C4, Ar3 (n. 202), p. 294b.

52 SH II, In2, Tr3, S2, Q3, Ti3, M2, C1 (n. 243), pp. 298a-9a; William of Auxerre, *Summa aurea* I, tr. 10, ll. 51–70 (Ribailier, 1:200–1).

here. The point I wish to make is merely that John is the immediate source for the accounts of providence that we find in the *Summa* and in William of Auxerre—and seems to have been the source of the distinction between God's antecedent and consequent will that becomes a later Scholastic commonplace.⁵³ And it is easy to see the appeal of the distinction: after all, as the authors of the *Summa* point out, God antecedently wills that all are saved; but he permits some to sin and thus to fail to be saved, and the distinction thus provides the first steps towards seeing just how damnation and divine providence might be compatible.⁵⁴

Of course, talk of two wills in God raises obvious difficulties for divine simplicity, and at one point the authors address these head-on: there is only one will, and any order of priority/posteriority is located in the creaturely realm: the antecedent will relates to the good that God does to us irrespective of our actions and merit; the consequent will relates to the good that God does to us conditionally upon our activity.⁵⁵ (We might think of one act of will with distinct and complex contents, some categorical, some hypothetical.)

The Nature of Faith

Theologians in the early 13th century began to develop an account of the theological virtues in terms of Aristotle's theory of the virtues as habits—accidents in the first species of quality. In line with this, they made a distinction between acquired and infused faith: the faith that is gained on the basis of human testimony, and the faith that consists in a divinely-bestowed disposition to believe certain claims. There was considerable controversy about this distinction: for example, whether or not the two kinds of faith can co-exist, or even whether or not there was any such thing as acquired faith. The authors of the *Summa* ascribe the distinction to John:

According to John Damascene, in book IV, he says: "Faith is of two kinds. For there is 'faith from hearing', for, when we hear the sacred Scriptures, we believe in the teaching of the Spirit. (...) And there is a faith which is undoubting and unquestioning hope for those things which are promised by God. (...) The first comes from our mind, the second is a charism of the Spirit." Damascene wants to say that there is a faith that is acquired from hearing or the testimony of the Scriptures, and a faith that is gratuitously infused by God for the purpose of assenting to the First Truth on account of itself.⁵⁶

⁵³ Aquinas, for example, credits John with the distinction at *Summa theologiae* I, q. 16, a. 6 ad 1.

⁵⁴ See *SH* I, P1, In1, Tr5, S2, Q3, Ti1, C6 (n. 207), p. 300b.

⁵⁵ See *SH* I, P1, In1, Tr6, Q3, Ti2, M1 (n. 273), p. 375a-b.

⁵⁶ *SH* IV, P3, In2, Tr1, M2 (n. 674), p. 1066b, quoting John of Damascus, *Expositio fidei*, c. 83, ll. 2–3, 9–12 (Kotter, 186; Buytaert, 298–9; Chase, 348).

The authors go on to identify this latter faith as a ‘habit’,⁵⁷ a ‘virtue’ that inheres in the practical intellect.⁵⁸ Aristotle is barely mentioned (he crops up in an objection to the effect that virtues have to do with the good, not the true, and thus that faith, since it has to do with the true, is not a virtue).⁵⁹ But he is clearly in the background here, and John is being corralled into a discussion that will ultimately result in a kind of Christianized Aristotelian teaching about supernatural virtues.⁶⁰

Religious Images

John, of course, was heavily involved in the first iconoclastic controversy, in defence of the permissibility of religious images—specifically, representations of Christ on the Cross. The worry is that such representations result in idolatry, worshipping an image, not the second person of the Trinity. The authors of the *Summa* take from John the basic idea—which John quotes and expressly attributes to Basil of Caesarea—that ‘the honour paid to the images is referred to the prototype—that is, the exemplar’.⁶¹

By way of clarification and restriction, the authors add a distinction between two types of image: ‘an image by participation’, and ‘an image as sign’.⁶² The former is ‘the rational creature’ (made in the image of God)—human beings; the latter is an artistic representation. Images by participation are worthy of reverence (‘dulia’), but not worship. But in the case of a simple imagistic sign,

the whole honour is referred to the prototype, that is, the exemplar. Whence Damascene says about the Cross, that, by adoring the Cross we adore the passion of Christ, or Christ suffering, in these words: “We adore the image (*typum*) of the precious Cross, and if it is made of a different material (not that we honour the material, God forbid!) [we honour] the image (*typon*) as a symbol—that is, as a mark (*notam*)—of Christ. For he said to his disciples, “Then shall appear the sign of the Son of Man in heaven.””⁶³

⁵⁷ SH IV, P3, In2, Tr1, M3 (n. 675), p. 1068a.

⁵⁸ SH IV, P3, In2, Tr1, M3 (n. 675), p. 1069a.

⁵⁹ SH IV, P3, In2, Tr1, M3 (n. 675), p. 1067a.

⁶⁰ There is a lot that could be said on the notion of ‘assenting to the First Truth on account of itself’, which seems to be an important innovation taken on by many thinkers subsequently (Albert, Bonaventure, Aquinas, for example, and expressly rejected by Scotus); but the issue, which perhaps originates in Augustine, *Confessiones* VI, c. 5, § 7, 3 vols, ed. James Joseph O’Donnell (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1992), 1:61–2, has nothing to do with the place of John in the account.

⁶¹ John of Damascus, *Expositio fidei*, c. 89, ll. 7–8 (Kotter, 206; Buytaert, 331; Chase, 370–1), quoting Basil, *De spiritu sancto*, c. 18, n. 45, ed. Benoît Pruche, 2nd ed., Sources Chrétiennes, 17bis (Paris: Cerf, 1968), 406.19–20; the text is quoted at SH IV, P2, In3, Tr2, S1, Q2, Ti1, D3, C2, Ar1 (n. 298), p. 455, where it is ascribed to Basil, and SH IV, P2, In3, Tr2, S1, Q2, Ti1, D3, C3, Ar1 (n. 303), pp. 457b–8a.

⁶² For the material in this paragraph, see SH IV, P2, In3, Tr2, S1, Q2, Ti1, D3, C3, Ar1 (n. 303), p. 458a.

⁶³ SH IV, P2, In3, Tr2, S1, Q2, Ti1, D3, C3, Ar1 (n. 303), p. 458a, more or less quoting John of Damascus, *Expositio fidei*, c. 84, ll. 61–4 (Kotter, 188–9; Buytaert, 302–3; Chase, 351).

As John immediately notes in a sentence not quoted by the *Summa*, ‘the sign of the Son of Man in heaven’ is an image of the Cross.

There is one clear difference: John was interested merely in two-dimensional images—icons and portraits. It is hard to know what he would have made of the statues that interest the authors of the *Summa*. At one point John notes that the Bible condemns those who ‘adore graven things’; but when he specifies what he means, he restricts the condemnation to ‘the statues of the Greeks’, which ‘happen to be rejected and condemned because they were representations of demons’.⁶⁴ The *Summa* mentions the Scriptural prohibition on ‘what can be sculpted (*sculptibile*)’,⁶⁵ but assumes that the restriction does not extend beyond the period of the Hebrew Bible, a time at which, as John points out in a passage that the *Summa* quoted, the only encounter with God was with ‘the invisible, incorporeal, uncircumscribed, and unportrayable God’.⁶⁶ Images of Christ are quite a different matter.

Problem Issues

Divine Simplicity

One of the sharpest lines of demarcation between the Eastern Fathers and the Western ones lies in their positions on divine simplicity. Putting the matter rather crudely, the kind of view we find in Augustine maintains that God’s utter simplicity entails that the divine essence and attributes are identical with each other; the kind of view that we find in John maintains that the utter simplicity of the divine essence *prevents* it from being identical with the divine attributes. Thus, John makes a distinction deriving from Gregory of Nyssa, between the divine nature and the things ‘around’ the nature, or that ‘follow’ the nature: ‘All that we state affirmatively of God does not show his nature, but only what is around his nature.’⁶⁷

But the nature of the theory that rejects Augustine’s identity is open to debate: whether the attributes are monadic properties of God, or relational ones (such as divine activities), or even merely divine names. The issue crops up in at least three ways: metaphysical, epistemic, and semantic—what God is, how we know God, and how we name God.

As I shall show, the teaching of the authors diverges sharply from John’s. But they nevertheless regard John’s discussion as in some sense normative. They structure their whole discussion of the divine names along lines that they ascribe to

⁶⁴ John of Damascus, *Expositio fidei*, c. 89, ll. 22–3 (Kotter, 207; Buytaert, 332; Chase, 371).

⁶⁵ See Exodus 20:4.

⁶⁶ John of Damascus, *Expositio fidei*, c. 89, ll. 24–5 (Kotter, 207; Buytaert, 332; Chase, 371), quoted *SH* IV, P2, In3, Tr2, S1, Q1, Ti2, M2, C2 (n. 286), p. 438b.

⁶⁷ John of Damascus, *Expositio fidei*, c. 4, ll. 33–4 (Kotter, 13; Buytaert, 28; Chase, 172), quoted in *SH* I, P2, In2, Tr1, Q4, C1 (n. 369), p. 547a.

John: firstly, names of the essence; secondly, names of the operations; thirdly, privative names; fourthly, names of things ‘around the essence’; fifthly, relative names; and sixthly, metaphorical names.⁶⁸

From a metaphysical point of view, the *Summa*’s authors maintain Augustine’s identity thesis.⁶⁹ But the thesis would seem to have a semantic consequence, which is that terms such as ‘good’ or ‘wise’ signify the divine essence. In the light of this, the authors need to respond to John’s semantic claim that terms such as ‘good’ ‘do not signify the divine nature, but things that are around the nature’.⁷⁰ The authors provide a *Gloss*:

Damascene does not say that goodness is not the nature, but he says “you do not mean the nature”: so he relates the issue to the way in which we speak. “He who is” is the name of the first [being], as he [viz. John] maintains when he speaks of the essence, adding or connoting nothing about the essence; but “good” means being that is communicative of itself, as Damascene says. So even though goodness is the essence, it nevertheless means something added to the first intention of the essence, which perfects the concept signified by the word “goodness”: namely, that to which all things are turned, or which is communicative of itself. For this reason it adds something in the notion of speaking, and for this reason he says “you do not mean the nature”.⁷¹

(I return in a moment to the claim that God’s nature is signified by ‘he who is’.) The second reference to Damascene here attributes something to John that is in fact correctly ascribed not to him but to Pseudo-Dionysius—so the evidence that the authors provide does nothing to support their interpretation of John.⁷² Still, the idea is that one and the same completely simple entity can be represented by different concepts: the concepts are ‘first intentions’, representations of things, not of concepts. And they are distinct concepts. It is in this way that the authors understand John’s distinction between the essence and things around the essence: a distinction in the way in which we form concepts about God:

A name of God can be considered in two ways: either in relation to its significate or in relation to the mode of signification. Considering the significate, all these names—whether [names] of an operation, or [names] of a privation, or [names] following the nature, or [names] of a relation [to creatures]—denote (*ostendunt*) that nature. But considering the mode of signification—which is just as in the creaturely case—Damascene says that they do not signify the nature but things that follow the nature, because they [viz. the terms] are spoken of those things

⁶⁸ *SH* I, P2, In2, Tr1, p. 512; here the *Summa* follows the order of John of Damascus, *Expositio fidei*, c. 9, ll. 21–9 (Kotter, 32; Buytaert, 50; Chase, 190).

⁶⁹ See *SH* I, P1, In1, Tr3, Q3, C4 (n. 107), p. 168a; *SH* I, P1, In1, Tr5, S1, Q1, M1 (n. 163), p. 244a.

⁷⁰ For the reference, see n. 68.

⁷¹ *SH* I, P1, In1, Tr3, Q3, M2, C3 (n. 110), pp. 172b–3b.

⁷² Pseudo-Dionysius, *De divinis nominibus*, c. 4, §1, in *Corpus Dionysiacum*, vol. 1, ed. Beate Regina Suchla, *Patristische Texte und Studien*, 33 (Berlin/New York: De Gruyter, 1990), 143–4. The authors make the same mistake at *SH* I, P1, In1, Tr3, Q3, M3, C5, Ar3 (n. 122), p. 192.

which follow the nature in creatures, and do not signify the substance but a property of the substance: for they signify the divine nature as a quality or habit.⁷³

Again, John does not mean without qualification that such terms do not signify the divine essence. Rather, our way of signifying divine things is derived from the way in which we signify creaturely things. In the latter case certain words signify not a creature's substance but properties that always or for the most part follow on from the substance; when we use such terms of God, they signify the divine essence, but are such that they would, if predicated of creatures, signify a property, not the essence or substance itself.

John's claim that the divine substance is signified by 'he who is' is supposed to leave the divine substance wholly unknown.⁷⁴ The term is purely extensional, and just a proper noun, and there is *no* other term that signifies the divine substance. The *Summa's* authors agree that 'he who is' signifies the divine substance; and they report John's view that it means 'a sea of infinite and indeterminate substance'.⁷⁵ But they do not agree that the divine essence is wholly unknown. Instead, they offer a complex account—again based on things suggested by John—according to which we can know 'what God is according to substance' through revelation, though not through natural reason. The discussion is not entirely clear. The starting point is John's claim that we can know something about God, but not 'what he is'.⁷⁶ The authors provide a *Gloss*: what John means is that we cannot know this 'by reason', but we can if 'helped by the light of faith'.⁷⁷ John's position is far more apophatic. We can formulate true predications of God, but those predications are what we would call extrinsic denominations: they merely express relations between that essence and other things. For the *Summa*, those predications signify the divine essence intrinsically, non-relationally, since they signify things identical to the essence. So while they use John to structure their discussion, the authors offer a highly Westernized and Augustinian interpretation of John's texts.

The Trinity

Two issues arise here: whether or not we might rightly think of the divine essence as a universal, and whether or not we might rightly think of the persons as distinct by 'characteristic properties'.⁷⁸ Both issues are dialectically complex—the first because

⁷³ SH I, P2, In2, Tr1, Q4, C1 (n. 369), p. 547a-b.

⁷⁴ The origin of the view that 'he who is' signifies the divine substance as such seems to be Pseudo-Dionysius; see *De divinis nominibus*, c. 5, § 4 (Suchla, 182).

⁷⁵ SH I, P2, In2, Tr1, Q1, Ar1 (n. 351), p. 522a.

⁷⁶ John of Damascus, *Expositio fidei*, c. 2, ll. 30, 35–6 (Kotter, 9–10; Buytaert, 15; Chase, 168).

⁷⁷ SH I, P2, In1, Tr1, Q1, C1 (n. 333), p. 493a; see too SH I, TrInt, Q2, C1 (n. 14), p. 24b.

⁷⁸ SH I, P2, In2, Tr3, S1, Q1, M1, C1 (n. 462), p. 660a.

John seems to adopt two distinct and incompatible views on the nature of universals, and the second because the *Summa* presents two possible answers to the question without deciding between them.

On the first, the *Summa*'s view is that the divine essence is not rightly thought of as a universal. The discussion arrays conflicting texts from John against each other, and adjudicates by interpreting the one set in the light of the other. The initial equivocation in John results from his sources: when he quotes Gregory of Nazianzus, he tends to the view, defended by Gregory, that universals are merely concepts;⁷⁹ when speaking in *propria persona*, he tends to the view that universals are real.⁸⁰ So the second John speaks as though the divine essence is a universal; the first John denies it. The *Summa*'s authors use the first John—the Gregorian one—to interpret the second.

The second John features heavily in the objections, defending the view that the divine essence is a universal:

[Obj. 4] Damascene says that "'God' and 'man' signify a common species, whereas 'hypostasis' picks out an individual, namely, the Father, the Son, and the Holy Spirit; Peter and Paul."⁸¹ (...) [Obj. 5] Again, in the same author, "'Substance' signifies what is the common and complete species of hypostases that are *homoideon*, that is, alike in species, for example, God, man; 'hypostasis' picks out the individual, namely, Father and Son and Holy Spirit, and Peter and Paul",⁸² and such-like. [Obj. 6] "'Deity' shows the nature, 'Father' the hypostasis; but 'God' signifies the common nature, and is ordered denominatively to each hypostasis [i.e. is predicated of each hypostasis], just like 'man' is [in relation to human hypostases]."⁸³

The point in all of these examples is that the formal features of the relation between essence and hypostasis are the same in both the divine and creaturely cases. The *Summa*'s authors deny this, following the lead of Augustine, whom they summarize in favour of the inapplicability of the notions of universal and particular in the case of God.⁸⁴ One reason is that they understand universals differently from the way in which John understands them. In the texts just cited, the assumption is that univer-

⁷⁹ John of Damascus, *Expositio fidei*, c. 8, ll. 223–37 (Kotter, 28; Buytaert, 42–3; Chase, 185–6); John paraphrases Gregory of Nazianzus, *Oratio* 31, § 15, in *Discours 27–31: Discours théologiques*, ed. Paul Gallay, Sources Chrétiennes, 250 (Paris: Cerf, 1978), 304.4–5.

⁸⁰ As in the texts that the authors quote in the passage I examine in a moment.

⁸¹ SH I, P2, In1, Tr1, Q2, C1 (n. 337), p. 499a, loosely quoting John of Damascus, *Expositio fidei*, c. 48, ll. 2–5 (Kotter, 116; Buytaert, 180; Chase, 275).

⁸² SH I, P2, In1, Tr1, Q2, C1 (n. 337), p. 499b; this is simply a more accurate rendering of Burgundio's translation of the passage quoted in the previous objection.

⁸³ SH I, P2, In1, Tr1, Q2, C1 (n. 337), p. 499b, quoting John of Damascus, *Expositio fidei*, c. 55, ll. 59–60 (Kotter, 133; Buytaert, 207; Chase, 292).

⁸⁴ SH I, P2, In1, Tr1, Q2, C1 (n. 337), p. 498a–b; see Augustine, *De trinitate* VII, c. 6, § 11, in *Sancti Aurelii Augustini de Trinitate libri XV*, 2 vols, ed. W.J. Mountain and F. Glorie, Corpus Christianorum Series Latina, 50, 50 A (Turnhout: Brepols, 1968), 1:262.33–263.51, 263.56–264.70).

sals are numerically one and the same in their instances. The *Summa*, contrariwise, maintains that universals are multiplied in their instances:

As Boethius says, when “man” is said, it is predicated of many men; but if we consider the humanity which is in the individual Socrates, it is made individual, since Socrates himself is individual and singular. From this it follows that, just as Socrates and Cicero are known to be singular and numerically many by their singular properties and accidents, so they are made to be numerically many by their proper individual and singular humanities. Since therefore the deity is in no way multiplied in the Father, Son, and Holy Spirit, the deity is not related to the Father, Son, and Holy Spirit as a universal to singulars.⁸⁵

We know that Socrates and Cicero are distinct since they bear distinct accidents; but the ontological explanation for their distinction is that each is a different instance of human nature, and that human nature is multiplied in its many instances. The divine essence, contrariwise, is not multiplied into many particulars in this way, and so is not a universal.

The authors appeal to the first John in support of this view:

“To be predicated essentially” is said equivocally about the divine essence and about genus or species, since the divine essence is the essence of the Father, Son, and Holy Spirit in a way different from that in which animal is the essence of a human being and a donkey, for the unity of animal in its species, as Damascene says, is seen (*consideratur*) not in reality but only in reason; the unity of the [divine] essence in the persons is seen in reality, and this is said because the divine essence is not multiplied in the persons, whereas the substance of a genus is multiplied into species, and the substance of a species [is multiplied] into individuals.⁸⁶

And the authors use this understanding of the issue to respond to the problematic texts (as they see it). They explain that the first text quoted in the objections is just an analogy.⁸⁷ The second is phrased as it is (the authors claim, with some plausibility) because the context indicates that John is simply trying to find a way of showing how one divine person could become incarnate without the others becoming incarnate: the answer, according to John, is that the commonality of the essence does not mean that the persons cannot be the subject of different predicates; the analogy to human beings simply gives a case in which this kind of situation obtains (commonality with non-identity).⁸⁸ And in relation to the third, they comment, ‘the divine nature is said to be common to the divine persons in a way different from that in which the nature of humanity is common to singular human beings’, and proceed

⁸⁵ SH I, P2, In1, Tr1, Q2, C1 (n. 337), p. 500a, appealing to Boethius, *De trinitate*, c. 1, ll. 51–58, in *De consolatione philosophiae*; *Opuscula theologica*, ed. Claudio Moreschini, Bibliotheca Scriptorum Graecorum et Romanorum Teubneriana (Saur: Leipzig, 2000), 167–8.

⁸⁶ SH I, P2, In1, Tr1, Q2, C1 (n. 337), p. 500b referencing the text cited in n. 80 above.

⁸⁷ SH I, P2, In1, Tr1, Q2, C1 (n. 337), Ad obiecta 4, p. 500b.

⁸⁸ SH I, P2, In1, Tr1, Q2, C1 (n. 337), Ad obiecta 5, p. 501a–b.

to repeat the distinction between natures that are multiplied in their instantiations and those that are not.⁸⁹

The second issue—the question of the explanation for the distinction between the persons themselves—was the subject of considerable controversy in the late 12th and early 13th centuries. The *Summa* sets out two views—that of Praepositinus of Cremona,⁹⁰ and ‘the common opinion of the Masters’.⁹¹ In this discussion, the relevant explanations are labelled ‘notions’ or ‘properties’. According to Praepositinus, ‘there are no notions other than in our way of speaking’;⁹² according to the common opinion, the notions are real, though somehow not distinct from the persons:⁹³ ‘the property of the person is the person, as paternity the Father, and nevertheless something is attributed to the one that is not attributed to the other.’⁹⁴ John crops up in defence of and explanation of the common view: each property can be thought of as a person’s ‘mode of existence’, and if we want to signify such a mode, we do so neither by signifying the essence (since that is common) nor by signifying the person (since the mode belongs to the person).⁹⁵

The *Summa* leaves the matter a more or less open question: it presents each view and shows how to respond to objections, but does not offer an express adjudication between the two views. But whereas it does not offer any argument in favour of the common opinion, it does offer one in favour of Praepositinus’ view—an argument that is simply copied from William of Auxerre: ‘The probability of this opinion is apparent, since just as God, since he is simple in every way, knows through himself and creates through himself, so the Father is distinguished through himself, and is related to the Son through himself.’⁹⁶ (‘Probability’ here simply means that there is a *prima facie* compelling argument for the view.) The idea is that the persons are distinct from each other, but that there is nothing other than the utterly non-composite persons themselves that explains this distinction. Praepositinus’ view, according to which the three divine persons share the divine essence and have no other properties, has a very striking consequence: if it is true, the principle of the Identity of Indiscernibles—according to which no two items can share all the same properties—is false.

⁸⁹ SH I, P2, In1, Tr1, Q2, C1 (n. 337), Ad obiecta 6, p. 501b.

⁹⁰ SH I, P2, In2, Tr3, S1, Q1, M1, C1 (n. 462), p. 660b.

⁹¹ SH I, P2, In2, Tr3, S1, Q1, M1, C1 (n. 462), pp. 661b–2a.

⁹² SH I, P2, In2, Tr3, S1, Q1, M1, C1 (n. 462), p. 660b.

⁹³ SH I, P2, In2, Tr3, S1, Q1, M1, C1 (n. 462), pp. 661b–2a.

⁹⁴ SH I, P2, In2, Tr3, S1, Q1, M1, C1 (n. 462), Ad obiecta 3, p. 662b.

⁹⁵ SH I, P2, In2, Tr3, S1, Q1, M1, C1 (n. 462), p. 662a–b; see John of Damascus, *Expositio fidei*, c. 10, l. 6 (Kotter, 32; Buytaert, 51; Chase, 190), where John includes persons and their properties as modes, and claims that the relevant terms name not the essence but something else; also John of Damascus, *Expositio fidei*, c. 49, ll. 10–11 (Kotter, 118; Buytaert, 184; Chase, 277): ‘each (...) is a perfect person and has its own property or distinct manner of existence.’

⁹⁶ SH I, P2, In2, Tr3, S1, Q1, M1, C1 (n. 462), p. 660b; see William of Auxerre, *Summa aurea* I, tr. 7, c. 6, ll. 5–13 (Ribaillier, 1:125).

John's usefulness in helping to explicate the common view makes him a problem for the Praepositinian view that the authors seem to prefer. He claims that the notions are 'characteristic properties', and such things are distinct from the divine essence.⁹⁷ The authors reply that, if we accept Praepositinus' view, we should interpret John's meaning to be simply that the persons are distinct from each other without being distinct from the nature.⁹⁸ Likewise, we should interpret the claim that the properties are modes of existence to mean that each person is distinct from each other; and if we claim that the persons are distinct not through themselves but through their properties, then we will be faced with an infinite regress—presumably since if the persons are not distinct through themselves, there is no reason to suppose that the properties are distinct through themselves.⁹⁹

Grace and Prelapsarian Humanity

Another position on which the authors of the *Summa* confront the different theological frameworks of Western (Augustinian) and non-Western theologies is the question of the natural endowments of prelapsarian humanity. The *Summa* marks a significant point in the development of Western theologies of grace—just as it did in the development of the theory of faith as an Aristotelian habit, as noted above. Basically, the *Summa* argues that what is required to make human beings pleasing and acceptable to God is some kind of *created* grace, over and above God's general presence to the universe (here spelled out in terms of the Lombard's distinction between presence by essence, presence and power):¹⁰⁰

⁹⁷ *SH* I, P2, In2, Tr3, S1, Q1, M1, C1 (n. 462), p. 660a; see John of Damascus, *Expositio fidei*, c. 50, ll. 9–10 (Kotter, 120; Buytaert, 187; Chase, 279).

⁹⁸ *SH* I, P2, In2, Tr3, S1, Q1, M1, C1 (n. 462), Ad objecta d, p. 661a.

⁹⁹ *SH* I, P2, In2, Tr3, S1, Q1, M1, C1 (n. 462), Ad objecta e, p. 661a. This last argument, incidentally, succeeds only if we suppose that the properties, just like the persons, are the same as the essence; perhaps someone accepting the common opinion could reject this, as we see Scotus doing 60 years later. The authors devote a long question to the discussion of the *filioque*, and report authorities on both sides. In all cases, they provide *Glosses* of the Greek views that render them compatible with the *filioque*. John occurs as the first authority on the *contra* side ('The Holy Spirit (...) proceeds inseparably (*indistanter*) from the Father, and rests in the Son', quoted in *SH* I, P1, In2, Tr1, Q1, Ti2, C4 (n. 310), pp. 447b–8a), and the authors simply interpret this text along the lines of a principle that they outline in their main solution: 'to proceed' has two senses: one in which it requires two terms (procession from one thing to another), and a second in which it merely has one term (an origin). In the first sense, claiming that the Spirit proceeded from the Father and the Son would suggest that the Spirit proceeds both from the Father to the Son, and vice versa. But while it is true that the Spirit proceeds from the Father to the Son (since it is the love that the Father bears to the Son as something produced by the Father), the opposite does not hold (since the Father was not produced by the Son). In this sense of 'proceed', it is false that the Spirit proceeds from the Father and the Son; and this is the sense of 'proceed' that John has in mind (*SH* I, P1, In2, Tr1, Q1, Ti2, C4 (n. 310), p. 450a).

¹⁰⁰ See Peter Lombard, *Sent.* I, d. 37, c. 1, n. 2 (Brady, 2:263–4).

Uncreated grace is in us and makes us pleasing (*gratos*) to God. What I call “pleasing to God” either posits in us some disposition by which we are pleasing to God, other than the uncreated disposition, or not. If it does not posit some disposition in us other than uncreated grace, then the graced (*gratus*) and the ungraced among us do not differ, because uncreated grace is in the ungraced soul by essence, presence, and power, and likewise in the graced soul, in so far as God is said to be everywhere by presence, power, and essence.¹⁰¹

Uncreated grace here is God’s causing some disposition in us—a habit in virtue of which we are acceptable to God, and our actions constituted as things worthy of a reward. If there were no such disposition, then there would be no basis for reward other than what is common to all creatures; likewise, given that the reward (heavenly beatitude) is beyond our natural powers, we need some supernatural power to enable us to attain it.¹⁰²

The authors maintain that this grace—a gift *superadded* to other human endowments—was required in prelapsarian humanity too. There is nothing analogous to this in Eastern theology, as far as I know. According to John, for example, ‘God made human beings innocent, just, virtuous (...) sinless, endowed with freedom of will (...) having the power to persevere and progress in the good’,¹⁰³ and such that ‘when we persevere in what is according to nature, we are in a state of virtue’.¹⁰⁴

The *Summa* takes a very different view:

God is maximal truth, a creature however is futility (*vanitas*); therefore in no way can it be united to him other than through a medium which is partly truth, partly futility. But this is grace, which is truth to the extent that it is from God, but vanity to the extent that it is a creature. Therefore it was impossible for human beings to merit without grace.¹⁰⁵

So the authors offer ways of reading John that make him more amenable to their rather pessimistic view. What they say is on the face of it surprising: rather than suggest that John has understated the requirements of prelapsarian existence (by neglecting to mention grace), they seem to argue that he has overstated them. Thus, when he claims that human beings were made in virtue, what he means is that God ‘made them apt and in a certain way disposed to [virtue], which he completed after a short time’;¹⁰⁶ and when John claims that they had the power to persevere in the good, what he means is that they would eventually attain that power,¹⁰⁷ or that they could do so if *gratia gratum faciens* (‘sanctifying grace’) were given to

101 SH IV, P3, In1, Tr1, Q2, C1, Ar2 (n. 609), p. 959a.

102 SH II, In4, Tr3, Q3, Ti1, C3, Ar2 (n. 510), p. 746a.

103 John of Damascus, *Expositio fidei*, c. 26, ll. 24–5, 37, 40–1 (Kottter, 76–7; Buytaert, 113–14; Chase, 235), quoted at SH II, In4, Tr3, Q3, Ti1, C3, Ar2 (n. 510), arg. 1 and 2, p. 744a.

104 John of Damascus, *Expositio fidei*, c. 44, ll. 16–17 (Kotter, 104; Buytaert, 162; Chase, 264), quoted SH II, In4, Tr3, Q3, Ti1, C3, Ar2 (n. 510), arg. 3, p. 744a.

105 SH II, In4, Tr3, Q3, Ti1, C3, Ar2 (n. 510), Contra a, p. 745b.

106 SH II, In4, Tr3, Q3, Ti1, C3, Ar2 (n. 510), Ad obiecta 1, p. 746b.

107 SH II, In4, Tr3, Q3, Ti1, C3, Ar2 (n. 510), Ad obiecta 2, p. 746b.

them,¹⁰⁸ or that they could progress merely in natural cognition and volition.¹⁰⁹ And when John claims that they could ‘persevere in what is according to nature’, what he means is that virtue (i.e. grace) is added to them after some kind of delay.¹¹⁰ Clearly, the texts presented our authors with no little difficulty.¹¹¹

Overall, the complexly textured nature of John’s *Expositio fidei* and of the way it was read in the Middle Ages makes for a fascinating study in the reception history of theology. John reads, copies, and interprets an array of earlier sources, often imposing on them, in virtue of the ways in which he arranges the texts he uses, a distinct interpretation of his own. The following summary of John’s originality in relation to the will offered by Michael Frede captures the scenario nicely:

If we now look back on this account, it is obvious that, in spite of its reliance on Aristotle in many regards, it is in crucial regards quite un-Aristotelian. (...) It relies on Nemesius, but the account is not that of Nemesius. It is heavily indebted to Maximus the Confessor. (...) But, though John of Damascus does nothing to point this out, his account of the will also subtly, but significantly seems to me to differ from Maximus’ account. The highly compilatory character of the account John offers should not make us overlook that, in spite of all the internal tensions and unclarity which arise from John’s use of disparate sources, the account which emerges in some ways is novel.¹¹²

What we see in the *Summa* and other medieval uses of John’s work is precisely the same process exercised in turn on John himself—careful interpretation and exegesis resulting in a theologian’s taking positions often quite different from those taken by John, but learning from him in a variety of ways. And the reintegration of Aristotle, undertaken independently in the 13th century as a kind of superstructure on top of

108 SH II, In4, Tr3, Q3, Ti1, C3, Ar2 (n. 510), Ad obiecta 2, p. 747a.

109 SH II, In4, Tr3, Q3, Ti1, C3, Ar2 (n. 510), Ad obiecta 2, p. 747a.

110 SH II, In4, Tr3, Q3, Ti1, C3, Ar2 (n. 510), Ad obiecta 3, p. 747a.

111 One curious subsidiary controversy sprang from the opinion ‘of the Greeks, namely Gregory of Nyssa and John of Damascus’ (SH II, In4, Tr2, S2, Q2, C1 (n. 463), p. 615b) that the creation of women was required only as a result of the Fall, and that Eve was thus created in virtue of God’s foreknowledge of the Fall. The idea is that Adam was to be tested and, if successful, endowed with immortality (see John of Damascus, *Expositio fidei*, c. 44, ll. 57–8 (Kotter, 105; Buytaert, 164–5; Chase, 265–6). Since God knew that Adam would ‘fall and be subject to death’, he created Eve ‘to aid [Adam] in the establishment of the race after the fall by succession through the process of begetting’ (John of Damascus, *Expositio fidei*, c. 44, ll. 28–31 (Kotter, 104; Buytaert, 162–3; Chase, 264). The *Summa* holds that God’s intentions always included human procreation, so that if there had been no original sin there would have been ‘the multiplication of the number of elect to be beatified, participating in God in glory or deiformity’ (SH II, In4, Tr2, S2, Q2, C1 (n. 463), p. 615b). The Greek theologians do not disagree: they believed that the beatification of Adam was one of God’s goals, and thus ‘believed that it was not necessary for [Adam] to be given a helper (...) [merely] on account of [this] (...) goal’ (SH II, In4, Tr2, S2, Q2, C1 (n. 463), pp. 615b–6a).

112 Frede, ‘John of Damascus,’ 93. I had earlier come to a similar conclusion about the nature of John’s Christology: ‘None of the elements of John’s theory is original. (...) But the combination is unique to him and appears to form a reasonably consistent whole’; see Richard Cross, ‘Perichoresis, Deification, and Christological Predication in John of Damascus,’ *Mediaeval Studies* 62 (2000): 120.

John's initial attempts at synthesis, adds a further complex layer to the reception history—one that I have not explored here but that would surely be worth pursuing.

Johannes Zachhuber

John of Damascus in the *Summa Halensis*

The Use of Greek Patristic Thought in the Treatment of the Incarnation

Abstract: This chapter examines the quotations from John of Damascus' *De fide orthodoxa* contained in the *Summa Halensis*, specifically in its section on the assumption of human nature in the Incarnation. Starting from contextual observations, the paper moves, in a first step, to an analysis of citations from the Damascene in Peter Lombard's *Sentences*. The authoritative role of the latter writing meant that its often idiosyncratic use of the Damascene was passed on to later scholastics, such as the authors of the *Summa*. A detailed consideration of ten quotations from the Damascene in the *Summa*, which makes up the second part of the paper, reveals a complex pattern of reception. Passages from *De fide orthodoxa* were often taken out of context, truncated, or both, in order to serve as building blocks in the *Summa*'s own, dialectical presentation of a theological topic. In conclusion, the paper cautions against the conventional assumption equating the number of references to an authority in the *Summa* with their conceptual influence.

The reader of the *Summa Halensis* is not only confronted with the extraordinary quantity of its literary achievement. Equally intimidating is the number of references made in this work of the early Franciscan school to a vast number of authorities: pagan, Jewish, Muslim, and Christian authors from antiquity up until their own time are cited, often with precise or seemingly precise references to the passages from which these citations have been taken. Among this huge number of intertextual references, quotations from the 8th-century Greek-Arabic theologian John of Damascus make up a not inconsiderable part. According to the comprehensive index of citations which the Quaracchi editors of the *Summa* have prepared, there is a total of 591 references to the work of the Damascene.¹ Almost all of them are taken from one book, his Ἐκδοσις ἀκριβὴς τῆς ὀρθοδόξου πίστεως.² This summary of Greek Patristic theology had been translated into Latin under the title *De fide orthodoxa* by Burgundio of Pisa in the mid 12th century.³ Its impact on Western scholasticism was nearly

1 *Doctoris irrefragabilis Alexandri de Hales Ordinis minorum Summa theologica: Indices in tom. I-IV* (Quaracchi: Collegium S. Bonaventurae, 1979), 148–50.

2 John of Damascus, *Die Schriften des Johannes von Damaskos*, vol. 2, *Expositio Fidei*, ed. Bonifatius Kotter (Berlin/New York: de Gruyter, 1973).

3 Saint John Damascene, *De Fide Orthodoxa: Versions of Burgundio and Cerbanus*, ed. Eligius M. Buytaert (St Bonaventure, NY: Franciscan Institute, 1955). In what follows, I use this title to refer to both the Greek and the Latin versions of John's treatise.

immediate not least because Peter Lombard made heavy use of this work in his four books of *Sentences*, a work of unrivalled influence in subsequent centuries.

It is immediately evident that both the Lombard and 13th-century writers, such as the author of the *Summa Halensis*, considered John a great authority. His work is cited alongside the most respected Patristic and medieval authorities, such as Augustine or Anselm of Canterbury even though these two thinkers and Augustine especially, admittedly, outrank the Greek theologian. Yet how influential was the Damascene on doctrinal and conceptual developments during this period? This question is much more difficult to answer than might first appear from the massive number of quotations from his work that were incorporated into the writings of his medieval readers. Part of the reason for this lies in the particular citation technique employed by early scholastic authors in which it is often far from evident what the function of a particular authoritative quotation is within a given argument.

One way to address this difficulty is to pay closer attention to individual references within their context. What is quoted? Are quotations faithful to their original context (and indeed their original text, as far as we can make it out)? How are the quoted texts used in their new textual environment? My chapter will contribute to this study which, as far as I can see, has not so far been extensively undertaken, certainly not for the quotations in the *Summa Halensis*. For practical reasons, I could only analyse a small selection of citations. It is thus inevitable that more general conclusions can only be drawn with caution. Yet I hope that the tendencies emerging from my research may nonetheless be enlightening.

As the basis for my investigation, I have chosen the section in Part 3 of the *Summa* which deals with the Incarnation. More specifically, I have focussed on those passages in which the Franciscan author deals with the notoriously difficult problem of Christ's assumption of human nature and the character of the ensuing divine-human union. There are obvious reasons for this selection. These problems were at the heart of Eastern doctrinal debate and development between the 5th and the 8th centuries.⁴ John of Damascus' magnum opus offers an excellent summary of the systematic outcome of these debates, at least on the Chalcedonian side. In the Latin West, Christology emerged as a major doctrinal problem during the 12th century.⁵ The amount of sophisticated Christological literature that existed in Latin up until that point which could be utilised in the ensuing discussions was limited.⁶ Nat-

⁴ Andrew Louth, 'Christology in the East from the Council of Chalcedon to John of Damascus,' in *The Oxford Handbook of Christology*, ed. Francesca Murphy (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2015), 139–53.

⁵ Lauge Olaf Nielsen, *Theology and Philosophy in the Twelfth Century: A Study of Gilbert of Porreta's Thinking and the Theological Expositions of the Doctrine of the Incarnation during the Period 1130–1180* (Leiden: Brill, 1982), 193–361.

⁶ The Christological controversy of the first millennium was essentially an Eastern affair in which some Latin theologians participated. Most of the latter, however, were thinkers with deep roots in the Greek intellectual tradition, such as Boethius or Facundus of Hermiane.

urally, Latin Patristic authorities, such as Augustine or Leo the Great, could be relied on to emphasise the fundamentals of orthodox Christology, but Western authors were to discover what their Greek counterparts had painfully found out half a millennium before, namely, that agreement on the full divinity and humanity of the saviour, together with a commitment to his personal unity, only served to define the terms on which a Christological conflict could be fought but did little to settle it.

It is therefore *prima facie* unsurprising that early medieval Western thinkers sought out the support of Greek fathers and especially that of Damascus' systematic presentation of the later Chalcedonian settlement. At the same time, any attempt to determine the potential influence of the Damascene on the *Summa Halensis* must start from the acknowledgement that such an attempt at appropriation faced considerable hermeneutical difficulties. What I mean is that the questions to which John of Damascus' clarifications sought to provide answers were in some ways rather different from the questions that shaped early medieval debates about Christology in the Latin West. Let me therefore begin by sketching more generally—and inevitably with a broad brush—the background to the Christological synthesis the medieval Latin thinkers were encountering in John of Damascus. I will then proceed to offer some observations on the integration of extracts from John's great work in the most influential theological treatise of the period, that is, Peter Lombard's *Sentences*, before moving on to consider the quotations found in my selections from the *Summa Halensis*.

The Background: Greek Patristic Christology at the End of the Patristic Era

The formula adopted by the Council of Chalcedon in 451 always appeared to Western Christians as the perfect, Solomonic judgment in an obviously subtle and complex doctrinal conflict.⁷ By asserting the duality of perfect divinity and perfect humanity, the consubstantiality of Christ with humankind insofar as he was human, and the unity of his personal individuality, the Council seemed to have hit on doctrinal truth in a way that appeared intuitively obvious to many or most. That this solution was credited to the benign, yet powerful influence of the Roman pontiff arguably added to the synod's reputation for exercising superior wisdom in adjudicating the doctrinal conflict at hand.⁸

⁷ Cf. the formula of 'four gospels and four councils' popularised by Gregory the Great (*Epistola* 1.24: PL 77:478 A).

⁸ The enthusiastic acclamation of Leo's *Tome* at the Council reached its climax in the words, 'Peter has spoken this through Leo' (Πέτρος διὰ Λέοντος ταῦτα ἐξεφώνησεν): *Acta Conciliorum Oecumenicorum*, ed. Eduard Schwartz, vol. 2/1/2 (Berlin/Leipzig: de Gruyter, 1933), 81, 23–31.

It was quite otherwise in the East where the formula adopted by the Council intuitively appeared implausible, even absurd, and certainly wrong to a large number of believers as well as to the most educated theological thinkers.⁹ It is always worth remembering the rather extraordinary fact that this state-sponsored synod did not have any first-rate theological support in the East for more than half a century. This changed from the age of Justinian, and the 6th century already testifies to a growing and increasingly confident group of major Chalcedonian authors, but their arguments were forged while on the defence against opponents who were fully convinced of the superiority of their own case, both in terms of patristic support and in terms of doctrinal and conceptual coherence. In principle, this situation had not changed even by the time of John of Damascus, as the Arabic conquest from the 7th century onwards initially led to a renewed consolidation of non-Chalcedonian Christianity in those areas that were newly liberated from the Chalcedonian dictate of the Byzantine emperors.¹⁰ It is impossible to appreciate John's account of Christology without taking this context into account.

What is the reason for this radically different history in the East and the West? I will restrain myself from speculating about different religious or intellectual mentalities as this is insignificant for my paper today. Instead, I want to focus on the alleged failures of the Chalcedonian formula, as they can help explain the conceptual approach taken by John of Damascus in his defence of Chalcedonianism. In many ways, the origin of the problem lay in the particular language that had been adopted by the so-called Cappadocian theologians of the late 4th century to resolve the trinitarian controversy. Basil the Great, his friend Gregory of Nazianzus and Basil's younger brother, Gregory of Nyssa, became uniquely influential in later Eastern theology due to their terminological and conceptual response to the doctrinal conflicts that divided the newly Christianised empire in the latter half of the 4th century.¹¹

Part of the force their solution took on clearly derived from its cast as a quasi-philosophical theory framed in a way that went beyond its immediate purpose, which was to explain how the three divine hypostases were also and at the same time one single divine *ousia* or God.¹² This theory had just enough points of contact

9 Aloys Grillmeier, *Christ in Christian Tradition*, vol. 2/1, trans. Pauline Allen and John Cawte (Atlanta, GA: John Knox, 1987), 93–317.

10 W.H.C. Frend, *The Rise of the Monophysite Movement: Chapters in the History of the Church in the Fifth and Sixth Centuries* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1972), 356–7.

11 Johannes Zachhuber, 'Christology after Chalcedon and the Transformation of the Philosophical Tradition: Reflections on a Neglected Topic,' in *The Ways of Byzantine Philosophy*, ed. Mikonja Knežević (Alhambra, CA: Sebastian Press, 2015), 89–110.

12 The foundational text is [Basil] *Epistola* 38. It is read in the editions of Basil's letters, most recently: Saint Basile, *Lettres*, ed. Yves Courtonne, vol. 1 (Paris: Les Belles Lettres, 1957), 80–92. Most scholars, however, now accept that the text was authored by Gregory of Nyssa. See most recently: Andrew Radde-Gallwitz, *Gregory of Nyssa: Doctrinal Works* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2018), 116. For a full interpretation of this text in its philosophical context, see Johannes Zachhuber, *Human Nature in Gregory of Nyssa: Theological Background and Theological Significance* (Leiden: Brill, 1999), 61–93.

with the prevailing logical accounts in the Aristotelian commentaries to inscribe Christian thought into existing intellectual traditions; it maintained enough independence from those pagan texts to make plausible the claim that this was a new form of Christian philosophy.

According to the Cappadocians, being is universal, but concrete existence is tied to individuals. *Ousia* or *physis* is one but has no existence or subsistence apart from individual hypostases. It is perhaps less obvious to see how it floundered on Christology; but it did.¹³ A famous battle cry of the opponents of the Chalcedonian solution was that there could be no *physis* without a hypostasis.¹⁴ This principle was little more than an application of—or an inference from—the Cappadocian philosophy in which it had been vital to insist that the divine nature existed only and exclusively in the three hypostases of the Godhead.

In Christology, it then seemed to follow that the two natures affirmed by Chalcedon led to two hypostases. But two hypostases were also counterintuitive since the term had been defined as the equivalent to *atomon* or individual. Hence the popular acceptance of miaphysitism, the belief that there was only one single nature in the Incarnate.

Once this problem was fully recognised on the Chalcedonian side—and this took the better part of a century—the need emerged to explain how two natures could come together in a single hypostasis. The celebrated solution to this problem, as it is presented for example in John of Damascus' work—was the doctrine of the anhypostatic human nature of the saviour—an individuated human nature that yet exists without a hypostasis of its own insofar as it is realised within the hypostasis of the divine Word.¹⁵

The ingenuity of this solution lies in the fact that it does not entirely break with the Cappadocian theory, as this would have had far-reaching consequences not least for trinitarian doctrine. The ontological link between universal nature and its hypostatic realisations is still maintained, but an additional—and as far as I can see, entirely innovative—ontological layer is introduced between the conceptual individuation through personal properties and actual, concrete, hypostatic existence.¹⁶

It is arguable that anyone seeking to arrive at a plausible Christology will encounter the difficulty of how the two natures, divine and human, can find a single united existence in the person of Jesus Christ. Yet the specific solution that appealed

13 Cf. Aloys Grillmeier, *Christ in Christian Tradition*, vol. 1, trans. John Bowden, 2nd ed. (Atlanta: John Knox, 1975), 551–2.

14 Cf. e.g. Leontius of Byzantium, *Contra Nestorianos et Eutychianos* 1, in *Leontius of Byzantium: Complete Works*, ed. Brian E. Daley (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2017), 130, 10–1; John the Grammarian, *Apologia concilii Chalcedonensis* IV, in *Johannis Caesariensis presbyteri et grammatici, Opera quae supersunt*, ed. Marcel Richard (Leuven: Peeters, 1977), 51, 82–3.

15 Cf. Benjamin Gleede, *The Development of the Term ΕΝΥΠΙΟΤΑΤΟΣ from Origen to John of Damascus* (Leiden: Brill, 2012).

16 Cf. Zachhuber, 'Christology after Chalcedon,' 124–6.

to John of Damascus was not necessarily attractive to those who had never been faced with the particular context of the Eastern Christological debate.

Western Christological debate, by contrast, was initially shaped in the 12th century by the different contributions of Gilbert of Poitiers, Hugh of St Victor, and Abelard.¹⁷ The problem of the assumption was, following Gilbert, often put into a four-way disjunction: did a person assume a person; or a person a nature; or a nature a person; or a nature a nature.¹⁸ From the turn of the 13th century onwards, the so-called three opinions (*assumptus homo*; subsistence; and habitus theory) expounded in Lombard's *Sentences* were accepted as a starting point by all major discussants even though the third of them was often treated as little more than a theoretical option since it had been officially condemned in 1177.¹⁹ While the questions raised by these conceptual frames were not unrelated to those addressed by John of Damascus, they were sufficiently distinct to take doctrinal debate in rather different directions.

Notably, the Latin preference for the term *persona*²⁰ gave theologians options their Greek counterparts did not have, as the special connotations of this term allowed the scholastics to concede other dualities in the saviour which in a Greek context would certainly have come dangerously close to affirming two hypostases.²¹ At the same time, the single major element of John's late Chalcedonian system, his emphasis on the possibility of the assumption of anhypostatized human nature, found only a limited echo among his early Western readers.

All this is not to say that the Damascene was without influence on Western Christological debates from the middle of the 12th century onwards. This would certainly be false.²² It is, for example, arguable that the relatively swift overall agreement, emerging from the early 13th century, that of the three opinions only the second one, the so-called subsistence theory, was ultimately acceptable, owed something to the proximity between that theory and the account of the Incarnation given by the Damascene. Yet by and large, sweeping claims are difficult and treacherous due to the different historical, cultural and theological contexts that were brought together by John's introduction into the Latin world.

17 Nielsen, *Theology and Philosophy*.

18 Nielsen, *Theology and Philosophy*, 164–5.

19 Peter Lombard, *Sententiae in IV libris distinctae* (hereafter, *Sent.*) III, dd. 6–7, 2 vols, ed. Ignatius C. Brady, 3rd rev. ed. (Grottaferrata: Editiones Collegii S. Bonaventurae, 1971–81), 2:49–66. Cf. Marcia L. Colish, *Peter Lombard*, 2 vols (Leiden: Brill, 1994), 1:399–404. For the reception of Lombard and the condemnation of 1177, see Clare Monagle, *Orthodoxy and Controversy in Twelfth-Century Religious Discourse: Peter Lombard's 'Sentences' and the Development of Theology* (Turnhout: Brepols, 2011).

20 At least since Leo's *Tome* of 451.

21 See further below at n. 85.

22 Note the useful overview in Milton V. Anastos, 'Some Aspects of Byzantine Influence on Latin Thought in the Twelfth Century,' in *Twelfth Century Europe and the Foundations of Modern Society*, ed. Marshall Clagett, Gaines Post, and Robert Peynolds, 2nd ed. (Madison, WI: University of Wisconsin Press, 1966), 131–88 = Milton V. Anastos, *Studies in Byzantine Intellectual History* (London: Variorum, 1979), 149–63.

It is for this reason that in what follows I shall largely avoid overarching claims and instead attend to the details of the Damascene's reception. Before addressing his citations in the *Summa*, it will be useful to take a quick glance at the work which both introduced *The Orthodox Faith* to a larger Western readership and also formed the structural backbone of most subsequent theological discussion. Here, I refer to Peter Lombard's *Four Books of Sentences*.

John of Damascus in the *Book of Sentences*

A major investigation of the way in which the Lombard incorporated quotations from John of Damascus into his *Sentences* does not seem to exist.²³ Yet such a study would be highly desirable. In the present place, I cannot obviously highlight more than a few observations on sections that will be important for my subsequent discussion of the *Summa Halensis*, but I hope that this small selection can serve as an illustration of the bigger picture. As we shall see, the Lombard used texts from Damascus rather liberally and throughout his work in a way intended to solve his own theological questions.

Sentences III, Distinction 2

My first example is taken from Distinction 2 in Book 3 of the *Sentences*.²⁴ Here, Lombard addresses the question whether Christ took on the whole of human nature and of what the meaning is of the terms 'humanity' and 'human nature'. In addressing this issue, which for him was framed by problems raised by Gilbert of Poitiers,²⁵ Lombard makes use of three separate passages in John's book. The first of them, taken from Chapter 48 (III 4) is relatively straightforward and works well with his argumentative purpose.²⁶ He then, however, moves on to another passage, which he does not identify, and from there, things become much more problematic.

Lombard's claim is that 'nature is not accepted in Christ in the same way as when it is said that there is one nature of all human beings'.²⁷ In support of this statement, he now cites a lengthy passage from *The Orthodox Faith*, Chapter 475 (III 5). In this section, the Damascene argues against his monophysite opponents who, he al-

²³ The most detailed account is in Anastos, 'Byzantine Influence'. Cf. also Eligius M. Buytaert, 'St. John Damascene, Peter Lombard and Gerhoh of Reichersberg,' *Franciscan Studies* 10 (1950): 323–43; Colish, *Peter Lombard*, 1:126–8, 215–6, 420.

²⁴ Peter Lombard, *Sent.* III, d. 2, c. 1 (Brady, 2:27–9).

²⁵ Nielsen, *Theology and Philosophy*, 245–6.

²⁶ Peter Lombard, *Sent.* III, d. 2, c. 1, 2 (Brady, 2:28.7–12).

²⁷ Peter Lombard, *Sent.* III, d. 2, c. 1, 3 (Brady, 2:28.13–4): 'Natura enim non sic accipitur in christo ut cum dicitur una natura esse omnium hominum.'

leges, did not properly distinguish the terms nature and hypostasis. Calling all human beings ‘one nature’, Damascus argues, we do not in this case consider them *qua* soul and body, as those two ontologically opposed constituents of the human person could not possibly be jointly understood as ‘one nature’. Instead, we speak of the many individuals who are all defined in the same way as possessing a rational soul and a body. In the case of Jesus, however, this consideration makes no sense as there is no species of saviours, but his case is unique—there never was and never will be another.

Let us leave to one side whether John’s argument would convince a dyed-in-the-wool monophysite. More pertinent for the present topic is how Peter Lombard used this passage, which is nothing short of extraordinary. We can easily appreciate that the Lombard was less concerned with Eastern miaphysites than his Greek source, but he could only marshal this passage for his own ends by making a small but decisive change to its wording as well as by truncating it at the end.

Peter Lombard, *Sentences*²⁸

Natura enim non sic accipitur in christo ut cum dicitur una natura esse omnium hominum. Quod euidenter **idem ioannes** ostendit, differentem rationem dicti assignans cum natura humana in christo nominatur, et cum una dicitur natura omnium hominum.

Ait enim: Cum unam hominum naturam dicimus, sciendum est quod non considerantes ad animae et corporis rationem hoc dicimus. Impossibile enim est unius naturae dicere **domini** corpus et animam ad inuicem comparata.

Sed quia plurimae personae hominum sunt, omnes autem eandem suscipiunt rationem naturae, omnes enim ex anima et corpore compositi sunt, et omnes naturam animae participant et substantiam corporis possident,

John of Damascus, *De fide orthodoxa* (Burgundio translation)²⁹

Sed hoc est quod facit haeretici errorem, quod idem dicunt naturam et hypostasim.

Quia autem unam hominum naturam inuimus, sciendum quod non inspicientes in eam quae animae et corporis rationem hoc dicimus. Impossibile enim unius naturae dicere animam et corpus ad inuicem comparata.

Sed, quia plurimae hypostases (id est personae) hominum sunt, omnes autem eandem suscipiunt rationem naturae;—omnes enim ex anima sunt compositi et corpore, et omnes naturam animae participant et substantiam corporis possident;

John of Damascus, *De fide orthodoxa* (Cerberus translation)³⁰

Quoniam autem unam hominum naturam esse dicimus, sciendum est quod non consideranter ad animae et corporis rationem hoc dicimus. Impossibile enim est unius naturae dicere corpusque **Domini** et animam ad inuicem comparata.

Quoniam autem plures personae hominum sunt et omnes eandem recipiunt rationem substantiae,—omnes ex anima et corpore compositae sunt et omnes naturam animae amplectuntur et substantiam corporis possident,

²⁸ Peter Lombard, *Sent.* III, d. 2, c. 1, 3 (Brady, 2:28.13–29.2).

²⁹ John of Damascus, *De fide orth.* 47.5 [III 3] (Buytaert, 176.49–64).

³⁰ John of Damascus, *De fide orth.* 47.5 [III 3] (Buytaert, 394.45–59).

communem speciem plurimarum et differentium personarum unam naturam dicimus, uniuscuiusque scilicet personae duas naturas habentis et in duabus perfectae naturis, animae scilicet et corporis.

In domino autem iesu christo non est communem speciem accipere. Neque enim factus est, nec est, nec aliquando fiet alius. Sed christus ex deitate et humanitate, in deitate et humanitate, deus perfectus est, idem et homo perfectus

– communem speciem plurimarum et diversarum hypostaseon (id est personarum) unam naturam inquit, unaquaque scilicet hypostaseos (id est persona) duas naturas habente et in duabus perfecta naturis, animae dico et corporis.

In Domino autem nostro Iesu Christo non est communem speciem suscipere. Neque enim generatus est, neque est, neque unquam generabitur alius. Christus ex deitate et humanitate, in deitate et humanitate Deus perfectus idem et homo perfectus.

Hinc non est dicere unam naturam in Domino nostro Iesu Christo.

– communem speciem plurimarum differentium personarum unam naturam dicimus esse, uniuscuiusque videlicet personae duas naturas habentis, et quae duabus perficitur naturis, animae dico et corporis.

Sed in domino nostro Iesu Christo non est communem speciem accipere. Neque enim fuit, neque est, neque aliquando erit alius Christus ex deitate et humanitate, et in deitate et humanitate, Deus perfectus et homo perfectus. **Ex quo non est dicere unam naturam esse in Domino nostro Iesu Christo.**

According to Peter's reading, the Damascene's text demonstrates that 'we assign a different principle of speech when we speak of the human nature in Christ and when we say that the nature of all human beings is one.'³¹ The key word here is clearly 'human nature' (*humana natura*). It would arguably still be correct, albeit liable to misunderstanding when taken out of context, to paraphrase Damascus as saying that 'nature' in Christ (as understood by the miaphysites) does not mean the same as universal human nature. By adding 'human', however, the Lombard represents his source as postulating a difference between Christ's humanity and that of the remainder of humankind.

This point is further substantiated by Peter's attribution to the Damascene of the view that it was 'impossible to call the soul and body of the Lord of one nature when compared with one another'. This is not particularly clear, but in light of Peter's preceding summary of what, in his opinion, John of Damascus was saying in this passage, he must clearly have intended it to mean that Christ's body and soul could not be considered of one nature with the remainder of humankind. The problem is that the Damascene, for obvious reasons, never wrote such a thing. Rather, the sentence quoted by the Lombard states, both in Greek and in the Burgundio translation that it was 'impossible to call soul and body of one nature when [they are] compared with one another'.³² In other words, Peter's idiosyncratic reading of *De fide orthodoxa* is here sustained by the word *domini* which is added to the original text of his source.

³¹ Peter Lombard, *Sent.* III, d. 2, c. 1, 3 (Brady, 2:28.15–6).

³² John of Damascus, *De fide orth.* 47.5 [III 3] (Kotter, 112.42–3 and 176.52).

The Lombard was not, however, personally responsible for this addition. Rather, he found it in the older, partial translation of John's work, attributed to a certain Cerbanus, which he initially used before the full translation by Burgundio became available.³³ Eligius M. Buytaert has done much to elucidate how the Lombard corrected his citations with the help of the later version once he was able to consult it. As Buytaert shows, however, the Lombard did this in a rather unsystematic fashion that resulted in an idiosyncratic text that often displayed a unique blend of the two versions.³⁴ The present passage offers an intriguing example of this practice insofar as it indicates that the Lombard's encounter with the Burgundio version could have substantive implications for the use he had previously made of the Damascene's argument in his own text.

Peter's use of the Cerbanus translation does not, however, fully explain his problematic use of the Damascene in the present passage. The purpose of John's argument is evident, in the Greek original as well as in both translations, from the concluding line which states that 'one therefore must not speak of one nature in our Lord Jesus Christ.'³⁵ The Lombard, however, omits this statement with the result that the preceding sentence, according to which 'one must not postulate a common species in the saviour', appears as the summary of the whole argument. The sense it is arguably meant to convey in the *Book of Sentences* would perhaps best be expressed by using the definite article in the English translation: 'one must not postulate the common species [i.e. humanity] in the saviour.'

I must admit that I do not know why it could have appeared attractive to the Lombard to credit John of Damascus with the extraordinary view that Christ's humanity was categorically different from ours.³⁶ As we shall see, however, the consequences of this integration of a Greek patristic argument into what was to become the most influential scholastic text were far-reaching.

³³ John of Damascus, *De fide orth.* 47.5 [III 3] (Buytaert, 394.47–9). From Kotter's edition it appears, moreover, that some Greek manuscripts contained the additional τοῦ κυρίου: *De fide orth.* 47.42 app. (Kotter, 112).

³⁴ Saint John Damascene, *De Fide* (see above, n. 3), XII–XIII.

³⁵ John of Damascus, *De fide orth.* 47.5 [III 3] (Kotter, 113.53–4; Buytaert, 176.65 and 394.59–60).

³⁶ According to one of his early critics, John of Cornwall, this passage illustrates Peter's Christological 'nihilism'. John may have been the first to note the Lombard's misleading use of the Damascene: N.M. Häring, 'Eulogium ad Alexandrum Papam tertiam of John of Cornwall,' *Medieval Studies* 13 (1951): 278. If it is the case, as Häring seems to think, that John simply culled his Patristic quotations from the *Sentences*, it is remarkable that his text omits the added 'domini'. John's criticism of the Lombard is summarily dismissed by Colish, *Peter Lombard*, 1:431. Cf. also: Monagle, *Orthodoxy and Controversy*, 106–7.

Sentences III, Distinction 5

My second example is taken from the fifth distinction in the same book. This is a crucial section which arguably shows how Greek thought had an influence on Western Christological thought. Once again, however, it is crucial to consider the details.

The explicit purpose of the distinction is to consider ‘whether person or nature assumed person or nature’, as Lombard put it in the heading. The question at once betrays that Peter here follows a problematic originating from the great but idiosyncratic 12th-century thinker, Gilbert of Poitiers. According to Gilbert, the theological problem of the Incarnation came down to a four-way disjunction: did a person assume a person; or a person a nature; or a nature a person; or finally a nature a nature? Gilbert’s argument cannot be rehearsed here, but for him, only one of those four options was acceptable: that a person assumed a nature.³⁷

Lombard generally follows Gilbert’s intuitions in his Christology—and in fact, the fourfold disjunction became through Lombard a widely-accepted starting point for later presentations of the doctrine, but Peter also saw that Gilbert’s insistence on the exclusive acceptability of *persona assumpsit naturam* conflicted with the Greek tradition as represented by John, for which there was no contradiction at all between the idea that the hypostasis of the Logos assumed human nature and the notion that divine nature took on human nature. In the present distinction, Lombard clearly seeks to integrate the Eastern perspective into the Gilbertian framework from which he starts.

As his proof text, he this time chooses a section in *The Orthodox Faith* that appears an obvious selection: after all, Chapter 50 (III 4) is entitled, ‘Why the whole divine nature in one of its hypostases is united to the whole human nature and not a part to a part.’³⁸ It may nonetheless be useful to look more closely at what the purpose of this section is in John of Damascus before turning to the way Peter Lombard employs it in his own argument.

For the Damascene, the context is once again the conflict with the miaphysite opponents of Chalcedon. A prominent (and in my view perfectly legitimate) argument against the dyophysitism of the Council was that its proponents neglected individuation of universal natures when speaking of the Incarnation. They should acknowledge, their opponents urged, that the divinity and humanity in Christ had to be ‘particular natures’ as otherwise they could not avoid the consequence that the whole Trinity became Incarnate in the whole humanity.³⁹ As we will see later, this argument was not entirely without effect on later Chalcedonians, such as John of

³⁷ Gilbert of Poitiers, *Expositio in Boecii Librum Contra Euticen et Nestorium* 4.108, in *The Commentaries on Boethius by Gilbert of Poitiers*, ed. Nikolaus M. Häring (Toronto: Pontifical Institute of Medieval Studies, 1966), 310.52–9.

³⁸ John of Damascus, *De fide orth.* 50 [III 6] (Buytaert, 186): ‘Quoniam omnis divina natura in una sui hypostaseon (id est personarum) unita est omni humanae naturae, et non pars parti.’

³⁹ Cf. Zachhuber, ‘Christology after Chalcedon,’ 114.

Damascus, but they never conceded the need for particular natures which, they felt, would open them up to the charge of tritheism. Chapter 50 of *The Orthodox Faith* is essentially constructed to counter this powerful argument. The Damascene uses both philosophical and theological considerations to show that the union must involve universal natures both on the divine and the human planes. Philosophically, he holds that natures *are* universal even though they are seen (only) in individuals. Theologically he alludes to the so-called physical doctrine of salvation, i.e. the idea that Christ's redemptive act spreads to humankind via their common participation in universal human nature.⁴⁰

In this context, the Damascene even manages to include a brief justification for the notorious *mia-physis* formula, 'according to blessed Athanasius and Cyril': the one Incarnate nature of the Word, he argues, merely refers to divine nature as encountered or realised in the hypostasis of the Logos.⁴¹

From this brief account, it should be obvious that, while the chapter clearly stated the position Peter Lombard was interested in, namely, the assumption of human nature by divine nature, it did so in a rather different context and consequently with the addition of material that was at the least not directly supportive of Peter's argumentative purpose in the present distinction. It is intriguing to observe how he dealt with this problem. First of all, he chose around 80 words from the whole chapter and wove them into one long quotation whose precise limits cannot have been easy to gauge for a reader without immediate access to the Latin text of *The Orthodox Faith*:

Peter Lombard, *Sentences*⁴²

Qui sensus ex uerbis iohannis damasceni confirmatur, qui totam diuinam naturam in una hypostasium incarnatam esse euidenter asserit, dicens: *In humanatione dei uerbi aimus omnem et perfectam naturam deitatis in una eius hypostaseon incarnatam esse, id est unitam humanae naturae, et non partem parti.*

Omni enim humanae naturae aimus unitam esse omnem deitatis naturam uel substantiam.

Item: *Eadem est natura in singula hypostaseon, id est personarum. Et quando dicimus naturam*

John of Damascus, *De fide orthodoxa*⁴³

Ita et in humanatione unius sanctae trinitatis Dei Verbi aimus omnem et perfectam naturam deitatis, in una eius hypostaseon (id est personarum), unitam esse humanae naturae, et non partem parti.

Omni autem humanae naturae aimus unitam esse omnem deitatis substantiam.

Eadem igitur natura in unaquaque hypostaseon (id est personarum) consideratur. Et quando di-

⁴⁰ Reinhard M. Hübner, *Die Einheit des Leibes Christi bei Gregor von Nyssa: Untersuchungen zum Ursprung der ‚physischen‘ Erlösungslehre* (Leiden: Brill, 1974).

⁴¹ John of Damascus, *De fide orth.* 50.6 [III 6] (Buytaert, 190.75–191.1). The (partial) acceptance of this formula is indicative of what scholars have called neo-Chalcedonianism: Marcel Richard, 'Le Néo-chalcédonisme,' *Mélange de Science Religieuse* 3 (1946): 156–61.

⁴² Peter Lombard, *Sent.* III, d. 5, c. 1, 12 (Brady, 2:45.24–46.6).

⁴³ John of Damascus, *De fide orth.* 50 [III 6] (Buytaert, 187.28–188.31.39–41 and 190.73–191.83).

uerbi incarnatam esse, secundum beatos et athanasium et cyrillum, deitatem dicimus esse unitam carni.

Et unam naturam dei uerbi incarnatam confitemur.⁴⁴

Verbum autem et quod commune est substantiae possidet, et quod proprietatis est habens hypostaseos, id est personae.

Ex his manifeste ostenditur quod natura diuina incarnata est; unde et eadem uere dicitur suscepisse humanam naturam.

cimus “naturam Verbi incarnatam esse”, secundum beatos et Athanasium et Cyrillum deitatem dicimus unitam esse carni.

Ideo non possumus dicere: natura Verbi passa est; non enim passa est deitas in ipso.

Dicimus autem humanam naturam passam esse in Christo, non tamen omnes hypostases (id est personas) hominum ostendentes; et humana natura passum esse confitemur Christum. Quare, naturam Verbi dicentes, ipsum Verbum significamus.

Verbum autem et quod commune substantiae habet, et quod proprium hypostaseos (id est personae).

The excerpt by and large illustrates Lombard's main point that Damascus affirms the assumption of human nature by divine nature. One intriguing quirk, however, should be mentioned. Included in Peter's selections from the chapter are John's words about Athanasius' [in reality Apollinarius'] and Cyril's use of the formula that 'the nature of the Word became incarnate'.⁴⁵ This was arguably unnecessary and might cause more harm than good. What is more surprising, however, is that Peter glosses John's words with a much more unequivocally monophysite formula: 'and we confess one nature of the Incarnate Word of God' (*Et unam naturam dei uerbi incarnatam confitemur*). How this sentence came to be added here is not easy to explain. Perhaps it was a Gloss on *The Orthodox Faith* 55.2 where John cites the *mia-physis* formula from Cyril's second letter to Succensus.⁴⁶ It certainly did raise eyebrows among the Lombard's later readers, including Alexander of Hales.

This brief examination of the use of two Damascene texts in key passages of Book 3 of Lombard's *Sentences* seems to justify the conclusion that Peter's role in introducing Damascus into Latin theological debate was not without its ambiguities. On the one hand, there is no doubt that through *The Orthodox Faith*, the Greek Patristic tradition was permitted to weigh in on major theological questions and to provide alternative perspectives and answers. On the other hand, it should have become clear that readers who relied on the *Sentences* to access the work of the Damascene were presented with excerpts that one would be kind to describe as tendentious. As we have seen, Lombard excerpted, took out of context, and even changed wording in

⁴⁴ Cf. John of Damascus, *De fide orth.* 55.2 [III 11] (Buytaert, 205.32–4).

⁴⁵ Cf. Anastos, 'Byzantine Influence,' 158–9 and 184, n. 124.

⁴⁶ This was, apparently, Anastos' assumption. See previous note.

order to make his source fit what he needed it to say. At the same time, he also introduced quotations that were seemingly unrelated to their context in the *Sentences* and which, therefore, invited speculative interpretations unless they were recontextualised within the full text of Damascus' great work.

The Use of the Damascene in the *Summa Halensis*

General observations

For the purposes of this paper, I limit myself to the fourth *quaestio*, the last of the first tractate of the third part of the *Summa Halensis*, entitled *De actu incarnationis*. It covers roughly 50 pages in the Quaracchi edition.⁴⁷ For purely practical reasons, I will leave out of consideration Members 2 and 3 of Distinction 3 (*de coassumptis*).⁴⁸ In the remaining section of the text, the *Summa* explicitly refers to John of Damascus ten times.⁴⁹ Before looking at some of those references in more detail, let me make a number of more general observations.

First, of these ten quotations, only two are cited with full references to a book and chapter of *The Orthodox Faith*.⁵⁰ All eight others are simply introduced by formulae such as *dicit Ioannes Damascenus*⁵¹ or *auctoritas Ioannis Damasceni*.⁵² As it happens, the two that are more specific references are quotations from one and the same passage albeit of different length. It is probably no coincidence that this very passage is cited in full in Alexander's *Gloss* on Lombard's *Sentences*, Book 3, Distinction 5,⁵³ all the more so since both the *Summa* and the *Gloss* identify it as taken from Damascus III 7 (while in our edition it is III 11).⁵⁴

⁴⁷ Alexander of Hales, *Doctoris irrefragabilis Alexandri de Hales Ordinis minorum Summa theologica* (*SH*), 4 vols (Quaracchi: Collegium S. Bonaventurae, 1924–48), Vol IV, P1, In1, Tr1, Q4, pp. 48–95.
⁴⁸ *SH* IV, P1, In1, Tr1, Q4, Ti1, D3, M2–3, pp. 62–8.

⁴⁹ All in *SH* IV, P1, In1, Tr1, Q4: *SH* IV, P1, In1, Tr1, Q4, Ti1, D1, C2, p. 50; *SH* IV, P1, In1, Tr1, Q4, Ti1, D2, C1, p. 51; *SH* IV, P1, In1, Tr1, Q4, Ti1, D2, C2, p. 52; *SH* IV, P1, In1, Tr1, Q4, Ti1, D2, C3, p. 53; *SH* IV, P1, In1, Tr1, Q4, Ti1, D2, C4, p. 54; *SH* IV, P1, In1, Tr1, Q4, Ti1, D2, C5, p. 56; *SH* IV, P1, In1, Tr1, Q4, Ti1, D2, C5, p. 57; *SH* IV, P1, In1, Tr1, Q4, Ti1, D3, M4, C3, Ar3, p. 76; *SH* IV, P1, In1, Tr1, Q4, Ti1, D3, M4, C3, Ar5, Pr2, p. 80; *SH* IV, P1, In1, Tr1, Q4, Ti2, C4, p. 87.

⁵⁰ *SH* IV, P1, In1, Tr1, Q4, Ti1, D2, C1, p. 51: 'auctoritas Ioannis Damasceni, III libro, cap. 11'. *SH* IV, P1, In1, Tr1, Q4, Ti1, D2, C4, p. 54: 'per auctoritatem Ioannis Damasceni, III libro, cap. 7'.

⁵¹ E.g. *SH* IV, P1, In1, Tr1, Q4, Ti1, D1, C2, p. 50.

⁵² E.g. *SH* IV, P1, In1, Tr1, Q4, Ti1, D2, C3, p. 53.

⁵³ Alexander of Hales, *Magistri Alexandri de Hales Glossa in quatuor libros Sentiarum Petri Lombardi* (hereafter, *Glossa*) III, d. 5, 14 (Quaracchi: Collegium S. Bonaventurae, 1951–57), 3:61–2. The correspondence is with *SH* IV, P1, In1, Tr1, Q4, Ti1, D2, C4, p. 54.

⁵⁴ According to Buytaert, 'the numbering of these chapters, in many codices, is very disturbed.' Burundio himself had used John's original division into chapters: Saint John Damascene, *De Fide* (see above, n. 3), XLIV.

This brings me to my second observation. There is little evidence that the writers of the *Summa* took any of these quotations directly from *The Orthodox Faith*. In addition to the two quotations the authors found in Alexander's *Gloss*, there are seven that are taken from the *Sentences*.⁵⁵ They include some of the passages I have discussed earlier and to which I shall return. Among these seven, there is one quotation that is not by the Damascene at all but conflates an argument from Lombard with the reference the latter had made to Damascus in order to support his own claim.⁵⁶ The conflation, however, was not the original work of the Franciscan author of the *Summa* who in this case simply copied William of Auxerre's *Summa Aurea*.⁵⁷ This leaves one single quote which I have been unable to locate,⁵⁸ but I suspect that it was also taken from a secondary source.

Third, it is interesting that all of John's citations are employed in order to oppose the evidently orthodox thesis. The caveat, of course, has to be that this is a small selection; I have no doubt that there are examples to the contrary. Nonetheless, this practice marks a stark contrast to Lombard's book in which John's work is introduced in support of the author's own contentions. I shall come back to this observation, as I will argue that it throws a fascinating spotlight on what one might call the citation technique of the *Summa*.

The Quotations

In a next step, I shall consider some of those citations in more detail. I will restrict myself here to a small sample. This is possible partly because some quotations are less remarkable than others. In some cases, there is also more than one reference to the same passage from the Damascene's work.

55 All in *SH* IV, P1, In1, Tr1, Q4: *SH* IV, P1, In1, Tr1, Q4, Ti1, D2, C2, p. 52; *SH* IV, P1, In1, Tr1, Q4, Ti1, D2, C3, p. 53; *SH* IV, P1, In1, Tr1, Q4, Ti1, D2, C5, p. 56; *SH* IV, P1, In1, Tr1, Q4, Ti1, D2, C5, p. 57; *SH* IV, P1, In1, Tr1, Q4, Ti1, D3, M4, C3, Ar3, p. 76; *SH* IV, P1, In1, Tr1, Q4, Ti1, D3, M4, C3, Ar5, Pr2, p. 80; *SH* IV, P1, In1, Tr1, Q4, Ti2, C4, p. 87.

56 *SH* IV, P1, In1, Tr1, Q4, Ti1, D3, M4, C3, Ar5, Pr2, p. 80. Cf. Peter Lombard, *Sent.* III, d. 22, c. 3, 2 (Brady, 2:139.13–25).

57 William of Auxerre, *Summa Aurea* III, tr. 9, c. 2, 7 vols, ed. Jean Ribailier, *Spicilegium Bonaventurianum*, 16–20 (Paris: Editions du Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique (CNRS); Grottaferata: Editiones Collegii S. Bonaventurae, 1980–7), 4:108. The same misattribution is to be found in Alexander of Hales, *Glossa* III, d. 22, 12, 3:94.12–4.

58 *SH* IV, P1, In1, Tr1, Q4, Ti1, D1, C2, p. 50. The reference is to John of Damascus, *De fide orth.* 8.17 [I 8] (Buytaert, 44.279–81).

A

The first case I want to consider is the *Summa*'s use of Chapter 55 (III 11) of the *Orthodox Faith*. As I have already pointed out, the two references to texts from this chapter are the only instances in my selection of texts for which the author gives exact references in the Damascene's work. I have also mentioned that Alexander cited this very text in his *Gloss* indicating that he considered it John's solution to the problem of universals.

This chapter in the Damascene's great work is indeed a fascinating example of Patristic philosophy.⁵⁹ We have seen that John adamantly defended the traditional rejection by Chalcedonians of 'particular natures'. And yet, he follows Leontius of Jerusalem in stipulating an alternative form of individuated nature. Leontius called this 'individual nature' (ἴδια φύσις⁶⁰); in John of Damascus it is called 'the nature that is seen in the individual'⁶¹ and is described as 'the same [nature] wholly with added accidents in one single hypostasis'.⁶² This individuated nature is contrasted with the abstracted universal 'after the many' (to use the conventional term) which is merely 'cogitated in empty contemplation'⁶³ and the universal 'in the many' which, according to John, is common to all individuals of the same species.⁶⁴

The common view of the late ancient Aristotelian commentators was that the universal 'in the many' was no true universal because it was already modified by differences.⁶⁵ This precisely was the reason why many Greek fathers rejected such a concept of particular substance. By contrast, therefore, Damascus' concept of the nature in the individual emphasises that it is *eadem*, 'the same', as the shared universal, but with accidents.

I cannot discuss here quite how he thought this could work at the philosophical level,⁶⁶ but I need to add two observations before moving on to consider the use of this text by the *Summa*: first, theologically it helps John explain how the Incarnation is not predicated of universal human nature with the consequence that God became flesh in all human individuals, *and yet* the individual nature in Christ is identical

59 For a detailed discussion see Richard Cross, 'Perichoresis, Deification, and Christological Predication in John of Damascus,' *Medieval Studies* 62 (2000): 81–4.

60 Leontius of Jerusalem, *Adversus Nestorianos* 1.20 (PG 86/1:1485C-D). Cf. Zachhuber, 'Christology after Chalcedon,' 126–6.

61 John of Damascus, *De fide orth.* 55 [III 11] (Buytaert, 203.10–1): 'in atomo considerata natura'.

62 John of Damascus, *De fide orth.* 55 [III 11] (Buytaert, 203.9–10): 'totaliter eadem in assumptione accidentium in una hypostasi'.

63 John of Damascus, *De fide orth.* 55 [III 11] (Buytaert, 203.6): 'nuda contemplatione cogitatur'.

64 John of Damascus, *De fide orth.* 55 [III 11] (Buytaert, 203.7): 'communiter in omnibus homoidesi'.

65 Simplicius, *In Aristotelis Categorias Commentarium*, ed. Karl Kalbfleisch (Berlin: Reimer, 1907), 83, 12–14.

66 Cf. for this Cross, 'Perichoresis'; Johannes Zachhuber, 'Universals in the Greek Church Fathers,' in *Universals in Ancient Philosophy*, ed. Riccardo Chiaradonna and Gabriele Galuzzo (Pisa: Edizione della Normale, 2013), 465–9.

with that of all other people thus making him, as he says alluding to Rom. 11:6, the ‘first fruits’ of humanity.

Second, it is again theologically vital for John of Damascus that this individual nature is not the same as the hypostasis. In fact, this is the major conceptual innovation: the Cappadocian theory had identified individuation through properties with the concrete existence of the particular hypostasis;⁶⁷ the late Chalcedonian theory, by contrast, draws a distinction between individuation ‘in the abstract’ as it were and concrete existence. The theological interest is obvious: to maintain Christ’s fully individuated humanity without conceding a second hypostasis in the Incarnate.

In the *Summa*, this chapter is cited twice; both quotations occur in the section I am focussing on.⁶⁸ In the first one, the Damascene is introduced as seemingly testifying against the statement that human nature was assumed in the Incarnation.⁶⁹ This of course is nearly the exact opposite of what John attempted to express in this section, and the author of the *Summa* can only make his point by reducing John’s statement to the interpretation he rejects without mentioning his own solution: ‘The Word did not assume the nature that is contemplated in empty thought nor that which is seen in the species.’⁷⁰

Once considered in its context, however, the use of these words from *The Orthodox Faith* by the Franciscan author may seem slightly less absurd than could appear at first sight. John’s testimony is introduced to neutralise the supreme authority of Boethius who in his treatise *Against Eutyches and Nestorius* had offered four definitions of the term *natura*.⁷¹ The fourth of those defines nature as ‘the specific difference which informs any given thing’;⁷² the Chalcedonian definition that Christ is constituted of two natures, according to Boethius, is based on this definition of *natura*.

It seems to me that the *Summa* rightly points to a tension between earlier and later Chalcedonians. Boethius, like many 6th-century Chalcedonians⁷³ was content to argue that in Christ, two universal natures, divinity and humanity, were jointly individuated. By the time of John of Damascus, however, Chalcedonians had conceded what their opponents had been saying all along: that such a view would imply that the whole Trinity took flesh in the whole humanity. As a matter of fact, as we have

67 Zachhuber, ‘Universals,’ 468–9.

68 In their index, the editors identify a further place where the author arguably alludes to this section but without direct citation: *SH* IV, P1, In1, Tr1, Q2, Ti1, D2, M1, C3, p. 29. This passage would merit further consideration than can here be given.

69 *SH* IV, P1, In1, Tr1, Q4, Ti1, D2, C1, p. 51: ‘Relinquitur ergo quod non potest dici “assumpsit humanam naturam”.’

70 *SH* IV, P1, In1, Tr1, Q4, Ti1, D2, C1, p. 51: ‘Verbum non eam, quae nuda consideratione contemplatur, naturam assumpsit neque eam, quae in specie consideratur.’

71 Boethius, *Contra Eutychen et Nestorium* 1 (PL 64:1341B–1342C).

72 Boethius, *Contra Eutychen et Nestorium* 1 (PL 64:1342C): ‘natura est unamquamque rem informans specifica differentia.’

73 Cf. Zachhuber, ‘Universals,’ 457–8.

seen, John's text continues with that precise point directly after the *Summa* ends its quotation.

The Franciscan author thus could agree with the Damascene in criticising Boethius' definition of nature. This does not mean, however, that he shared John's own view; in fact, he may have decided for this very reason to truncate his quotation before the Damascene could even present his own solution. The *Summa Halensis* presents its own answer by proposing another meaning of *natura* according to which the Incarnation was to be understood: 'Nature is that from which the being of a natural thing comes or from which a thing is born.'⁷⁴

In this sense, the text explains rather succinctly, soul and body can each be called 'nature' insofar as the human being is constituted out of them. The nature the Word assumed in the Incarnation thus is not universal but that of which an individual human being is. Whatever the origin of this idea,⁷⁵ it is not the thought of John of Damascus.

The author of the *Summa* returns to the same passage in *The Orthodox Faith* when discussing the question of whether Christ assumed a human person. This time, he cites John's argument in full length, though with some omissions:

The Word did not assume the nature that is contemplated in empty thought, for this would not be an Incarnation but the delusion of an Incarnation. Nor [did he assume] that which is seen in the species, but that which is in the individual. For he took on the first fruits of our dough (lat. *massa* from Greek φύραμα; cf. Romans 11:6), which did not subsist by itself or existed previously as an individual and was thus assumed by him but exists in the Son's own hypostasis.⁷⁶

What is the *Summa's* interpretation of this passage? The author argues that, since a person is 'the individual substance of a rational nature', the Damascene clearly indicates that a human person would have been taken on by the Logos in the Incarnation.⁷⁷ This, however, is clearly not the orthodox view, as it would entail a duality of persons in the Incarnate.⁷⁸

⁷⁴ SH IV, P1, In1, Tr1, Q4, Ti1, D2, C1, p. 51: [Natura est] 'ex qua fit esse rei naturalis vel ex quibus est res nata'.

⁷⁵ The language is certainly reminiscent of Gilbert of Poitiers: cf. Nielsen, *Theology and Philosophy*, 47–9.

⁷⁶ SH IV, P1, In1, Tr1, Q4, Ti1, D2, C4, p. 54: 'Verbum incarnatum Deus neque eam, quae nuda contemplatione consideratur, naturam assumpsit: non enim hoc est incarnatio, sed fictio incarnationis; neque eam, quae in specie consideratur, sed eam, quae in atomo; primitias enim assumpsit nostrae massae, non secundum seipsam iam subsistentem et atomum existentem prius et ita ab ipso assumptam, sed in ipsa Filii hypostasi existente.'

⁷⁷ SH IV, P1, In1, Tr1, Q4, Ti1, D2, C4, p. 54: 'Igitur assumpsit "naturam in atomo"; sed natura existens in atomo est persona; ergo assumpsit personam: persona enim est "rationalis naturae individua substantia", quod convenit naturae in atomo.'

⁷⁸ SH IV, P1, In1, Tr1, Q4, Ti1, D2, C4, p. 55: 'Si persona assumpta est, necesse est in Christo duas esse personas, quia non potest dici absorberi persona humana in assumendo, cum non fuerit prius persona quam assumpta; manent igitur in Christo differentes naturae et diversae personae; non est igitur

We have thus a case that is rather similar to the one previously analysed. An assumption is imputed to Damascus that was clearly not his own, but at the same time, a well-observed tension between his position and the earlier Chalcedonianism of Boethius is exploited to neutralise the latter authority. In other words, the quotation from *The Orthodox Faith* serves to highlight that on Boethius' classical definition of *persona*, it might be inevitable to postulate a human person in the Incarnation; an evident *reductio ad absurdum*.

Once again, therefore, the use of Damascus' authority is not without subtlety, but his usefulness is limited to that of a strategic weapon against the authority of Boethius. The *Summa*'s author himself endorses an alternative that owes nothing to the Damascene, namely, his celebrated theory of person as a moral term denoting dignity and nobility.⁷⁹ According to this theory, which the Franciscan author found in William of Auxerre's *Summa Aurea*⁸⁰ and which in its fundamentals goes back to the 5th-century Semipelagian, Faustus of Riez,⁸¹ Christ's single personality is justified by the greater dignity of the divine person which 'consumes' the person of lower rank on the principle *persona consumpsit personam*, which the *Summa* (and before it William of Auxerre) intriguingly believed to have been mandated by the Council of Nicaea.⁸²

This Christological theory permitted the *Summa* to concede that Christ *qua* humanity possessed *incommunicabilitas* and thus constituted a separate individual and, in all but name, a separate hypostasis.⁸³ Damascus' text is understood along those lines: from his mention of the nature in the individual, the Franciscan author argues, 'it does not follow that he assumes a person because the word *atomon*, which is the same as individual, only signifies the distinction of singularity and incommunicability, but not dignity on which the principle of personhood is based.'⁸⁴

From an Eastern perspective, it is tempting to compare here the approach taken by the Antiochenes and later so-called Nestorians, who similarly felt they had to con-

unum in natura nec unum in persona. Relinquitur igitur quod non est unio Dei ad hominem nisi sicut d in aliis hominibus; quod est absurdissimum. Relinquitur igitur quod persona non est assumpta.'

⁷⁹ For the historical background of this discussion, see Magdalena Bieniak, *The Soul-Body Problem at Paris, ca. 1200–1250: Hugh of St-Cher and his Contemporaries* (Leuven: Leuven University Press, 2010), 48–57.

⁸⁰ William of Auxerre, *Summa Aurea* III, tr. 1, c. 3, q. 8 (Ribaillier, 4:36.53–38.2).

⁸¹ Faustus of Riez, *De spiritu sancto* 2.4 (PL 62:29C).

⁸² *SH* IV, P1, In1, Tr1, Q4, Ti1, D3, M4, C3, Ar4, p. 78. Cf. William of Auxerre, *Summa Aurea* III, tr. 1, c. 3, q. 8 (Ribaillier, 4:36.41–3).

⁸³ *SH* IV, P1, In1, Tr1, Q4, Ti1, D2, C4, p. 55: 'Dicendum ergo quod prima distinctio est in anima Christi, scilicet singularitatis, et etiam in corpore; prima et secunda est in composito ex anima et corpore, quae potest notari, cum dico "hic homo" demonstrando compositum ex anima et corpore, scilicet singulare.'

⁸⁴ *SH* IV, P1, In1, Tr1, Q4, Ti1, D2, C4, p. 55: 'non tamen sequitur ex hoc quod assumpsit personam, quia per atomum, quod est idem quod individuum, non notatur nisi distinctio singularitatis vel incommunicabilitatis, non dignitatis, a qua sumitur ratio personae.'

cede a separate human hypostasis to secure Christ's full humanity and sought to build their case for the unity of the God-man on an alternative conception of *proso-pon*.⁸⁵ Be this, however, as it may, it seems evident that the author of the *Summa* understood—to a certain point—what Damascus was saying in this passage and was content to use it against a popular Boethian theory without however committing himself to the particular view espoused by the Damascene. In fact, his citation of John's text as seemingly leading to an absurd consequence makes it easy for him to avoid serious consideration of the Eastern theologian's doctrinal and philosophical point of view.

B

My second case has arguably less intrinsic interest for the theology of the *Summa* but can serve as an illustration of what I have called earlier the ambiguous heritage of Peter Lombard's use of the Damascene. As we have seen, the Lombard cited a passage from *The Orthodox Faith* as if the Damascene had proposed that Christ's humanity was different in kind from that of other human beings. We recognise the effect of this distortion when the *Summa* ascribes to the authority of Damascus the single statement that 'one must not posit the common species in the Lord Jesus Christ'⁸⁶ and goes on to expound it as implying that the term 'homo' is used equivocally of Christ and other human beings.

This is then extensively discussed, but in the solution to objections, it turns out that the Franciscan author is perfectly aware that the basis of his earlier citation was a distortion of John's actual view. The Damascene simply meant to say, the Franciscan now explains correctly, that it is illicit to ascribe to Christ a common species 'mixed of divinity and humanity' (*conflatam ex deitate et humanitate*) as the heretics do. He then goes on to quote the clarifying words from John's book concluding that the Damascene by no means intended to deny that according to his humanity, the nature was predicated of Christ in the same way it is said of everyone else.⁸⁷

To confuse things further, the author then adds that one might nonetheless understand John's original quotation in another, apparently less reproachable sense. After all, when predicated of other human beings, the nature expresses their whole being, while when predicated of Christ, it does not since it excludes his deity.⁸⁸

⁸⁵ Cf. Luise Abramowski, 'Die Christologie Babais des Großen,' in *Symposium Syriacum 1972: Célébré dans les jours 26–31 octobre 1972 à l'Institut pontifical oriental de Rome: Rapports et communications* (Rome: Pontificium Institutum Orientalium Studiorum, 1974), 219–44.

⁸⁶ SH IV, P1, In1, Tr1, Q4, Ti1, D2, C5, p. 56: 'non est sumere communem speciem in Domino Iesu Christo.'

⁸⁷ SH IV, P1, In1, Tr1, Q4, Ti1, D2, C5, p. 57.

⁸⁸ SH IV, P1, In1, Tr1, Q4, Ti1, D2, C5, p. 57.

The purpose of this additional comment in the context of the *Summa* is not entirely clear, but the succession of John's truncated and misleading quotation evidently extracted from the *Sentences*, the solution on the basis of the context in *The Orthodox Faith* and, finally, the suggestion of a less objectionable interpretation of the original quote points quite distinctly to the source from which the *Summa* lifted the whole section: William of Auxerre's *Summa Aurea*. There, we find the exact same structure; the texts often agree nearly line by line:

William of Auxerre, *Summa Aurea*⁸⁹

Illā autem auctoritas Iohannis Damasceni: 'Non est communem speciem predicare de Christo', sic est intelligenda, id est 'non' contingit 'predicare de Christo communem speciem' vel speciem conflatam ex duabus, scilicet ex deitate et humanitate. Hoc dixit Iohannes Damascenus contra Euticiū hereticū, qui dicebat quod Christus nec est Deus nec est homo, sed partim Deus, partim homo; et ita volebat quod quedam communis species confl(a)ta ex illis duabus, ita quod neutra illarum predicaretur de Christo. Vel potest sic intelligi illa auctoritas: 'Non est communem speciem' etc., id est 'non' contingit 'predicare de Christo communem speciem' communiter, quia hec species 'homo' si predicetur de Christo, sicut de aliis hominibus, non tamen ponitur communiter, id est communi modo, id est eo modo prorsus quo de aliis hominibus. De aliis enim hominibus ita predicatur quod comprehendit totum esse ipsorum, sed non comprehendit totum esse Christi, quia non comprehendit deitatem eius.

***Summa Halensis*⁹⁰**

Ad illud quod obicit de auctoritate Iohannis Damasceni quod 'in Domino Iesu Christo non est communem speciem sumere' dicendum quod ita intelligit, quia non convenit de Christo dicere communem speciem conflatam ex deitate et humanitate, quae nec Deus esset nec homo, sicut dicebant haeretici, sicut patet per hoc quod subditur: 'Neque enim factus est neque aliquando fiet alius Christus.' Non negatur ergo quod, secundum quod homo, de ipso praedicetur ipsa communis species et univoce sicut de aliis. Vel potest intelligi aliter quod non prorsus eodem modo praedicatur de Christo et de aliis, quia praedicata de aliis comprehendit totum esse ipsorum, sed praedicata de Christo non comprehendit totum esse Christi, quia non comprehendit deitatem.

We can now reconstruct what happened: from Lombard's book, the single line according to which the common human species should not be predicated of Christ was distilled as an opinion of the Damascene. As such, it was integrated into the growing treasure of authoritative quotations. It was soon realised, however, that a simple look into the chapter from which the sentence was taken revealed that this rather extraordinary claim was not at all what the Damascene had intended to say. Still, this did not simply stop its further use. Indeed, we find that, in addition to the clarification of the Damascene's intention on the basis of the original source, there is developed another argument to protect the Greek father against the obviously dangerous inferences of his apparent statement. All of this is found side-by-side in

⁸⁹ William of Auxerre, *Summa Aurea* III, tr. 1, c. 3. q. 9, 6–7 (Ribaillier, 4:38.105–39.119).

⁹⁰ SH IV, P1, In1, Tr1, Q4, Ti1, D2, C5, p. 57.

the *Summa*; it must be left to further, more detailed research to interpret this intriguing outcome.

C

So far, my method has been rather pedestrian, focussing on the use of Damascene texts in the section I chose from the *Summa Halensis*. On this basis, not much evidence has emerged for a positive influence of Eastern Patristic thought on the theology of the *Summa*. I would like to add one further observation which is of a rather different kind and inevitably more speculative.

In discussing the mode of the union, the *Summa Halensis* discusses a number of analogies including that of the union of soul and body in the human person. Ultimately, this analogy is discarded in favour of that of a branch grafted onto an existing tree. The point is clear: the body and soul analogy might suggest that two elements come together to form a third thing (*unum, scilicet tertium, sit ex illis*).⁹¹ The whole passage including the grafting model is not original to the *Summa* but found previously in Alain of Lille's *Regulae theologicae*.⁹² Nonetheless, the conceptual shift is remarkable. In the 12th century, several major theologians, including Gilbert of Poitiers, Hugh of St Victor, and even Abelard had seen this analogy as valid in spite of their fundamental Christological disagreements.⁹³ The reason was simple: the analogy was found literally in the *Symbolum Quicumque* which for Western Christians was an accepted creed.⁹⁴ What can explain the sudden fall from favour of this model?

The argument that the body-soul analogy might be dangerous in that it suggests that the hypostatic union results in a third thing made out of two elements, is encountered in John of Damascus, as one would expect in the context of his criticism of miaphysite Christologies. The relevant passage is once again in Chapter 47 (III 3):

But we do not call Christ “of one composite nature” [1], nor “something else out of other [elements]” [2], in the way in which a human being [consists] of soul and body or the body of the four elements, but one and the same out of other [elements] [3].⁹⁵

⁹¹ *SH* IV, P1, In1, Tr1, Q4, Ti2, C1, p. 84.

⁹² Alain of Lille, *Theologicae regulae* 100 (PL 210:674B-675B).

⁹³ Nielsen, *Theology and Philosophy*, 168–9 (for Gilbert), 201 (for Hugh of St Victor), 215–8 (for Abelard), and *passim*.

⁹⁴ Cuthbert Hamilton Turner, ‘A Critical Text of the *Quicumque Vult*,’ *Journal of Theological Studies* 11 (1910): 410, n. 37.

⁹⁵ John of Damascus, *De fide orth.* 47.2 [III 3] (Buytaert, 174.22–5): ‘Nos autem, neque unius compositae naturae Christum nominamus neque ex aliis aliud, quemadmodum ex anima et corpore hominem, vel ut ex quatuor elementis corpus, sed ex aliis eadem.’

John here proposes three options for the union in extremely brief and condensed form: mixture of two into one; constitution of a third out of two; and a hypostatic union of two natures. The first is the monophysite view; the second is problematic as well; the third is orthodox.

While admittedly neither Alain nor the *Summa* mention John of Damascus here, let alone this passage, the parallels are nonetheless remarkable. Both present the same options in the same order: The monophysite ‘confusion’; then the body-soul analogy; finally, the (acceptable) grafting analogy. In this order, the three are presented in a more developed way and each with an illustrating analogy. At the end of their respective sections, both Alain and the author of the *Summa* offer a brief summary, and here they use the same formulaic style employed by the Damascene in his text.

Alain summarises as follows:

Body and soul are united to the Son of God; thus they are not the Son of God, but they are *of* the Son of God [3]. Thus [it results] that the Son of God does not consist of them and another [2], but in one person there are two natures, the divine remaining divine, the human remaining human.⁹⁶

The *Summa* follows this quite closely:

The union then of humanity to the deity is such that one is made by and is of the other [3]. It is not a union in which one is the other [1] nor one in which a third item comes to be from those [two] [2].⁹⁷

While the Latin writers deviate from John’s order in their brief summaries, they had followed it in their longer argument. Otherwise, parallels here abound with the Damascene’s text. Interestingly, it is the *Summa* that is closest to the Greek theologian here. It preserves the three options and presents them in a kind of shorthand that strongly resembles Damascus’ own formulation.

In the absence of an explicit reference to the Damascene, it is difficult to be unequivocal on this dependence. Yet circumstantial evidence appears strong to me not least in the face of the earlier popularity of the body-soul analogy. It would certainly not be without irony if it turned out that the strongest conceptual influence Damascus had on the *Summa*’s Christology might well not be found where the book is explicitly cited but in more indirect and unacknowledged ways. It would show that, while the ideas of Damascus were in the mind of the *Summa*’s authors as potential resources to be employed, the scholastic method did not constrain them in presenting those views either to do so exactly along the lines of their source or even in as-

⁹⁶ Alain of Lille, *Theologicae regulae* 100 (PL 210:674 A-B): ‘Similiter corpus et anima sunt Filio Dei unita, ita quod non sunt Filius Dei, sed sunt de Filio Dei; ita quod Filius Dei non constat ex illis, et alio; sed in una persona sunt duae naturae, divina manens divina, humana manens humana.’

⁹⁷ *SH* IV, P1, In1, Tr1, Q4, Ti2, C1, p. 84: ‘quod unio humanitatis ad deitatem est illa, in qua fit unum vel est de altera, et non in qua unum sit alterum nec in qua unum, scilicet tertium sit ex illis.’

sociation with their original source, which could in its own right be twisted to contest or endorse views not indigenous to it. For the Patristic scholar this would, if anything, mark a return to a literary practice that was generally used and accepted for at least a millennium in the intellectual culture of Greek Christianity.

Conclusion

One final question needs to be addressed. If the Franciscan author of the *Summa* found most of the quotations he used from John of Damascus in previous Western literature, notably in Lombard's *Sentences*, was there any originality in his inclusion of these sources in his huge work? To answer this question, I propose to consider briefly the particular technique the *Summa Halensis* employed in making use of these extracts of the Damascene's work. The examples studied in this paper practically all illustrate this rather particular and, arguably, novel way of working with traditional authorities.

Citations, of course, have had their place in Christian literature from its very beginning. Often, and perhaps most straight-forwardly, they were introduced to bolster the author's own position by indicating its agreement with a traditional and accepted authority as, for example, in Patristic florilegia. Popular also, especially among polemicists, was the practice of citing opponents in their very words in order to ensure the full exposure of their doctrinal error as well as other depravities. Occasionally, ambiguous texts by accepted authorities had to be cited to stem their potential misinterpretation or abuse. Church historians or other archivists would adduce texts as part of an effort to document what happened in the past.

While this list may not be exhaustive, it serves to throw into sharp relief the idiosyncrasy of the *Summa's* use of quotations. The authority of John of Damascus is cited in support of the most extraordinary positions to which the author of the *Summa* obviously did not himself subscribe. Yet there is little evidence that the Franciscan writer was concerned that an eminent authority would have uttered such outrageous opinions; he certainly does not write to unmask the Damascene as a heretic. In fact, as we have seen, the quotations usually only appear problematic because they are taken out of context, truncated, or both.

Instead, what we seem to encounter in the *Summa Halensis* is the use of known sentences or brief excerpts for more or less purely dialectical purposes. They matter insofar as the thorough investigation of a doctrinal *topos* required the careful discussion of any potential objection to the teaching of the Church and the solution of any conceptual problem that might seem to exist in the doctrinal tradition. This use of proof texts, it seems, was still fairly novel at the time of the *Summa*. It is absent from Lombard's *Sentences* and still rather inchoate in William's *Summa Aurea*. It is, therefore, likely that it emerged as part of the new institutional and didactic context of the medieval university. The *Summa's* use of a large number of authoritative quotations should, I would thus conclude, be further analysed against this back-

ground and as part of a newly emerging intellectual culture. The absolute number of explicit references to any given author may, by contrast, tell us relatively little about that person's intellectual influence on the theology of the *Summa's* authors.

Catherine Kavanagh

The Eriugenian Influence in the *Summa Halensis*: A Synthetic Tradition

Abstract: This paper will consider the question as to whether the thought of Eriugena is a source for the Eastern Christian ideas found in the *Summa Halensis*. I shall first give a general historical overview of the fate of Eriugenian texts and ideas in this period. Following that, I shall examine the Eriugenian element in an important section of the Parisian *Corpus Dionysiacum* (*Mystical Theology* V), and the anonymous *Liber de causis primis et secundis*, which gives us something of a key to the 13th reading of Eriugena, and helps explain the harshness of later reaction to him. Finally, I shall examine a key example from the *Summa* in which this debate from the previous five centuries emerges, and conclude. For the purposes of this comparison, I shall focus on one problem, that is, the problem of Eriugena's presentation of the Primordial Causes.

Introduction

When we come to consider the question of the possible influence of Eriugena on Alexander of Hales, we are dealing with a very complex situation, thanks largely to the Condemnations of 1210, 1225 and 1241. We cannot expect to find clear citations of the *Periphyseon* or any of Eriugena's works. The instruction given in 1225 to find and destroy all the exemplars of the *Periphyseon* in monastic libraries seems to have been thoroughly executed; the Condemnations of 1241 guaranteed that Eriugena's was not a name one cited except with extreme caution—and usually to condemn him. Significant elements of Eriugena's thought are present in his translations of the *Corpus Dionysiacum*, and in the editorial work on the *Corpus Dionysiacum*,¹ arising

1 For studies of the Parisian *Corpus Dionysiacum*, see Pseudo-Dionysius, *Dionysiaca: recueil donnant l'ensemble des traductions latines des ouvrages attribués au Denys de l'areopage, et synopse marquant la valeur de citations presque innombrables allant seules depuis trop longtemps, remises enfin dans leur contexte au moyen d'une nomenclature rendue d'un usage très facile*, 2 vols, ed. Philippe Chevallier et al. (Bruges: Desclée De Brouwer, 1937); also Hyacinthe François Dondaine, *Le Corpus Dionysien de l'Université de Paris aux XIII^e siècle*, *Storia e letteratura*, 44 (Roma: Edizioni di Storia e letteratura, 1953); also L. Michael Harrington, *A Thirteenth Century Textbook of Mystical Theology at the University of Paris: The Mystical Theology of Dionysius the Areopagite in Eriugena's Latin Translation with the Scholia translated by Anastasius the Librarian and Excerpts from Eriugena's Periphyseon*, ed. and trans. L. Michael Harrington, *Dallas Mediaeval Texts in Translation*, 4 (Leuven: Peeters, 2004); also John Scotus Eriugena, *Johannis Scoti Eriugena Expositiones in Ierarchiam coelestem*, ed. Jeanne Barbet, *Corpus Christianorum Continuatio Mediaevalis*, 31 (Turnhout: Brepols, 1975); also Pseudo-Dionysius, *La hiérarchie céleste: introduction par René Roques*, ed. Günter Heil, trans. Maurice de Gandillac (French), *Sources Chrétiennes*, 58bis (Paris: Cerf, 1970); also James McEvoy, 'John Scottus Eri-

both from the Victorine School and the anonymous hand which inserted large chunks of Eriugena (including also his citations of Greek Fathers) into the 'Maximian' *Glosses* on the *Corpus Dionysiacum* following the condemnations of 1225.² The *Vox Aquilae* also survived anonymously as did the *Clavis Physicae* of Honorius of Autun, a resume of the *Periphyseon* of Eriugena, which did make its way into several versions of the *Corpus Dionysiacum* without any difficulty,³ and those excerpts from the *Periphyseon* and the *Expositiones in Ierarchiam Coelestem* which were included in the marginal *Gloss* on the Dionysian translation.⁴ These *Glosses* remain remarkably consistent from manuscript to manuscript throughout the transmission of the *Corpus Dionysiacum*, which means that the works of Dionysius were read on the whole through an Eriugenian lens. On a historical note, the text of Eriugena's *Expositiones in Ierarchiam Coelestem* was partly reconstructed from *Glosses*.⁵ Therefore, the area where we are most likely to find Eriugenian influence is in the interpretation of ideas considered 'Greek', as might be expected, since he declared the interpretation of Greek ideas for the benefit of the Latin West to be his life's work. The key concepts are: negative theology, the question of deification and the vision of God, and the question of the Primordial Causes, the *prototypa*, related as they are to the question of theophany. The Condemnations of 1225 highlight a second aspect of the problem: the texts there condemned for pantheism alongside Eriugena, turn out, on examination, to be a blend of Aristotelian or Avicennian elements, together (in the case of Amaury of Bene) with Eriugenian elements: in fact, this mix of Eriugenian and Avicennian elements with the existing Augustinian paradigm turns out to be crucial to the understanding of the condemnations of Eriugena.

For the remainder of this paper, I shall first give a general historical overview of the fate of Eriugenian texts and ideas. Following that, I shall examine the Eriugenian element in an important section of the Parisian *Corpus Dionysiacum* (*Mystical Theology*, Chapter 5), in order to demonstrate how his work was used, when it was used. I shall then look at the anonymous *Liber de Causis Primis et Secundis*, which gives us something of a key to the 13th-century reading of Eriugena, and helps explain the

gena and Thomas Gallus, Commentators on the *Mystical theology*, in *History and Eschatology in John Scottus Eriugena and His Time*, ed. James McEvoy and Michael Dunne (Leuven: University Press, 2002), 183–202. The modern edition of the text of the *Corpus Dionysiacum* is: Pseudo-Dionysius, *Corpus Dionysiacum*, 2 vols, ed. Beate Regina Suchla (vol. 1), Günter Heil and Adolf M. Ritter (vol. 2), Patristische Texte und Studien, 33, 36 (Berlin/New York: De Gruyter, 1990–1). Translated by Colm Luibheid and Paul Rorem, *Pseudo-Dionysius: The Complete Works*, trans. Colm Luibheid and Paul Rorem, Classics of Western Spirituality (New York: Paulist Press, 1987).

² See Dondaine, *Le Corpus Dionysien*, passim; also Harrington, *Thirteenth-Century Textbook*, 28–32.

³ Honorius Augustodunensis, *Clavis Physicae*, ed. Paolo Lucentini, *Tem e Testi*, 21 (Roma: Edizioni di storia e letteratura, 1974); also Paolo Lucentini, *Platonismo medievale: Contributi per la Storia dell'Eriugenismo* (Firenze: La Nuova Italia, 1979).

⁴ See Dondaine, *Le Corpus Dionysien*; Jeanne Barbet, 'Introduction,' in *Johannis Scoti Eriugena Expositiones in Ierarchiam coelestem*, XII–XV.

⁵ See Barbet, 'Introduction,' XII–XV.

harshness of later reaction to him. Finally, I shall examine a key example from the *Summa* of Alexander of Hales, in which this debate from the previous five centuries emerges, and conclude. For the purposes of this comparison, I shall focus on one problem, that is, the problem of Eriugena's presentation of the Primordial Causes. He roots it in the Patristic tradition, but as we shall see, by the time we get to the *Summa Halensis*, the Patristic background has been forgotten, and the strange uses to which the concept could be put are uppermost in the mind of the Halensian Summist to the extent that it is simply condemned out of hand.

Overview

The history of Eriugena's engagement with the Greek tradition begins with his translation of Pseudo-Dionysius, which makes use of a first effort by Hilduin (according to Théry, probably a collaborative work),⁶ but it is a considerable improvement on the latter. Philosophical terms remain constant throughout, and it is clear that this time, the translator understood the philosophical import of what he was translating.⁷ He was not interested merely in producing a smooth piece of Latin, but also in understanding himself the thought he was trying to render into Latin from Greek, and thus he brought out the philosophical and theological structure of the text. The final version of his translation was to be the standard Latin version of the *Corpus Dionysiacum* for the next five centuries, and elements of the Latin vocabulary developed by Eriugena to express the new ideas of Dionysius became standard terminology. (The best example of this is the word 'supernatural', *supernaturalis*, which is common both in Latin and in English, invented to translate *hyperphyseon*, a Greek neologism of Dionysius'.) New translations were produced by Sarrazenus and by Grosseteste in the 13th century, and by Traversari in the 15th century,⁸ but all of these were in a sense reworkings of the original, which was Eriugena's: his remained the definitive version, on which others were based, and, significantly, was the stan-

⁶ See Gabriel Théry, *Études dionysiennes*, vol. 1, *Hilduin, traducteur de Denys*, *Études de philosophie médiévale*, 16 (Paris: Vrin, 1932), 101–42.

⁷ Eriugena has left us an account of his method as a translator in his commentary on the *De Celestis Hierarchiis* of Dionysius. In this text, we have first, the *lemma* from Dionysius, then we have an alternative translation, then we have a brief explanation as to what the piece means, and finally we get an extended commentary on the *lemma*. See Barbet, 'Introduction,' IX–XI, esp. x, n. 2; also René Roques, "'Valde artificialiter": le sens d'un contresens,' *Annuaire 1969–1970: École pratique des hautes études, Section des sciences religieuses*, 77 (1968): 31–72; Vignaux Paul, Roques René, and Jolivet Jean, 'Histoire des anglaises médiévales,' *Annuaire 1969–1970: École pratique des hautes études, Section des sciences religieuses*, 77 (1968): 308–11; Vignaux Paul, Roques René, and Jolivet Jean, 'Histoire des anglaises médiévales,' *Annuaire 1970–1971: École pratique des hautes études, Section des sciences religieuses*, 78 (1969): 301–5.

⁸ See Pseudo-Dionysius, *Dionysiaca* (see above, n. 1) for a description and editions of these translations.

dard version in use in Franciscan houses through the era of high scholasticism.⁹ Eriugena also studied Maximus the Confessor, in order to understand Dionysius better (Maximus was thought to be the Scholiast on the Greek *Corpus*, although that is now known to be John of Scythopolis), and eventually translated two texts of Maximus': some of the *Ambigua ad Iohannem*, and the *Quaestiones ad Thalassium*. In fact, great chunks of Maximus make their way into the *Periphyseon*, which is intended to enrich the philosophical and theological life of the Western Church with the ideas Eriugena had found so stimulating in the great Byzantine thinkers.

This work of translation and commentary exposed Latin thinkers both to the advances in Christian theology which had emerged in the debates around Chalcedon, and to a more developed stage of Neoplatonic thought than is found in Augustine. The post-Chalcedonian Greek theological tradition makes extensive use of the latest developments in Neoplatonic thought, through Dionysius' adaptation of Proclus' *Henads*,¹⁰ but in so doing, it also alters the fundamental metaphysics, since the particularity of the Incarnation inverts the previous prioritisation of the universal over the particular. All this material which he explored in his translations bore fruit in his own most important work, the *Periphyseon*.

In the centuries which follow, evidence of engagement with Eriugena is sparse: Heiric of Auxerre and Raoul Glaber both used his work, and he was caught up in the Eucharistic controversy of the 11th century because certain works of Ratramnus of Corbie are attributed to him.¹¹ During the 12th century, as academic life intensified in both the Cathedral schools and monasteries, we find evidence of more profound engagement with Eriugena, linked to the intense interest in the Greek Fathers which

⁹ See Dondaine, *Le Corpus Dionysien*; also Donna Maria Altimari-Adler, 'Dionysiaca Franciscana: materials Dionysian possessed or written by Franciscans or present in manuscripts together with Dionysiaca of Franciscan authorship: Submitted by Donna Maria Altimari-Adler to Professor Emery, Pseudo-Dionysius course' (typescript article, University of Notre Dame, 1995).

¹⁰ See Stephen Gersh, *From Iamblichus to Eriugena: An Investigation of the Prehistory and Evolution of the Pseudo-Dionysian Tradition*, *Studien zur Problemgeschichte der antiken und mittelalterlichen Philosophie*, 8 (Leiden: Brill, 1978), for a full analysis of this very complex process of transmission.

¹¹ See Paul Edward Dutton, 'Raoul Glaber's *De divina quaternitate*: An unnoticed reading of Eriugena's translation of the *Ambigua* of Maximus the Confessor,' *Medieval Studies* 42 (1980): 431–53; also Ratramnus of Corbie, *De corpore et sanguine Domini: texte original et notice bibliographique*, ed. J.N. Bakhuizen van den Brink (Amsterdam: North-Holland Pub. Co., 1974), a text long thought to be Eriugenian, and, as such, arousing the interest of James Ussher, in *A Discourse of the Religion anciently Professed by the Irish and British* (1631), in *The Whole Works of the Most Rev. James Ussher, D.D., Lord Archbishop of Armagh, and Primate of All Ireland*, vol. 4, ed. Charles Richard Elrington (Dublin: Hodges and Smith; London: Whittaker and Co., 1847), 285. See Édouard Jeuneau, 'Guillaume de Malmesbury, premier éditeur anglaise du *Periphyseon*,' in *Sapientiae doctrina: Mélanges de théologie et de littérature médiévales offerts à Dom Hildebrand Bascour O.S.B.*, ed. Roland Hissette, Guibert Michiels, and Dirk Van den Auweele (Louvain: Abbaye du mont César, 1980), 173. Reprinted in Édouard Jeuneau, *Études Érigéniennes* (Paris: Etudes Augustiniennes, 1987), 490–521, 514–15.

Chenu and Lévy have noted:¹² at the Cathedral School of Chartres, his Platonic cosmology was of interest to people such as Bernard of Chartres. Eriugena is not often cited by name at Chartres, but indirect reference to the works of Eriugena had been usual since Raoul Glaber, at least; Amalric of Bene is a Chartrean, and such elements of his work as we still possess after 1210 indicate serious reading of Eriugena—mistaken, perhaps, but nonetheless extensive, and Amalric cannot have been alone in this.¹³ In Paris, as noted above, the *Periphyseon* was excerpted as part of the standard *Gloss* on the *Corpus* and his translation of the *Corpus Dionysiacum* played a very important part in the development of the Victorine school.¹⁴ Honorius of Autun produced the *Clavis physicae*. In monastic, largely Cistercian circles, William of St Thierry makes abundant use of Eriugena,¹⁵ and Bernard of Clairvaux knew Eriugena's work, and used it.¹⁶

All of this was to change, however, during the 13th century, when, in 1210, he was condemned at the Council of Sens along with David of Dinant and Amalric of Bene (or Chartres), a condemnation for which we do not have *acta*, as it happens, but the terms of which we know from the letters of Honorius III in 1225, which refer to it. This condemnation was reiterated in 1225. He was condemned again in 1241, and again in 1681 upon publication of Gale's *editio princeps*, upon which the *Periphyseon* was promptly placed on the Index, lingering there until the final abolition of the Index. What is condemned in 1210 is essentially pantheism. The Maximian/Eriugenian claim that the universe is unified in God through the deification of man seemed to some minds at least to be stating that the universe is God. Eriugena intended to reproduce the Maximian Christological cosmology for the benefit of the Western

12 Marie-Dominique Chenu, *La Théologie au XIIe siècle* (Paris: Vrin, 1966); Antoine Lévy, *Le Créé et L'Incréé: Maxime le confesseur et Thomas d'Aquin: aux sources de la querelle palamienne* (Paris: Vrin, 2006), 102–8.

13 See Édouard Jauneau, 'Le renouveau érigénien du XIIe siècle,' in *Eriugena redivivus: zur Wirkungsgeschichte seines Denkens im Mittelalter und im Übergang zur Neuzeit: Vorträge des V. Internationalen Eriugena-Colloquiums, Werner-Reimers-Stiftung Bad Homburg, 26.–30. August 1985*, ed. Werner Beierwaltes (Heidelberg: Winter, 1987), 26–92, where, due to the lack of citation, he concludes that Eriugena was not much read at Chartres. However, Lévy disagrees: see Lévy, *Le Créé et L'Incréé*, 80. See also Gabriel Théry, *Autour du décret de 1210*, 2 vols, vol. 1, *David de Dinant*, vol. 2, *Alexandre d'Aphrodise*, Bibliothèque thomiste, 6, 7 (Le Saulchoir: Revue des sciences philosophiques et théologiques, 1925–6) and Catherine Capelle, *Autour du décret de 1210*, vol 3, *Amaury de Bène*, Bibliothèque thomiste, 16 (Paris: Vrin, 1932), for an account of Amalric of Bène, who was a Chartrean.

14 Dondaine, *Le Corpus Dionysien*, 35–66.

15 See Jean Déchanet, *Guillaume de St. Thierry: Aux sources d'un pensée*, Théologie historique, 49 (Paris: Beauchesne, 1978), 63–97.

16 See Étienne Gilson, 'Maxime, Erigène, S. Bernard,' in *Aus der Geisteswelt des Mittelalters: Studien und Texte Martin Grabmann zur Vollendung des 60. Lebensjahres von Freunden und Schülern gewidmet*, ed. Albert Lang, Joseph Lechner, and Michael Schmaus, Beiträge zur Geschichte der Philosophie und Theologie des Mittelalters, Supplementband 3/1 (Münster: Aschendorff, 1935), 188–95 and Étienne Gilson, *La Théologie mystique de Saint Bernard*, Études de philosophie médiévale, 20 (Paris: Vrin, 1969), 38–42.

Church, and, given its strong emphasis on negative theology, pantheism in the strict sense cannot be said to be characteristic of his work read as he clearly intended it to be; but what of the other two?

It is difficult to know for certain, since in their case, the instruction to destroy their works seems to have been followed absolutely. However, we know something of what they said from other works in which theirs were discussed, most notably, in the case of David of Dinant, in a discussion by Albert the Great, as Théry notes throughout his work from 1934. What emerges from these citations is that Amalric was, in fact, influenced by Eriugena, and Eriugena's condemnation came about at least partly as a result of having influenced Amalric, whose main inspiration, however, was not Eriugena, but Joachim of Fiore and his antinomian pneumatology. However, there is a clear connection to Amalric.

With David of Dinant, the situation is a good deal more puzzling. The citations we find in Albert the Great demonstrate no Eriugenian influence at all; they are not even Neoplatonic in any general sense. David is reading Aristotle; he is a dialectician, but in the Aristotelian sense, not the Platonic; he is far closer to Abelard than to Eriugena. In fact, he is a thoroughgoing materialist; anything further from Eriugena's 'objective idealism' would be hard to find. What finally emerges is that David has been reading the early books of Aristotle's *Metaphysics*, and he has taken on board the Presocratic belief in the unity of the cosmos—a belief which is fundamentally immanentist and materialist. The condemnation of David, then, marks one stage in the battle which raged around the works of Aristotle for most of the 13th century—and that is why Albert the Great took such a keen interest in him. Albert was trying to demonstrate that David had misunderstood Aristotle, and that the latter did not deserve to be excluded from the universities on the basis of David's misunderstanding.

The quarrel had very little to do with Maximus' cosmology as presented by Eriugena; he was guilty by association, since some notion of the unity of the cosmos underpinned both.¹⁷ But what is really interesting here is the fact that David's materialist cosmic unity could have been read by somebody as Eriugenian; this could only come about if someone is reading Eriugena through an Avicennian lens. There is a great deal of latent Aristotelianism in the later Byzantine Church Fathers, above all in the use Leontius of Byzantium makes of Aristotle in the post-Chalcedonian controversies;¹⁸ but without some prior knowledge of the later Greek Christian tradition, it would appear that Eriugena's Maximian citations could be made to mean almost anything. The net result was that the most comprehensive and intelligent attempt to understand and represent the thought of the Greek East for centuries was badly frustrated. Only a very select few—e.g. Nicholas of Cusa—succeeded in getting be-

¹⁷ See Théry, *Autour du décret de 1210*, vols 1 and 2, and Capelle, *Autour du décret de 1210*, vol. 3, for a full discussion of the process and implications of this condemnation.

¹⁸ See Leontius of Jerusalem, *Complete Works: Leontius of Byzantium*; ed. and trans. Brian E. Daley (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2017).

yond the bad odour which attended Eriugena to know his thought, which is, in so many respects, Maximus' thought.

The *Parisian Corpus Dionysiacum*

The text of Dionysius used at Paris in the 13th century is very complex; the most intensely studied exemplar is Paris, *Bibliothèque Nationale*, Ms. Lat. 17341, the subject of extensive studies by Dondaine and Harrington.¹⁹ Both Eriugena's and Sarrazenus' translations are found there, together with Anastasius' Latin translations of the Greek scholia on Dionysius, and long excerpts from the *Periphyseon*, all interpolated into the text, so that the reader is not reading simply Dionysius, but, as Harrington has observed, also seven centuries of commentary and interpretation as well. The *Corpus Dionysiacum* is a text, or set of texts, which requires great hermeneutical subtlety in the reading and interpretation of it—that is one of the things which makes it so difficult to translate—and the commentary tradition as found in the *Glosses* alone, is extraordinarily rich. To a certain extent, the increasingly analytic approach of the burgeoning scholastic movement ran counter to the hermeneutical subtleties of the commentary on the *Corpus*, and this is perhaps another element which gets Eriugena into trouble eventually, since in order to read Eriugena, a willingness to immerse oneself in and sympathise with his particular style and diction is necessary: in that regard he resembles Plotinus. It is a style of doing philosophy to which monastic life is very suited: the slow process of the *lectio divina* allows the text to release its richness gradually in a way that the more agonistic style of the scholastic *quaestio* forbids.

The excerpts from the *Periphyseon* found in the text of the *Corpus* seem to have been selected, on the whole, for the light they cast on the Greek scholia: these are rich in examples from Greek literature and theology which must have been very puzzling for a Latin reader of the 13th century lacking access to the full resources of Greek culture, but Eriugena's explanations of the same material do make it much more intelligible to a Latin mind-set: see, for example, the Scholiasts' explanations of the terms *kataphatike* and *apophatike* as compared with Eriugena's.²⁰ The most significant group of concepts is that surrounding the questions of the knowledge of God by the creature, God's knowledge of Himself, and God's knowledge of creatures.

It is a commonplace of negative theology that God is known in his effects, but the effects are not God, so God in himself is not known in this way. Combined with this in Greek theology is Gregory of Nyssa's emphasis on God's infinity, so that God could never be known fully by a finite creature—simply as a matter of

¹⁹ See Dondaine, *Le Corpus Dionysien*; Harrington, *A Thirteenth-Century Textbook*.

²⁰ See Harrington, *A Thirteenth-Century Textbook*, 88–91 (for the Greek Scholiast in Paris, *Bibliothèque Nationale de France*, Lat. 17341) and 81 (for Eriugena's explanation of the same material).

logic. The finite cannot encompass the infinite. However, for Pseudo-Dionysius, the 'effects' by which God is known are not the ontological realities that Aquinas was later to work into the Five Ways, but the words of Scripture. Scripture is what Dionysius means by 'Theology': thus the *Mystical Theology* is a hermeneutical exercise. This is, so to speak, the ultimate reading of Scripture, the hard reading. Ultimately, the goal of all theology and philosophy is contemplation, which is not propositional nor does it assert anything at all, nor does it deny anything: it is 'the cloud of unknowing'. One can see the monastic, contemplative approach to Scripture lying behind this. It is full of paradox: negation says more than affirmation, darkness is brighter than light, ultimate Wisdom is unknowing...The Scholiasts carefully unpack and explain all of this for the benefits of the reader, and Eriugena improves on the Scholiasts.

In the *Gloss* on Chapter 5 of the *Mystical Theology*, the glossator has inserted a long excerpt from the *Periphyseon*, Book 2, including in the latter part of the citation elements drawn from Gregory of Nyssa (whom Eriugena confused with Gregory Nazianzen):

So when we ask of this or that "What is it?", does it not appear to you that we are seeking for nothing else but a substance which either has been defined or is capable of being defined? (...) If, then, no wise man asks of all essence in general what it is, since it cannot be defined except in terms of the circumstances which circumscribe it, so to speak within limits, I mean place and time, quantity and quality, relation, connection, rest, motion, condition and the other accidents by which the substance itself by reason of being subject, unknown and indefinable through itself, is shown only as subsisting, but not as to what it is, what man learned in the discipline of the divine word would presume to inquire of the Divine Substance what it is, when he understands very well concerning it that it cannot be defined, and is not any of the things that are, and surpasses all things that can be defined? (...) let every soul refrain from rashly rushing into any speech of the matters that concern God, to define him thereby, but let her reverence in silence only the truth of the Divine Essence, ineffable and beyond understanding, and the highest wisdom of all. If then, there is no one, even among the wisest, who can know the reasons of existing things, as those reasons were first established, who would dare to find in anything a definition of God?²¹

21 Harrington, *A Thirteenth-Century Textbook*, 109, citing the text of Eriugena from the *Periphyseon*, Book 2. See Iohannis Scotti seu Eriugena, *Periphyseon*, Books I-V, 5 vols, ed. Édouard Jeuneau, Corpus Christianorum Continuatio Mediaevalis (CCCM), 161–5 (Turnhout: Brepols, 1996–2003), 2:136.24–138.13. Translation: Eriugena, *Periphyseon (The Division of Nature)*, trans. I.P. Sheldon-Williams (Books I-V), (Books IV-V) revised by John O'Meara, Cahiers d'études médiévales (Montréal, Québec), Cahier special, 3 (Montreal: Bellarmin; Washington: Dumbarton Oaks, 1987); also *Joannis Scoti opera quae supersunt omnia*, ed. Heinrich Joseph Floss (PL 122:439–1022); Iohannis Scotti Eriugena, *Periphyseon (De Divisione Naturae)*, 4 vols, Books I-III ed. Inglis Patrick Sheldon-Williams, Book IV ed. Édouard Jeuneau, Scriptores latini Hiberniae 7, 9, 11, 13 (Dublin: Dublin Institute for Advanced Studies, 1968–95). Harrington provides his own translation; I have used the Sheldon-Williams version.

This is certainly very startling: that God is not ultimately comprehended by the human intellect is, as noted, a commonplace of not only Christian Neoplatonism, but also of pagan Neoplatonism: Plotinus says it, Proclus says it, Damascius says it. Indeed, we could trace it back to Plato; in Christianity, we find it in St Paul and St John's works: what he is in himself is not known, because the finite cannot compass the infinite. But to say that creatures cannot know each other, let alone that God does not know his creatures seems to push the concept into absurdity. What is Eriugena doing here?

Eriugena had already argued that the essence even of created things is ultimately unknown as to what it is in Book 1 of the *Periphyseon*, where we find²² the Aristotelian Categories blended with the *periochae*, or 'circumstances', although the *periochae* are usually a hermeneutical structure, which can ultimately be traced, as a hermeneutical device, to Servius' commentary on Virgil.²³ Commonly associated in antiquity with rhetorical, legal proofs, had come to be employed as a kind of key in the exegesis of texts, initially by Servius, and then by generations of Hiberno-Latin biblical commentators;²⁴ finally, it would appear, being fixed as the form of the *accessus* in the circle around Eriugena and Remigius of Auxerre. They have been adapted here for a philosophical purpose; they indicate OYCIA (*ousia*), in itself incomprehensible: 'they are seen to be around it.' Something can be understood about *ousia* from the categories of place, quantity, situation and time. The congruence of these indicates an *ousia* which itself is none of them; it a useful way of delimiting essence without having to pin down what it is. The *periochae* function as a sort of *accessus ad essentiam*—they do not necessarily comprehend it any more than an *accessus* comprehends its text.

This understanding of essence as incomprehensible in itself underpins the citation incorporated into the *Corpus*. He is arguing that what we consider 'knowledge' is normally our interpretation of our sensory experience, dependent on circumstance, and that is summed up by the Categories, identified with the *Circumstantiae* of Servius. But circumstance does not touch the essence of a thing; a real thing cannot simply be the sum total of its circumstances. Thus, there is something irreducibly mysterious about any being whatever—because, in the final analysis, all things come from God, and their divine origin is a mystery. At this point, we revert to the Eriugenian Primordial Causes (which have their origin in Augustine's *rationes seminales*, ultimately a Stoic structure): anything at all that exists has a Primordial Cause, which is in God. What it is, is ultimately its Primordial Cause, which is not accessible

²² Eriugena, *Periphyseon* I, 471C-472B (CCCM 161).

²³ Servius, *Servii Grammatici qui fervntvr in Vergilii carmina commentarii*, 4 vols, ed. Georg Thilo and Hermann Hagen (Leipzig: B.G. Teubner, 1881), 1:1: 'In exponendis auctoribus haec considerata sunt: poetae vita, titulus operis, qualitas carminis, scribentis intentio, numerus librorum, ordo librorum, explanatio.'

²⁴ See Pádraig Ó Néill, 'The Old Irish Treatise on the Psalter and its Hiberno-Latin Background,' *Ériu* 30 (1979): 148–64.

to our senses. The glossator of the *Corpus*, quotes Eriugena on the ancients at this point,²⁵ where Eriugena observes that the ancients taught that what is accessible to the senses is not known, since it is unstable, reiterating Plato's doctrine that knowledge in the true sense can only be of stable things—that is, of the Forms in their transcendence, which cannot be bodily knowledge. So what we think of as knowledge is bodily, entering by the senses, and therefore it can only ever be circumstantial: it cannot access the Primordial Causes, which is to say the essences of things, things as they really are in God: *ousia*. Anything that is a different kind of wisdom will not appear to us to be 'knowledge', but some other kind of intuition or understanding.

What about God's knowledge of himself, or of creatures? If what we think of as knowledge is circumstantial and bodily—well, God is pure spirit, and so, as he is in himself, he cannot have this knowledge. But also, he is infinite, unencompassable, even by himself. But the Primordial Causes of creature are also found in God, and to that extent, they participate in his divinity, including, presumably, his infinity, and to that extent, they are also unencompassable. This is also an aspect of the freedom of creatures: they are not simply puppets, but have real capacity to act autonomously. Paradoxically, the creature most like God is the one with the capacity also to reject him.

Clearly, these are difficult ideas. Understood as part of a rich hermeneutic applied to the reading of a very complex text, they facilitate meditation on some of the greatest mysteries of the Christian faith. However, taken out of context, and juxtaposed with philosophy emerging from a very different tradition, they appear startling, opposed to Christian tradition, and this is what happens when Eriugena begins to be read in conjunction with Avicenna. As Lévy has pointed out, it is not necessary to read Eriugena as saying the same thing as Avicenna, but it is very easy to do so.²⁶ This is what we see happening in the anonymous *Liber de Causis Primis et Secundis*, and it is precisely this complex of ideas around the knowledge of God (in theophany) and the presence of intermediaries between God as he is in himself and creation (in theophany, also primordial causes) which lead ultimately to the condemnations of 1241 and some sharp remarks in the *Summa Halensis* on Eriugena's Primordial Causes.

Avicenna and Eriugena

During the late 12th and early 13th centuries, Avicenna's reading of Aristotle, heavily Neoplatonised, introduced ideas into the Western philosophical canon which were sufficiently similar to the philosophical ideas introduced by Eriugena from the Greek theological tradition, at least in terms of philosophical structure, to be syncret-

²⁵ Harrington, *A Thirteenth-Century Textbook*, 109.

²⁶ Lévy, *Le Créé et L'Incréé*.

ically combined with them. At the origin of both lies Proclus, in fact. The translation of the *Liber de Causis* introduced Proclus by far more direct means,²⁷ but it was thought to be Aristotelian. That the *Liber de Causis* could be accepted as a work of Aristotle's tells us something about what the earlier part of the 13th century expected from Aristotelian theology: apparently, it expected Procline Neoplatonism, thanks largely to these mistaken attributions of Neoplatonic texts to Aristotle: the Arabic tradition of the *Liber de Causis*, ascribed to Aristotle, and the Plotinian *Theology of Aristotle*, ascribed to Aristotle by Al Kindi, along with the Avicennian reading of Aristotle. This Neoplatonic reading of Aristotle combined with Eriugena could produce a kind of *philosophia perennis* which carried philosophy in a direction quite inimical to orthodox Christian theology. The anonymous *Liber de Causis Primis et Secundis*,²⁸ discussed below, makes this very clear. Eriugena had prioritised the Greek Fathers: the *Periphyseon* is on one level an extended argument between the Augustinian position, as argued by the *Alumnus* and the Dionysian-Maximian, as argued by the *Nutritor*.²⁹ Read in the light of a knowledge of Maximian theology, Eriugena is orthodox—given perhaps, to literary or poetical similes, open to misinterpretation, but not necessarily implying such. The Western Christian reaction to Eriugena is normally taken by Eastern Christian scholars as yet one more example of the woeful failure of Western Christianity to understand the Eastern tradition, and on one level, this is true. However, Eriugena read in combination with Avicenna which no Orthodox scholar would do, but was clearly happening at this time, could also take one right back to late Hellenistic Neoplatonism, and on to a system of thought diverging very sharply from Christian theology. This may help to explain why Eriugena comes under fire to such an extent in the early 13th century. The condemnations of 1241, following on from those of 1210 and 1225, have in view a very specific conjunction of influences—Arab, Greek and Aristotelian—which they want to break up. Albert the Great set himself to disentangle Aristotle from all of this, in order to demonstrate that Aristotle was worthy of serious consideration by a Christian, but the question as to how the Greek Fathers could be integrated into the Western tradition was not directly addressed. As Chenu has pointed out, the Condemnations of 1241 indicate a profound discomfort with orthodox Greek Christian thought, but clearly nobody can condemn

27 See *Liber de causis: Das Buch von den Ursachen, mit einer Einleitung von Rolf Schönberger*, trans. Andreas Schönfeld, Philosophische Bibliothek, 553 (Hamburg: Meiner, 2003).

28 *Liber de Causis Primis et Secundis et de fluxu eorum*, ed. Roland de Vaux, in Roland de Vaux, *Notes et Textes sur L'Avicennisme Latin aux confins des XII^e-XIII^e siècles*, Bibliothèque thomiste, 20 (Paris: Vrin, 1934).

29 Even that is controversial, however, since a number of distinguished Eriugenian scholars (e.g. Édouard Jauneau) argue that Eriugena represents in reality 'an Augustinian fabric with Greek motifs stitched into it': see Édouard Jauneau, 'Pseudo-Dionysius, Gregory of Nyssa, and Maximus the Confessor in the Works of John Scottus Eriugena,' in *Carolingian Essays: Andrew W. Mellon lectures in early Christian studies*, ed. Uta-Renate Blumenthal (Washington, DC: The Catholic University of America Press, 1983), 138–49. Reprinted in Jauneau, *Études Érigéniennes*, 175–87.

so august a figure as Dionysius the Areopagite or his followers. Yet Eriugena, being a 'modern', is a different prospect.

The *Liber de Causis Primis et Secundus*

The reasons for this extreme concern with potentially pantheistic elements in 1210, and with that and many other propositions also in 1241, can be understood on reading the *Liber de Causis Primis et Secundis*. It consists of a mixture of Avicennian, Augustinian and Eriugenian elements, but, as the editor observes, specifically Christian references are all carefully filtered out of both the Augustinian and Eriugenian material, in order to make the work a purely rational, philosophical text.³⁰ Clearly what is at work in the *Liber* is an active engagement with Avicenna (whose Neoplatonised reading of Aristotle made the Philosopher a much easier prospect for scholars trained in the profoundly Augustinian schools of the early Middle Ages) and an attempt to combine him with the existing Augustinian paradigm, into which Eriugena is also stitched. In the edition published in 1508 by the Augustinians at Venice, this is called *Liber Avicenne in primis et secundis substantiis et de fluxu entis*—it was thought to be by Avicenna. However, even the most cursory reading of the text reveals elements which are manifestly not Avicennian: there are frequent references to Dionysius the Areopagite; the authority of Augustine is invoked; the name of Gregory of Nyssa is brought into play also; and there is distinctly non-Avicennian vocabulary in use (the author refers to *theophaniae* and *vita prima*). The text is composed as a series of extracts drawn from various *auctoritates*, juxtaposed one against the other in order to teach a certain philosophical doctrine. But this is not a simple process of redaction: the author edits his selected texts very carefully in order to guide the discussion to the desired outcome. The authorities actually mentioned are the great ones: Augustine, Dionysius, Gregory of Nyssa (often Eriugena in the case of these latter two), the Philosopher, i.e. Aristotle, although in a couple of cases the author actually cites Avicenna as the 'Philosopher'. This practice is not, however, unique to the *Liber*. In the *Summa Halensis*, Aristotle and Avicenna are both called the 'Philosopher'. The author knows the *Liber de Causis*, and quotes Aristotle according to the oldest translation from Greek into Latin, and seems to have drawn some material from Alexander of Aphrodisias and Alfarabi. Books 1 and 2 of the *Periphyseon* underpin much of the text, although Eriugena is never mentioned by name—his thought appears occasionally under the name of Gregory of Nyssa or Pseudo-Dionysius.

It dates from the first quarter of the 13th century: the textual references, the manuscript tradition, the paucity of reference to Aristotle, and the extensive use of Eriugena all indicate a date of composition some time then. It would be difficult to find a

30 *Liber de Causis Primis et Secundis*, 72–9.

text making such free use of the *Periphyseon* following 1225. The subject of the text is Neoplatonic emanationism, in which the angelic hierarchies of Dionysius and the primordial causes of Eriugena are all reduced to the Intelligences of the spheres of Avicenna. Throughout the *Liber*, we find Avicenna and Eriugena tightly interwoven—see, for example, Chapter 8, where the author's discussion of motion and life, and its relation to essence and being, shifts seamlessly from Avicenna to Eriugena and back: specifically Christian elements are simply not present in the discussion.

In order to appreciate how the author of the *Liber* is working with Eriugena, it is useful to compare specific texts. In Chapter 2 of the *Liber*, we find:

We say then, that those things which are made are co-eternal with God, but are not absolutely coeternal with God. Coeternal indeed because nothing was done by Wisdom without the Primordial Causes made in it.³¹

Compare this with:

N: So the principal causes of all things are co-eternal with God (...) A: They are not in all respects co-eternal. For while we believe that the Son is in all respects co-eternal with the Father, those things which the Father makes in the Son, we call co-eternal with the Son, but not in all respects co-eternal. They are co-eternal in the sense that the Son was never without the Primordial Causes of natures created in Him.³²

The question with which the author is concerned here is that of the Primordial Causes: are they absolutely equal to God? If so, then we are dealing with a variety of pantheism here—certainly, some kind of emanationism. The really fundamental question is how a created work can relate to its creator: what is the nature of the relationship? Is the world really separate from God? Or is it God—is God really separate, beyond the world? The answer given here is the characteristic Neoplatonic one: it is and it is not. It proceeds from God in its effects, which are what we know (which is a form of separation); but it also remains in him, which is why Eriugena says essences are unknown: they are that aspect of reality which is always with God, Who is unknown as to what he is (but not that he is). It proceeds, but does not detach. Eriugena, along with the whole Greek tradition, wants to say that the material, the phenomenal, is contained within the spiritual, and never detaches from it, and the Neoplatonic structure of Procession and Return permits that. Avicenna retains this Neoplatonic ontology in his reading of Aristotle, but the role of the *Logos*, the essen-

31 *Liber de Causis Primis et Secundis*, 92: 'Dicimus ergo quod illa que facta sunt deo coeterna sunt, non omnino tamen deo coeterna. Coeterna quidem quia numquam fuit sapientia sine primordialibus rerum causis in se factis.'

32 Eriugena, *Periphyseon* II, 561C (CCCM 162): 'Sequitur haec omnia, Deum Patrem dico et Verbum rerumque causas in eo factas, coeterna esse (...) Non omnino coeterna sunt. Nam filium Patri coeterna esse omnino credimus, ea vero qui facit Pater in Filio, coeterna Filio esse dicimus non autem omnino coeterna: coeterna quidem qui nunquam fuit Filius sine primordialibus naturarum causis in se factis.'

tial intermediary, is not as evident. It looks as though the author of the *Liber* is trying to reintroduce the Logos, but as a philosophical rather than a Scriptural, concept, by calling it 'Wisdom'; although the identification of Christ with Wisdom is a mediaeval exegetical commonplace, and one needs to be careful about reading too much into this.

The author then follows on with:

That they are not absolutely coeternal is made certain by this, and is this, that the first cause of things, because of the infinity of its diffusion, and its incomprehensible altitude, and the excellence of its ineffable purity, is not perceived by any intellect, except that which formed them in the beginning. For they are known from their effects, that is, their processions into intelligible forms, but only that they are, not what they are, and thus they originate in the principal causes in those things of which they are causes, and they do not leave the Beginning, that is Wisdom, in which they are made, and, as I say, in themselves, they remain invisible, hiding their excellence in darkness, not ceasing to appear in their effects as in the light of knowledge.³³

Compare this with:

For they are called "abyss" on account of their unfathomable depth and their infinite diffusion through all things, which is perceived by no sense, and comprehended by no intellect, and they have earned the name of 'darkness' because of the ineffable excellence of their purity (...) Thus there was darkness over the abyss of the Primordial Causes darkness is still over this abyss because it is perceived by no intellect except that which formed it in the beginning. But from its effect, that is, its procession into intelligible forms, it is known only that it is, not what it is.³⁴

And

The principal causes, then, both proceed into the things of which they are the causes, and at the same time, do not depart from their principle, that is, the Wisdom of the Father, in which they are created, and if I may so express it, just as remaining in themselves invisibly by being eter-

33 *Liber de Causis Primis et Secundis*, 92–3: 'Quod autem non omnino coaeterna, certificatur in hoc, et est hoc quia cause rerum prime propter infinitam sui diffusionem et incomprehensibilem altitudinem et ineffabilis puritatis excellentiam nullo percipiuntur intellectu, except illo qui eas in principio formavit. Ex effectibus autem earum, hoc est ex processionibus in formas intelligibiles, cognoscitur solummodo quia sunt, non quid sunt, et sic principales cause in ea quorum sunt cause proveniunt, et principium, id est sapientiam, in qua condita sunt, non reliquunt, et ut ita dicam in se ipsis permanent invisibiles, tenebris excellentiae sue abscondite, in effectibus suis, veluti in quondam lucem cognitionis prolate non cessant apparere.'

34 Eriugena, *Periphyseon* II, 550C–551 A (CCCM 162): 'Abyssus enim dicuntur propter earum incomprehensibilem altitudinem, infinitamque sui per omnia diffusionem, quae nullo percipitur sensu, nullo comprehenditur intellectu, praeque ineffabilis suae puritatis excellentia tenebrarum nomine appellari meruerunt (...) Et adhuc tenebrae sunt super hanc abyssum, quia nulla percipitur intellectu, eo excepto qui eam in principio formavit. Ex effectibus autem, hoc est processionibus eius in intelligibiles formas cognoscitur solummodo quia est, non autem intelligitur quod est.'

nally concealed in the darkness of their excellence, do not cease to appear by being brought forth into the light, as it were, of knowledge in their effects.³⁵

These passages develop the question of Procession and Remaining further. What proceeds is known to our intellect, what remains cannot be. What proceeds is the effects by which a thing is known through circumstances ('Categories', or *Circumstantiae*), but what it really is, its essence, remains unknown. It is notable that Eriugena gives these ideas a distinctively Christian, theological slant, in his use of the word 'Father' for God, and all of his thought is contained within a fundamentally Trinitarian structure. The Author of the *Liber*, on the other hand, has tried to move the whole discourse onto a purely philosophical plane, but treating of Christian, Trinitarian discourse as purely philosophical analogy will alter the nature of what is under discussion fundamentally, since either multiplicity (three) or unity (One God) can be retained logically speaking, but not both.

A very important Eriugenian point is subsequently reiterated:

every creature begins to be, because it was when it was not. For it is not true eternity to begin in some way.³⁶

Compare this with:

But every creature begins to be because there was a time when it was not. It was in its causes when it was not in its effects. Therefore it is not in all respects coeternal with true eternity.³⁷ Again, the subordinate place of the Primordial Causes is reiterated. Although located in the Word, and thus enjoying a species of eternity, they do have a beginning in time, and therefore are not the same as God, who does not.

These citations, clearly, deal with the Primordial Causes, which, together with the question of the knowledge of God, was to be a very vexed question for Alexander of Hales. The Eriugenian Primordial Causes have deep roots in the philosophical tradition, going back to Augustine's seminal reasons. What they are, in the end, is the Forms: the eternal Idea of any thing in the mind of God, before it comes to be in space and time, and this is a perfectly standard idea in both Eastern and Western Christian metaphysics. However, as represented here, they seem to indicate another level of divinity, some kind of World Soul, or indeed pantheism, and this is what is

35 Eriugena, *Periphyseon* II, 552 A (CCCM 162): 'Principales itaque causae et in ea quorum causae sunt proveniunt et principium, id est sapientiam Patris, in qua factae sunt, non relinquunt et, ut sic dicam, in seipsis permanentes invisibiles, tenebris suae excellentiae semper absconditae, in effectibus suis veluti in quamdam lucem cognitionis prolatae, non cessant apparere.'

36 *Liber de Causis Primis et Secundis*, 93: 'omnis creatura incipit esse, quoniam erat quando non erat. Non est autem vere eternitatis modo quodam incipere esse (...).'

37 Eriugena, *Periphyseon* II, 562 A (PL 122:562 A): 'Omnis enim creatura incipit esse quia erat quando non erat: erat in causis quando non erat in effectibus. Non omnino igitur vere aeternitati coaeterna est.'

condemned in the *Summa Halensis*. As the Eriugenian theophany is merely intended as a way to understand how one's knowledge of God could be eternally growing, a reiteration of Gregory of Nyssa's 'From Glory into Glory', but was misunderstood as claiming that one could never know God, but only some kind of reflection of Him, so too this is misunderstood as pantheism.

The *Summa Halensis*

When we come to look at the *Summa Halensis*, we find that the debate concerning Avicennian readings of Eriugena and of his Greek sources has had its effect. Alexander poses the question: 'An creari sit aliquod creatum ut medium inter Creatorem and creaturam?'³⁸ The formulation is lapidary: either a thing is created or it is not. The *Summa Halensis* does focus on the Divine Ideas throughout, very much so, but what it rejects from the earlier tradition is the idea of these Divine Ideas as mediators between created being and God: it is the idea of mediation that is attacked, as it is in 1241 in regard to theophany as well. Partly this is because of a different metaphysics of being: for the Byzantine tradition, being is that which exists in space and time; thus, God is beyond being. If God creates, He draws things from non-being into being—but He must have the idea of them first, so some kind of pre-being blueprint is necessary, if creation is to be conceived at all. But here we seem to be dealing with a more absolute identification of being with existence as such. The mental categories of real in space and time and not-yet-real, as an idea of God's, on which Eriugena plays, are here hardened into definite and separate structures of Creator and created being: only one or the other is possible.

The *Summa* makes this very clear in the *contra*:

Omne quod est, aut est Creator aut creatura; ergo supervacuum est ponere medium inter haec, immo pro damnata haeresi in concilio Senonensi quod dicitur in libro *Periphyseon*, in quo dicebatur quod ideae erant medium inter Creatorem et creaturam; (...).

Respondendum est quod non ponitur medium inter Creatorem et creaturam: non enim est medium inter ens ab alio et ens non ab alio.³⁹

³⁸ Alexander of Hales, *Doctoris irrefragabilis Alexandri de Hales Ordinis minorum Summa theologica (SH)*, 4 vols (Quaracchi: Collegium S. Bonaventurae: 1924–48), Vol II, In1, Tr1, S2, Q2, M1, C3 (n. 43) p. 52.

³⁹ SH II, In1, Tr1, S2, Q2, M1, C3 (n. 43) p. 52: [Everything that is is either the Creator or a creature: therefore it is redundant to place a medium between these, as indeed was the heresy condemned at the Council of Sens, of that which is said in the *Periphyseon*, in which it is said that the Ideas were a medium between the Creator and the creature; (...).

Response: A medium is not to be placed between the Creator and the creature, for there is no medium between a being from something and a being not from something].

The *Summa* here is reacting to a section of *Periphyseon* III: ‘Then, descending from the Primordial Causes which occupy a *kind of* intermediate position between God and the creature (...) He is made in his effects, and openly revealed in their theophanies.’⁴⁰ One can certainly sympathise with the Summist’s impatience with that *quamdā*: what does it mean to say, ‘kind of, as it were, a medium’? Going further, what is a ‘medium’ between God and His creation anyhow? But the fundamental problem which Eriugena is trying to address remains: What is it to create? What is it for God to create? What is the link between Creator and created? Eriugena’s use of *quamdā* here is highly significant: he is signalling that a link of some sort there must be, and that this is one way of talking about it. But clearly, this is open to all sorts of interpretation, including some very strange ones. The Summist, in attempting to clear up the confusion which Eriugenian Avicennianism was causing, has simply dismissed the question—at least here.

Conclusion

The examples discussed here seem to indicate that Eriugena’s influence was largely negative, in that he was somebody against whom Alexander and the authors of the *Summa* reacted. This is not necessarily so, but that it appears to be so is largely a function of how theology and philosophy were written for centuries: something taken as true was simply absorbed into the tradition without citation (as, for example, Eriugena’s coinages for Dionysius’ *hyper*-terms), whereas something rejected is sharply noted and criticised. What the controversy around the Primordial Causes does indicate, however, is the extent to which Eriugena was a significant author: his were ideas which still had to be considered. Undoubtedly, further detailed work on key Eriugenian concepts—deification, microcosmism (a very significant idea in the *Summa Halensis*), the living unity of the Universe—would indicate that his were ideas with which the authors of this era engaged seriously and in great depth, albeit anonymously.

⁴⁰ Eriugena, *Periphyseon* III, 683 A-B (CCCM 163): ‘Deinde ex primordialibus causis, quae medieta-tem quamdam inter Deum et creaturam obtinent, hoc est inter illam ineffabilem superessentialitatem super omnem intellectum et manifestam substantialiter naturam.’

Amos Bertolacci

Reading Aristotle with Avicenna

On the Reception of the *Philosophia Prima* in the *Summa Halensis*¹

Abstract: The present paper aims to provide some methodological tools for obtaining a more precise understanding of the way Avicenna's metaphysics contributed to shaping the metaphysical views expressed in the *Summa*. More specifically, it will try to offer a detailed assessment of the ways in which the authors of the *Summa* quoted, contextualized, and employed for their own purposes the only metaphysical work by Avicenna available to them, namely, the *Liber de Philosophia prima sive Scientia Divina*, which is the Latin translation of the metaphysical part of Avicenna's magnum opus, the *Book of the Cure* (or: *of the Healing*). The general aim is coherently to situate the *Summa* within the framework of the Latin reception of Avicenna's metaphysics in the 13th century, and to document its full significance as a remarkable specimen of one of the possible ways of using it as a source, i.e. what has been labelled elsewhere the '*Philosophia prima* and *Metaphysics*' pattern of joint reception of Avicenna and Aristotle.

Introduction

Avicenna's influence on the *Summa Halensis* has been pointed out in many ways in recent scholarship. So far the investigation has necessarily proceeded in a piece-meal fashion, due to the very wide scope of the work and to the fact that systematic research on the numerous sources of the *Summa* has started only with Lydia Schumacher's ERC project. The present paper aims to provide some methodological tools for obtaining a more precise understanding of the way Avicenna's metaphysics contributed to shaping the metaphysical views expressed in the *Summa*. More specifically, it will try to convey a more detailed assessment of the ways in which the authors of the *Summa* quoted, contextualized, and employed for their own purposes the only metaphysical work by Avicenna available to them, namely, the *Liber de Philosophia prima sive Scientia Divina*, which is the Latin translation of the metaphysical part of Avicenna's magnum opus, the *Book of the Cure* (or: *of the Healing*).² As we will

¹ I am deeply grateful to Lydia Schumacher for the kind invitation to the magnificent conference she organized, and for the continuous, attentive, and competent assistance she provided at every step of the research leading to this paper. My sincere gratitude goes to Oleg Bychkov for the English translations of the Latin passages and to Simon Kopf for the careful revision of a first draft of this article.

² Avicenna Latinus, *Liber de Philosophia prima sive Scientia divina*, 3 vols, ed. S. van Riet (Louvain: Peeters; Leiden: Brill, 1977–83).

see, key doctrines taken from the two main parts of this work by Avicenna (its ontology, with special regard to the primary intelligibles, and its philosophical theology, in connection with issues like creation and emanation) are crucial for the present inquiry. The general aim is to coherently situate the *Summa* within the framework of the Latin reception of Avicenna's metaphysics in the 13th century, and to document its full significance as a remarkable specimen of one of the possible ways of using it as a source.

Status Quaestionis: A Sketch

In the wait for the forthcoming publications of Schumacher's team on the issue, two pieces of scholarship on the influence of Avicenna's philosophy in the *Summa Halensis* should be highlighted, since each of them not only provides a valuable account of the Avicennian background of some doctrines of the *Summa*, but also teaches an insightful methodological lesson.

An aspect of Avicenna's influence on the *Summa Halensis* has been investigated by Dag N. Hasse's book on the Latin reception of Avicenna's *De anima*.³ The focus of Hasse's contribution is obviously psychology. In five extremely dense pages,⁴ Hasse points out that the influence of Avicenna's psychology in the *Summa* is uneven, in the sense that some more elaborated and less problematic parts of Avicenna's account are adopted more fully and more faithfully in the *Summa* than other more disputable parts. A case in point is Avicenna's doctrine of the internal senses, on the one hand, and Avicenna's view of the intellect, on the other. Whereas in the former case, the *Summa*'s adherence to Avicenna is virtually total, fully developed, and involves recourse to both Avicenna's *De Anima* and his *Canon of Medicine*, in the latter case, the influence of Avicenna is mitigated and modified by the medieval Augustinian inheritance, thus resulting in an instance of what Hasse calls 'Avicennized Augustinianism'. In his analysis, Hasse aptly remarks that in several cases, Avicenna is not mentioned by name, but through the use of the epithet *philosophus*,⁵ and that this more opaque reference to Avicenna is due, in the case of the psychology of the *Summa*, to an intermediate source, i.e. John of La Rochelle's *Summa de anima*, which the author of the part of the *Summa Halensis* dealing with psychology presupposed.

The second major contribution in scholarship that should be highlighted here is the masterly essay on the doctrine of primary concepts or transcendentals in Latin medieval

³ Dag Nikolaus Hasse, *Avicenna's De anima in the Latin West: The Formation of a Peripatetic Philosophy of the Soul, 1160–1300* (London: The Warburg Institute, 2000), 51–4 (cf. 216–8).

⁴ Hasse, *Avicenna's De anima*, 51–4.

⁵ Hasse, *Avicenna's De anima*, 53, n. 240.

philosophy by Jan A. Aertsen.⁶ In this book, Aertsen documents the *Summa*'s conscious endorsement of Avicenna's ontology and epistemology relating to the transcendentals. In the section of his book specifically devoted to the *Summa*,⁷ Aertsen brings to the reader's attention a quotation from Avicenna, which is of central importance for our discussion here, since it represents the main case in which the *Summa* ascribes a distinctly Avicennian doctrine of the *Philosophia prima* to the *Philosophus*. Aertsen notices that, contrary to many other medieval works in which the Avicennian doctrine of the transcendentals is treated, the *Summa* does not hesitate to speak of the primary concepts as *primae impressiones intellectus* ('first concepts imprinted on the intellect'), despite the epistemological implication of some sort of innate knowledge of the transcendentals, since the Avicennian idea of an immediate grasp of the most universal concepts is consonant in the *Summa* with the Augustinian idea of an innate knowledge of God. Moreover, Aertsen underscores several other key ontological tenets in the *Summa*, which display a distinctly Avicennian character. These include the so-called 'onto-theological' conception of metaphysics, namely the structural bipartition into a *metaphysica generalis* dealing with being qua being, and a *metaphysica specialis* dealing with God; the fact that 'being' (*ens*) is said of substance and accidents according to priority and posteriority (*secundum prius* and *posterius*); the independent treatment of the concept of 'one' (*unum*) apart from the concept of 'being'; the priority ascribed to 'being' among the transcendentals; the real identity, and the conceptual difference between 'being' and 'one', and so on⁸. Aertsen does not ascribe to Avicenna any of these tenets, which he instead tends to perceive as signs of the influence of Philip the Chancellor. However, he acknowledges that not all of these ideas can be found in Philip. Since, however, all these topics do in fact constitute a sort of 'system' of Avicennian metaphysics, I think that their number and coherence cannot be accidental, and it might reveal a direct or indirect recourse to Avicenna that future research will need to investigate more closely.

From previous studies, consequently, we learn that the *Summa* makes considerable recourse to Avicenna's philosophy, embracing his natural philosophy, medicine,

6 Jan A. Aertsen, *Medieval Philosophy as Transcendental Thought: From Philip the Chancellor (ca. 1225) to Francisco Suárez* (Leiden/Boston: Brill, 2012), 135–47.

7 Aertsen, *Medieval Philosophy as Transcendental Thought*, 135–47.

8 What seems *prima facie* missing in Aertsen's account is Avicenna's famous distinction between essence and existence, a real cornerstone of Avicenna's metaphysics, to which abundant Avicennian scholarship is devoted. Since the distinction in question pervades both Avicenna's ontology and philosophical theology in their entirety and at all levels, and is the basis of Avicenna's doctrine of transcendentals, future research will need to inspect whether and the extent to which it is included among the other Avicennian doctrines that the *Summa* incorporates, especially the doctrine of the 'one' as primary concept and of God as Necessary Existent. (I thank Lydia Schumacher for calling my attention to this issue and for informing me of a forthcoming publication in which she analyzes the *Summa*'s recourse to the Avicennian distinction of essence and existence in terms of the Boethian distinction between *quo est* and *quod est*.)

and metaphysics at the very least;⁹ that in each of these theoretical areas we should expect different degrees of Avicennian allegiance on specific topics; that in metaphysics the endorsement of Avicennian doctrines can be bold and unprecedented; that the influence of Avicenna is sometimes obscured by oblique ways of referring to him (i.e. as *Philosophus* rather than ‘Avicenna’), or it may be totally implicit and silent; finally, that the influence of Avicenna can be either direct, i.e. due to consultation of his texts, or indirect, namely, mediated by intermediate sources.

Testing a Hypothesis

The Hypothesis

In a study from 2012, I argued that the reception of Avicenna’s *Philosophia prima* in Latin philosophy remains continuous and uninterrupted from the time of the translation of Avicenna’s work into Latin until the late 13th century, and I divided its historical reception before Albertus Magnus into three phases, which I called respectively, ‘*Philosophia prima* without *Metaphysics*’, ‘*Philosophia prima* and *Metaphysics*’, and ‘*Philosophia prima* in the exegesis of the *Metaphysics*’.¹⁰

In the first phase (‘*Philosophia prima* without *Metaphysics*’), Avicenna’s work is both quoted and silently reproduced within independent treatises, in which it represents the main text, or one of the main texts, on metaphysics. By contrast, recourse to Aristotle’s *Metaphysics* is absent or very scanty, since the first Latin translations of this work were either incomplete, or had a very limited diffusion at the time. The scattered quotations from the *Metaphysics* in this phase are either indirect references, that is, citations of authors who had access to and quoted Aristotle’s work, or supplementary references, in which the name of Aristotle and his work are added to doctrines drawn from the *Philosophia prima* on account of the supposed identity of views of the two authors.

The second phase (‘*Philosophia prima* and *Metaphysics*’) is marked by the joint consideration of Aristotle’s *Metaphysics* and Avicenna’s *Philosophia prima* by philosophers and theologians in universities. Aristotle’s *Metaphysics* is now regarded as the main text on the subject, but Avicenna’s *Philosophia prima* represents the privileged means of access to Aristotle’s work and its main tool of interpretation.

⁹ As to natural philosophy, beside the recourse to Avicenna in psychology documented by Hasse, the Index ‘Auctoritates et Scripta’ of the current edition of the *Summa* shows numerous quotations of Avicenna’s zoology (see below, n. 11).

¹⁰ Amos Bertolacci, ‘On the Latin Reception of Avicenna’s *Metaphysics* before Albertus Magnus: An Attempt at Periodization,’ in *The Arabic, Hebrew and Latin Reception of Avicenna’s Metaphysics*, ed. Dag Nikolaus Hasse and Amos Bertolacci, *Scientia Graeco-Arabica*, 7 (Berlin: De Gruyter, 2012), 197–223.

In the third phase ('*Philosophia prima* in the exegesis of the *Metaphysics*'), Averroes' *Long Commentary* on the *Metaphysics* replaces Avicenna's *Philosophia prima* as the authoritative interpretation of the *Metaphysics* and as the current exegetical device. Yet, both in Oxford and in Paris, commentators on the *Metaphysics* continue to refer to the *Philosophia prima*, even though their references to Avicenna's work are much less frequent and systematic than those to Averroes' *Long Commentary*.

The second phase is the most interesting for the present purposes. It is documented from the beginning of the 13th century, and it continues even during the third phase which started around 1240, being institutionally linked, in different ways, with the universities of Paris and Oxford. In the aforementioned article I argued that this second phase is represented by thinkers like John Blund, Robert Grosseteste, William of Auvergne, Roland of Cremona, and Roger Bacon, some of whom (like Bacon) were Franciscans or connected with the Franciscan order (like Grosseteste): the *Summa Halensis* remained out of the scope of investigation. I wish now to argue that the *Summa* also belongs to the second phase, and that it offers enlightening evidence regarding the ways in which the paradigm '*Philosophia prima* and *Metaphysics*' took shape.

The Evidence

The evidence on which my argument is based is limited but, I believe, fairly representative. I am taking into consideration all the explicit quotations of Avicenna's *Liber de Philosophia prima* in the *Summa*, relying on the data provided by the *Index Auctoritates et Scripta* of the current edition of the *Summa* under the entry *allegations explicitae*.¹¹ The Index corrects in significant ways the notations on the sources of the *Summa* provided in the footnotes of the edition itself, Avicenna being a case in point.

¹¹ *Doctoris irrefragabilis Alexandri de Hales Ordinis minorum Summa theologica: Indices in tom. I-IV* (Quaracchi: Collegium S. Bonaventurae, 1979), Index III ('Auctoritates et Scripta'), 110b. Since the Index was composed before the critical edition of Avicenna's work, in it the *Liber de Philosophia prima* is called *Metaphysica* and is cited according to the edition printed in Venice in 1508 (in which the division into chapters does not squarely correspond to that adopted in the critical edition of the 'Avicenna Latinus' series). In the Index, the books of the *Summa* recorded as III and IV are in fact, respectively, the second part of Book 2 and Book 3 of the work (the following table adopts the notation adopted by the Index). The Index includes among the *allegationes explicitae* some references to Avicenna which are not explicit, since in them Avicenna is not referred to either by his name or by substantives like *philosophus*: LPP II.2–3, SH II (n. 54), p. 67, n. 1 (definition of 'one' as undivided in itself and divided from other things); LPP III.6, SH I (n. 75), p. 120, nn. 1–6 (opposition 'one'-'many'); LPP VIII.7, SH III (n. 115), p. 133, n. 11 ('delectatio est apprehensio convenientis'); LPP VIII.7, SH III (n. 123), p. 140, n. 1 ('gaudium est ex apprehensione convenientis'). These cases of implicit quotations, although recorded in the Index, are not included in the table.

The main limitation of my evidential material is that in the *Summa*, in addition to the *allegationes explicitae* of Avicenna, numerous *citationes implicitae* also occur, as the same Index aptly records,¹² and the latter are not less numerous or relevant than the former, in the case of the *Summa* as in that of many other Latin works of philosophy or theology.¹³ Despite not being all-inclusive, however, the former type of quotations is frequent and widespread enough to allow some reliable general inferences to be drawn.

Table 1 – Conspectus of the explicit quotations of Avicenna's *Liber de Philosophia prima* (LPP) in the *Summa* (SH)

Avic. LPP (= <i>Metaphysica</i> in the Index)	SH libri I; II 1 ^a pars; II 2 ^a pars [= III in the Index]; III [= IV in the Index]	Source's name	Attitude	Index's correc- tions of the edition
I.5 (<i>ens est prima impressio intelligentiae</i>) ¹⁴	II, p. 3, n. 9 (in contr.)	Philosophus (2x)	qualifying reply (<i>respondendum est ad hoc</i>)	—
I.8 [I.9 in the Index] (<i>veritas est adaequatio rei et intellectus sicut generaliter adaequatio signi et significati</i>) ¹⁵	I, p. 142, n. 2	quidam philosophus	consensus	the philosopher quoted is Avicenna (rather than Averroes)
III.2–3 (<i>assignatio differentiae unitatis et ratio assignationis</i>) ¹⁶	I, p. 117, nn. 2–7; pp. 118–9	Avicenna (5x) in <i>Metaphysica</i> sua (1x)	consensus	—

¹² In some cases, however, the implicit references that the Index discloses do not amount to anything more than vague resemblances: see, for instance, the echo of LPP VIII.6 ('*Veritas uniuscuiusque rei est proprietas sui esse quod stabilitum est ei*') in SH I (n. 89), p. 142, n. 3 ('*Veritas est indivisio esse et eius quod est*').

¹³ The importance of a comprehensive analysis of the quotations of Avicenna (including the implicit ones) in the Commentary on the *Metaphysics* by Albert the Great is shown in Amos Bertolacci, "'Subtilius speculando": Le citazioni della *Philosophia Prima* di Avicenna nel Commento alla *Metafisica* di Alberto Magno,' *Documenti e Studi sulla Tradizione Filosofica Medievale* 9 (1998): 261–339, and Amos Bertolacci, 'Le citazioni implicite testuali della *Philosophia prima* di Avicenna nel Commento alla *Metafisica* di Alberto Magno: analisi tipologica,' *Documenti e Studi sulla Tradizione Filosofica Medievale* 12 (2001): 179–274.

¹⁴ [Being is what is first imprinted on to the intellect].

¹⁵ [Truth is correspondence between the thing and the intellect, just as, generally, it is correspondence between the sign and the signified].

¹⁶ [The assigning of the difference of unity and the reason for assigning].

Table 1 – Conspectus of the explicit quotations of Avicenna's *Liber de Philosophia prima* (LPP) in the *Summa* (SH) (Continued)

Avic. LPP (= <i>Metaphysica</i> in the Index)	SH libri I; II 1 ^a pars; II 2 ^a pars [= III in the Index]; III [= IV in the Index]	Source's name	Attitude	Index's correc- tions of the edition
III.6 (<i>omne compositum ex contrariis est dissolubile</i>) ¹⁷	IV, p. 5, n. 7	Avicenna	consensus	the work quoted is Avicenna's LPP (rather than the <i>Sufficientia</i>)
VI.2 (<i>Si fuerit eius esse post non-esse absolute, tunc adventus eius a causa erit creatio etc.</i>) ¹⁸	II, p. 37, n. 3	Avicenna in sua <i>Prima Philosophia</i>	consensus	—
VI.5 (<i>quaedam est vis imperans motum (...) et quaedam est faciens vel exsequens motum</i>) ¹⁹	IV, p. 983, n. 7	Avicenna [Augustinus, ms. Va]	consensus	VI.4 – 5, fol. 93b (rather than VI.5, foll. 93d [sic]-94a)
VII.3 (<i>reprobant philosophi ideas</i>) ²⁰	II, p. 18, n. 4	Avicenna in sua [Prima?] <i>Philosophia</i>	qualifying reply (<i>sed hic non est intentio illarum formarum exemplarium sive idealium, de quibus nos hic intendimus</i>)	—
VIII.7 (<i>delectatio est ex coniunctione convenientis cum conveniente et sensu eiudem</i>) ²¹	II, p. 701, n. 9	Philosophus	qualifying reply (<i>ad illud (...) dicendum</i>)	—
IX.4 (<i>a Primo, quod est vere unum, non proce-</i>	II, p. 64, n. 5	quidam philosophi	criticism (<i>Sed haec ratio non congruit</i>)	Avicenna, rather than

¹⁷ [Whatever is put together out of contraries can be taken apart].

¹⁸ [If its existence will come after its non-existence in an absolute sense, then its coming will amount to a creation by its cause, etc.].

¹⁹ [There is a power that orders motion (...) and there is a power that executes it or makes this motion happen].

²⁰ [The philosophers reject the ideas].

²¹ [Delight comes as a result of a union of two things that harmonize with each other, of which we become aware].

²² [Only [something] one proceeds immediately from the First, which is one in a true sense].

Table 1 – Conspectus of the explicit quotations of Avicenna's *Liber de Philosophia prima* (LPP) in the *Summa* (SH) (Continued)

Avic. LPP (= <i>Metaphysica</i> in the Index)	SH libri I; II 1 ^a pars; II 2 ^a pars [= III in the Index]; III [= IV in the Index]	Source's name	Attitude	Index's correc- tions of the edition
<i>dit immediate nisi unum</i>) ²²				Averroes, is the philoso- pher quoted
IX.4 (<i>ab uno non pro- cedit nisi unum solum immediate</i>) ²³	II, p. 68, n. 6	Philosophi	criticism (<i>falsa est propositio (...) nisi in- telligatur</i>)	idem.
IX.4 (<i>ab uno simplici non provenire imme- diate nisi unum sim- plex</i>) ²⁴	II, p. 401, n. 2	antiqui phi- losophi	criticism (<i>falsa est positio</i>)	idem.
IX.7 (<i>delectatio cuius- que virtutis plena est acquisitio suae perfec- tionis</i>) ²⁵	II, p. 669, n. 1	Avicenna	consensus	—

Table 1 shows that the *Summa* gathers passages of the *Philosophia prima* which span from the beginning of Avicenna's work (Chapter I.5) to its last part (Chapter IX.7) and that all the three books of the *Summa* contain quotations of this kind. The quotations from Avicenna occur almost invariably in the *pro* and *contra* arguments, rather than in the solutions to the various questions. Besides Avicenna himself, Avicenna's work is quoted at least twice (3 and 7) under the titles of *Metaphysica* or *Prima Philosophia*; if Quotation 9 should also be regarded as a formal reference to Avicenna's *Prima Philosophia* (i.e. the work of Avicenna in question), rather than as a generic reference to his *Philosophia* (i.e. the encyclopedia to which this work belongs),²⁶ then the *Liber de*

²³ [Only [something] one immediately proceeds from [something] one].

²⁴ [Only [something] one and simple proceeds immediately from [something] one and simple].

²⁵ [The delight of any power consists in a full attainment of its perfection].

²⁶ Since the doctrine in question in Quotation 9 is surely taken from the *Philosophia prima*, and since, immediately before the quotation of Avicenna, Aristotle's *Metaphysics* is quoted as *Prima philosophia* ('sicut habetur in fine *Primae Philosophiae* et similiter ab Avicenna in sua *Philosophia*'), the integration of *Prima* before *Philosophia* is debatable. The expression 'in sua *Prima Philosophia*' occurs also in Quotation 5.

philosophia prima would be the work of Avicenna most frequently quoted in the *Summa*, surpassing the *De Anima* which is quoted no more than twice.²⁷

Three main groups of quotations of Avicenna can be singled out for the present purposes. First, those in which Avicenna is called by his proper name—a typology of quotations which I have elsewhere called ‘explicit nominal’—and connected in a more or less perspicuous way with Aristotle (3, 5, 7); second, those in which the *Philosophus* is referred to in connection with doctrines of the *Philosophia prima* (1, 8), for which the label ‘explicit epithetical’ quotations can be coined; third, those in which Avicenna is grouped with other thinkers (including Aristotle), who are collectively referred to in the plural as *philosophi*, with the occasional addition of *quidam* or *antiqui* (9–11); these can be described as ‘explicit indeterminate’ quotations. It remains to be ascertained whether the *quidam philosophus* in Quotation 2 designates Avicenna or not (I incline towards a negative reply). A subset of quotations, those in which Avicenna is quoted explicitly but with no apparent connection with Aristotle (4, 6, 12), are not analyzed in this chapter.

In what follows, I am going to analyze each of these three main groups of quotations. As far as I can see, each group instantiates a precise mode of employing Avicenna’s *Philosophia prima* together with Aristotle’s *Metaphysics*, which corresponds to one of three different ways of understanding the conjunction ‘and’ in the formula, ‘*Philosophia prima* and *Metaphysics*’. In the first case, the conjunction involves an integration: the *Philosophia prima* and the *Metaphysics* remain distinct from one another, but are quoted together and thus become interconnected. In the second case, the conjunction corresponds to a conflation: doctrines of the *Philosophia prima* are projected back in history by the authors of the *Summa* onto the metaphysical thought of Aristotle himself. In the third case, the conjunction implies a cumulation: a doctrine of the *Philosophia prima* is ascribed to an unidentified group of philosophers, which includes Aristotle and Avicenna, without however being limited to them.

‘*Philosophia prima* and *Metaphysics*’: Integration

Three of the explicit nominal quotations from Avicenna are especially relevant for our purposes. They are Quotations 3, 5, and 7. Their importance is signaled by the authors of the *Summa* themselves, who in these quotations record the title of Avicenna’s work together with the author’s name.

²⁷ For the explicit quotations of works by Avicenna other than the LPP in the *Summa*, see ‘in tractatu de anima’, *SH* II (n. 359), p. 436; ‘in principio de anima’, *SH* II (n. 444), p. 547; ‘de celo et mundo’, *SH* II (n. 453), p. 581; ‘libro I <sc. Canonis>’, *SH* II (n. 477), p. 651; ‘in libro de naturis animalium’, *SH* III (n. 188), p. 200.

Quotation 3—*SH* I, P1, In1, Tr3, Q1, M1, C3 (n. 74), pp. 117–20.²⁸

- [a] Item, philosophi alio modo assignant differentias unitatis. Avicenna, in *Metaphysica* sua: “‘Unum’ dicitur ambigue de rebus, quae in hoc conveniunt quod in eis non est divisio in effectu, in quantum unumquodque eorum est id quod est; haec autem intentio est in eis secundum prius et posterius.” Dicitur ergo ‘unum’ secundum accidens et secundum essentiam. ‘Unum secundum accidens’ dicitur tribus modis: uno modo, quia unum accidit alicui, ut album Sorti; alio modo, quia duo accidunt uni, ut grammaticum et musicum Platoni; tertio, quia duobus accidit unum, sicut albedo Sorti et Platoni. Item, ‘unum per essentiam’ dicitur multis modis: unum genere, unum specie, unum comparatione, unum subiecto, unum numero. (...) ²⁹
- [b] Item, secundum Aristotelem, in V *Metaphysicae*, assignantur differentiae ‘unius’ hoc modo: unum per se et unum per accidens. Et unum per accidens secundum tres modos, sicut prius ab Avicenna. (...) ³⁰
- [c] Item, Algazel, in sua *Metaphysica*, alio modo distinguit: (...) ³¹
- [d] Quaeritur ergo ratio diversarum assignationum. (...) ³²
- [e] Secundum autem Avicennam, qui sequitur Aristotelem, differentiae unius assignantur hoc modo. (...) ³³
- [f] Secundum quem etiam modum assignantur differentiae primae in assignatione Aristotelis, consequentes vero variantur, sicut patet diligenter consideranti. ³⁴
- [g] Differentiae vero Algazel [*sic*] assignantur secundum differentias eius quod est ‘simpliciter’ et eius quod est ‘secundum quid’, sicut patet diligenter intuenti. ³⁵

The above text reports the most relevant passages of the chapter of the *Summa* that is devoted to the divisions or ways/modes of the universal concept ‘unity’, with respect

28 Alexander of Hales, *Doctoris irrefragabilis Alexandri de Hales Ordinis minorum Summa theologica* (*SH*), 4 vol. (Quaracchi: Collegium S. Bonaventurae, 1924–48).

29 [Also, the philosophers assign differences of ‘unity’ in another way. Avicenna in his *Metaphysics*: “‘One’ is predicated equivocally of things whose common trait that they share is that there is no actual division in them insofar as each of them is what it is; however, this notion applies to them sequentially.” Therefore, ‘one’ is predicated either in an accidental or in an essential sense. ‘One accidentally’ is predicated in three ways: in one way, when something one happens to be in something, for example, when ‘white’ happens to be in Socrates; in another way, when two things happen to be in something one, for example, when ‘grammatical’ and ‘musical’ happen to be in Plato; third, when something one happens to be in two things, for example, when whiteness happens to be in both Socrates and Plato. Also, ‘one essentially’ is predicated in multiple ways: one in genus, one in species, one relationally, one in subject, one in number].

30 [Also, according to Aristotle in *Metaphysics* V, the differences of ‘one’ are assigned in the following way: one essentially and one accidentally. And ‘one accidentally’ can be according to three ways, as previously stated by Avicenna].

31 [Also, Algazel in his *Metaphysics* draws a distinction differently].

32 [Therefore, one asks about the reason for the different assignations].

33 [However, according to Avicenna, who follows Aristotle, the differences of ‘one’ are assigned as follows].

34 [And, as is clear to one who considers the matter diligently, depending on the way in which primary differences are assigned in Aristotle, subsequent differences vary].

35 [However, as is clear to one who looks into [this matter] diligently, the differences given by Algazel are assigned according to that which exists in an unqualified sense, and that which exists in a qualified sense].

to the views of philosophical authorities (the theological authorities cited in the chapter, which are not reported in the above text, include Pseudo-Dionysius and Bernard of Clairvaux). This quotation is a clear attestation to the pattern of reading '*Philosophia prima* and *Metaphysics*'. First of all, Avicenna is mentioned first among the philosophical authorities and is quoted at length, with regard to the doctrine of two entire chapters of his *Philosophia prima*. Second, the passages quoted from Avicenna's work (in sections [a] and [e]) precede shorter quotations from Aristotle's *Metaphysics* (in sections [b] and [f]) and quotations from Algazel (al-Ġazālī, d. 1111, in sections [c] and [g]). The latter was considered by Latin philosophers to be a follower of Avicenna, because a limited number of his works were available in Latin translation. In the above passage, the references to Aristotle are enclosed between references to Avicenna himself and to Avicenna's Summarizer, Algazel, and, in this way, they are structurally 'Avicennized'. Third, cross-references interconnect Avicenna and Aristotle: the *Summa* ascribes to Avicenna what looks like a personal version of Aristotle's work on metaphysics (in *Metaphysica sua*, section [a]), and says of Avicenna that 'he follows Aristotle' (*sequitur Aristotelem*, section [e]), but in fact it is Aristotle who is understood and explained in the light of Avicenna's position. This is particularly evident in section [f], in which Aristotle's position is expounded on the footsteps of Avicenna's standpoint (as to the relationship between primary and secondary differences of unity), after a lengthy exposition of Avicenna's view in the previous section, leaving the comparison between the two positions in the background (*sicut patet diligenter consideranti*). In this way, Avicenna functions as the key to the interpretation of Aristotle's position both positively (for the points of convergence) and negatively (for the aspects of divergence). The *Philosophia prima* plays the same overall interpretative function—as should be expected—with respect to Algazel's position.

Quotation 5 – *SH* II, In1, Tr1, S1, Q2, Ti2, M2, C6 (n. 26), p. 37:

Quod etiam videtur per hoc quod philosophi posuerunt Creatorem esse, sicut dicit Avicenna, in sua *Prima Philosophia*: "Si fuerit eius esse post non-esse absolute, tunc adventus eius a causa erit creatio, et hic est dignior omnibus modis dandi esse, quia privatio remota est omnino et inducitur esse. Sed si ponatur privatio taliter quod esse praecedat eam, tunc generatio erit impossibilis nisi ex materia, et inductio esse, scilicet esse rei ex re, quod est debile et futurum."³⁶

On a smaller scale and in a more elliptical way, Quotation 5 presents a similar scenario. In this case, Avicenna is quoted alone and neither Aristotle nor Algazel are

36 [That [the philosophers arrived to the knowledge of creation] is also visible from the fact that they posited the existence of the Creator, as Avicenna says in his *First Philosophy*: "If its existence will come after its non-existence in an absolute sense, then its coming will amount to a creation by its cause, and this way of giving existence is more noble than any other, because privation [in this case] is removed completely and existence is bestowed. However, if privation is posited in such a way that [some] existence precedes it, then the only possibility would be to have generation from matter, and [there will be] a bestowal of existence, namely of the existence of a thing from a [pre-existing] thing, which is weak and occurs in time."

mentioned, but both his belonging to the group of the *philosophi*, and the adjective *sua* which precedes the title of his metaphysical work, alert the reader that another philosopher and another *Philosophia prima*, namely Aristotle and his *Metaphysics*, are lurking in the background. One is entitled to surmise on this basis that, according to the authors of the *Summa*, Aristotle is among the *philosophi* mentioned at the beginning of the quotation, and that Avicenna is meant to be the thinker that develops and unpacks a tenet implicitly present in Aristotle himself. Also in this case, as in the case of Quotation 3, a text of the *Philosophia prima* is quoted. The connection between Avicenna and the larger group of the *philosophi* is relevant for what we are going to see in the third group of quotations.

Quotation 7 – *SH* II, In1, Tr1, S1, Q2, Ti1, M2, C1 (n. 9), p. 18:

Quod autem reprobant philosophi ideas, sicut habetur in fine *Primae Philosophiae* et similiter ab Avicenna, in sua [*Prima?*] *Philosophia*, hoc est quia loquuntur de formis mathematicis, quas ponunt ideales; sed hic non est intentio illarum formarum exemplarium sive idealium, de quibus nos hic intendimus.³⁷

In Quotation 7, as in Quotation 3, Aristotle's and Avicenna's positions are cited jointly, but independently from one another, in support of one and the same position (the philosophical rejection of Platonic ideas, conceived in mathematical terms), although this time Aristotle's *Metaphysics* (called *Philosophia prima* with Avicennian nomenclature) is quoted before, rather than after, Avicenna's work. By contrast to the previous two quotations, the issue at stake is this time a 'punctual' doctrine (*reprobant philosophi ideas*) rather than a lengthy position documented by recourse to texts of the *Philosophia prima*. In the light of what we are going to see in the third group of quotations, it is noteworthy that both Aristotle and Avicenna are referred to as main representatives of the larger group of the 'philosophers'.

'*Philosophia prima* and *Metaphysics*': Conflation

In two cases, we find that the *Summa* ascribes doctrines of Avicenna not to Avicenna himself (i.e. to him called by his proper name) but to a *Philosophus*, whose precise identity deserves careful investigation:

Quotation 1.1–*SH* II, In1, Tr1, S1, Q1, C2 (n. 2), p. 3:

[a] Praeterea, dicit Philosophus quod ens est prima impressio intelligentiae; [b] sed quo ordine se habet ens in communitate, eo ordine se habet primum ens in causalitate; [c] ergo et primum ens in ordine causalitatis est prima impressio; [d] se ipso ergo cognoscitur secundum substan-

³⁷ [As for the fact that the philosophers reject the ideas, as is stated at the end of the *First Philosophy*, and similarly by Avicenna in his [*First?*] *Philosophy*, this is because they speak of mathematical forms, which they posit as ideal; but they do not mean those exemplary or ideal forms, which we imply here].

tiam ab intelligentia.

Respondendum est ad hoc quod duplex est cognitio: patriae et viae (...) Et sic intelligitur quod habetur a Philosopho.³⁸

Quotation 8.1—*SH II*, In4, Tr3, Q2, M1, C2 (n. 496), pp. 701–3:

Ut habetur a Philosopho, delectatio est ex coniunctione convenientis cum convenienti et sensu eiusdem. (...)

Ad illud quod obicitur in contrarium, scilicet quod ‘delectatio est ex coniunctione convenientis cum convenienti et sensu eiusdem’: dicendum quod non tantum venit ex coniunctione, sed etiam ex virtutis conversione super delectabile. In statu autem naturae institutae (...).³⁹

Quotations 1 and 8 confront us with a dilemma. On the one hand, in both cases the doctrine ascribed to the *Philosophus* is markedly and unmistakably Avicennian, as the comparison with the following two passages of the *Philosophia prima* shows:

Quotation 1.2—Avicenna, *Liber de Philosophia prima* 1.5:⁴⁰

res et ens et necesse talia sunt quod statim imprimuntur in anima prima impressione (...).⁴¹

Quotation 8.2—Avicenna, *Liber de Philosophia prima* VIII.7:⁴²

delectatio non est nisi apprehensio convenientis secundum quod est conveniens; unde sensibilis delectatio est sensibilitas convenientis.⁴³

The terminology of *prima impressio* in the former case, and of *conveniens* and of *sensus/sensibilis* in the latter, leaves no doubt that the authors of the *Summa* are referring in these two quotations to two famous doctrines of the *Philosophia prima*.

On the other hand, the possibility that the *Philosophus* mentioned here is Avicenna rather than Aristotle proves problematic to our hypothesis. In fact, one would expect the epithet *Philosophus*—i.e. ‘philosopher par excellence’—to be applied to Aristotle, and not to Avicenna, in a pattern of ‘*Philosophia prima* and *Metaphysics*’,

38 [[a] Besides, the Philosopher says that being is what is first imprinted on to the intellect; [b] but the rank that being occupies in the order of commonality, is the same rank that the first being occupies in the order of causality; [c] therefore, the first being in the order of causality is also ‘what is first imprinted’; [d] therefore it is known of itself substantially by the intellect.

One must reply to this that cognition is of two kinds: of the type we have in this life and of the type we have in the life to come (...) This is how the Philosopher’s statement is understood].

39 [As the Philosopher puts it, delight comes as a result of a union of two things that harmonize with each other, of which we become aware. (...) To the objection to the contrary, namely, that ‘delight comes as a result of a union of two things that harmonize with each other, of which we become aware’, one must reply that it comes not only from a union, but also from the fact that a power turns to the object of delight. However, in the state of established nature (...)].

40 Avicenna Latinus, *Liber de Philosophia prima*, 1:31.2–32.4 [Arabic, 1:29.5–6]. Cf. Avicenna, *Liber de Philosophia prima*, 1:33.25–7.

41 [‘Thing’, ‘being’, and ‘necessity’ are of such nature that they are at once imprinted in the soul at first impression (...)].

42 Avicenna Latinus, *Liber de Philosophia prima*, 2:432.67–9 [Arabic, 2:369.6–7].

43 [Delight consists entirely in perceiving a suitable object insofar as it is suitable; therefore, delight of the senses consists in sensing a suitable object [of sense]].

namely in a historical phase in which the greatness and authority of Aristotle has fully come to the fore, without obscuring the prestige of Avicenna or his significance as an aid in interpreting Aristotle. From a historical perspective, the identification of the *Philosophus* with Avicenna would seem more congruent with the '*Philosophia prima* without *Metaphysics*' pattern.⁴⁴ If Avicenna were the 'Philosopher' referred to in Quotations 1 and 8, we would have before us a clear-cut polarity between Quotation 1, dealing with *ens* and apparently invalidating the '*Philosophia prima* and *Metaphysics*' pattern, and Quotation 3, dealing with *unum* and ostensibly supporting this very pattern. Such a polarity within the very same doctrine of primary intelligibles in the *Summa*—*ens* on the one hand, *unum* on the other—would make the issue even more problematic.

It should be remarked that the designation *Philosophus* in the *Summa* fluctuates and that in some cases it appears indeed to refer to Avicenna.⁴⁵ Moreover, at least for Quotation 1, previous scholarship has proposed the identification of the *Philosophus* at stake with Avicenna.⁴⁶ On the other hand, the authors of the *Summa* show themselves careful to evidence at least some of the cases in which the term *Philosophus* does not designate Aristotle.⁴⁷ This, however, does not happen in our case. In view of this contrasting evidence, a more systematic analysis of the issue is certainly needed. Provisionally, I wish to argue that in both our quotations, the epithet *Philosophus* refers, in all likelihood, to Aristotle read with Avicennian lenses, rather than to Avicenna alone.

The main evidence on which I can rely here concerns the fact that shortly after Quotation 1, in the context of the same *quaestio*, the epithet *Philosophus* is surely ascribed to Aristotle:

⁴⁴ In fact, I am aware of only one noticeable mention of the *Philosophus* with reference to Aristotle in the '*Philosophia prima* without *Metaphysics*' pattern (see Bertolacci, 'On the Latin Reception of Avicenna's *Metaphysics* before Albertus Magnus,' 209, n. 42); significantly this reference to Aristotle is drawn indirectly from al-Fārābī.

⁴⁵ I wish to thank Lydia Schumacher for bringing to my attention that in a small part of the *Summa* (*SH* II, In4, Tr3 (nn. 469–523), pp. 631–784: 'De coniuncto humano') which was added later (around 1255) to the work, one can find many cases where *Philosophus* is used interchangeably to describe Aristotle and Avicenna. This happens also in earlier parts of the *Summa*, but the trend is particularly pronounced in this later part. Interestingly, in this part, the epithet 'Commentator' does not refer to Averroes but to Maximus the Confessor.

⁴⁶ See Aertsen, *Medieval Philosophy as Transcendental Thought*, 141: "'the Philosopher" must in this case be identified with Avicenna.'

⁴⁷ My gratitude goes to John Marenbon for informing me that the term *Philosophus* designates, rather than Aristotle, the astrologer Abu Ma'shar in *SH* II (n. 430), p. 511b ('ut ostendit Philosophus, scilicet Albumasar, in *Libro introductorio ad artem astronomiae*'), and Isaac Israeli in *SH* II (n. 438), p. 533a ('Ut habetur a Philosopho, scilicet Isaac, in *Dietis universalibus*'), as the parenthetical remarks make clear.

Quotation 1.3—*SH* II, In1, Tr1, S1, Q1, C2 (n. 2), p. 4:

Et sic dicit Philosophus quod “intellectus noster se habet ad manifesta naturae sicut visus noctuae ad lumen diei.”⁴⁸

This is a literal quotation from Aristotle’s *Metaphysics* Book 2 (Alpha Elatton), 993b9–10, which has very remote echoes, if any at all, in Avicenna’s works. The fact that a few lines after our first quotation of the *Philosophus*, the same term is rightfully applied to Aristotle in connection with a notorious doctrine of the *Metaphysics*, makes it difficult to think that the *Summa* applies the same term in Quotation 1 exclusively to Avicenna rather than to Aristotle.

The same identification of the ‘Philosopher’ with Aristotle is made shortly after Quotation 8, in the immediately following chapter:

Quotation 8.3—*SH* II, In4, Tr3, Q2, M1, C3 (n. 497), p. 706:

cum motus progressivus in ratione utentibus ortum habeat a ratione sive ab intelligentia practica, sicut vult Philosophus.⁴⁹

In this case the quotation refers to a doctrine expounded in Aristotle’s *De Anima*, Book 3, Chapter 9, as the notes to the edition of the *Summa* indicate.

How can one then explain the ascription of a doctrine of Avicenna to the *Philosophus*? I have three possible explanations to offer. The weakest rationale is to suppose that in Quotations 1 and 8, the *Summa* is generically referring to ‘a philosopher’ (*philosophus* with lowercase ‘p’), rather than to ‘the Philosopher’ (*Philosophus* with capital ‘P’). In this scenario the Avicennian doctrines would be ascribed neither to Avicenna himself, nor to Aristotle, but to a generic representative of the philosophical community. Quotation 2, in which a doctrine by Avicenna looks to be ascribed to ‘a certain philosopher’ (*quidam philosophus*), seems to offer some support to this explanation. Several arguments, however, militate against this hypothesis.

To start with, Quotation 2 is inserted within the Avicennian dossier of the *Summa* by this text’s editors; for this reason it is recorded in the above table. On closer inspection, however, this quotation might not derive from Avicenna’s *Philosophia prima*.

Quotation 2.1—*SH* I, P1, In1, Tr3, Q2, M1, C3 (n. 89), p. 142:

Item, ponitur alia [sc. definitio veritatis] a quodam philosopho: [a] Veritas est adaequatio rei et intellectus, [b] sicut generaliter adaequatio signi et significati.

[c] Sed obicitur: Adaequatio signi ad significatum non est nisi cum significatio est; ergo non esset veritas, si non esset significatio.⁵⁰

⁴⁸ [Thus the Philosopher says that “our intellect stands in the same relation to the [most] manifest things of nature as the sight of a bat to daylight”].

⁴⁹ [Because, according to the Philosopher, advancing motion in those who use reason originates from reason or practical intelligence].

⁵⁰ [Also, some philosopher provides another [definition of truth]: [a] truth is correspondence between the thing and the intellect, [b] just as, generally, it is correspondence between the sign and

In fact, this quotation is the mirror image of a passage of the *Summa de bono* of Philip the Chancellor (written ca. 1225–8), from which it is probably taken:

Quotation 2.2—Philip the Chancellor, *Summa de bono*, Q. II:⁵¹

Item a quodam Philosopho dicitur: “veritas est adaequatio rei et intellectus”, sive ut generaliter dicatur signi et signati.⁵²

Therefore, the issue of the possible identification of the *quidam philosophus* with Avicenna moves back from the *Summa* to its likely source in Philip the Chancellor. However, the most recent studies on the latter’s *Summa de bono* are cautious in making such identification for the passage in question.⁵³

The proposal to identify the *quidam philosophus* with Avicenna in the case of Philip’s *Summa* dates back to a pioneering article of H. Pouillon published in 1939, followed, with some provisos, by N. Wicki in his edition of the *Summa de bono* of 1985.⁵⁴ On the basis of Pouillon’s article, the curators of the Index of the *Summa Halensis* have proposed to identify the *quidam philosophus* with Avicenna, in an amendment of the previous identification advanced in the edition of the text, where the thinker in question was taken to be Averroes.⁵⁵ It should be recalled, however, that both Pouillon and, following in his footsteps, the curators of the *Summa* and Wicki, do regard the idea according to which *veritas est adaequatio rei et intellectus* in section [a] as the doctrinal core of the position of this ‘certain philosopher’, to which they found some correspondence in the *Philosophia prima*. More specifically, Pouillon and Wicki quote the following passage of Avicenna’s work:

the signified. [c] But it is objected: the sign is not adequate to the signified unless there is signification; therefore there would be no truth if there were no signification].

51 Philip the Chancellor, *Summa de bono*, 2 vols, ed. Nicolai Wicki (Berne: Francke, 1985), 1:10.32–3. Cf. Henri Pouillon, ‘Le premier traité des propriétés transcendantes: La “Summa de bono” du Chancelier Philippe,’ *Revue néo-scholastique de philosophie* 61 (1939): 57, where the passage is reported as follows: ‘Item a quodam Philosopho: “veritas est adaequatio rei et intellectus, sicut, ut generaliter dicatur, signi et signati.”’

52 [Also [is is stated] by some philosopher: “truth is correspondence between the thing and the intellect, just as, as is generally stated, [it is correspondence] between the sign and the signified”].

53 Aertsen, *Medieval Philosophy as Transcendental Thought*, 118, for example, does not indicate any source.

54 See Pouillon, ‘Le premier traité des propriétés transcendantes: La “Summa de bono” du Chancelier Philippe,’ 59. For the identification with Avicenna, Pouillon relies on an essay by P. Mingès of 1914 (Pouillon, ‘Le premier traité des propriétés transcendantes,’ 54, n. 58). Wicki remarks (Philip the Chancellor, *Summa de bono*, 1:10.32) that section [a] of Quotation 2.1 is found almost *verbatim* in the *Summa aurea* of William of Auxerre (written between 1215 and 1220), where however no indication of provenience is given: ‘Sed potest dici quod (...) veritas dictionis (...) est adaequatio intellectus ad rem’ (William of Auxerre, *Summa aurea in quatuor libros Sententiarum* I, c. 10 (Paris, 1500; repr. Frankfurt: Minerva, 1964), fol. 23ra).

55 *SH* I (n. 89), p. 142, n. 2. Averroes’ *Destructio destructionum* can hardly be the source of the quotation at stake, as the editors of the *Summa* supposed, since this work became available to the majority of Latin readers only in the 14th century.

Quotation 2.3—Avicenna, *Liber de Philosophia prima* 1.8:⁵⁶

Veritas (...) intelligitur dispositio dictionis vel intellectus qui significat dispositionem in re exteriore cum est ei aequalis.⁵⁷

to which this other passage, shortly following, should be added:

Quotation 2.4—Avicenna, *Liber de Philosophia prima* 1.8:⁵⁸

Veritas autem quae adequatur rei, illa est certa.⁵⁹

The idea of truth as a correspondence between intellect and reality, however, notoriously (albeit mistakenly) circulated under the name of Isaac Israeli in medieval philosophy, for example in the writings of Thomas Aquinas.⁶⁰ More importantly, however, the objection raised to this definition of truth in section [c] of Quotation 2 makes it evident that the doctrinal core of the position in the *Summa* is not only the general point expressed in section [a], for which some Avicennian antecedent can be found, but also the analogy that section [b] establishes, according to which the intellect conforms itself to external things as a sign conforms itself to the thing signified, which has no manifest correspondence in the *Philosophia prima*. There are therefore good reasons to believe that in Quotation 2, Philip the Chancellor and, following in his footsteps, the authors of the *Summa* may not refer to Avicenna, or to another proponent of tenet [a], but to a further philosopher, who adhered to tenets [a] and [b]. The identity of this philosopher remains, to the best of my knowledge, unassessed.

This being the case, Quotation 2 cannot be invoked *sic et simpliciter* to support the first possible explanation of our problem. Rather, the fact that in Quotation 2 the philosopher whose identity remains uncertain is referred to as such, i.e. as a ‘certain philosopher’, makes it likely that the authors of the *Summa* would have felt the need to add a similar qualification, ‘certain’ (*quidam*), to the epithet ‘Philosopher’ in Quotations 1 and 8 as well, should the ‘Philosopher’ in these cases be intended in the same generic sense of the ‘philosopher’ of Quotation 2.

As a second explanation, one might suppose that the term *Philosophus* (with a capital ‘P’) in Quotations 1 and 8 does in fact refer to Avicenna, but that this way of referring to Avicenna derives from a previous source, intermediate between Avicenna and the *Summa*, which still considered Avicenna as the philosopher par excel-

⁵⁶ Avicenna Latinus, *Liber de Philosophia prima*, 1:55.58–60 [Arabic, 1:48.6–7]

⁵⁷ [Truth (...) is meant to be a status of a statement or of a notion when the latter signifies an external state of affairs and adequately reflects it].

⁵⁸ Avicenna Latinus, *Liber de Philosophia prima*, 1:55.64–65 [Arabic, 1:48.10]

⁵⁹ [Certain truth is the truth that adequately reflects the thing].

⁶⁰ See A. Altmann and S.M. Stern, *Isaac Israeli: A Neoplatonic Philosopher of the early tenth Century: His Works translated with comments and an outline of his Philosophy* (London: Oxford University Press, 1958; repr. Westport Connecticut: Greenwood Press, 1979; repr. with a new foreword by Alfred Ivry, Chicago/London: University of Chicago Press, 2009), 58–9. The point is not discussed in the relevant section regarding Thomas Aquinas in Aertsens, *Medieval Philosophy as Transcendental Thought*, 221.

lence according to the '*Philosophia prima* without *Metaphysics*' pattern. In this case, some remnants of the '*Philosophia prima* without *Metaphysics*' paradigm in Quotations 1 and 8 would coexist, on specific and limited points and due to the very peculiar composition history of the *Summa*, with the subsequent pattern of '*Philosophia prima* and *Metaphysics*', witnessed by Quotations 3, 5, and 7. This impression is reinforced by the fact that Quotations 1 and 8 occur in arguments that are later qualified or discarded, and that can therefore be imported from previous philosophical debates. While certainly more reliable than the previous explanation, this second way of clarifying why Avicennian doctrines are ascribed to the *Philosophus* in the *Summa* does not solve the serious difficulty associated with positing in one and the same structural unit of the *Summa* occurrences of the term *Philosophus* which bear different meanings: in one case, Avicenna (supposedly in Quotations 1 and 8, if we take the *Philosophus* there to refer to him); in another case, Aristotle (as in Quotations 1.3 and 8.3).

The third explanation is the one which looks most trustworthy to me: one can surmise that in Quotations 1 and 8, the term *Philosophus* refers to Aristotle, but that the authors of the *Summa* phrase the doctrines that they ascribe to him in the way Avicenna formulates them, drawing the doctrinal material from the *Philosophia prima*, but attributing it retrospectively to Aristotle, called by the epithet '*Philosopher*' that is proper to him, and treated in this instance as the forerunner of Avicenna. In this third scenario, far from discarding the '*Philosophia prima* and *Metaphysics*' scheme, our passages reinforce it, by making Avicenna the interpreter *toto coelo* of Aristotle and by rendering the *Philosophia prima* as the key to the interpretation and doctrinal quintessence of the *Metaphysics*. In other words, it looks likely that in these cases the first element of the dyad '*Philosophia prima* and *Metaphysics*' has collapsed into the second, and the second has absorbed the first within its own theoretical framework. The fact that the two doctrines of Avicenna in question are not accepted *sic et simpliciter* by the authors of the *Summa*, but are qualified or countered by them (*respondendum est; ad illud dicendum est*), might be the cause of this collapse and absorption, as a sort of defensive strategy put in action on behalf of Avicenna.

'*Philosophia prima* and *Metaphysics*': Cumulation

If the interpretation proposed above is correct, this overlapping of the philosophical profiles of Aristotle and Avicenna, with the consequent attribution to the former of metaphysical tenets of the latter, which is observed in the second group of quotations, might anticipate a more sweeping defensive strategy, regarding Avicenna as well as Aristotle, which is clearly displayed in the third group of quotations. Here we confront the attempt to project not on the *Philosophus*, but on a larger and less easily definable group of thinkers, the weight of a doubtful Avicennian doctrine in order to exonerate Avicenna (and, with him, Aristotle) of responsibility for it. This

is what happens in Quotations 9 to 11, in which a doctrine of Avicenna strenuously opposed by the authors of the *Summa* (*haec ratio non congruit; falsa est propositio; falsa est positio*) is ascribed generically, at increasing levels of precision, first to ‘certain philosophers’ (*quidam philosophi*, Quotation 9), then to the ‘philosophers’ (*philosophi*, Quotation 10), and finally to ‘the ancient philosophers’ (*antiqui philosophi*, Quotation 11). In all three cases, the reader can surmise that either Avicenna, or Aristotle, or both, are members of the group, but neither of them is explicitly quoted, and so the reader can only guess about the identity of the philosophers in question.

In all three quotations that fall under the present category, the aforementioned group of philosophers is criticized with regard to a fundamental tenet of the emanation theory of Avicenna, that is, the famous doctrine which posits that only one thing proceeds from one thing, and which is expounded in Chapter IX.4 of the *Philosophia prima*. Since in the three quotations, this doctrine ceases to be the exclusive intellectual property of Avicenna, insofar as he is never named explicitly, being either inserted into the larger group of the *philosophi* (less or more precisely determined), or even moved back in time among the *antiqui philosophi*, it seems clear that the intent of the authors of the *Summa* is to divert from Avicenna the target of the polemic and to spare him, as well as his forefather Aristotle, an unescapable criticism.

A similar connection between Avicenna, Aristotle, and the *philosophi* on a contentious doctrinal issue, in which Avicenna’s and Aristotle’s positions were not considered totally congruent with the truth by the authors of the *Summa*, has already been discussed above in the case of Quotation 7.

Conclusion

The previous results are based on a limited sampling of evidence and therefore should be taken as provisional. The limited nature of this inquiry is due not only to a restricted focus on the explicit quotations of Avicenna in the *Summa*, to the exclusion of the implicit ones; it also results from the neglect of important indirect sources of Avicenna’s philosophy for Latin medieval culture, like al-Ġazālī and Averroes (d. 1198). As I have remarked elsewhere, the Latin reception of Avicenna cannot be studied without taking into account Avicenna’s follower and epitomizer al-Ġazālī and his arch-enemy Averroes, since both of them, in opposite ways, were transmitters of the views of Avicenna to the Latins.⁶¹ In fact, both al-Ġazālī and Averroes are among the prominent sources of the *Summa*.

Although limited, the chosen vantage point has allowed us to test, successfully, the inscription of the *Summa* into that network of scholars and works, some of which are congruent with the *Summa* in place, time, and intellectual orientation, that still

⁶¹ Amos Bertolacci, ‘The Reception of Avicenna in Latin Medieval Culture,’ in *Interpreting Avicenna: Critical Essays*, ed. Peter Adamson (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2013), 242–69.

consider Avicenna to be a solid and insightful interpreter of Aristotle, at least as far as the *Metaphysics* is concerned. This network has been labelled by means of the formula ‘*Philosophia prima and Metaphysics*’, where ‘and’ means either the integration of Avicenna’s and Aristotle’s metaphysical views, or the conflation of the ones with the others under the aegis of the *Philosophus*, or the ascription of Avicennian tenets to a cumulative series of thinkers, crossing time and encompassing the full scope of philosophy. None of these three modes should be regarded as exclusive to the *Summa*.⁶² Their joint presence, however, in the work under examination is worth noticing. The reason for the prestige enjoyed by our author in the *Summa* seems obvious: Avicenna remains an interpreter of Aristotle’s *Metaphysics* more suitable than Averroes to bring Aristotle’s work in line with a religious and a theological world-view. Quotations 1, 5, and 7 seem to point clearly in this direction. Quotation 1 lets the ‘Philosopher’ apply to God the idea of ‘first impression of the intellect’ that Avicenna expresses openly only for ‘being’ in general. Quotation 5 positively contends that Avicenna has established a philosophical proof for the existence of a creator. Quotation 7 negatively states that Aristotle’s and Avicenna’s criticisms of the mathematical ideas are inoffensive towards the Augustinian doctrine of the Platonic ideas as God’s thoughts. In other words, the *Summa* fully discloses the reasons for the persistence and appeal of the ‘*Philosophia prima and Metaphysics*’ pattern among Latin theologians, as well as the concrete ways of implementing this paradigm in a *summa* of theology.

Future research on the *Summa*, and in particular the ground-breaking analysis that Lydia Schumacher has undertaken in her project, is needed to corroborate, as I hope, and possibly to revise or subvert, if necessary, the present results.

⁶² Some kind of ‘cumulative’ use of Avicenna’s psychology, for example, can be found in John of La Rochelle; in the *Tractatus de anima*, for instance, he describes views on psychology which he attributes ‘to the philosophers, especially Avicenna’, although the ideas he discusses are genuinely Avicennian (I thank Lydia Schumacher for having brought this point to my attention). See Jean de La Rochelle, *Tractatus de divisione multiplici potentiarum animae: Texte critique avec introduction, notes et tables*, ed. Pierre Michaud-Quantin (Paris: Vrin, 1964).

Lydia Schumacher

The *De anima* Tradition in Early Franciscan Thought

A Case Study in Avicenna's Reception

Abstract: In the 12th and early 13th centuries, we witness a steady rise in the level of sophistication with which scholars analysed the nature of the rational soul. This increase was undoubtedly attributable to the translation movement of the period, which made many Greek and Arabic philosophical texts available in Latin for the first time. This paper will show how the introduction of Avicenna's *De anima* in particular mediated readings of Aristotle as well as Augustine in the period of the *Summa*'s authorship, specifically, as regards the account of the soul, its relationship to the body, and its cognitive operations. In this way, I will illuminate the extent to which the reading of Avicenna shaped fundamentally the ways in which the Franciscan tradition came to construe human nature.

Throughout history, the soul has remained a topic of perennial interest and debate. In the 12th and early 13th centuries, we witness a steady rise in the level of sophistication with which scholars analysed the nature of the rational soul. This increase was undoubtedly attributable to the translation movement of the period, which made many Greek and Arabic philosophical texts available in Latin for the first time. The most significant of these texts were the works of Aristotle and the Islamic philosopher Avicenna, who dominated the reception of Aristotle until nearly the mid 13th century. At this point, better translations of Aristotle were produced which enabled the study of his thought in its own right.

The reasons for the focus on Avicenna over or with Aristotle until this time are many, but among them, there is the fact that the translations of Aristotle that were produced in the mid-to-late 12th century were in some cases only partial and in most cases, riddled with inaccuracies. For this reason, Latin thinkers were more inclined to rely on the superior and more complete translations of Avicenna, who was in fact a very different thinker to Aristotle with a system and views all his own. Although Avicenna was clearly the main resource for reading Aristotle before, say, the 1250s and 60s, his own reception was mediated and mitigated by numerous other figures, such as Dominicus Gundissalinus, the translator of Avicenna, as well as the Spanish Jew Avicbron and the Syrian Christian Costa Ben Luca, whose works were translated by Gundissalinus and John of Spain, respectively.

Furthermore, the reception of Aristotle was complicated by the wide circulation of works like the Neo-Platonic *Liber de causis* which was believed before 1268 to offer a genuine representation of Aristotle's theological views; and by the so-called *De spi-*

ritu et anima, a 12th-century work that was attributed to Augustine despite evidence to the contrary. These works generated widespread confusion about what Aristotle and Augustine really said, slanting readings of them in favour of Avicenna. What I would like to do in this paper is to give a window into the complex reception of Avicenna in this period by looking at how he was interpreted by some of those who appropriated his work most extensively and enthusiastically, especially in dealing with questions about the soul.

The thinkers I have in mind are the founders of the Franciscan intellectual tradition, who worked together between 1236 and 1245 to author one of the first great theological Summae of a period that became famous for its vast intellectual syntheses. In particular, I refer to John of La Rochelle, whose works on the soul, in particular, his *Summa de anima* (SDA; 1235–6) formed the basis for the section on the rational soul in the *Summa Halensis*.¹ These works by John were the first sustained effort to take advantage of the new material on natural philosophy that scholars in Paris had been banned from lecturing and publishing upon until around 1231. The only earlier attempt of a similar nature was the *De anima* of John Blund, who was the first university master of arts to write a treatise on the soul, and who managed to do so just before the first condemnation of Aristotle came into effect in 1210.

In the years between Blund and Rochelle, the topic of the soul was obviously not neglected, nor were the Greco-Arabic sources. Nevertheless, theologians approached the topic in a way that was clearly circumscribed by what might be described as their theological or indeed ‘Augustinian inheritance’. Although they dealt with newer questions, for instance, about the body-soul relationship, so far as they felt Augustine’s works spurious or otherwise justified it, they did not explore ‘nitty gritty’ questions about the mechanics of sensation and cognition which are only treated before John by Blund and a couple anonymous authors, and then in a very cursory way that was not entirely faithful to Avicenna’s original.

The analysis of such topics that John of La Rochelle gives in his *Summa de anima* later formed the basis for a section on the rational soul in the *Summa Halensis*, which thus became the first theological Summa to deal with the cognitive mechanisms that lay beyond the scope of authors like Augustine and John of Damascus, who otherwise loom large in Rochelle’s account. Although the *Summa de anima* and *De anima rationali* (DAR) section of the *Summa Halensis* follow almost the exact same line of questioning, and the latter repeats much of the material of the former, there are some differences that may reflect differences in dating. While John probably wrote his Summa between 1235 and 1236, in the heyday of Avicenna’s Latin reception, the *De anima rationali* makes a more concerted—though no more informed—effort to interact with Aristotle on some issues. This seems to suggest a possible date

¹ John of La Rochelle, *Summa de anima*, ed. Jacques Guy Bougerol (Paris: Vrin, 1995). See also Rochelle’s work dating around 1232, the *Tractatus de divisione multiplici potentiarum animae*, ed. Pierre Michaud-Quantin (Paris: Vrin, 1964).

around or after 1240, when the Averroes commentaries on Aristotle were beginning to garner interest and draw more attention towards Aristotle in his own right.

Throughout my discussion, I will refer to both of the aforementioned Franciscan texts, tracing some developments between them. The ‘way in’ I will invoke for exploring the nature and extent of Avicenna’s influence in these works is a list the *Summa* provides of the basic differences between human souls and angels. While this comparison might seem like an unusual springboard for exploring key aspects of human psychology, David Keck has aptly observed that it was as normal for medievals to take angels as their point of departure for studying human nature as it currently is for modern scientists to compare humans with animals.² The differences in question pertain to what the *Summa* calls the *esse naturale*, *esse rationale*, and *esse metaphysico* of the rational beings in question.

As Theo Kobusch has shown, this three-fold way of categorizing modes of *esse* is unique to the *Summa Halensis* and as we will see, it has far-reaching implications for the doctrines formulated within it.³ When it comes to angels and rational souls, the category of *esse naturale* distinguishes between beings which are either ‘separate according to substance’ (*separatum secundum substantiam*) from the body or ‘unitable according to substance’ (*unibile secundum substantiam*).⁴ As far as *esse rationale* or *esse logicum* is concerned, rational souls differ from angels because they engage in discursive reasoning where angels know simply. Put differently, human beings pursue knowledge and make discoveries while angels ‘just know’ what is true.⁵ That said, both can be described as images of God in virtue of the rational power.⁶

In terms of *esse metaphysicum*, angels and rational souls differ in their way of being receptive or in a state of potentiality with respect to knowing the natural world. Although angels are certainly capable of knowing things that are inferior to themselves, they do not receive phantasms or images of things from those things themselves, as if from below. Rather, they receive the forms of things through illumination from above.⁷ As we will discover, human beings also receive forms from above

2 David Keck, *Angels and Angelology in the Middle Ages* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1998), 16.

3 Theo Kobusch, ‘The *Summa Halensis*: Towards a New Concept of Person,’ in *The Summa Halensis: Doctrines and Debates* (Berlin: De Gruyter, 2020).

4 Alexander of Hales, *Doctoris irrefragabilis Alexandri de Hales Ordinis minorum Summa theologica* (*SH*), 4 vols (Quaracchi: Collegium S. Bonaventurae, 1924–48), Vol II, In2, Tr2, Q1, C5 (n. 112), Solutio, p. 150.

5 *SH* II, In2, Tr2, Q1, C5 (n. 112), Solutio, p. 151: ‘Dico autem intellectum cum ratione intellectum componentem et dividendum et ab extremo ad extremum per medium decurrentem, quo modo non est in intelligentia angelica: intelligit enim modo simplici sine decursu rationis.’

6 *SH* II, In2, Tr2, Q1, C5 (n. 112), Ad obiecta 6.b, p. 152: both angels and humans are the image of God by virtue of rational power.

7 *SH* II, In2, Tr2, Q1, C5 (n. 112), Solutio, p. 151: ‘Secundum esse vero metaphysicum differunt essentialiter per intellectum possibilem ad species in phantasmatis et intellectum abstractum ab hac possibilitate; intelligentia enim angelica habet intellectum abstractum ab hac possibilitate.’

by illumination, but in a different way.⁸ These forms do not represent the objects of knowledge as they seemingly do for angels, but the means of abstracting species from phantasms. Ultimately, then, the illuminated forms in humans are only triggered as a result of receiving those phantasms from below, after which they can be rendered intelligible through the forms acquired from above.

These distinctions, while not elaborate in their detail, provide a useful basis for examining more closely some of the key areas in which early Franciscans adopted ideas from Avicenna, among other new sources. In what follows, I will take these issues one-by-one, starting with the question of embodiment encapsulated by the mode of *esse naturale* before turning to the rational soul's cognitive operations as reflected in *esse rationale* and *esse metaphysico*. As we have seen, the essential difference between angels and the rational human soul with regard to *esse naturale* is that 'an angel is a substance separate from the body but the soul is unitable to the body.'⁹

Following Avicenna, early Franciscans hold that the soul can be considered in two ways, either in its own right, independently of the body, and in this way, they describe it as a 'spirit'.¹⁰ Alternatively, it can be considered in relation to the body, and in this sense, it is properly called a soul.¹¹ Corresponding to this two-fold account of the soul, the *Summa* argues that there are two ways to describe something as corporeal, either absolutely, or by reason of some conditions. If we think of the soul absolutely, then the human soul is not corporeal but incorporeal and therefore separate from the body.

To establish this point, the *Summa* presents a number of arguments. The first, drawn from Avicenna, states that one thing that moves another is distinct from the essence of what it moves; since the soul moves the body, it must therefore be distinct from the essence of the body and is a substance in its own right.¹² Another argument, which invokes an analogy found in Aristotle's *De anima*, states that the soul has a body as a sailor a ship; a sailor is divided according to substance from the ship, as he moves the ship and is thereby moved by it accidentally. Therefore, the soul is a substance divided from the body and a substance beyond the body.¹³ In

⁸ SH II, In2, Tr2, Q1, C5 (n. 112), Ad obiecta 6.a, p. 152: 'angelus substantia intellectualis, illuminatio-num, quae sunt a Primo, prima relatione perceptiva, anima vero, ultima relatione perceptiva.'

⁹ SH II, In2, Tr2, Q1, C5 (n. 112), p. 149: 'angelus est substantia separata a corpore, anima vero est unibilis corpori.'

¹⁰ SH II, In4, Tr1, S1, Q1, C2 (n. 321), Respondeo 2, p. 385.

¹¹ Richard C. Dales, *The Problem of the Rational Soul in the Thirteenth Century* (Leiden: Brill, 1995), 8: 'The human soul may be considered from two points of view: as it is related to the body, and as it is in itself.'

¹² SH II, In4, Tr1, S1, Q1, C2 (n. 321), Respondeo 2.a, p. 386a: 'Quod movens per se est distinctum per essentiam a mobili; sed anima movet corpus; ergo est distincta per essentiam a corpore; ergo est substantia praeter substantiam corporis.'

¹³ SH II, In4, Tr1, S1, Q1, C2 (n. 321), Respondeo 2.b, p. 386, citing Aristotle, *De anima* 2.1: 'anima se habet ad corpus sicut nauta ad navim; sed nauta secundum substantiam dividitur a navi, cum movet

his own work, John of La Rochelle establishes the soul as a separable substance through explicit invocation of Avicenna's 'flying man' argument, which notes that a human being deprived of all their senses would still be able to reason and therefore would not be able to doubt the independent existence of the rational soul.¹⁴

What makes the soul a substance, on the *Summa's* understanding, is that it is comprised not only of form but also of matter—not physical matter, of course, but a sort of intellectual matter.¹⁵ This application of the doctrine of universal hylomorphism, or the idea that all substances, including rational souls and angels, are comprised of matter and form, is not actually found in Avicenna but in Avicbron, whose theories were encountered by Latin thinkers largely through the mediation of Gundisalinus. Although the soul so construed is an independent entity, it can also be considered a 'perfection' in relation to the body, or that which animates the body in the first instance.

For Avicenna, the soul has a natural inclination not just to any body but to one in particular. This inclination sets one soul apart from another, establishing the soul rather than the body or matter as the principle of individuation. Although the soul needs the body in order to enact its individuality, that is, to distinguish itself from other souls, the soul remains a substance in its own right, which does not require the body to complete its essence. On this showing, rather, soul and body are united accidentally. At death, consequently, the soul goes on being the substance that it is.¹⁶ By the same token, however, the body is a substance in its own right, which can exist independently of the soul, albeit not as a living body. This is because it too is comprised not only of matter but also its own specific 'form of corporeity',¹⁷ which in turn predisposes the body to be united to the soul.

This view is one early Franciscans found attractive because it allowed them to affirm that a dead body is in fact the body of the soul departed from it. Furthermore, it enabled them to account for the resurrection of the body, that is, the possibility of the body of a particular soul to be reconstituted at the end of time. In the years just before the *Summa* was composed, most notably in the work of Philip the Chancellor,

navim et secundum accidens movetur; ergo anima secundum substantiam dividitur a corpore, et, si movetur, secundum accidens movetur; ergo, anima est substantia praeter corpus.'

¹⁴ John of La Rochelle, *Summa de anima*, 51.

¹⁵ *SH* II, In4, Tr1, S1, Q2, Ti2, C1 (n. 328), Solutio, p. 399: 'Ad quod dicendum quod anima humana dicitur composita ex forma et materia intellectuali.'

¹⁶ Bernardo Carlos Bazàn, 'The Human Soul: Form and Substance? Thomas Aquinas' Critique of Eclectic Aristotelianism,' *Archives d'histoire doctrinale et littéraire du Moyen Age* 64 (1997): 104. For Avicenna, as Bazan writes, citing Avicenna's *De anima* 5.7, 'the relationship between soul and body ceases to have any meaning after death, once the goals that were sought with the union are achieved the soul continues to live its substantial self-sufficient existence in the company of the superior intelligences that are its true realm. The spiritual substance is the real self of a human being: we are our soul.'

¹⁷ Magdalena Bieniak, *The Soul-Body Problem at Paris, ca. 1200–1250: Hugh of St. Cher and His Contemporaries* (Leuven: Leuven University Press, 2010), 12.

Avicenna's idea of an accidental relationship between the body and the soul, mediated by the form of corporeity, was a prevalent view at Paris. Although this view continued to be held in the next generation by the likes of William of Auvergne and others, the situation changed significantly with the early Dominican Hugh of St Cher, who ventured to insist that the body is in fact intrinsic to the substance of the soul, which exhibits the quality of *unibilitas substantialis* or unitability to the body.¹⁸

Although Hugh's *Sentences* Commentary represents an important turning point for this doctrine, its relatively early dating—between 1229 and 1231—left much room for development. Ironically, this happened more than anywhere in the hands of his later Franciscan contemporaries, above all, John and the authors of the *Summa Halensis*. As this suggests, there was not so much of the division between Franciscan and Dominican schools that would come to characterize the next generation of Bonaventure and Aquinas. Although Franciscans and Dominicans did differ on certain points in this period, there was more that they had in common as inheritors of a certain set of sources and questions than there was that divided them.

In the wake of Hugh, and in the work of John of La Rochelle particularly, the notion of *unibilitas* became the key feature that set the rational soul apart from the angel. While angels can be united to bodies in a merely instrumental sense, it is not natural for them to take a body.¹⁹ When they do so, consequently, it is not as a 'perfection to perfectible' as in the case of humans who are naturally inclined to the body, but merely as a 'motor to a moved', as Avicenna put it, or in Aristotle's terms, as a sailor to a ship that he navigates but does not obviously merge with in his essence.²⁰ In consequence, angels cannot really be said to perform the bodily functions they might seem to perform. For example, they might appear to eat and digest food, but this is not necessary to keep them alive but only to show familiarity with beings that eat.²¹

Since their knowledge is purely intellectual, moreover, angels do not require the senses to know sense objects, even when they inhabit a body that has sense faculties. The reason that human beings possess both sense and intellectual faculties is precisely that they mediate between creatures and God, knowing one in relation to

18 Bieniak, *The Soul-Body Problem at Paris*, 26, on William of Auvergne, 33.

19 SH II, In2, Tr2, Q1, C5 (n. 112), Ad objecta 7, p. 152: 'angelus (...) non sit unitus corpori sicut forma vel perfectio cum perfectibili'; cf. SH II, In2, Tr3, S2, Q2, Ti2, M2, C1, Ar1 (n. 183), 1, p. 238: 'Videtur quod angelus de natura sua sit substantia a corpore separata.'

20 SH II, In2, Tr3, S2, Q2, Ti2, M2, C1, Ar3 (n. 185), a, p. 240: 'Constat enim quod, quando spiritus angelicus assumit corpus, quod ei unitur; sed spiritus non videtur posse uniri corpori nisi aut sicut perfectio perfectibili aut sicut motor mobili: iis enim duobus modis unitur corpori; sed constat quod primo modo non unitur corpori; ergo secundo; et ita videtur quod pro tanto debeat dici quod angelus assumit corpus, quoniam unitur ei sicut motor mobili.'

21 SH II, In2, Tr3, S2, Q2, Ti2, M2, C2, Ar1–2 (nn. 191–2), pp. 245–6. Franklin T. Harkins, 'The Embodiment of Angels: A Debate in Mid-Thirteenth Century Theology,' *Recherches de théologie et philosophie médiévales* 78 (2011): 25–58.

the other.²² Because angels only mediate between intellectual creatures and God, however, they do not need sense faculties by nature. The only reason they have them and the body more generally is that this is the sole means by which angels can imprint ideas on the human intellect, namely, by imprinting them on the senses, which are visual and auditory.²³ Although angels therefore need a body in order to accomplish aspects of God's mission amongst human beings, they remain separate from the body even when they assume one.²⁴

As we have established, this is not the case for humans, in whom the soul is naturally unitable to the body as its perfection. In support of this claim, John and the *Summa* like so many other contemporary texts cite Aristotle's *De anima* 2.1.²⁵ At the time, this text circulated in a couple of main translations, namely, the Greco-Latin translation of James of Venice, which stated that 'the soul as the soul is the form', or elsewhere, the first act 'of the natural organic body having the potential for life' (*anima est forma corporis physici organici potentia vitam habentis*); and the Arabo-Latin translation of Michael Scotus, which reads that *anima est prima perfectio corporis naturalis habentis vitam in potentia* ('the soul is the first perfection of the natural body having life in potency').²⁶ At the time a number of variations circulated of the Scotus translation particularly, which was popular not least among John and the authors of the *Summa Halensis*, who invoke his definition explicitly.²⁷

Although the difference between the translations might seem minimal, it was actually monumental. For to say that the soul is the 'form' of the body is to say that having a body is part of what it means to be a soul:²⁸ that the soul cannot therefore exist without the body, and the body cannot be enlivened without the soul, which is precisely what the soul does as its 'first act'.²⁹ This, ironically, is precisely what Aristotle's sailor/boatman analogy in *De anima* 2.1 is presumably meant to convey: not that the sailor and shipman are fundamentally separate entities as the *Summa* sug-

22 SH II, In2, Tr3, S2, Q2, Ti1, C2, Ar1 (n. 160), Solutio, p. 211.

23 SH II, In2, Tr3, S2, Q2, Ti2, M2, C1, Ar3 (n. 184), Respondeo 1, p. 240.

24 SH II, In2, Tr3, S2, Q2, Ti2, M2, C1, Ar3 (n. 184), Respondeo 1, p. 240: angels take on a body 'ad manifestationem ipsius creaturae spiritualis vel ad demonstrationem divinam (...) quoniam angeli ad suum corpus non est unio sicut perfectionis ad suum perfectibile, sed sicut motoris ad mobile.'

25 Aristotle, *De anima* 2.1, 412a18–19.

26 Sander de Boer, *The Science of the Soul: The Commentary Tradition on Aristotle's De anima, c. 1260–1360* (Leuven: Leuven University Press, 2017), 123. The slightly later Greco-Latin translation of William of Moerbeke read: 'anima est primus actus corporis physici potentia vitam habentis.' Daniel A. Callus, 'The Treatise of John Blund on the Soul,' in *Autour d'Aristote: Recueil d'études de philosophie ancienne et médiévale offert à Monseigneur A. Mansion*, ed. Auguste Mansion (Louvain: Publications universitaires de Louvain, 1955), 491, lists several variants of the definition that were used in the early 13th century, all of which contain the term 'perfectio'.

27 SH II, In4, Tr1, S1, Q3, Ti2, C1, Ar1 (n. 344), Contra c, p. 418: 'anima est perfectio corporis physici, organici.'

28 Aristotle, *De anima*, 412a27.

29 Bieniak, *The Soul-Body Problem at Paris*, 13.

gests, but that the soul activates the potential of the body to live in the way the sailor activates the potential of the ship to sail.

The reference to the soul as the perfection of the body, by contrast, represents the means by which Avicenna posited an independent existence for the soul, which comprises a separate substance from the body.³⁰ For him, we have seen, the soul does not constitute the body qua body. This is the job of the form of corporeity; it only establishes the body as living. This incidentally is what is implied in Avicenna's idea of the soul as the 'motor' of what it moves, namely, that the soul is a sort of engine for the body that can keep on running even without it. The popularity of Avicenna's work during the period in question meant that his understanding of the body-soul relationship was preferred, whether scholastics referred to the soul as a form or as a perfection, or both.³¹

In his *Summa de anima*, John provides an excellent example of a thinker from this period who employs the terms 'form' and 'perfection' interchangeably.³² In most cases, he freely conflates the terms, for instance, when he affirms that 'the soul is united to the body as its form and perfection'.³³ In another place, he says that the soul 'is united as form or as a perfection to a perfectible'.³⁴ When he is explicating Aristotle's definition of the soul, however, he states that 'the soul is the perfection and form and first act of the body'.³⁵ Similarly, the *Summa Halensis* refers to the soul not only as the form of the body, using Aristotle's term, but also employs the Avicennian terms not only of what is moved in relation to what moves it, or is perfectible in relation to that which perfects it.³⁶ In fact the *Summa* conflates the terms, stating that a 'form is defined insofar as it perfects being'.³⁷

³⁰ Bieniak, *The Soul-Body Problem at Paris*, 15.

³¹ Bieniak, *The Soul-Body Problem at Paris*, 17: 'The Arabic definition of the soul as perfection of the body enters the Latin West not only through Avicenna, but also thanks to Costa Ben Luca's treatise *De differentia spiritus et animae*. It is through the latter that the definition is assimilated into the first Latin work influenced by Avicenna, i.e. the *De anima* by Dominicus Gundissalinus.'

³² Bieniak, *The Soul-Body Problem at Paris*, 35: 'like Philip the Chancellor, John uses the terms "perfection" and "form" interchangeably.'

³³ John Of La Rochelle, *Summa de anima*, 115: 'Item cum anima uniatur corpori ut forma et perfectio eius.'

³⁴ John Of La Rochelle, *Summa de anima*, 116: 'respondeo: anima rationalis unitur corpori secundum duplicem modum: unitur enim ut forma sue materie sive ut perfectio suo perfectibili; unitur etiam ei ut suo organo sive instrumento per quod operatur duplex est ergo ratio unionis. Secundum primum modum unitur anima corpori sine medio.'

³⁵ John Of La Rochelle, *Summa de anima*, 58: 'anima sit perfectio et forma et actus corporis, est actus primus, non secundus.'

³⁶ SH II, In4, Tr1, S1, Q3, Ti2, C1, Ar1 (n. 344), Ad obiecta 3, p. 419: 'corpus vero humanum indigent anima non tantum ut moveatur sed etiam ut in esse in quo est subsistat et permaneat, et ideo duplicem habet comparisonem: ut mobilis ut motorem et perfectibilis ad perfectionem suam, unde unum in natura constituunt, scilicet hominem.'

³⁷ SH II, In4, Tr1, S2, Q1, C2, Ar1 (n. 350), 1, p. 425: 'forma autem dicitur in quantum perficit esse.'

As such examples illustrate, there is almost total fluidity in the use of terms that are technically contradictory. On this basis, scholars like Bazàn have accused early scholastics, including John, of exhibiting deep confusion about the true meaning of a form and the fact that it cannot, like a perfection, exist independently of the body. Of course, Franciscans avoided Avicenna's extreme dualism through the doctrine of *unibilitas substantialis*, which while defining body and soul as separate substances ultimately established them as one nature.³⁸ However, Theodore Crowley concluded that they show no awareness of the 'metaphysical problems and indeed the contradiction inherent in simultaneously affirming that the soul is at once a form and an independent substance in its own right.'³⁹

As plausible as this criticism may seem at first glance, a further study of John's text and the *Summa Halensis* proves that early Franciscans were not ignorant of the deep differences between a form and a perfection.⁴⁰ Their strategy for resolving the tension—which scholars like Bazàn and Crowley completely neglect to take into account—involves showing that in the exceptional case of the soul, there can be a form which by contrast to the norm can also be separable from matter.⁴¹ The detailed reasoning that underlies their claims in this regard lies beyond the scope of the current discussion.

At this point, I simply wish to summarize briefly the ground covered so far. The Summists transform Avicenna's description of the soul as the 'perfection' of the body into code language to describe their understanding of the soul as naturally and essentially unitable to a body. They also employ Avicenna's language that the soul serves as a motor to a moved, but since this analogy implies a fundamental dualism or separability of soul from body, it is not sufficient to capture the full way in which the soul relates to the body. This analogy does however serve adequately to describe the relationship, if any, that an angel may have to a body, that is, a purely instrumental or accidental one, which involves something like putting on a garment temporarily.

As we have seen, the substance dualism that underlies the Franciscan vision entered the theological scene in the years before the Franciscans, for example, in the work of Philip the Chancellor, whose *Summa de bono* probably dates to around 1230. This was still a period of some timidity with regard to embracing the full scale of philosophical sources such as Aristotle and Avicenna. Nevertheless, the pe-

38 SH II, In4, Tr1, S1, Q3, Ti2, C1, Ar1 (n. 344), Solutio, p. 418: 'coniungibilia sunt anima et corpus et uniuntur in unum ut fiat una natura.'

39 Theodore Crowley, *Roger Bacon* (Louvain: Éditions de l'Institut Supérieur de Philosophie, 1950), 122: 'for these men, the soul was no less essentially form than it was substance (...) the metaphysical problems arising out of this combination may not have been clearly perceived.'

40 SH II, In4, Tr1, S1, Q3, Ti2, C1, Ar4 (n. 347), 1, p. 421: 'forma non habet esse praeter materiam; sed anima habet esse praeter corpus; ergo non dicuntur unum illo modo.'

41 SH II, In4, Tr1, S1, Q3, Ti2, C1, Ar4 (n. 347), Solutio, p. 422: 'haec unio, quae est animae et corporis, (...) dicitur nativa et se habet ad modum formae cum materia.'

riod does testify to a certain level of engagement, to the extent that this was perceived as compatible with the tradition of Augustine. Whether Augustine himself was a dualist along the lines of Avicenna is certainly up for debate. While it is a common opinion that he inherits dualistic tendencies from Platonism, the case for his dualism in the Middle Ages was made almost exclusively on the basis of spurious works like the *De spiritu et anima* and *De fide ad Petrum*, in the face of evidence that undermined the authenticity of such works.

The result was a reading of Augustine—not to mention Aristotle—which had more in common with Avicenna than any authentic idea of Aristotle or Augustine themselves. Such a tendency to read both figures in line with Avicenna was characteristic and indeed endemic for a period in which the Aristotelian and Platonic traditions were still fundamentally regarded as consistent and the distinctive features of Aristotle's thought were still not fully understood.

The confusion seeps into yet another area in which the *Summa* has noted that angels and humans differ, namely, regarding *esse rationale*, or the way they acquire knowledge, that is, discursively or not. This mode of being is closely related to the *esse metaphysicum*, whereby angels and rational souls are said to differ in terms of the way they receive data from the outside world. In order to see what is at stake in these differences, we must explore in more detail the early Franciscan psychology which deals with both matters at once. As I have hinted already, this is the main area in which John of La Rochelle in particular boldly breaks new ground that was never traveled by a theologian or thinker before him.

The interesting thing—and the one major structural difference—between the *SDA* and the *DAR* is that the latter text changes the order in which it treats the main psychological schema that the author wants to consider. In the *SDA*, John deals first with Augustine, albeit the Augustine exclusively of the *De spiritu et anima*, then with Damascus, then with Avicenna by name. In the *DAR*, by contrast, the order is Aristotle—who was not mentioned in John's psychology at all—Augustine, and Damascus. This is one slight change that suggests perhaps a later date for the *DAR*; a growing awareness of Aristotle's authority as distinct from Avicenna's may have encouraged this re-ordering of priorities, even though it does not alter in any major way the actual substance of the views that the Franciscan authors want to present.

While these are presented partly in conversation with Augustine and Damascus, I am not going to discuss the way the Franciscan texts deal with these authors. Basically, such patristic authors make an appearance here because they are the main authorities in the Christian tradition to date who provided psychological schema, and as Dag Hasse has noted, Latin thinkers at this time were somewhat constrained to find a way to reconcile the new philosophical resources with their indigenous tradition. This tradition was in no way as sophisticated as Avicenna's when it came to describing the work of the senses and the intellect. In that sense, the patristic material is there basically to suggest or even to show that Christian thinkers provide a broad framework for thinking about human psychology into which Avicenna's account of the various faculties can justifiably be inserted.

These thinkers for instance acknowledge the existence of three tiers of something like external and internal senses, as well as the intellect, even though they do not go much into the details of these faculties' operations. For this very reason, Hasse has noted, Latin thinkers at this time—and Rochelle above all—were inclined basically to adopt wholesale Avicenna's account of internal sensation, even while they looked for ways to reconcile his doctrine of the intellect with those that pre-existed in Augustine and Damascus.

In his *SDA*, John delineates quite straightforwardly an Avicennian account of the five internal senses. The common sense is that which receives forms imprinted by the five external senses and gives us a unified picture of their different aspects. What John calls the imagination retains those forms after they are no longer directly accessible by experience. The excogitative sense is able to compose and divide the different accidents attached to a given form. Estimation registers what is beneficial or harmful in the forms perceived, while the fifth internal sense of the memory apprehends and retains the product of estimation, that is, the intentions of sensible things, the images of things with their connotational attributes or positive or negative connotations.

Instead of detailing the way the *DAR* basically repeats this account of the internal senses, I will simply give its summary of their functions:

As regards sensible forms, there are faculties that apprehend, and those that preserve or transform. The first one apprehending the forms is called the common sense; the one preserving them the imagination or phantasia; the one transforming and comparing in the absence of matter is called the imaginative sense; the one that concerns intentions of good or evil or harmfulness or helpfulness, as a lamb with respect to a sheep or a wolf is either apprehending or preserving; if it is apprehending, it is called estimation, if preserving, memory.⁴²

In transitioning from the discussion of the internal senses to the intellect in the *SDA*, John invokes a three-fold distinction between the passive or material intellect, which is necessarily united to the body, and then the separable intellect, which includes the possible and the agent intellects. This particular way of describing the intellects cannot be traced exactly to the available philosophical sources at the time—Aristotle, Avicenna, Alexander of Aphrodisias, and Averroes—but only to an anonymous theological text from around 1230 which construes their relationship in this way.⁴³

42 *SH* II, In4, Tr1, S2, Q1, M2, C4, Ar2, (n. 361), I, p. 438: 'Quae vero est circa formas sensibiles aut est apprehendens aut custodiens aut transformans sive conferens absente materia. Si vero est apprehendens, dicitur sensus communis; si vero custodiens, dicitur imaginatio vel alio modo phantasia; si vero est transformans vel conferens absente materia, dicitur imaginativa. Si vero est circa intentiones, ut bonitatem et malitiam, sive nocumentum et iuvamentum, prout accidit de agno respectu ovis aut lupi, aut est apprehendens aut custodiens. Si apprehendens, dicitur aestimativa; si custodiens, dicitur memorativa.'

43 Daniel A. Callus, 'The Powers of the Soul: An Early Unpublished Text,' *Recherches de théologie ancienne et médiévale* 19 (1952): 131–70.

According to John, the material intellect is what receives the forms or intelligible species in the phantasms; that is to say, it knows forms abstracted from matter in the mode of particulars.⁴⁴ The possible and agent intellects know the forms abstracted from matter, as universals. The possible intellect does so only potentially: it is a *tabula nuda*⁴⁵ or blank slate which is receptive to all kinds of forms but has none of them in act. The agent intellect is what makes the forms known, insofar as it is the source of an intelligible light of the first truth that is naturally impressed upon us.

In the first volume of the *Summa Halensis*, John goes into considerable detail as to what this light entails, developing his own version of Avicenna's doctrine of the transcendentals which are the 'first known' of all things. Following Avicenna, John says that 'being is the first object of the intellect'. In his account, however, being is qualified by three further concepts which respectively render the human mind an image of the Trinity. These include unity, which enables us to know one thing as distinct from another; truth, which renders a being intelligible as such; and goodness, which reveals the purpose of the being in question.

Thanks to these transcendentals or the image of God, the human mind has the conceptual resources to comprehend actual beings. It has a light by which to grasp whatever form may find itself in the possible intellect, which cannot itself render the forms it contains intelligible. When it comes to explaining how the agent and possible intellects work together, John invokes Avicenna's doctrine of the four intellects explicitly, along with his illustration of the stages in which a young boy learns to write.⁴⁶

The first stage concerns the material intellect which has the capacity for all forms but is not yet subject to any form, as a young child has the capacity to learn to write before actually having learned to do so. The second is the intellect *dispositionem habens* or *in habitu*, which has the principles or skills needed to cognize forms before having done so. This is the stage at which the transcendentals would be acquired. The third is the *intellectus perfectus* or *in effectum conclusionem*, which has actually drawn conclusions from those principles but is not in the act of considering them at present. The fourth is the intellect *in usu* or 'in act'. This corresponds to the active intellect strictly speaking while the previous three correspond to the possible.

As previously suggested, the angels only have what could be described as the agent intellect and not the possible, because they exist separately from the senses of the body and do not need to receive data from them, which is then subject to the analysis of the agent intellect. The only sense in which they might be regarded

⁴⁴ John Of La Rochelle, *Summa de anima*, 274.

⁴⁵ John Of La Rochelle, *Summa de anima*, 275.

⁴⁶ John Of La Rochelle, *Summa de anima*, 276.

as possible is with respect to the forms of things they receive from God above, not through a discursive process, but directly or immediately.⁴⁷

Whereas Avicenna had denied any intellectual memory of abstracted concepts, the Halensian Summists insist upon it, distinguishing between an innate memory, which holds the transcendental concepts, and acquired memory, which holds the concepts abstracted with the help of the transcendentals.⁴⁸ On the matter of the active intellect, there is the further question that famously exercised Latin thinkers after Gundissalinus as to whether the agent intellect is in fact God in the case of human beings. In this regard, John invokes a distinction from the *De spiritu et anima* between things that are above, next to, and below the self.

In order to know what is above the self, namely, God, the mind needs God to act as Agent Intellect. In order to know what is next to the self, namely, angels, the mind needs angels to serve as the agent intellect. In order to know itself or inferior creatures, however, the aforementioned transcendentals are sufficient for human knowledge. This is a rather more conservative and perhaps plausible view than the one famously advocated by Roger Bacon, Roger Marston, and other Franciscans that God is the Agent Intellect in all respects. The *Summa Halensis* advocated the same position as John.⁴⁹ It is not the case in the *Summa*, as in Avicenna and Gundissalinus, that the possible intellect alone belongs to the human.

Nevertheless, the *Summa*'s account of the material, possible and agent intellects differs somewhat from that of John's original, not in its substance but in the fact that the substance is assigned to Aristotle rather than Avicenna, at least by the editors of

47 SH II, In4, Tr1, S2, Q3, Ti1, C2, Ar2 (n. 372), Ad obiecta 2, p. 452: 'Haec enim quae est in angelo, separata est a parte sensibili: unde non habet possibilem nisi dicatur possibilis, id est receptibilis illuminationum a Summo, sed habet partem sibi sufficientem ad cognoscendum ea quae nondum sunt cognita ab ea.'

48 SH II, In4, Tr1, S1, Q3, C5, Ar7 (n. 342), Respondeo, p. 415: 'Est memoria innata et acquisita. Memoria veritatis innata est principium intelligentiae et voluntatis: est enim, sicut dictum est, vis conservativa similitudinis primae veritatis impressae a creatione, et secundum hoc memoria attribuitur Patri, intelligentia Filio, voluntas Spiritui Sancto. Memoria vero acquisita primae veritatis potest considerari duobus modis, quia quantum ad fieri aut quantum ad esse. Quantum ad fieri naturaliter procedit acquisita memoria ex intellectu et voluntate: et secundum hoc intellectus, qui est generans veritatem, attribuitur Patri, voluntas, quae est genita, Filio, memoria, ex utroque procedens, Spiritui Sancto. Quantum ad esse vero, memoria veritatis acquisita potest esse principium veritatis intelligentiae et voluntatis' [The innate memory of the truth is the principle of understanding and will: for as is said, it is the power that conserves the likeness of the first truth that is impressed from creation. And in this way, memory is attributed to the Father, intelligence to the Son, and will to the Holy Spirit. The acquired memory of the first truth can be considered in two ways, insofar as it acts or insofar as it exists. Insofar as it acts, acquired memory naturally proceeds from the [operation] of the intellect and will. Thus, the intellect, which is what generates truth, is attributed to the Father, will, which is the cause of what is generated, to the Son, and memory, which proceeds from both, to the Holy Spirit. As regards its essence, the acquired memory of truth is the principle of truth of understanding and will].

49 SH II, In4, Tr1, S2, Q3, Ti1, C2, Ar2 (n. 372), III.2, p. 452.

the text. Another notable difference is the absence of the doctrine of four intellects in this context. However, the Summist finds a way to affirm this still by concluding that Avicenna's signature doctrine is basically compatible with John of Damascus' account of the intellect, which of course bears no resemblance to it at all. This massive stretch of an argument goes to show just how hard early Franciscans would work to salvage the major aspects of Avicenna's psychology, even while trying to keep abreast of current trends by paying lip service to Aristotle and patristic authorities.

Further support for the argument that the Summists maintain an Avicennian rather than Aristotelian account of abstraction can be found in the *Summa's* account of the internal senses, which virtually pastes its content from John's *SDA*, which itself lifts almost verbatim from Avicenna's *De anima*. If we assume as Hasse and Alpina have argued that much of the work of abstraction takes place at the level of producing an intention by the internal senses, then it follows that the *DAR* presupposes Avicenna's idea of how the four intellects finish the job.⁵⁰ So far as I can tell, there is no sign that the Summists understand the differences between Aristotle and Avicenna on abstraction, which are considerable but lie beyond the scope of the current paper.

In this connection, it is worth noting that the *Summa Halensis* constantly uses the term *Philosophus* interchangeably for both Aristotle and Avicenna, sometimes even exhibiting the cheeky tendency to pretend as if there was no difference between them, i.e. *secundum autem Avicennam, qui sequitur Aristotelem*⁵¹ or in attributing a quotation from Avicenna to Aristotle. All of this suggests that we are still in the phase spanning into the 1240s that Amos Bertolacci has described as one of 'reading Aristotle with Avicenna'.⁵² As noted, this was a time when interest in Aristotle was increasing, partly under the impetus of Averroes' recently translated commentaries, but the habit of reading Aristotle in terms of Avicenna was proving difficult to discard, and resources for doing otherwise were still thin on the ground.

What I have tried to do in this paper is give a taste of Avicenna's reception in the school of thought that interpreted him most enthusiastically and most faithfully in this period. Obviously, others of the generation most notably Albert the Great interacted with Avicenna extensively. But they seemingly did so in a slightly more sophisticated and sometimes even critical fashion. That is not to say that the Franciscan reception of Avicenna was altogether pure. As we have seen, it was mediated by the likes of Gundissalinus and mitigated by many others, such as Costa Ben Luca and Avicbron.

50 Tommaso Alpina, 'Intellectual Knowledge, Active Intellect, and Intellectual Memory in Avicenna's *Kitab al-Nafs* and Its Aristotelian Background,' *Documenti e studi sulla tradizione filosofica medievale* 25 (2014): 131–83.

51 *SH* I, P1, In1, T3, Q1, M1, C3 (n. 74), III, p. 119: 'Secundum autem Avicennam, qui sequitur Aristotelem (...).'

52 Amos Bertolacci, 'On the Latin Reception of Avicenna's *Metaphysics* before Albertus Magnus: An Attempt at Periodization,' in *The Arabic, Hebrew and Latin Reception of Avicenna's Metaphysics*, ed. Dag Nikolaus Hasse and Amos Bertolacci (Berlin: De Gruyter, 2012), 197–223, esp. 204.

Above all, it was undertaken in many cases under the guise of reading Aristotle and Augustine, although we have seen that the operative understanding of both authors was somewhat distorted not least by the wide circulation of spurious texts. That is not to say that the Franciscan philosophy of the soul was confused. Notwithstanding the liberties taken with Aristotle's idea of the soul as the form of the body, and just about every idea that could be linked to Augustine, the Franciscans of the early scholastic period, and John first and foremost, knew what they thought about human psychology. And the ideas they developed would continue to form Franciscan ideas on this subject for generations, long after the links to Avicenna or anyone else had been forgotten.

Aaron Canty

The Influence of Anselm of Canterbury on the *Summa Halensis*' Theology of the Divine Substance

Abstract: The influence of Anselm of Canterbury can be found in all four parts of the *Summa Halensis*. It is true that among the hundreds of quotations of Anselm, the majority occur in the third part, on Christology, but the Franciscan authors of the *Summa* also found Anselm to be very useful in the first part, as well. The authors of the *Summa* drew especially from Anselm's *Monologion* and *Proslogion* when discussing God as the divine substance. After examining how infrequently scholastic theologians in the generation before the *Summa* appropriated Anselm in their discussions of God's existence and attributes, the essay demonstrates that the authors of the *Summa* engaged Anselm on a much more sustained level and drew from a much wider variety of Anselmian sources than did their predecessors.

The theology of Anselm of Canterbury, after an uneven reception in the 12th century, exerted considerable influence on early Franciscan theologians in the first half of the 13th century.¹ Anselm's prayerful reflections on God's attributes and existence in the *Proslogion*, the Trinitarian Persons in the *Monologion*, and his Christology and soteriology in the *Cur Deus Homo* resonated with such authors as Alexander of Hales, John of La Rochelle, Odo Rigaldus, William of Melitona, and Bonaventure of Bagnoregio, some, or all, of whom contributed either directly or indirectly to the compilation of the *Summa Halensis*.² Scholars have noted the role Anselm's thought has played in the areas of early Franciscan arguments for God's existence,³ Trinitarian theology,⁴

1 See Enzo Marigliano, *Anselmo d'Aosta: La vicenda umana di un grande monaco del Medioevo* (Milano: Ancora, 2003), 229.

2 See Victorin Doucet, 'Prolegomena in librum III necnon in libros I et II "Summa Fratris Alexandri", in *Doctoris irrefragabilis Alexandri de Hales Ordinis minorum Summa theologica*, vol. 4 (Quaracchi: Collegium S. Bonaventurae, 1948), CXXXIV-CCXLVII.

3 See Scott Matthews, 'Arguments, Texts, and Contexts: Anselm's Argument and the Friars,' *Medieval Philosophy and Theology* 8 (1999): 83–104 and Scott Matthews, *Reason, Community and Religious Tradition: Anselm's argument and the Friars* (Aldershot: Ashgate, 2001), 35–9, 50–73, 111–43; and Rega Wood, 'Richard Rufus's Response to Anselm,' in *Anselm and Abelard: Investigations and juxtapositions*, ed. G.E.M. Gasper and H. Kohlenberger (Toronto: Pontifical Institute of Mediaeval Studies, 2004), 87–102.

4 See Matthew Levering, 'Speaking the Trinity: Anselm and His 13th-Century Interlocutors on Divine Intelligere and Dicere,' in *Saint Anselm—His Origins and Influence*, ed. John R. Fortin (Lewiston, NY: The Edward Mellen Press, 2001), 131–43.

soteriology,⁵ and Christology.⁶ Focusing on the theology of Alexander of Hales, Aleksander Horowski has noted that, in his *Gloss* on Peter Lombard's *Sentences* and disputed questions, Alexander cites Anselm 314 times, especially in discussions of free will and Christology.⁷

It is no surprise, then, that Anselm's theology is a significant source in the *Summa Halensis*. In fact, not only does Anselm's theology play an even more significant role in the *Summa* than it does in Alexander's *Gloss* on the *Sentences*, but it also influences discussions on a wider variety of topics than those that scholars have recently examined. The Quaracchi editors, in their index of cited authorities, noted over 500 direct references to Anselm in Books 1 to 3 (and there are many more if one both includes Book 4 and adds Eadmer of Canterbury's *Liber de similitudinibus* to the list of Anselmian material).⁸ This quantity approximates or exceeds the number of references in the *Summa* to the works of such authors as Ambrose of Milan, Bede, John of Damascus, and Bernard of Clairvaux.

Although the *Summa* draws much inspiration from Anselm's *Cur Deus homo* in its Christology and soteriology, this essay will examine another theological subject on which Anselm's theological and philosophical insight was brought to bear, namely God's existence and attributes. Of course, the *Proslogion* plays a role here, but the *Summa* draws from a wide variety of Anselmian texts to explicate how God's attributes should be understood. When one juxtaposes how the *Summa* treats God's existence and attributes with how earlier theological texts do so, one notices that the discussion of what the *Summa* calls the divine substance not only contains many more

5 See Hubert Philipp Weber, *Sünde und Gnade bei Alexander von Hales: Ein Beitrag zur Entwicklung der theologischen Anthropologie im Mittelalter* (Innsbruck/Wien: Tyrolia Verlag, 2003), 100, 162, 363–4, 378–9; and Robert Pouchet, *La rectitudo chez saint Anselme: Un itinéraire augustinien de l'ame à Dieu* (Paris: Études Augustiniennes, 1964), 252–9.

6 See Walter H. Principe, *The Theology of the Hypostatic Union in the Early Thirteenth Century*, vol. 2, *Alexander of Hales' Theology of the Hypostatic Union* (Toronto: Pontifical Institute of Mediaeval Studies, 1967), 41, 116–7, 184–8, 196–8; Michael Robson, 'Saint Anselm, Robert Grosseteste and the Franciscan Tradition,' in *Robert Grosseteste: New Perspectives on His Thought and Scholarship*, ed. James McEvoy (Turnhout: Brepols, 1995), 233–56; Michael Robson, 'The Impact of the *Cur deus homo* on the Early Franciscan School,' in *Anselm: Aosta, Bec, and Canterbury: Papers in Commemoration of the Nine-Hundredth Anniversary of Anselm's Enthronement as Archbishop, 25 September 1093*, ed. D.E. Luscombe and G.R. Evans (Sheffield: Sheffield Academic Press, 1996), 334–47; Michael Robson, 'Anselm's Influence on the Soteriology of Alexander of Hales: The *Cur Deus homo* in the *Commentary on the Sentences*,' in *Cur Deus Homo: Atti del Congresso Anselmiano Internazionale, Roma 21–23 maggio 1998*, ed. Paul Gilbert, Helmut Kohlenberger, and Elmar Salmann (Rome: Pontificio Ateneo S. Anselmo, 1999), 191–219; and Michael Robson, 'Odo Rigaldi and the Assimilation of St Anselm's *Cur Deus homo* in the School of the Cordeliers in Paris,' in *Saint Anselm of Canterbury and His Legacy*, ed. Giles E.M. Gasper and Ian Logan (Durham: Institute of Medieval and Renaissance Studies; Toronto: Pontifical Institute of Mediaeval Studies, 2012), 155–73.

7 Aleksander Horowski, *La Visio Dei come forma della conoscenza umana in Alessandro di Hales* (Roma: Istituto Storico dei Cappuccini, 2005), 16.

8 See Doucet, 'Prolegomena,' xci.

topics, but it also treats Anselm as a weightier authority and relies on Anselm much more than did earlier theological treatises.

Anselm in the Parisian Theology of the 1220s

Before the authors of the *Summa* appropriated Anselm extensively for their discussion of what they call the divine substance, previous Parisian theologians had barely mentioned Anselm. When considering God's existence, Peter Lombard in his *Four Books of Sentences*, drew principally upon Augustine.⁹ Alexander of Hales, in his *Gloss* on the *Sentences*, also included texts from John of Damascus, Pseudo-Dionysius, and Aristotle,¹⁰ while William of Auvergne engaged arguments from Boethius and Avicenna.¹¹ William's treatise *De Trinitate*, written around 1223 as part of the larger *Magisterium divinale*, bears little trace of Anselm on the topic of divine substance. Philip the Chancellor, when explicating the highest Good in his *Summa de bono*, described it as that than which a greater cannot be thought, but other facets of Anselm's arguments are neglected.¹² Of these authors, however, only Alexander mentioned Anselm by name, once when maintaining that God cannot be thought not to exist and once when discussing the 'nothing' from which God created all things.¹³

Of any author writing in the 1220s, whose arguments influenced the *Summa Halensis*, William of Auxerre is the one who relied on Anselm the most when discussing God's existence and attributes.¹⁴ William's *Summa aurea* mentions Anselm by name in its listing arguments for God's existence. Drawing on Chapter 3 of the *Proslogion*, William explains the contention that God cannot be thought not to exist.¹⁵ Although Anselm's argument is the last of four arguments about God's existence, coming after causal arguments from Nicholas of Amiens and John of Damascus and after Boethius' concept of the best as the highest good, William's engagement with Anselm consists of much more than an appropriation of the *Proslogion* regarding God's exis-

⁹ See Peter Lombard, *Sententiae in IV libris distinctae* I, d. 3, c. 1, 2 vols, ed. Ignatius C. Brady (Grottaferrata: Editiones Collegii S. Bonaventurae, 1971–81), 1:68–71.

¹⁰ See Alexander of Hales, *Magistri Alexandri Glossa in quatuor libros Sententiarum Petri Lombardi* (hereafter, *Glossa*) I, dd. 2–3, 4 vols (Quaracchi: Collegium S. Bonaventurae, 1951–7), 1:27–74.

¹¹ See William of Auvergne, *De trinitate: An Edition of the Latin Text with an Introduction*, cc. 1–5, ed. Bruno Switalski (Toronto: Pontifical Institute of Mediaeval Studies, 1976), 16–34.

¹² Philip the Chancellor, *Summa de bono*, 2 vols, ed. Nicolaus Wicki (Berne: Francke, 1985), 1:46.

¹³ See Alexander of Hales, *Glossa* I, d. 3, 1:42, 70.

¹⁴ On William's influence within the larger context of the University of Paris, see Spencer E. Young, *Scholarly Community at the Early University of Paris: Theologians, Education and Society, 1215–1248* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2014), 102–30.

¹⁵ William of Auxerre, *Summa aurea* I, tr. 1, 7 vols, ed. Jean Ribailier, *Spicilegium Bonaventurianum*, 16–20 (Paris: Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique; Grottaferrata: Editiones Collegii S. Bonaventurae, 1980–7), 1:23.

tence. William also relies on Anselmian texts to show that God is simple,¹⁶ true,¹⁷ omnipresent,¹⁸ merciful, and just.¹⁹ Given the repeated mention of Anselm's name, in contradistinction to the usage in other roughly contemporaneous theological texts, and the appropriation of his arguments, William's reliance on Anselm as a theological authority, even if not at all widespread, is significant.

Anselm in the *Summa's* Theology of the Divine Substance

Even if William of Auxerre had found Anselm to be a helpful theological resource, there are only five explicit references to Anselm in the first book of the *Summa aurea* regarding God's existence and attributes.²⁰ Compared to the omission of Anselm from roughly contemporaneous texts, the *Summa aurea* represents a retrieval of several important Anselmian theological insights, but the overall influence of Anselm on the theology of God's existence and attributes in the 1220s is negligible, and it is in this regard that the *Summa Halensis* makes several notable contributions.

After the paucity of references to Anselm in the preceding generation, the *Summa Halensis* appropriates numerous Anselmian texts when discussing the same topics. Anselm first appears in the *Summa* in the opening question of the first part of Book 1,²¹ which explains the 'unity of the Trinity ordered towards the belief of the heart'.²² The first question of that section, on the 'essentiality of the divine substance', addresses God's existence.²³ The *Summa* gives five reasons for why God must exist, and three are derived from Anselm. The first argument is from Richard of St Victor's *De Trinitate* and argues that things that begin in time must have their being from another; since all created things draw their existence from some-

16 Regarding God's simplicity, William makes two Anselmian arguments without citing Anselm explicitly. First, William argues that God is a maximum who does not owe His existence to another; and secondly, good things predicated of God are the same in God (see William of Auxerre, *Summa aurea* I, tr. 2 (Ribaillier, 1:24)).

17 William of Auxerre, *Summa aurea* I, tr. 12, c. 4, q. 8 (Ribaillier, 1:242).

18 William of Auxerre, *Summa aurea* I, tr. 14, c. 1 (Ribaillier, 1:262).

19 William of Auxerre, *Summa aurea* I, tr. 13, c.1 (Ribaillier, 1:246–7).

20 There are, however, a few other implicit references, and there is one explicit reference to Anselm regarding the procession of the Holy Spirit.

21 Alexander of Hales, *Doctoris irrefragabilis Alexandri de Hales Ordinis minorum Summa theologica* (SH), 4 vols, (Quaracchi: Collegium S. Bonaventurae, 1924–48), Vol I, P1, In1, Tr1, Q1, C1 (n. 25), p. 41.

22 SH I, P1, In1, prol., p. 39: 'Est igitur inquisitio bipartita de Unitate et Trinitate deitatis: prima de ipsa re, quae est Unitas Trinitatis ordinata ad credulitatem cordis; secunda de nominatione ordinata ad confessionem oris, ut sciamus quod credimus, confiteri locutionibus catholicis et veris.'

23 SH I, P1, In1, Tr1, Q1, p. 40: 'De divinae igitur substantiae essentialitate ostendenda sunt duo: primo, quod necesse est divinam substantiam esse; secundo, quod necesse est notam esse sic ut non possit cogitari non esse.'

thing else, there must be an eternal being that has being (*esse*) from itself. The *Summa* then cites John of Damascus as proving the existence of the divine substance according to the notion of causality. Quoting from Book 1 of *On the Orthodox Faith*, the authors of the *Summa* note that since created substances are causable, there must an 'incausable substance' that causes all other substances.²⁴

The remaining three arguments all incorporate important passages from Anselm. The authors of the *Summa*, in the first of these arguments, begin with the notion of truth. They quote from the opening of Anselm's *De veritate*, which in turn quotes two consecutive passages from the *Monologion*:

Let anyone who can, try to conceive of when it began to be true, or was ever not true, that something was going to exist. Or [let him try to conceive of] when it will cease being true and will not be true that something has existed in the past. Now, if neither of these things can be conceived, and if both statements can be true only if there is truth, then it is impossible even to think that truth has a beginning or an end.²⁵

The *Summa* notes that 'we call this [eternal truth] the divine essence'²⁶ and continues again with the opening of *De veritate*:

Indeed, suppose that truth had had a beginning, or suppose that it would at some time come to an end: then even before truth had begun to be, it would have been true that there was no truth; and even after truth had come to an end, it would still be true that there would be no truth. But it could not be true without truth. Hence, there would have been truth before truth came to be, and there would still be truth after truth had ceased to be. But these conclusions are self-contradictory. Therefore, whether truth is said to have a beginning or an end, or whether it is understood not to have a beginning or an end, truth cannot be confined by any beginning or end.²⁷

²⁴ *SH* I, P1, In1, Tr1, Q1, C1 (n. 25), p. 41: 'Cum ergo omnes substantiae huius mundi sint vertibiles, exierunt de non esse in esse; ergo causabiles; sed nihil est causabile a se; relinquatur ergo quod est substantia incausabilis, a qua sunt alia causabilia.'

²⁵ Anselm of Canterbury, *De veritate*, c. 1, in *S. Anselmi cantuariensis archiepiscopi Opera omnia*, 6 vols, ed. F.S. Schmitt (Edinburgh: Thomas Nelson, 1946–61), 1:176: 'Cogitet qui potest, quando incepit aut quando non fuit hoc verum: scilicet quia futurum erat aliquid; aut quando desinet et non erit hoc verum: videlicet quia praeteritum erit aliquid. Quodsi neutrum horum cogitari potest, et utrumque hoc verum sine veritate esse non potest: impossibile est vel cogitare, quod veritas principium aut finem habeat.' All translations of Anselm's works are from Anselm of Canterbury, *Complete Philosophical and Theological Treatises of Anselm of Canterbury*, trans. Jasper Hopkins and Herbert Richardson (Minneapolis: The Arthur J. Banning Press, 2000), 164.

²⁶ *SH* I, P1, In1, Tr1, Q1, C1 (n. 25), p. 41: 'Ergo est veritas aeterna: et hanc dicimus divinam essentiam.'

²⁷ Anselm of Canterbury, *De veritate*, c. 1 (Hopkins and Richardson, 164–5; Schmitt, 1:176): 'Denique si veritas habuit principium aut habebit finem: antequam ipsa inciperet, verum erat tunc quia non erat veritas; et postquam finita erit, verum erit tunc quia non erit veritas. Atqui verum non potest esse sine veritate. Erat igitur veritas, antequam esset veritas; et erit veritas, postquam finita erit veritas; quod inconvenientissimum est. Sive igitur dicatur veritas habere, sive intelligatur non habere principium vel finem: nullo claudi potest veritas principio vel fine.'

After concluding from these passages of Anselm that truth must exist eternally, the authors of the *Summa* discuss the distinction between something true *secundum quid* and something true *simpliciter*. They seem to concede as true *secundum quid* Augustine's argument from the *Soliloquies* that asserting that truth does not exist is a contradiction, since it would then be true that truth does not exist. While such a concession seems to undermine the conviction that truth exists eternally, since a true statement *secundum quid* requires some qualification, nonetheless the *Summa* goes on to state that 'everything true *secundum quid* is *simpliciter* from another perspective; if, therefore, there is something true *secundum quid*, it follows necessarily that something is true *simpliciter* and that there is some truth *simpliciter*.'²⁸

The fourth reason that shows God's existence is drawn from the notion of goodness. What is good in potency is less than what is good in act; likewise, what is good or best in the intellect is less than what is good or best in act. Drawing on the argumentation of Anselm in Chapter 2 of the *Proslogion*, the authors of the *Summa* contend that if the best were only in the intellect, there could be a better, namely a best that is both in the intellect and outside the intellect 'in a necessary act'.²⁹ The best is explicitly linked with Anselm's phrase 'that than which none greater can be thought' so that 'if, therefore, no intellect can deny that the best is the best, it must concede necessarily that the best is in act.'³⁰

The fifth reason is from the notion of preeminence, a kind of argument from gradation. Although the *Summa* draws from an argument about gradations from Richard of St Victor's *De Trinitate*,³¹ it first uses an argument from the *Monologion*. In Chapter 4 of that work, Anselm says,

[A]lthough we cannot deny that some natures are better than others, nonetheless reason persuades us that one of them is so pre-eminent that no other nature is superior to it. For if such a division of gradation were so limitless that for each higher grade a still higher grade could be found, then reason would be led to the conclusion that the number of these natures is boundless. But everyone holds this [conclusion] to be absurd, except someone who himself is utterly irrational.³²

28 SH I, P1, In1, Tr1, Q1, C1 (n. 25), p. 42: 'Si dicatur quod 'veritatem non esse, esse verum' ponit verum secundum quid, non simpliciter, tamen adhuc sequitur: quia omne 'secundum quid' est respectu alicuius quod est simpliciter; si ergo est verum secundum quid, sequitur necessario quod aliquid est verum simpliciter et aliqua veritas simpliciter.'

29 SH I, P1, In1, Tr1, Q1, C1 (n. 25), p. 42: 'In intellectu eius quod est 'optimum' intelligitur ens actu necessario: quia intellectus eius quod est 'optimum' est 'quo nihil est melius'.'

30 SH I, P1, In1, Tr1, Q1, C1 (n. 25), p. 42: 'Si ergo ens 'quo nihil melius' ponit ens actu necessario, ergo et optimum ponit ens actu; si ergo nullus intellectus potest negare optimum esse optimum, ergo necessario habet concedere optimum esse actu.'

31 See Richard of St Victor, *De Trinitate* I, c. 11, in *De Trinitate: texte critique avec introduction, notes et tables*, ed. Jean Ribaillier (Paris: Vrin, 1958), 95–6.

32 Anselm of Canterbury, *Monologion*, c. 4, in *S. Anselmi cantuariensis archiepiscopi Opera omnia*, 1:17 (Hopkins and Richardson, 11): 'Cum igitur naturarum aliae aliis negari non possint meliores, nihilominus persuadet ratio aliquam in eis sic supereminere, ut non habeat se superiorem. Si enim

From this passage, the authors of the *Summa* affirm that there must be a supreme nature compared to which all finite natures are inferior.

In these arguments for the necessity of God's existence the *Summa* relies extensively on Anselm. While it is true that the authors of the *Summa* are content primarily to quote Anselm without offering much commentary—indeed, in the last three arguments, Anselm is given more space than the authors allow themselves—nonetheless the authors of the *Summa* have extracted important passages from *De veritate*, the *Monologion*, and the *Proslogion* and cast them in terms of ways of thinking about the divine essence.

The second chapter of Question 1 argues not only that God exists, but it also contends both that God cannot be thought not to exist and that only God cannot be thought not to exist. Although John of Damascus and Boethius are cited as authorities in these questions, Anselm's arguments play a much more important role. For example, a passage from Chapter 3 of the *Proslogion* is the first argument the *Summa* uses to demonstrate the God cannot be thought not to exist.

For there can be thought to exist something which cannot be thought not to exist; and this thing is greater than that which can be thought not to exist. Therefore, if that than which a greater cannot be thought could be thought not to exist, then that than which a greater cannot be thought would not be that than which a greater cannot be thought—[a consequence] which is contradictory. Hence, something than which a greater cannot be thought exists so truly that it cannot even be thought not to exist. And You are this [being], O Lord our God. (...) For if any mind could think of something better than You, the creature would rise above the Creator and would sit in judgment over the Creator—something which is utterly absurd.³³

The authors of the *Summa* feel compelled to address the objection from Gaunilo that one could in fact think that there is no God, but all they provide as a response is Anselm's argument from Chapter 4 of the *Proslogion* that anyone who understands that God is that being than which none greater can be thought cannot think of God as not existing, since then a greater could be thought.

In addition to drawing extensively on Anselm's arguments for God's existence, the authors also find numerous passages in Anselm's works important for their discussion of God's other attributes. These attributes include God being infinite, uncir-

huiusmodi graduum distinctio sic est infinita, ut nullus ibi sit gradus superior quo superior alius non inveniatur, ad hoc ratio deducitur, ut ipsarum multitudo naturarum nullo fine claudatur. Hoc autem nemo non putat absurdum, nisi qui nimis est absurdus.'

33 Anselm of Canterbury, *Proslogion*, c. 3, in *S. Anselmi cantuariensis archiepiscopi Opera omnia*, 1:102–3 (Hopkins and Richardson, 94): 'Nam potest cogitari esse aliquid, quod non possit cogitari non esse; quod maius est quam quod non esse cogitari potest. Quare si id quo maius nequit cogitari, potest cogitari non esse: id ipsum quo maius cogitari nequit, non est id quo maius cogitari nequit; quod convenire non potest. Sic ergo vere est aliquid quo maius cogitari non potest, ut nec cogitari possit non esse. Et hoc es tu, domine deus noster. Sic ergo vere es, domine deus meus, ut nec cogitari possis non esse. Et merito. Si enim aliqua mens posset cogitare aliquid melius te, ascenderet creatura super creatorem, et iudicaret de creatore; quod valde est absurdum.'

cumscribable, eternal, one, true good, powerful, knowledgeable, and volitional. For example, to prove that the divine substance is infinite, the *Summa* cites *Proslogion*, Chapter 22, where Anselm says that God has only a present existence and thus cannot be thought not to exist.

That goodness is called infinite from which comes every goodness and than which a greater cannot be thought; and likewise that power is called infinite from which comes every power and than which a greater cannot be thought. That, therefore, could be said to be infinite from which comes every existence and than which a greater cannot be thought; but such is divine existence, and therefore it is infinite. I say, moreover, that it exceedingly exists, as Anselm says that it differs from non-being exceedingly, namely that which has neither non-being after being nor being after non-being nor can be thought not to be.³⁴

Since God has neither a past existence followed by non-existence nor a future existence preceded by non-existence, God's existence is infinite and thus the source of all finite existence.

The *Summa* also claims that the divine substance is both unmeasurable and uncircumscribable. To the objection given by the authors from John of Damascus, namely that only God is uncircumscribable, the authors offer a response inspired by the *Proslogion*, Chapter 13. Corporeal objects are completely circumscribed, since they are wholly in one place and not in another. Objects that are both circumscribed and uncircumscribed include created spirits, since they are circumscribed insofar as they cannot be everywhere, and yet they are partially uncircumscribed since they can exist in multiple places (e.g. such as distinct body parts in the case of human souls) simultaneously. Finally, only God is completely uncircumscribed since He is everywhere simultaneously.³⁵

Chapter 20 of the *Proslogion* plays an important role in a discussion of the properties of divine eternity. Two important objections in one question seem to concede God's existence before created objects,³⁶ but they find it difficult to distinguish between God's eternity and the perpetual existence of a creature that has no end. This difficulty is expressed well by Anselm himself, 'You fill and encompass all things; You are before and beyond all things. Indeed, You are before all things because before they were made You already are. But how is it that You are beyond

³⁴ *SH* I, P1, In1, Tr2, Q1, C1 (n.34), p. 55: 'Item, bonitas illa dicitur infinita a qua est omnis bonitas et qua maior excogitari non potest et similiter illa potentia infinita a qua est omnis potentia et qua maior excogitari non potest; ergo et illud esse dicetur infinitum a quo est omne esse et quo maius excogitari non potest; sed tale est esse divinum; ergo illud est infinitum. Dico autem maxime esse, sicut dicit Anselmus, quod maxime distat a non esse, quod scilicet nec habet non esse post esse nec esse post non esse nec potest cogitari non esse.'

³⁵ See *SH* I, P1, In1, Tr2, Q3, Ti1, C2 (n. 39), p. 63.

³⁶ See *SH* I, P1, In1, Tr2, Q4, M2, C1 (n. 61), p. 89.

all things? For how are You beyond those things which will have no end?'³⁷ The *Summa* supplies Anselm's answer to these questions from later in the same chapter. Anselm gives three reasons why perpetual things cannot be equated with eternity even with respect to subsequent duration (*ex parte post*).³⁸ The first is that creatures, even if they have a temporal beginning but no end, cannot exist without God; the second is that they can be thought of as not existing whereas God cannot be thought not to exist; and the third is that the eternity of God and the eternity of creatures are present to God, whereas creatures 'do not yet have that [part] of their eternity which is yet to come, even as they no longer have that [part] which is already past'.³⁹

Anselm's *Epistola de incarnatione verbi* and his *De processione spiritus sancti* first become significant sources in the treatment on God's unity. To the objection that a unity without plurality is greater than a unity with plurality, the *Summa* responds that a distinction must be made between universal essence and the first essence. Universal essence is multiplied through the many things in which it exists; the first essence, however, while it exists in multiple things, that is, Persons, nonetheless is not multiplied through them. The *Summa* gives two highly abbreviated passages from Anselm, but this lengthier account from the end of *De processione spiritus sancti* articulates the point that the *Summa* is making:

[W]hen God is begotten from God or when God proceeds from God, the one who proceeds or is begotten does not pass outside of God but remains within God. So since God within God is only one God: when God is begotten from God, the one who begets and the one who is begotten are only one God; and when God proceeds from God, the one who proceeds and the one from whom He proceeds are only one God. Hence, since God has no parts but is wholly whatever He is, it follows inescapably that the Father is God as a whole, the Son is God as a whole, and the Holy Spirit is God as a whole—and they are one and the same God, not different gods.⁴⁰

³⁷ Anselm of Canterbury, *Proslogion*, c. 20 (Hopkins and Richardson, 106; Schmitt, 1:115): 'Tu ergo implex et complecteris omnia, tu es ante et ultra omnia. Et quidem ante omnia es, quia antequam fierent tu es. Ultra omnia vero quomodo es? Qualiter enim es ultra ea quae finem non habebunt?'

³⁸ *SH* I, P1, In1, Tr2, Q4, M2, C1 (n. 61), p. 90: 'Anselmus, in *Proslogion*, assignans tres rationes quare perpetua non possunt aequari aeternitati etiam ex parte post.'

³⁹ Anselm of Canterbury, *Proslogion*, c. 20 (Hopkins and Richardson, 106; Schmitt, 1:115–6): 'An hoc quoque modo transis omnia etiam aeterna, quia tua et illorum aeternitas tota tibi praesens est, cum illa nondum habeant de sua aeternitate quod venturum est, sicut iam non habent quod praeteritum est? Sic quippe semper es ultra illa, cum semper ibi sis praesens, seu cum illud semper sit tibi praesens, ad quod illa nondum pervenerunt,' and see *SH* I, P1, In1, Tr2, Q4, M2, C1 (n. 61), p. 90.

⁴⁰ Anselm of Canterbury, *De processione spiritus sancti*, c. 16, in *S. Anselmi cantuariensis archiepiscopi Opera omnia*, 2:218–9 (Hopkins and Richardson, 513): 'Sed quoniam non est aliquid extra deum: cum nascitur deus de deo vel cum procedit deus de deo, non exit nascens vel procedens extra deum, sed manet in deo. Quoniam ergo deus in deo non est nisi unus deus: cum nascitur deus de deo, unus solus est deus gignens et genitus; et cum procedit deus de deo, unus tantummodo deus est procedens et de quo procedit. Unde inevitabiliter sequitur, quoniam deus nullas habet partes, sed totus est quidquid est: unum eundemque et non alium et alium deum totum esse patrem, totum esse filium, totum esse spiritum sanctum.'

The *Summa* concedes that the principle affirming that a unity without plurality is greater than a unity with plurality is generally true—but only when it applies to creatures.⁴¹ Since divine unity is the highest unity that can ‘exist or can be thought’, it cannot be incompatible with a plurality of Persons who all remain ‘within’ God.⁴²

Anselm’s *De veritate* and *Monologion* return in a question about divine truth. Chapter 18 of the *Monologion* is the principal argument supporting the claim that truth must exist necessarily and thus eternally. If truth were not eternal, ‘then even before truth had begun to be, it would have been true that there was no truth; and even after truth had come to an end, it would still be true that there would no longer be truth.’⁴³ The *Summa* glosses this passage by adding not only that truth must be eternal, but also, in Anselmian fashion, that it is not possible for one to think of it as not existing.⁴⁴ The authors of the *Summa* also return to the distinction between speaking *secundum quid* and *simpliciter* that was used in the discussion on whether God can be thought not to exist. To the objection that truth *secundum quid* cannot prove a truth *simpliciter* because of an equivocation with respect to the word ‘truth’, the *Summa* insists that truth does exist eternally since the reduction of truth *secundum quid* to truth *simpliciter* does not imply that truth means the same thing in each case, but rather that if there is something true *secundum quid*, it must be reduced to something true *simpliciter*.⁴⁵

In a question about divine goodness, Anselm functions as something of a foil to the position that the *Summa* maintains. The *Summa* argues, in a question about how to consider different kinds of goodness, that different kinds of goodness generally follow different kinds of being, but with one important distinction: goodness always implies a final cause.⁴⁶ Anselm provides an argument about different kinds of truth that the authors of the *Summa* find useful as an objection. In *De veritate*, Anselm argues that there is only one rightness (*rectitudo*) that exists in any number of things, even if it seems at first that there must be one rightness for each right thing. For example, it might seem as though there is a rightness in each signification, in each thing signified, and in each will to signify; but Anselm argues that what gives any

⁴¹ See *SH* I, P1, In1, Tr3, Q1, M3, C2 (n. 83), p. 134.

⁴² *SH* I, P1, In1, Tr3, Q1, M3, C2 (n. 83), p. 134. ‘Dicimus quod inter omnes unitates, quae possunt esse vel intelligi, unitas divina maior est et summa quae esse vel intelligi possit; nec est dicendum quod ei repugnat pluralitas personarum et notionum.’

⁴³ Anselm of Canterbury, *Monologion*, c. 18 (Hopkins and Richardson, 30; Schmitt, 1:33): ‘Quodsi neutrum horum cogitari potest, et utrumque hoc verum sine veritate esse non potest: impossibile est vel cogitare, quod veritas principium aut finem habeat. Denique si veritas habuit principium vel habebit finem: antequam ipsa inciperet, verum erat tunc quia non erat veritas; et postquam finita erit, verum erit tunc quia non erit veritas. Atqui verum non potest esse sine veritate. Erat igitur veritas, antequam esset veritas; et erit veritas, postquam finita erit veritas; quod inconvenientissimum est.’

⁴⁴ See *SH* I, P1, In1, Tr3, Q2, M1, C1 (n. 87), p. 138.

⁴⁵ See *SH* I, P1, In1, Tr3, Q2, M1, C1 (n. 87), p. 139.

⁴⁶ See *SH* I, P1, In1, Tr3, Q3, M1, C3 (n. 106), p. 168.

one of these things its rightness is a *rectitudo* that exists eternally.⁴⁷ The objection that is formulated from this argument is that just as truth is not multiplied according to different kinds of being, but rather according to things, signs, and intentions, among others, so too goodness cannot be multiplied according to different kinds of being. Setting aside the fact that the *Summa* actually tends to follow the student's line of reasoning in Anselm's dialogue less than the teacher's, which represents better Anselm's own position and setting aside the fact that Anselm is not discussing goodness in the passage from *De veritate*, one can note that while Anselm emphasizes the one *rectitudo* in all things, the *Summa* permits the distinction between absolute and uncreated goodness on the one hand and relative and created goodness on the other. The *Summa* and Anselm agree that goodness is not multiplied according to different kinds of being,⁴⁸ but not for the same reasons. Anselm emphasizes that truth (and the *Summa* infers goodness, as well) exists independently of any true thing, while the *Summa* argues that goodness can refer either to an end or something as ordered to an end. In the former case, God is good *per essentiam*, while creatures are good *per participationem*.⁴⁹

Anselm's *Cur Deus homo* makes an appearance in the *Summa*'s discussion of God's power. After treating God's absolute power, the *Summa* asks questions about the relation among God's power, knowledge, and will with respect to creatures. The *Summa*, in its literary structure, treats these three aspects in that order, namely, power, knowledge, and will; and yet, Anselm clearly states in *Cur Deus homo* that ability depends on willing. One finds this assertion in *Cur Deus homo*, Book 2, Chapter 10, in a discussion about Christ's ability to sin. The literary figure Anselm addresses Boso's concern that Jesus says to the Jewish leaders in John 8:55, 'If I said, I do not know him, I should be a liar like you; but I do know him and I keep his word.' Boso seems to think that Jesus' statement implies that He could lie if He wanted to do so. Anselm provides the following response:

All ability depends upon willing. For when I say "I am able to speak or to walk", the proviso "if I will to" is understood. For if willing is not included, then the ability is not really an ability but is a necessity. For when I say "I am able to be dragged off or to be overcome against my will", this is not an instance of my ability but is an instance of constraint and of another's ability. Indeed, "I am able to be dragged off or to be overcome" means nothing other than "Someone else is able to drag me off or to overcome me." Therefore, we can say of Christ, "He was able to tell a lie", provided "if He willed to" is understood. And since He was not able to lie against His will and was not able to will to lie, He can equally well be said not to have been able to lie. So, then, He was able to lie and not able to lie.⁵⁰

47 See Anselm of Canterbury, *De veritate*, c. 13 (Schmitt, 1:196–9).

48 See *SH* I, P1, In1, Tr3, Q3, M1, C3 (n. 106), p. 168.

49 See *SH* I, P1, In1, Tr3, Q3, M1, C3 (n. 106), p. 168.

50 Anselm of Canterbury, *Cur Deus homo* II, c. 10, in *S. Anselmi cantuariensis archiepiscopi Opera omnia*, 2:107 (Hopkins and Richardson, 360): 'Omnis potestas sequitur voluntatem. Cum enim dico quia possum loqui vel ambulare, subauditur: si volo. Si enim non subintelligitur voluntas, non est potestas sed necessitas. Nam cum dico quia nolens possum trahi aut vinci, non est haec mea potes-

The *Summa* focuses on the statement that ‘ability depends upon willing’, but it makes a distinction that allows the authors to reconcile Anselm’s statement with their own position. This distinction is between power *in habitu* and power *in effectu* (or *potentia potens* and *potentia exequens*). With power *in habitu* power is conceived before the will; and with power *in effectu*, the will is conceived before power.⁵¹ The *Summa* contends that willing derives from ability ‘according to our method of understanding; nevertheless, in God they are the same’. Because ‘the execution of power in act is from the will’, one could say that ‘ability depends upon willing’, but properly speaking, that is not the case.⁵² Thus, Anselm’s contention that ‘ability depends upon willing’ is true insofar as it means that when God wills to do something, such as create or redeem, He is able to do so because He has willed it; and yet, God could not will in the first place if He did not have the power to do so.

Anselm’s *De concordia praesentiae et praedestinationis* plays an important role in the *Summa*’s discussions of God’s knowledge and foreknowledge. Regarding the question about whether God’s foreknowledge causes things, the *Summa* marshals Anselm’s explanation of God’s foreknowledge in *De concordia*. There Anselm says,

Therefore, when I say “If God foreknows something, it is necessary that this thing (...) occur”, it is as if I were to say: “If this thing will occur, of necessity it will occur.” But this necessity neither compels nor prevents a thing’s existence or non-existence. For because the thing is presumed to exist, it is said to exist of necessity; or because it is presumed not to exist, it is said to not-exist of necessity.⁵³

Drawing on this statement, the *Summa* makes a distinction between knowledge of simple intelligence (*scientia simplices notitiae*) and knowledge of approval (*scientia approbationis*). God’s knowledge of simple intelligence is not causal in any way, since it is mere knowledge with no approval (or disapproval) brought to bear on it; the knowledge of approval, however, does imply a cause since in addition to

tas, sed necessitas et potestas alterius. Quippe non est aliud: possum trahi vel vinci, quam: alius me trahere vel vincere potest. Possumus itaque dicere de Christo quia potuit mentiri, si subauditur: si vellet. Et quoniam mentiri non potuit nolens nec potuit velle mentiri, non minus dici potest nequivisse mentiri. Sic itaque potuit et non potuit mentiri.’

51 See *SH* I, P1, In1, Tr4, Q1, M2, C2 (n. 135), p. 207.

52 *SH* I, P1, In1, Tr4, Q1, M2, C2 (n. 135), p. 207: ‘Ad auctoritates ergo obiectas intelligendum quod per illas non significatur quod potentia sit subiecta voluntati aut sequatur eam secundum se, cum velle sit ex posse, secundum rationem intelligentiae tamen in Deo sunt idem, sed quia executio potentiae in actum est a voluntate; ratione ergo eius in quod est potentia, dicitur potentia sequi voluntatem, non ratione sui.’

53 Anselm of Canterbury, *De concordia praesentiae et praedestinationis*, 1.2, in *S. Anselmi cantuariensis archiepiscopi Opera omnia*, 2:248–9 (Hopkins and Richardson, 533): ‘Quare cum dico quia si praescit deus aliquid, necesse est illud esse futurum: idem est ac si dicam: Si erit, ex necessitate erit. Sed haec necessitas nec cogit nec prohibet aliquid esse aut non esse. Ideo enim quia ponitur res esse, dicitur ex necessitate esse; aut quia ponitur non esse, affirmatur non esse ex necessitate.’

knowledge, there is an accompanying *approbatio intellectae*.⁵⁴ When the *Summa* asks further questions about whether foreknowledge may be caused by things, whether foreknowledge imposes necessity on anything, and whether foreknowledge and free choice are compatible, the opening chapters of *De concordia* are invoked to assert four things regarding God's foreknowledge: 1. it causes good; 2. it does not cause evil; 3. it is not caused by finite creatures; and 4. it is compatible with human freedom.

The will is the last aspect of the divine substance that the *Summa* treats with Anselm's influence. The *Summa* addresses the question of whether God can command something that contradicts the natural law. Anselm contends in *Cur Deus homo* that 'what God wills is just and what He does not will is not just',⁵⁵ so it seems that God could command something that contradicts the natural law. Although the *Summa* fails to quote the remainder of Anselm's passage, it is worth quoting in full here, since it likely helped the authors formulate their response to the contrary:

[W]e must not interpret this to mean that if God were to will any kind of unfitness, it would be just simply because He willed it. For the supposition "God wills to lie" does not warrant the inference "Lying is just", but, instead, warrants the inference "This being is not really God". For no will can at all will to lie except a will in which the truth has been corrupted—or better, a will which has become corrupted by abandoning the truth. Therefore, when we say "If God wills to lie", this means "If God is of such a nature as to will to lie. (...)" And so, "Lying is just" is not inferable therefrom—unless we interpret the if-then statement as an example of our saying about two impossibilities "If this is true, then that is true", although neither the one nor the other is true.⁵⁶

Anselm qualifies the statement that 'what God wills is just and what He does not will is not just' by saying that God's incorrupt will could not will to lie, since a will to lie would have been corrupted 'abandoning the truth'.

With that qualification in mind the *Summa* distinguishes between three different ways of being 'against nature'. The first is against the human experience of nature (*consuetudinem naturae*); the second is against the order and potency implanted by God in the natural universe; and the third is against the law of the highest na-

⁵⁴ See *SH* I, P1, In1, Tr5, S2, Q1, C2 (n. 182), p. 268.

⁵⁵ Anselm of Canterbury, *Cur Deus homo* I, c. 12 (Hopkins and Richardson, 321; Schmitt, 2:107): 'Quod autem dicitur quia quod vult iustum est, et quod non vult non est iustum.'

⁵⁶ Anselm of Canterbury, *Cur Deus homo* I, c. 12 (Hopkins and Richardson, 321; Schmitt, 2:107): '[N]on ita intelligendum est ut, si deus velit quodlibet inconueniens, iustum sit, quia ipse vult. Non enim sequitur: si deus vult mentiri, iustum esse mentiri; sed potius deum illum non esse. Nam nequaquam potest velle mentiri voluntas, nisi in qua corrupta est veritas, immo quae deserendo veritatem corrupta est. Cum ergo dicitur: si deus vult mentiri non est aliud quam: si deus est talis natura quae velit mentiri; et idcirco non sequitur iustum esse mendacium. Nisi ita intelligatur, sicut cum de duobus impossibilibus dicimus: si hoc est, illud est; quia nec hoc nec illud est.'

ture.⁵⁷ Since the law of the highest nature regulates all things, God cannot prescribe against the natural law in that sense. He can command, however, an act that contradicts the usual order implanted by God in nature.⁵⁸

From this conclusion, the *Summa* argues that, while God cannot will anything unfitting, He could order something that seems to be against the Second Table of the Decalogue, as long as it did not prevent the person or community from achieving their final end, namely God Himself. On the one hand the *Summa* argues that God cannot command something that violates the Decalogue, and on the other, he can command actions that preserve the human tendency toward God while altering their relations with each other. The authors of the *Summa* clearly have in mind God's command to Abraham to kill Isaac, the despoliation of the Egyptians by the Israelites, and patriarchal polygamy. God is free to command any action that preserves the human order towards God, as long as it does not involve injustice. Thus, when Anselm says that 'there is freedom only with respect to what is advantageous or what is fitting', the authors of the *Summa* infer from that statement that He cannot command evil; but He could command something that preserves justice and charity while altering the relations among humans. As examples, the *Summa* contends that God could order the despoliation of the Egyptians while still prohibiting theft, and He could command concubinage or sexual intercourse while still prohibiting fornication. What would be preserved in such commands is the prohibition of cupidity and lust, while taking something from someone or having intercourse with a concubine could be done justly.⁵⁹

Another facet of the will in which Anselm's thought plays a role pertains to God's mercy and justice. Following the *Proslogion*, Chapter 8, the *Summa* contends that God is merciful and just, not in the sense that He feels sorrow or owes anything to anyone, but in the sense that He relieves peoples' suffering or pardons their sins.⁶⁰ It also means that God's mercy and justice, while not being directed towards creatures from all eternity, nonetheless can be found in His works.⁶¹

Conclusion

Anselm's influence on the *Summa's* theology of the divine substance is much greater than can be recounted here. Although many of the approximately 175 references to

57 See *SH* I, P1, In1, Tr6, Q3, Ti2, M2, C1, Ar2 (n. 275), p. 380. This account summarizes Augustine's *Contra Faustum* 26.3, ed. Josef Zycha, *Corpus Scriptorum Ecclesiasticorum Latinorum*, 25/1 (Vienna: Tempsky, 1891), 730–1.

58 See *SH* I, P1, In1, Tr6, Q3, Ti2, M2, C1, Ar2 (n. 275), p. 380.

59 See *SH* I, P1, In1, Tr6, Q3, Ti2, M2, C1, Ar3 (n. 276), p. 383.

60 See *SH* I, P1, In1, Tr6, Q3, Ti2, M2, C3, Ar1 (n. 280), p. 388. See also *SH* I, P1, In1, Tr6, Q3, Ti2, M2, C3, Ar2 (n. 281), pp. 389–90.

61 See *SH* I, P1, In1, Tr6, Q3, Ti2, M2, C3, Ar3 (n. 282), pp. 390–8.

Anselm in Book 1 of the *Summa* deal with topics other than the existence and attributes of the divine substance (e.g. the Trinitarian Persons and divine names), nonetheless, when one considers that there are over 40 references to the *Monologion* and over 30 each to the *Proslogion* and *De veritate*, one can see that there is a significant expansion in the engagement with and appropriation of Anselmian texts and arguments compared with the previous generation of theological texts. In the 1220s, the primary engagement with Anselm consisted principally with Anselm's contention in Chapter 3 of the *Proslogion* that God cannot be thought not to exist, and Anselm's discussions about God's attributes are neglected. Only William of Auxerre, whose *Summa aurea* proved to be a significant influence on the *Summa Halensis*, used a variety of Anselmian passages to discuss multiple divine attributes. Nonetheless, William's engagement with Anselm is far less than that of the *Summa Halensis*.

Part of the reason for increased sustained engagement with Anselm can be found simply in the increased scope of the *Summa* and the vast multiplication of questions compared to the theological texts from the 1220s. Nonetheless, the authors of the *Summa* could have chosen other interlocutors as they formulated their questions. Anselm's inclusion in questions not only regarding God's existence, but also regarding God's truth, goodness, power, knowledge, and will suggests at the very least an increased engagement with and appreciation of the full range of Anselm's philosophical and theological works. Whereas William of Auxerre had drawn principally from the *Proslogion*, the *Monologion*, and *De veritate*, the *Summa Halensis* found other works useful, as well, including the *Cur Deus homo* (even in questions about the divine substance), *De concordia praescientiae et praedestinationis et gratiae dei cum libero arbitrio*, and *De processione spiritus sancti* (especially in questions about God's unity). Drawing from a wide array of Anselmian texts, some of which were quoted at much greater length than any such passages in the theology manuals of the 1220s, the authors of the *Summa* appropriated Anselm as a theological authority whose arguments aided them in formulating their own teachings on the divine substance.

Andrew V. Rosato

Anselm's Influence on the Teaching of the *Summa Halensis* on Redemption

Abstract: It has long been recognized that the *Summa Halensis* was one of the first texts to extensively engage the arguments of Anselm's *Cur Deus homo*. As a result of this engagement, Anselm can rightly be thought of as exercising a great deal of influence on how the *Summa* understands Christ's redemptive work. We see this influence, for instance, when the *Summa* takes up questions Anselm poses about redemption, such as whether satisfaction is necessary for sin or whether only a God-man can make satisfaction. Without denying the influence of Anselm on the soteriology of the *Summa Halensis*, this chapter focuses primarily on how the *Summa* both modifies Anselm's ideas and supplements them. Thus, I examine how the *Summa* employs the distinction between God's absolute and ordained power to modify Anselm's claims regarding the manner in which certain aspects of God's plan of redemption are deemed necessary. Also, I show that Peter Lombard's *Sentences* significantly shape how the *Summa* interprets what Anselm writes about Christ's satisfaction and merit. Finally, I consider how the *Summa* draws on other authorities such as Gregory the Great and John Damascene to supplement Anselm's account of redemption.

Alexander of Hales was one of the first 13th-century theologians to closely examine *Cur Deus homo* and treat Anselm as a significant theological authority. Anselm's treatise is cited extensively in Alexander's *Glossa* and in his disputed questions. Yet Anselm's *Cur Deus homo* has an even greater presence in the *Summa Halensis* (*SH*) than it does those earlier works. Michael Robson, who has documented the influence of Anselm among early Franciscan theologians, writes, 'A barometer of the growing influence of Anselm on the nascent Franciscan school is strikingly present in Book 3 of the *Summa Fratris Alexandri*, whose early questions presuppose a close reading of the *Cur Deus homo*.'¹ Similarly, J. Patout Burns writes that in the *SH* 'Anselm comes into his own as the master of teaching on redemption'.² Anselm did exercise a great amount of influence on how the *SH* understands Christ's redemptive work. The *SH*, for instance, adopts Anselm's claim that making satisfaction is central to

1 Michael Robson, 'Odo Rigaldi and the Assimilation of St. Anselm's *Cur Deus homo* in the School of the Cordeliers in Paris,' in *Saint Anselm and his Legacy*, ed. Giles E.M. Gasper and Ian Logan, Durham Medieval and Renaissance Monographs and Essays, 2 (Toronto: Pontifical Institute of Mediaeval Studies, 2012), 165. For more on the place of the *Summa Halensis* in the reception of *Cur Deus homo*, see Brian P. McGuire, 'The History of Saint Anselm's Theology of the Redemption in the Twelfth and Thirteenth Centuries' (D.Phil. thesis, University of Oxford, 1970).

2 J. Patout Burns, 'The Concept of Satisfaction in Medieval Redemption Theory,' *Theological Studies* 36 (1975): 293.

Christ's redemptive work. Yet the way that the teachings of *Cur Deus homo* were incorporated into the *SH* were affected by theological principles unique to the *SH* and by the ideas of other important theological authorities. As a result the *SH* modifies and supplements Anselm's *Cur Deus homo* in various ways as it puts forward its own teaching on Christ's redemptive work. In what follows I will focus on three ways that the *SH* incorporates and modifies Anselm's *Cur Deus homo*. First, I will examine how the *SH* uses the distinction between God's absolute and ordained power to modify Anselm's claims regarding the manner in which certain aspects of God's plan of redemption are deemed necessary. Second, I will show that Peter Lombard's *Sentences* significantly shape how the *SH* interprets what Anselm writes about Christ's satisfaction and merit. Finally, I will consider how the *SH* draws on other authorities such as Gregory the Great and John Damascene to supplement Anselm's account of redemption.

The Necessity of God's Plan of Redemption

In *Cur Deus homo* (*CDH*) Anselm argues that many aspects of God's plan of redemption are necessary. Anselm is aware that this would seem to conflict with God's omnipotence, and for this reason Anselm distinguishes a necessity arising from external coercion from a necessity arising from God's immutability. When Anselm argues that it is necessary that God restore human nature, the necessity in question is not a result of God being externally coerced, but of God immutably acting in accord with his wisdom. For, according to Anselm, it would have been unwise of God to create human beings for eternal life, and then to let them all perish in eternal damnation. While God is unable to act against his wisdom, this is not a sign of weakness, but of his perfect power.

The *SH* also attributes a necessity of immutability to God, and this necessity applies to his decision to restore human nature.³ For the *SH*, however, the necessity of immutability refers to God's consistently and unfailingly willing whatever he has chosen to will from among the several possible things he might have willed. Thus, this understanding of the necessity of immutability does not preclude God's ability to have chosen otherwise than he did. The *SH* argues that God could have chosen to permit the damnation of the entire human race. This was not so for Anselm. As William Courtenay writes,

for Anselm, God does not have the ability to will that which he has not willed or that which is contrary to his nature. For Anselm only one way was ever really correct or possible, for God's

³ Alexander of Hales, *Doctoris irrefragabilis Alexandri de Hales Ordinis minorum Summa theologica* (*SH*), 4 vols (Quaracchi: Collegium S. Bonaventurae, 1924–48), Vol IV, P1, In1, Tr1, Q1, M3, C3 (n. 3), Respondeo, p. 14a [a and b refer to the left and right columns respectively].

will has to express God's nature, and God's nature in turn can never have been subject to multiple possibilities.⁴

Nevertheless, the *SH* claims to find a basis in *CDH* I.15 for its own interpretation of the necessity of immutability. In this place Anselm states that fallen humans and angels who do not wish to submit to the divine will and its order cannot ultimately escape it. For if they seek to escape God's ordering will, they will become subject to his punishing will. Even though Anselm's point seems to have been that it is futile in the end to try to escape God's will, the *SH* takes Anselm to support the conclusion that God could have chosen to let the whole human race suffer eternal punishment. For, according to the *SH*, God has the power to either order the human race to beatitude through his justice and mercy or instead order the human race to punishment through divine justice.⁵

Another side of the *SH*'s understanding of divine power surfaces when it investigates whether it is necessary that there be satisfaction for sin. According to the *SH* the statement 'God cannot restore human nature without satisfaction' can be interpreted in two ways depending upon whether God's power is being considered absolutely or with order.⁶ The *SH* states, 'taking divine power absolutely, we intend a certain infinite power, and in this sense nothing determines divine power, and in this sense it is conceded that he could restore human nature without satisfaction for sin.'⁷ Divine power, however, can also be considered 'with order', and in this sense it is considered with respect to justice and mercy. While God can do nothing that is not in accord with his justice and mercy, the *SH* makes a further distinction with regard to what is meant by saying that God must act in accord with his justice. For God's ability to do something from justice can be referred either to his essence or to how he has decided to manifest his justice and mercy with respect to his creatures. According to the *SH*, 'the ability from justice can be referred to its principal significate, which is the divine essence, and, then, the ability from justice is the same as the ability from power, and in this way he could [forgive sins without satisfaction].'⁸ Yet God's ability to act with justice can also be referred to how he has decided to relate to

4 William Courtenay, 'Necessity and Freedom in Anselm's Conception of God,' *Analecta Anselmiana* 45 (1975): 62.

5 *SH* IV, P1, In1, Tr1, Q1, M3, C3 (n. 3), Ad obiecta 2–4, p. 14b.

6 For the role of the *SH* in the development of this distinction, see William Courtenay, *Capacity and Volition: A History of the Distinction of Absolute and Ordained Power* (Bergamo: Lubrina, 1990), 73–7. See also Corey L. Barnes, 'Necessary, Fitting, or Possible: The Shape of Scholastic Christology,' *Nova et Vetera*, English Edition, 10 (2012): 657–99.

7 *SH* IV, P1, In1, Tr1, Q1, M4, C4 (n. 4), Respondeo, p. 15b: 'Considerando divinam potentiam absolute cogitamus quamdam virtutem infinitam, et secundum hunc modum non est determinare divinam potentiam, et conceditur hoc modo quod potest reparare humanam naturam sine peccati satisfactione.'

8 *SH* IV, P1, In1, Tr1, Q1, M4, C4 (n. 4), Respondeo, p. 16a: '(...) potest referri "posse de iustitia" ad principale significatum, quod est divina essentia, et tunc idem est posse de iustitia quod posse de potentia, et hoc modo potest.'

creatures, and in this way God gives to each what he deserves. Assuming the decision to give each creature what it deserves, it would be unjust for God to forgive sin apart from satisfaction since of itself sin deserves punishment rather than reward.⁹ Given his decision to manifest his justice with respect to creatures in this way, God is unable to restore human nature without satisfaction. Here again the *SH* claims to reach a conclusion consistent with Anselm.¹⁰

In its explanation of both the sense in which it was necessary that God restore human nature and necessary that there be satisfaction, the *SH* relies on an understanding of the relation of divine power to alternative possibilities that seems foreign to Anselm's way of understanding divine omnipotence. Yet, as we have seen, the *SH* presents its own teaching as being in continuity with that of Anselm's. This is also the case with its answer to the question of whether God acts justly in permitting his innocent Son to suffer. The *SH* cites Anselm's treatment of that question from *CDH* I.8, where Anselm argues that the Son's suffering is just because it is voluntary.¹¹ The *SH* accepts this interpretation, but goes on to claim that God's absolute power sheds further light on the question: "To the solution of Anselm we must add the following: by referring to absolute divine power there would be no injury in punishing the innocent, according to what the Apostle says in Rom. 9:21: "Surely the potter has power etc.", because no action of God could be unjust."¹² The *SH* presents its own

9 *SH* IV, P1, In1, Tr1, Q1, M4, C4 (n. 4), Ad obiecta 5, pp. 16b-7a.

10 *SH* IV, P1, In1, Tr1, Q1, M4, C4 (n. 4), Respondeo, p. 16a: 'Si autem referatur ad connotatum, dicit Anselmus quod tunc "posse de iustitia" est posse secundum congruentiam meritorum, et hoc modo dicit idem Anselmus: "Non potest Deus peccatum impunitum sine satisfactione dimittere nec peccator ad beatitudinem, qualem habiturus erat ante peccatum, poterit pervenire"' [If it is referred to the thing indicated, then Anselm says that the "ability from justice" is an ability according to the congruity of merits, and Anselm says the same thing in this way: "God is not able to forgive unpunished sin without satisfaction nor could a sinner achieve a beatitude of the sort that he was about to have prior to sin"].

11 *SH* IV, P1, In1, Tr5, Q1, M4, C1, Ar1 (n. 151), arg. 1, p. 211a-b.

12 *SH* IV, P1, In1, Tr5, Q1, M4, C1, Ar1 (n. 151), Ad obiecta 1, p. 212b: 'Est tamen addendum ad solutionem Anselmi, quod referendo ad potentiam divinam absolutam, nulla esset iniuria punire innocentem, secundum quod dicit Apostolus, Rom. 9, 21: "Numquid potestatem habet figulus etc.", quia nulla actio Dei potest esse iniusta.' See also *SH* I, P1, In1, Tr4, Q2, M2, C2 (n. 141), pp. 220b-1a: 'Ad illud vero quod quaerit "utrum possit damnare Petrum" etc., distinguendum quod potentia Dei intelligitur dupliciter: uno modo absoluta, alio modo ordinata secundum rationem divinae praeordinationis iustitiae reddentis unicuique secundum merita. De potentia ergo absoluta posset damnare Petrum et salvare Iudam; de potentia vero ordinata secundum praeordinationem et retributionem secundum merita, not posset; nec in hoc derogatur eius potentiae, sed ostenditur immutabilitas ordinis potentiae secundum praeordinationem et iustitiam' [But to that which is asked, namely, "whether [God] could damn Peter, etc.", we must distinguish between two ways of understanding God's power: in one way [it is considered] absolutely, in another way as it is ordered by what he has foreordained according to divine justice whereby he returns to each according to his or her merits. Therefore, *de potentia absoluta* he could have damned Peter and saved Judas. Yet he could not do this *de potentia ordinata* according to what he foreordained and according to what is owed for one's

teaching as being consistent with Anselm's, and merely as providing a resolution of the question to a more fundamental principle. Yet in coming to this conclusion and others that rely on the distinction between God's absolute and ordained power, the *SH* has modified Anselm's teaching on the necessity of God's plan of redemption in accord with an understanding of divine power that is more commonly associated with later Franciscan theologians like Duns Scotus and William of Ockham.¹³

Satisfaction and Merit

The *SH* attributes a significant role to satisfaction and merit in its explanation of how Christ's death redeems the human race. Naturally the *SH* often cites Anselm's *CDH* when talking about Christ's satisfaction for sin. There is even a basis in *CDH* II.19 for some of what the *SH* says regarding Christ's merit of human salvation. As we shall see, however, the *SH* interprets Anselm's teachings about satisfaction and reward in light of what Peter Lombard writes about Christ's redemptive work in *III Sentences*, Distinctions 18–19. It seems as if the authors of the *SH* sought to produce a synthesis of Anselm's and the Lombard's teaching on redemption.¹⁴

The *SH* claims that divine justice requires Christ to make satisfaction through suffering. According to the *SH*, 'the justice of God is such that he never forgives sin without punishment. For sin is not ordered except through punishment, according to what Augustine says in the book *De natura boni*: "sins are ordered in punishments".'¹⁵ The *SH* goes on to say that God's justice can be manifested in two different ways in the face of sin. First, God's justice could be manifested through eternally punishing sinners. Second, if God were to punish sins temporally, then this would manifest his justice and mercy.¹⁶ For this reason the *SH* teaches that making satisfaction necessarily involves freely accepting some sort of temporal punishment.¹⁷

merits. There is no restriction of his power in this, but what is shown through this is the immutability of the order of his power according to his foreordaining and his justice].

13 For Scotus' soteriology, see Andrew V. Rosato, 'The Teaching of Duns Scotus on whether only a God-Man could make Satisfaction for Sin,' *The Thomist* 79 (2015): 551–84. See also Thomas M. Ward, 'Voluntarism, Atonement, and Duns Scotus,' *The Heythrop Journal* 58 (2017): 37–43.

14 For the Lombard's contribution to the theology of redemption, and his relation to Anselm, see Marcia L. Colish, *Peter Lombard*, 2 vols, Brill's Studies in Intellectual History, 41 (Leiden: Brill, 1994), 1:448–70.

15 *SH* IV, P1, In1, Tr5, Q1, M4, C1, Ar1 (n. 151), Respondeo, p. 212a: 'Dei enim iustitia est, ut nunquam peccatum dimittatur sine poena. Peccatum enim non ordinatur nisi in poena, secundum quod dicit Augustinus, in libro *De natura boni*: "Peccantes in suppliciis ordinatur".'

16 *SH* IV, P1, In1, Tr5, Q1, M4, C1, Ar1 (n. 151), Respondeo, p. 212a.

17 *SH* IV, P1, In1, Tr1, Q1, M6, C5, Ar2 (n. 6), Respondeo, p. 20a: 'Ad satisfactionem peccati requiritur gratia Dei, per quam fit absolutio reatus aeterni et sustinentia poenae temporalis: primum est ex Dei misericordia, secundum ex iustitia' [For the satisfaction of sin the grace of God is required, through which absolution for eternal guilt comes about, and the enduring of temporal punishment: the first is from the mercy of God, the second from his justice].

This way of understanding the relation between punishment and making satisfaction is different from what we find in *CDH*.¹⁸ Anselm speaks of God requiring either satisfaction or punishment because of sin, and this disjunction suggests that undergoing punishment is not essential to satisfaction.¹⁹ For Anselm it is performing some supererogatory act for God's honor that is essential to making satisfaction. Anselm argues that the God-man's mode of making satisfaction involved suffering and death because there was nothing else that he was not already obligated to offer for the honor of God.

Although in *CDH* II.19 Anselm does briefly mention that the death of the God-man earns a reward that redounds to human salvation, the *SH* draws explicitly on Peter Lombard when addressing questions about Christ's merit. One reason for this is no doubt that Peter Lombard presents a more detailed analysis of Christ's redemptive merit than Anselm does. The influence of Peter Lombard on the understanding of Christ's merit in the *SH* is evident in the following passage:

Merit, with respect to its power, depends upon charity. With respect to its effect, however, it depends upon a work caused by charity, either an interior work, such as an act of will, or an exterior one such as to do or to suffer something. With regard to Christ's power to merit, he merits as much before his passion as he does in his passion. With regard to the effect of his merit, however, he merits more [in his Passion], that is [he merits] more things or in more ways, according to what the Master says in Distinction 18 of Book 3 of his *Sentences*: "he does not advance with respect to the power to merit" but "with respect to the number of things merited".²⁰

Christ's power to merit remains constant throughout his life because he always possesses the fullness of charity. Yet Christ does add to the things he merits over the course of his life, and some of what he merits both for himself and for us comes through choosing to suffer on behalf of the human race.²¹

The *SH* sets out in detail how Christ's satisfaction and merit bring about human salvation when addressing the question of how Christ justifies sinners. The *SH* begins

¹⁸ For more on the understanding of satisfaction in the *SH* and the early Franciscans, see Andrew V. Rosato, 'The Interpretation of Anselm's Teaching on Christ's Satisfaction for Sin in the Franciscan Tradition from Alexander of Hales to Duns Scotus,' *Franciscan Studies* 71 (2013): 411–44; and Lydia Schumacher, *Early Franciscan Theology: Between Authority and Innovation* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2019): 212–41.

¹⁹ Anselm of Canterbury, *Cur Deus homo* I, c. 13, in *S Anselmi Cantuariensis archiepiscopi opera omnia*, vol. 2, ed. Franciscus Salesius Schmitt (Edinburgh: Nelson, 1946), 71–2.

²⁰ *SH* IV, P1, In1, Tr4, Q3, M3, C3 (n.134), Respondeo, pp. 186b-7a: 'Meritum, quantum ad virtutem, consistit penes caritatem; quantum vero ad effectum consistit in opere, movente caritate, sive sit opus interius, sicut voluntas, sive exterius, quantum ad agere et pati. Attendendo ergo ad virtutem meriti, tantum meruit Christus ante passionem quantum in passione. Attendendo vero ad effectum meriti, plus meruit, id est pluribus modis sive in pluribus, secundum quod dicit Magister, in *Sententiis*, dist. 18 III libri, quod "non profecit quantum ad virtutem meriti", sed "quantum ad numerum meritorum". See also *SH* IV, P1, In1, Tr5, Q1, M3, C2 (n. 149), Ad obiecta 2, p. 210a.

²¹ *SH* IV, P1, In1, Tr4, Q3, M4, C2, Ar2 (n. 139), Ad obiecta 1–4, p. 192b.

by distinguishing two ways of considering Christ's Passion. It can be considered as a historical event, but also as something that comes to exist in the soul in some way. In other words, the *SH* is distinguishing the Passion as an event that in itself makes satisfaction and merits grace, but nevertheless still needs to be appropriated in some way by individual sinners who seek justification through Christ.²²

As a historical event, the passion of Christ overcomes sin in two ways. These two ways correspond to two aspects of sin, namely sin as incurring a debt to punishment and sin as staining the soul.²³ By making satisfaction for sin, the passion frees human beings from the punishment due to sin.²⁴ The *SH* speaks of Christ's passion as removing the temporal punishment due to original sin, as removing the debt to eternal punishment, and even in some sense as removing temporal punishment for sin here and now for Christians. The *SH* acknowledges that if an individual human person were given grace, then he or she could offer satisfaction for personal sins.²⁵ Original sin, however, is a different kind of sin since it affects human nature as such, and therefore, the one who can make satisfaction for it must be able to reorder the whole of human nature to God.²⁶ This is something only a God-man could do because only such a being could offer a satisfaction equivalent to the debt incurred by original sin.²⁷ The satisfaction of Christ has such great value in virtue of both his divine person and in virtue of the infinite grace his human soul possesses.²⁸ In making satisfaction, then, Christ simultaneously pays the debt to temporal punishment incurred by original sin and overcomes our debt to eternal punishment. The *SH* also sees some relaxation to the temporal punishment of sinners in this life insofar as a Christian is no longer under the dominion of death, and, therefore, need not fear death.²⁹ The *SH* holds up the martyrs as especially exemplifying this effect of Christ's satisfaction.

22 *SH* IV, P1, In1, Tr5, Q1, M6, C1, Ar1 (n. 156), Respondeo, p. 216a: 'Passio Christi se habet ad remissionem peccati pluribus modis. Est enim passio Christi dupliciter: in rei natura et in anima' [The passion of Christ is related to the remission of sins in many ways. For the passion of Christ exists in two ways: in its own right and in the soul].

23 *SH* IV, P1, In1, Tr5, Q1, M6, C1, Ar1 (n. 156), Respondeo, p. 216a: 'In peccato autem sunt duo, macula et reatus: macula quae est deformitas vel dissimilitudo ad Deum; reatus obligatio ad poenam' [There are two aspects of sin, namely its stain and its guilt: the stain which is a deformity or unlikeness to God, and the guilt which brings about an obligation to punishment].

24 *SH* IV, P1, In1, Tr5, Q1, M6, C1, Ar1 (n. 156), Respondeo, p. 216a: 'Est etiam causa satisfactoria reatus poenae, secundum quod dicitur Isaiah 53:4: "Vere languores nostros ipse tulit etc."' [The guilt obligating punishment is also a satisfactory cause, according to what is said in Isaiah 53:4, "Truly he bore our infirmities, etc."].

25 *SH* IV, P1, In1, Tr1, Q1, M5, C5, Ar1 (n. 5), pp. 17b-8a.

26 *SH* IV, P1, In1, Tr1, Q1, M5, C5, Ar2 (n. 6), p. 20a.

27 *SH* IV, P1, In1, Tr1, Q1, M9, C7 (n. 9), pp. 23-4.

28 *SH* IV, P1, In1, Tr4, Q3, M4, C2, Ar2 (n. 139), p. 192b.

29 *SH* IV, P1, In1, Tr4, Q3, M4, C2, Ar3 (n. 140), Respondeo, p. 193b: 'Sed et dominium mortis temporalis destruxit in pluribus; ita enim dominabatur mors prius quod timore mortis retro abibant, sed post factum est ut non timeretur, sed gratanter current ad mortem, quod in martyribus claruit'

The other way that Christ's death overcomes sin involves removing the stain of sin that deforms the human soul. This occurs through Christ meriting grace for sinners. As the *SH* states, 'the passion of Christ is a meritorious cause of removing the stain [of sin] because he merits grace and everything else for us by which sin is removed.'³⁰

After setting out these two ways that Christ's passion brings about justification, the *SH* quotes a long passage from *CDH* II.14, where Anselm speaks of Christ's life as so good and so worthy of love that it can overcome the sins of the whole world. The *SH* offers the following *Gloss* on Anselm's words: 'Therefore, the passion of Christ in itself destroys sin as a meritorious cause of grace that removes its stain and as a satisfactory cause that destroys the obligation to punishment.'³¹ With these words the *SH* recapitulates what we have already seen as its own way of describing the twofold manner in which the Passion destroys sin, and here it attributes this same teaching to Anselm. While what Anselm says in *CDH* II.14 and elsewhere is compatible with the position of the *SH*, it is noteworthy that Anselm does not distinguish the stain of sin from the punishment due to sin nor does he distinguish the temporal punishment due to sin from the eternal punishment. Thus, Anselm does not describe some aspects of Christ's death as addressing the stain of sin, and other aspects as addressing the punishment due to sin. These ways of analyzing the passion of Christ are found, however, in III *Sentences* Distinctions 18 to 19. For example, in Chapters 3 to 4 of III.19, the Lombard speaks of how Christ's death is related to overcoming the temporal and eternal punishments due to sin.³²

Peter Lombard also influences how the *SH* explains the manner in which the fruits of Christ's passion are appropriated by individuals. The *SH* states that Christ's passion removes sin insofar as it exists in the soul of the person through love, faith, compassion, and imitation. According to the *SH*, 'in these four ways [Christ's passion] is joined to the soul and has existence in it.'³³ The *SH* refers to the *Sentences*

[But he also destroyed in many ways the temporal dominion of death. For death was dominating to such an extent that they were turning back out of a fear of death, but after it was done they did not fear, but voluntarily ran to death, as is clear in the case of the martyrs].

30 *SH* IV, P1, In1, Tr5, Q1, M6, C1, Ar1 (n. 156), Respondeo, p. 216a: 'Est ergo Christi passio causa meritoria deletionis maculae quia meruit nobis gratiam et omne illud quo deletur peccatum.'

31 *SH* IV, P1, In1, Tr5, Q1, M6, C1, Ar1 (n. 156), Respondeo, p. 216b: 'Sic ergo passio Christi in ipsa natura rei delet peccatum ut causa meritoria gratiae ad delendum maculam et ut causa satisfactoria ad delendum reatum ad poenam.'

32 Peter Lombard, *Sententiae in IV libris distinctae* 3, d. 19, cc. 3–4, 2 vols, ed. Ignatius C. Brady, *Spicilegium Bonaventurianum*, 3–4 (Grottaferrata: Collegium S. Bonaventurae, 1971–81), 2:121–2. See also Peter Lombard, *Sententiae* 3, d. 18, c. 5 (Brady, 2:116): 'Meruit enim nobis per mortis ac passionis tolerantiam quod per praecedentia non meruerat, scilicet aditum paradisi et redemptionem a peccato, a poena, a diabolo' [By undergoing his passion and death, he merits for us certain things he had not previously merited, namely the opening of paradise, redemption from sin, punishment, and the devil].

33 *SH* IV, P1, In1, Tr5, Q1, M6, C1, Ar1 (n. 156), Respondeo, p. 216b: 'Istis enim quatuor modis coniungitur animae et habet esse in illa.'

in its explanation of the first two ways, and its own analysis of how love and faith remove sin closely follows what the Lombard writes in *Sentences*, Book 3, Distinction 19.³⁴ Peter Lombard refers to Rom. 5:8 where Paul writes that God commended his charity towards us by dying for us when we were sinners. The *SH* also cites this passage from Romans, and the *SH* follows Peter Lombard's interpretation of the passage according to which the death of Christ justifies us by enkindling charity in our hearts through its own example of love for us.³⁵

When explaining how faith justifies the sinner, the *SH* follows Peter Lombard's teaching from Chapter 1 of III.19, using again a passage from Romans that Peter Lombard cites to support its claims. Faith in Christ's death is an efficient cause for removing the stain of sin since such a faith is conjoined to charity.³⁶ The *SH* interprets Rom. 3:22–25 to suggest that faith in Christ's passion has this power: '[the stain of sin] is removed in adults through their own faith, or with the sacrament of faith, as in Baptism, that removes the stain in children through the faith of the Church. Thus, the Apostle in Romans 3:22–25, "the justice of God" is "by faith in Jesus whom [God] proposed as a propitiator through faith in his blood", that is, through faith in the passion.'³⁷

Faith and charity remove the stain of sin in the soul. The other aspect of sin—the obligation to punishment—has been overcome by Christ in the ways described above, but once a baptized person falls into sin again he or she incurs a new debt to punishment. This new debt is overcome through the passion of Christ having existence in the person through both compassion and imitation. The *SH* indicates that

34 *SH* IV, P1, In1, Tr5, Q1, M6, C1, Ar1 (n. 156), Respondeo, p. 216b: 'Passio ergo Christi duobus modis valet ad deletionem peccati, sicut dicit Magister, in III *Sententiarum*, 18 [sic] dist. Primus modus est ex parte caritatis, secundus ex parte fidei' [Therefore, the passion of Christ can delete sin in two ways, just as the Master says in III *Sentences* d. 18 [sic]: the first way is from charity, the second from faith].

35 *SH* IV, P1, In1, Tr5, Q1, M6, C1, Ar1 (n. 156), Respondeo, p. 216b: 'Primus modus est ergo ex parte caritatis, quia per passionem Christi excitatur in nobis amor Dei, secundum quod Apostolus, Rom 5:8, "Commendat Deus caritatem suam in nobis, quoniam, cum essemus peccatores, Christus pro nobis mortuus est." Et ex hoc accendimur ad amandum ipsum amore caritatis, quae "operit multitudinem peccatorum" [1 Peter 4:8]' [The first way is from charity because through the passion of Christ the love of God is roused in us, as the Apostle writes in Romans 5:8, "God commends his charity to us because when we were sinners, Christ died for us." From this we are inflamed to love of him with the love of charity, which "covers a multitude of sins" (1 Peter 4:8)]. Cf. Peter Lombard, *Sententiae* 3, d. 19, c. 1 (Brady, 2:118).

36 *SH* IV, P1, In1, Tr5, Q1, M6, C1, Ar1 (n. 156), Respondeo, p. 216b: 'Ex parte vero fidei ostenditur modus per modum efficientis, quia passio Christi per fidem formatam, quae est cum amore Dei, valet ad deletionem maculae peccati ut causa effectiva coniuncta' [On the part of faith this occurs through the mode of efficiency, because the passion of Christ (through formed faith, which is with the love of God) can delete the stain of sin as an effective conjoined cause]. Even though God alone is the principal cause of removing the stain of sin, the *SH* describes the passion as a cooperating efficient and meritorious cause of this (see *SH* IV, P1, In1, Tr5, Q1, M6, C1, Ar1 (n. 156), Ad obiecta 1, p. 217a).

37 *SH* IV, P1, In1, Tr5, Q1, M6, C1, Ar1 (n. 156), Respondeo, p. 216b.

compassion is an interior act that serves as a meritorious cause of the remission of sins whereas imitation of Christ's passion occurs through an external act whereby one makes satisfaction to pay the debt of punishment incurred by sin.³⁸ There is no parallel in III *Sentences*, Distinctions 18 to 19 to what the *SH* writes about how Christ's passion exists in the soul through compassion and imitation. It does bear some similarities to what Peter Lombard writes in IV *Sentences*, Distinction 16 about the compunction of heart and satisfaction in deed that form two of the three parts of penance. Regardless of whether that lies in the background, it is clear that the *SH* goes beyond the teaching of *CDH* in discussing how Christ's passion is appropriated by individuals, and, as we have seen, its discussion of this aspect of Christ's redemptive work is influenced by what Peter Lombard writes about faith and charity.

The Magnitude of Christ's Suffering

The connection between punishment and satisfaction leads the *SH* to explore questions about the manner and degree of Christ's suffering not addressed by Anselm. In answering these questions, the *SH* will nevertheless sometimes draw on resources from the *CDH* in addition to resources provided by other theological authorities such as Peter Lombard and John Damascene.

When considering which type of suffering would constitute an adequate satisfaction for sin, the *SH* asks if Christ could make satisfaction by the shedding of a single drop of blood. It attributes the following argument to Bernard of Clairvaux: 'One drop of blood was a sufficient price for our redemption. Therefore, after his circumcision, it was not necessary for him to suffer.'³⁹ In response to this, the *SH* distinguishes between two ways of determining the adequacy of the suffering offered as satisfaction for sin. If considered from the perspective of the person suffering, then one drop of blood would suffice since the person suffering is God. In determining the value of Christ's suffering in relation to the divine person who undergoes the suffering, the *SH* follows Anselm's way of understanding why Christ's satisfaction was able to pay the debt of sin.⁴⁰ Yet the *SH* notes that the adequacy of one's satisfaction

38 *SH* IV, P1, In1, Tr5, Q1, M6, C1, Ar1 (n. 156), Respondeo, pp. 216b-7a: 'Passio vero Christi in compassione et imitatione vel per compassionem et imitationem valet ad deletionem reatus poenae; sed compassio interior, ut causa meritoria remissionis poenae; imitatio in actu exteriori, ut causa satisfactoria poenae debita' [The passion of Christ in compassion or imitation or through compassion and imitation could delete the guilt for punishment; but interior compassion does this as a meritorious cause of the remission of punishment, while imitation in exterior act does this as a satisfactory cause for the debt to punishment].

39 *SH* IV, P1, In1, Tr5, Q1, M3, C2 (n. 149), arg. 3, p. 209a: 'Item, Bernardus: Una gutta sanguinis sufficiens fuit pretium nostrae redemptionis; ergo post circumcisionem non fuit necesse eum pati.'

40 Anselm of Canterbury, *Cur Deus homo* II, c. 14 (Schmitt, 113–6).

could also be considered according to the kind of punishment suffered. In this sense one drop of blood would not be sufficient. For 'in satisfaction the kind of punishment ought to correspond to the kind of guilt.'⁴¹ The severity of human guilt would make it unfitting for satisfaction to be made through the shedding of a single drop of blood. An adequate satisfaction requires that Christ undergo the greatest suffering.

In addition to discussing the magnitude of Christ's suffering, the *SH* explores the types of suffering that Christ could have undergone. The *SH* first distinguishes culpable suffering from penal suffering.⁴² Culpable suffering is suffering for one's own guilt, while penal suffering is the suffering imposed on the human race because of original sin. Christ did not experience every kind of suffering because none of his suffering was culpable suffering. He did undergo some, but not all, types of penal suffering. Following Peter Lombard, the *SH* divides penal suffering into suffering that detracts from one's dignity and suffering that does not do so.⁴³ The types of suffering which detract from one's dignity are either those that are so overwhelming that one's reason is disturbed or those that stem from some type of ignorance. Christ freely takes on sufferings such as hunger, thirst, and sorrow that do not detract from his dignity and that will contribute to his work of redemption. These types of suffering along with willingly accepting death contribute in different ways to his salvific work.

The *SH* uses John Damascene's distinction between the natural and rational will to explain the magnitude of suffering involved in Christ's death. The severity of Christ's experience of suffering can be determined in two different ways depending upon whether it was contrary to his natural will only or both his natural will and his rational will. In the first way, Christ experienced the greatest suffering. To say that Christ's bodily suffering was against his natural will indicates that Christ's soul (like that of any human being) is naturally inclined to union with its body, and opposed to separation from it. Yet Christ's death is uniquely painful, according to the *SH*, because 'his body had the best construction and was optimally suited to its soul.'⁴⁴ Christ's death, however, was not against his rational will, and insofar as it

41 *SH* IV, P1, In1, Tr5, Q1, M3, C2 (n. 149), Ad obiecta 3, p. 210b: 'In satisfactione autem respondere debet genus poenae generi culpae.'

42 *SH* IV, P1, In1, Tr5, Q1, M2, C2, Ar1 (n. 147), Respondeo, p. 204a-b.

43 Peter Lombard, *Sententiae* 3, d. 15, c. 1 (Brady, 2:93): 'Suscepit autem Christus sicut veram naturam hominis, ita et veros defectus hominis, sed non omnes. Assumpsit enim defectus poenae, sed non culpae; nec tamen omnes defectus poenae, sed eos omnes quos homini eum assumere expediebat et suae dignitati non derogabat' [Just as Christ took on the true nature of man, so also he took on the true defects of man, but not all of them. For he assumed the defects of punishment, but not of guilt. He did not take on all the defects of punishment, but all those which it was suitable for him to assume as man and which did not detract from his dignity].

44 *SH* IV, P1, In1, Tr5, Q1, M5, C1 (n. 154), Respondeo, p. 214b.

was in accord with his rational will, he did not suffer. Indeed, the ability of his suffering to contribute to human redemption depends precisely on its being willed.⁴⁵

The Salvific Significance of Christ's Incarnation, Life, and Resurrection

Anselm focuses on explaining how the death of a God-man is necessary for human salvation. While Christ's suffering and death is the main focus of the *SH*'s treatment of redemption, it also investigates the redemptive significance of the Incarnation itself as well as the redemptive significance of the earthly life and resurrection of Christ.

The *SH* asks whether the Incarnation itself accomplishes human salvation. An argument for this is based on Gregory the Great's statement that the humility of the redeemer should be as great as the pride of the sinner. On this basis the *SH* develops the following argument: 'that his humility was at least as great is clear because Adam wished to ascend to deity not in the union of person, but through conforming in knowledge [to God]. But God descends to us even up to the union with a human [nature].'⁴⁶ Adam's pride sought a union with God in terms of knowledge, but the Logos' humility sought an even more intimate union with humanity, a union in person rather than merely a union of knowledge. Thus, according to the *SH*, to the extent that our salvation requires an act of humility that outweighs the pride of Adam's sin, then the humility evinced in the Incarnation itself more than suffices.⁴⁷

The *SH* also sees redemptive significance in the suffering Christ underwent prior to his death on the cross.⁴⁸ The *SH* locates the importance of this suffering in redressing the perverse enjoyment (*perversa delectatio*) present in Adam's sin.⁴⁹ This perverse enjoyment was manifested in a spiritual way through desiring to eat the fruit, and in a material way through eating the fruit. The perverse enjoyment in something physical is remedied by Christ's suffering at different moments in his life. As an example of this, the *SH* points to Luke 19:41, where Christ cries over Jerusalem's re-

45 *SH* IV, P1, In1, Tr5, Q1, M5, C1 (n. 154), Respondeo, p. 214b: 'secundo non fuit dolor in Christo, quia nunquam fuit martyr, qui tantum informatus caritate desideraret mori, et ex hoc est meritum passionis' [In the second way (i.e. with respect to his rational will) there was no *dolor* in Christ, because he was never a martyr, but he was one who was informed by so much charity that he desired to die, and from this is the merit of the passion].

46 *SH* IV, P1, In1, Tr5, Q1, M3, C2 (n. 149), arg. 1, p. 209a: 'Et quod tanta fuerit humilitas, patet, quia Adam ascendere voluit ad deitatem, non in unione personae, sed per conformitatem scientiae. Sed Deus descendit usque ad unionem cum humana.'

47 *SH* IV, P1, In1, Tr5, Q1, M3, C2 (n. 149), Ad obiecta 1, p. 209b.

48 For more on this aspect of the soteriology of the *SH*, see Boyd Taylor Coolman, 'The Salvific Affectivity of Christ according to Alexander of Hales,' *The Thomist* 71 (2001): 1–38.

49 *SH* IV, P1, In1, Tr5, Q1, M3, C2 (n. 149), Ad obiecta 1, p. 209b.

jection of the peace that he offers. These moments of suffering prior to his death on the cross are anticipations of the full rendering of satisfaction that occurs on in his death.⁵⁰

The *SH* also argues that Christ's resurrection contributes to our redemption. The *SH* takes Rom. 4:25 as raising this issue when Paul writes, 'He died for our sins and rose for our justification.'⁵¹ Thus, it seems that Paul teaches that Christ's resurrection is the cause of our justification whereas his death causes the forgiveness of sins. The *SH* holds that forgiveness of sins and justification imply one another. There can be no forgiveness apart from justification and no justification that does not involve cleansing a person from his sins.⁵² Thus, if the resurrection is the cause of justification, it will also be the cause of forgiveness. Moreover, as the *SH* notes, interpreting Rom. 4:25 as denying that the death of Christ brings about our justification contradicts Rom. 3:24–25, which states that we are justified through faith in Christ's blood.⁵³

To resolve the questions raised by Rom. 4:25 the *SH* draws on the *Gloss* of Peter Lombard. According to the *Gloss*, both Christ's death and resurrection take away our sins and justify us. Yet the *Gloss* states that there is a difference between the death and resurrection of Christ in regard to what they signify. The *SH* cites the following passage from the *Gloss*: 'the death of Christ alone signifies the destruction of our old life, and in the resurrection alone new life is signified.'⁵⁴ Thus, Christ's death is a sign of the remission of sins, but his resurrection is a sign of our justification. Rom. 4:25 connects the resurrection to our justification because of what it signifies, not because it is the sole cause of justification. Even though the death and resurrection are both causes of our justification, they bring this about in different ways. The passion is a cause of justification that brings about an incomplete justification in this life. While justification in this life destroys one's guilt for sin by the conferral of grace, justification in the next life will free a person from every sort of misery. It is the res-

50 *SH* IV, P1, In1, Tr5, Q1, M3, C2 (n. 149), Ad obiecta 1, p. 209b: 'Unde sicut ab elatione inchoavit peccatum Adae, ita fuit consummatio in comestionis delectatione. Eodem modo dispensatio nostrae redemptionis fuit in initio humilitatis incarnationis, progressus in conversatione, in qua passus est per compassionem, unde "flevit", Luc. 19, 41; consummatio vero fuit in passione, unde dixit: "Consummatum est"' [Just as the sin of Adam began from passion, so also was there consummation in the pleasure of eating. In the same way the dispensation of our redemption began from the humility of the incarnation, advanced through his living among us, during which period he suffered through compassion, whence "He cried" (Luke 19:41). But its consummation was in the passion, whence he said, "It is consummated"]].

51 *SH* IV, P1, In1, Tr5, Q1, M6, C1, Ar1 (n. 156), arg. 1, p. 217a.

52 *SH* IV, P1, In1, Tr5, Q1, M6, C1, Ar1 (n. 156), args 2–3 and Ad obiecta 2 and 3–5, p. 217a-b.

53 *SH* IV, P1, In1, Tr5, Q1, M6, C1, Ar1 (n. 156), arg. 5, p. 217b.

54 *SH* IV, P1, In1, Tr5, Q1, M6, C1, Ar1 (n. 156), Respondeo, p. 217b: 'mors tamen Christi sola interitum vitae veteris significat, et in sola resurrectione nova vita significatur.'

urrection that is the cause of justification in that latter sense.⁵⁵ Thus, the justification of sinners, the primary fruit of Christ's redemptive work, is also caused by Christ's resurrection.

Conclusion

While the *SH* supplements Anselm's narrow focus on Christ's death by its attention to how the Incarnation, life, and resurrection of Christ contribute to his redemptive work, it nevertheless relies on Anselm's *CDH* at key moments in its treatment of redemption. Yet even in those places where the *SH* seems most heavily dependent on Anselm—for example in its adoption of the category of satisfaction or its claim that certain aspects of the plan of redemption are necessary—we find the *SH* interpreting Anselm's claims in light of principles not taken from Anselm. Thus, satisfaction comes to be linked to punishment, and the 'necessity of immutability' is reformulated in light of the distinction between God's ordained and absolute power. The *SH* moreover frequently brings Anselm's ideas into dialogue with those of other theological authorities. In doing so the *SH* produced an original synthesis of its sources that is especially apparent in its use of Anselm and Peter Lombard. Many of the texts cited about satisfaction are taken from *CDH*, but the particular way of interpreting the concept of satisfaction is heavily influenced by Peter Lombard's *Sentences*. Moreover, the way that Christ's merit comes to have equal importance to his satisfaction also reflects the influence of Peter Lombard. Given the interest of Alexander of Hales and his early disciples in promoting the study of both Anselm's *CDH* and Peter Lombard's *Sentences*, it should perhaps be expected that the *SH* would bring their teaching on redemption together in a creative way.

⁵⁵ *SH* IV, P1, In1, Tr5, Q1, M6, C1, Ar1 (n. 156), Ad objecta 2, p. 217b and *SH* IV, P1, In1, Tr6, Q1, M2, C2 (n. 172), p. 244a-b. For more on the different types of causality exercised by Christ's resurrection, see *SH* IV, P1, In1, Tr6, Q1, M2, C1 (n. 171), pp. 241–3.

Boyd Taylor Coolman

Hugh of St Victor's Influence on the *Summa Halensis*

Abstract: The influence of the 12th century Victorines, especially that of Hugh and Richard of St Victor, on the *Summa Halensis*, is pervasive, both deep and wide. The Halensist quotes both authors explicitly and frequently. A catalogue of Hugh citations would reveal one kind of perspective on Hugh's influence on various topics, especially on the sacraments in the unedited Book IV of the *Summa*. Arguably more important, though, is Hugh's influence on the entire orientation and method of the early Franciscan *Summa*. Three aspects of this form of influence are noteworthy. First, the Halensist adopts and adapts Hugh's signature distinction between the two fundamental 'works of God', namely, creating and restoring, as a framework for organizing the content of the entire *Summa*. Second, the Halensist identifies the overarching subject matter of theology as the Hugonian 'works of restoration' in salvation history, centered on the Incarnation. Third, the Halensist is inspired by Hugh to conceive of theology as a practical discipline, aimed ultimately at perfecting its practitioner affectively by orienting her in love toward divine goodness. In this, theology is a distinct form of Christian wisdom.

Assessing the influence of Hugh of St Victor (d. 1241) on the *Summa Halensis* (SH), it seems fitting to begin with Bonaventure's oft-cited praise of the Victorine in *On the Reduction of the Arts to Theology*.¹ There, surveying the luminaries of the recent and remote Christian tradition, the Seraphic Doctor paid special tribute to Hugh. The Franciscan observed that Augustine and Anselm excelled in speculative theology, Gregory the Great and Bernard of Clairvaux in practical morality, and Dionysius and Richard of St Victor in mystical contemplation. But Hugh 'excelled in all three'.² Bonaventure's paean to Hugh is oft-noted, but still noteworthy: It is very high praise, especially in light of the fact that the medievals themselves highly val-

1 Bonaventure, 'On Retracing the Arts to Theology 5,' in *The Works of Bonaventure*, vol. 3, trans. José de Vinck (Paterson, NJ: St Anthony's Guild Press, 1966), 20.

2 Bonaventure, *De reductione artium ad theologiam*, in *Doctoris seraphici S. Bonaventurae opera omnia*, vol. 5 (Quaracchi: Collegii S Bonaventura, 1891), 321: 'Unde tota sacra Scriptura haec tria docet, scilicet Christi aeternam generationem et incarnationem, vivendi ordinem et Dei et animae unionem. Primum respicit fidem, secundum mores, tertium finem utriusque. Circa primum insudare debet studium doctorum, circa secundum studium praedicatorum, circa tertium studium contemplativorum. Primum maxime docet Augustinus, secundum maxime docet Gregorium, tertium vero docet Dionysius; Anselmus sequitur Augustinum, Bernardus sequitur Gregorium, Richardus sequitur Dionysium, quia Anselmus in ratiocinatione, Bernardus in praedicatione, Richardus in contemplatione. Hugo vero omnia haec.'

ued comprehensive, synthetic integration. To unite everything into a coherent and indeed beautiful whole, like a gothic cathedral, an institutional *universitas*, or a theological Summa—‘where there is a place for everything and everything has its place’—was for high medieval culture the consummate human achievement. To position Hugh thus, not merely as the exemplar in one part or aspect, but of all—*le modèle du théologien accompli*³—is to put him at the pinnacle of all that a high medieval theologian might esteem.

Another point is germane. Bonaventure’s esteem for Hugh is often considered in isolation—a tribute from one theological virtuoso to another. The Franciscan casts his eyes back over an intervening century to the venerable Victorine, perhaps, given the former’s purported ambivalence about the trajectory of scholastic culture in his own day, with a whiff of nostalgia for a bygone era when things were right in the theological world. Quite probably, though, contemporary Franciscan readers would not have been startled by this homage—as modern readers tend to be—nor would they have heard it as a wistful retrospect to a now quaint theological enterprise. Rather, they may well have found it an obvious commonplace. As J.G. Bougerol pointed out long ago,⁴ a distinctive 13th-century Franciscan interest in the Victorines (in contrast to the Dominicans), in Hugh certainly but also in Richard,⁵ was already deeply imbedded in Franciscan intellectual culture by Bonaventure’s time. In fact, it began with Alexander of Hales,⁶ founder of the Franciscan school and Bonaventure’s own revered master. This may well be a function of Alexander’s close relationship with the Abbey of St Victor in Paris, and to its regent master in the first two decades of the 13th century, Thomas Gallus.⁷ Beginning with Alexander’s *Gloss* on the Lom-

3 Sylvain Piron, ‘Franciscains et victorins: Tableau d’une réception,’ in *L’école de Saint-Victor de Paris: Influence et le rayonnement du Moyen Âge à l’Époque modern*, ed. Dominique Poirel, Bibliotheca Victorina, 22 (Turnhout: Brepols, 2010), 522.

4 Jacques Guy Bougerol, *Introduction à Saint Bonaventure* (Paris: Vrin, 1988), 94.

5 Piron, ‘Franciscains et victorins,’ 526, notes that as an Englishman, ‘Alexander undoubtedly played a role in the importation into Paris of the writings of the Archbishop of Canterbury who never seems to have been quoted with such frequency by the masters of previous generations. But it is probably in Paris that he encountered the works of his compatriot Richard.’

6 See Victorin Doucet, ‘Prolegomena,’ in Alexander of Hales, *Magistri Alexandri de Hales Glossa in quatuor libros Sententiarum Petri Lombardi*, 4 vols, Bibliotheca Franciscana Scholastica Medii Aevi, 12–5 (Quaracchi: Collegium S. Bonaventurae, 1951–7), 1:7*–75*. According to Doucet, Alexander arrived in Paris in the first decade and was regent master in the faculty of arts (as Roger Bacon mentions) prior to the prohibition against lectures on the physical books of Aristotle in 1210. He then seems to have shifted over to the faculty of theology in 1212 to 1213, where he became successively student, bachelor, and regent master in 1220 or 1221. In 1236, he became a Franciscan, which was the occasion of a transfer of his university chair into the Franciscan Order. The first Franciscan theological school coalesced around him.

7 Bougerol, *Introduction à Saint Bonaventure*, 94, hypothesized that in fact Alexander was first the student, and then the successor of the last great Victorine master, Thomas Gallus or Thomas of Saint-Victor, who was teaching at the Abbey until 1219, when he departed for Vercelli (cf. Gabriel Théry, ‘Thomas Gallus: aperçu biographique,’ *Archives d’histoire doctrinale et littéraire du Moyen*

bard's *Sentences*, and continuing in his disputed questions, Hugh is a consistent presence in Alexander's authentic writings. Not only that: the frequency of Hugh citations only increases (as does the percentage relative to other authors) in the *SH*.⁸ As the edition editors noted, the *SH* 'is greatly indebted to the masters of the school of St Victor'.⁹

Bonaventure's tribute to Hugh, then, is symptomatic of a well-established 'Victorine-Franciscan' worldview, sensibility, and tradition running from the early 12th century to the mid 13th,¹⁰ terminating in St Bonaventure.¹¹ Modern historians ought

Âge 12 (1939): 163). Thus, Alexander's accession to the rank of master and the beginning of his regency follows hard, intriguingly, on Gallus' departure. On this theory, accordingly, the chair of the Abbey of Saint-Victor would have thus passed to a secular master (Alexander), on the assumption that no Victorine canon was qualified to assume it (Piron, 'Franciscains et victorins,' 527). Bougerol also noted that on January 26, 1237, Gregory IX issued a papal bull granting a new chair of theology to Saint-Victor, just a few months after Alexander joined the Franciscans in 1236. In the bull, Gregory notes that teaching at Saint-Victor had been 'interrupted for some time' (*aliquandiu intermissa*), perhaps because of Alexander's departure. Bougerol's theory is based largely on circumstantial evidence, namely, this double coincidence of dates, along with the traces of intellectual continuity between Alexander and the Victorines. Other scholars have disputed it (cf. Jacques Verger, 'Saint-Victor et l'université,' in *L'école de Saint-Victor de Paris* (see above, n. 3), 139–152). Though an attractive theory, it seems safest to say that the evidence remains inconclusive.

8 See the statistical tabulation in Piron, 'Franciscains et victorins,' 525. As he notes at 526, that Alexander refers to Hugh and Richard as *magister* hints at a more intimate relationship than mere familiarity with their texts.

9 'Prolegomena ad primum librum Summae Theologicae,' in Alexander of Hales, *Doctoris irrefragabilis Alexandri de Hales Ordinis minorum Summa theologica*, vol. 1 (Quaracchi: Collegium S. Bonaventurae, 1924), xxxiv: 'A magistris quoque scholae S. Victoris valde dependet Doctor noster'.

10 The Victorines influenced other important figures in the early Franciscan movement, including St Anthony of Padua, who seems to have known and revered Thomas Gallus (cf. Gabriel Théry, 'Saint Antoine de Padoue et Thomas Gallus: I. Formation du thème vercellien,' *La vie spirituelle* 37 (1933): 94–115; Gabriel Théry, 'Saint Antoine de Padoue et Thomas Gallus: II. Critique du thème vercellien,' *La vie spirituelle* 37 (1933): 163–70; Gabriel Théry, 'Saint Antoine de Padoue et Thomas Gallus: III. L'éloge de S. Antoine de Padoue par Thomas Gallus,' *La vie spirituelle* 38 (1934): 22–51; see also Jean Châtillon, 'Saint Antoine de Padoue et les victorins,' *Il Santo* 22 (1982): 171–202, republished in Jean Châtillon, *Le mouvement canonial au Moyen Âge: réforme de l'Église, spiritualité et culture*, ed. Patrice Sicard, Bibliotheca Victorina, 3 (Paris/Turnhout: Brepols, 1992), 255–92). As Piron notes, Anthony had been trained in Lisbon and especially in Coimbra, with regular canons, who read Victorine writers, some of whom might have even studied in Paris with Gallus. Anthony also seems to have spent time studying with the Parisian-trained Gallus in Vercelli, perhaps coinciding with an attempt to found a university there in 1228, which involved attracting the masters and students of Padua (Piron, 'Franciscains et victorins,' 528).

11 Gilson saw this nearly a century ago: 'Such works testify amply, and they will testify more and more, as they are studied, of the intense vitality manifested by Christian thought towards the end of the twelfth century and the beginning of the thirteenth century. Far from appearing to us as a messy site occupied by teams of anarchic workers and powerless to build, it appears to us as resolutely engaged since the time of Victorines in the way that leads to St Bonaventure. Of essentially theological inspiration, it uses, without false shame, the terminology or even the doctrine of Aristotle, but under the express condition that none of its constituent principles will ever come to replace those

to adopt the notion that a continuous, coherent, and compelling theological tradition—distinguishable from other contemporary currents¹²—flows between Hugh and Bonaventure, with Alexander and the *SH* as the conduit between them. One might even see the nascent Franciscan theological tradition as the early 13th-century form and expression, even sublimation, of the Victorine school.

Bonaventure's praise of Hugh harbors one last feature relevant to the Victorine's influence on the early Franciscan intellectual tradition. As in the praise itself, the significance of Hugh's presence in the *SH* is less related to a particular doctrine or aspect of the theological enterprise (e.g. sacraments or contemplation), though Hugh is cited as an authority on many such topics¹³—too numerous to catalogue here, especially in Book 4, on the topics of the sacraments. Rather, it is more ambient, atmospheric, and global, more an underlying theological sensibility and orientation. Three such aspects, all from the 'General Introduction' of the *SH*, are treated below.

Hugh's 'Two Works' and the Structure of the *Summa Halensis*

In order to appreciate the first area of Hugh's influence on Alexander, a brief glance at the opening lines of Hugh's great masterwork, the *De sacramentis*, is necessary.¹⁴ With a certain methodological self-consciousness at the dawn of medieval scholasticism, Hugh begins by specifying the nature of his undertaking in this way:

of Augustine in the edifice built by tradition' (Étienne Gilson, *La philosophie de Saint Bonaventure* (Paris: Vrin, 1924), 468).

12 This is not to deny the presence of other important theological currents flowing into the *Summa Halensis*, including those from Augustine of Hippo, John of Damascus, Anselm of Canterbury, and Peter Lombard. Cf. 'Prolegomena ad primum librum Summae Theologicae,' xxviii: '1. Alexander Halensis in conscribenda *Summa Theologica* doctrinas philosophicas et theologicas a S. Augustino, S. Anselmo et schola Sancti Victoris praecipue excogitates et iam in academiis Medii Aevi usu receptas, fidelissime amplectitur. Etenim decursu saeculorum, sapientia christiana motu quodam progressivo in synthesim organicam sese constituerat, ut videre est praesertim in libro *De Trinitate* S. Augustini, in *De fide orthodoxa* Ioannis Damasceni, in Summis *De Sacramentis* et *De Trinitate* Hugonis et Richardi a S. Victore, in quatuor *Libris Sententiarum* Petri Lombardi et in aureis opusculis, *Monologion* et *Proslogion*, S. Anselmi.'

13 The editors mention several, but there are many others. Cf. 'Prolegomena ad primum librum Summae Theologicae,' xxxiv: 'In primis distinctionem Hugonis a S. Victore inter opera conditionis et opera recreationis agnoscit (n. 3, ad 1, 2, 4, p. 6–7). Ad mentem eius tractat de statu primi hominis (n. 146, p. 225) et de cognitione quam Adam de Deo habebat in paradiso (n. 18, p. 29). Illum prae ceteris laudat in quaestione de differentiis voluntatis divinae in generali (n. 272, p. 369b).'

14 Hugh of St Victor, *De sacramentis* (hereafter, *Sacr.*) (PL 176:173 A-618B); Hugh of St Victor, *On the Sacraments of the Christian Faith* (*De sacramentis*), trans. Roy J. Deferrari, Medieval Academy of America, 58 (Cambridge, Mass.: Mediaeval Academy of America, 1951).

The subject matter of all the divine Scriptures is the work of restoration (*opera restaurationis*) of humanity. For there are two works in which is contained all that has been done. The first is the work of creation (*opus conditionis*). The second is the work of restoration (*opus restaurationis*). The work of creation is that whereby those things which were not came into being. The work of restoration is that whereby those things which had been impaired were made better. Therefore the work of creation is the creation of the world with all its elements. The work of restoration is the Incarnation of the Word with all its sacraments, both those which have gone before from the beginning of time, and those which come after, even to the end of the world.¹⁵

He then concludes this introductory discussion with the following:

Therefore, the works of creation (*opera creationis*), as of little importance, were accomplished in six days, but the works of restoration (*opera restaurationis*) can only be completed in six ages. Yet six are placed over against six that the Restorer may be proven to be the same as the Creator.¹⁶

From much that could be said of these texts, three features merit mention: First, the distinction between the two works, namely, of creation and of restoration, is a distinctive Hugonian marker, a fundamental, far-reaching, and signature distinction in his theology. The second feature is the emphasis on divine activity in history ('salvation-history' in modern terms), in creating, but especially in restoring fallen creation; i.e. the 'works of restoration'. Christological centrality is the third: Christ is the center of God's activity in salvation history, and all those acts are 'sacraments' (another piece of distinctive Hugonian vocabulary) mediating divine self-revelation. In short, for Hugh, the subject matter of all of Scripture, what the whole of Scripture is ultimately about, is salvific divine activity in history, centered around the Incarnation.

In light of Hugh's text, consider the continuity of themes and the persistent Hugonian orientation found in the opening paragraphs of the 'General Prologue' of the *SH*: 'The whole discipline of Christian faith pertains to two things: to the faith and

15 Hugh of St Victor, *Sacr.*, I.Prol.2 (Deferrari, 3; PL 176:183 A-B): 'Materia divinarum Scripturarum omnium sunt opera restaurationis humanae. Duo enim sunt opera in quibus universa continentur quae facta sunt. Primum est opus conditionis. Secundum est opus restaurationis. Opus conditionis est quo factum est ut essent quae non erant. Opus restaurationis est quo factum est ut melius essent quae perierant. [183B] Ergo opus conditionis est creatio mundi cum omnibus elementis suis. Opus restaurationis est incarnatio Verbi cum omnibus sacramentis suis; sive iis quae praecesserunt ab initio saeculi, sive iis quae subsequuntur usque ad finem mundi.'

16 Hugh of St Victor, *Sacr.*, I.Prol.2 (Deferrari, 4; PL 176:184 A): 'Propterea illa [opera conditionis] quasi modicum aliquid sex diebus perfecta sunt; haec [opera restaurationis] vero non nisi aetatibus sex compleri possunt. Tamen sex contra sex e diverso ponuntur, ut idem reparator qui creator demonstratur.'

understanding of the Creator and the faith and understanding of the Savior.¹⁷ The Halensist then elaborates on each:

The faith [and understanding] of the Creator principally contains two things, namely, the cognition of the substance of the Creator and the cognition of the works of the Creator. The cognition of the substance of the Creator consists in the cognition of the divine Unity and of its most blessed Trinity, while the cognition of the works of the Creator consists in the cognition of the creation or formation of things.¹⁸

And:

Likewise, the faith and understanding of the Savior revolves around two things, namely, around the person of the Savior and around the work of salvation. And the person of the Savior is the person of the Son of God, namely, Christ in two natures, of divinity and of humanity. For Christ is one, God and man.¹⁹

Between the Victorine and the Halensian is a shared interest in divine activity in history—the divine *opera*.²⁰ Distinctive to the latter is the interest in the divine Actor, as well (more on this below). It may also be the case that the Halensist grants the two

17 Alexander of Hales, *Doctoris irrefragabilis Alexandri de Hales Ordinis minorum Summa theologica* (*SH*), 4 vols (Quaracchi: Collegium S. Bonaventurae, 1924–48), Vol I, ‘Prologus Generalis’: ‘Tota christianae fidei disciplina pertinet ad duo: ad fidem et intelligentiam Conditoris et fidem atque intelligentiam Salvatoris. Unde Isaias Propheta, in persona Domini loquens, dicit, 43:10–11: “Credatis et intelligatis quia ego ipse sum: ante me non est formatus deus et post me non erit. Ego sum, ego sum Dominus, et non est absque me Salvator.”’

18 *SH* I, ‘Prologus Generalis’: ‘Fides enim [Conditoris] principaliter continet duo, scilicet cognitionem substantiae Conditoris et cognitionem operis Conditoris. Cognition substantiae Conditoris consistit in cognitione divinae Unitatis et eiusdem beatissimae Trinitatis; cognition vero operis Conditoris consistit in cognitione creationis rerum seu formationis. Unde Propheta signanter dixit quantum ad cognitionem substantiae: “Intelligatis quia ego sum”; Ex. 3:14: “Ego sum qui sum”; quantum ad cognitionem operis subdidit: “Ante me non est formatus deus”, a quo sit principium universae creationis.’

19 *SH* I, ‘Prologus Generalis’: ‘Item, fides et intelligentia Salvatoris versatur circa duo, scilicet circa personam Salvatoris et circa opus salvationis. Persona autem Salvatoris est persona Filii Dei, scilicet Christus in duabus naturis, divinitatis scilicet et humanitatis: Deus enim et homo unus est Christus. Unde ad significandum personam Salvatoris in natura divinitatis dicit: “Ego sum”, cui scilicet competit nomen quod est Ex. 3:14: “Qui est misit me ad vos”. Ad significandum eandem personam in natura humanitatis addit: “Ego sum Dominus”; unde in Rev. 19:16: “Habebat in vestimento suo et in femore suo scriptum: Rex regum et Dominus dominantium.” Opus salvationis consistit in sacramentis salutis per praesentem gratiam et praemiis salutis per futuram gloriam. Ad quod designandum addit: “Et non est absque me Salvator”, a quo scilicet sit principium et causa nostrae salvationis; Hos. 13:4: “Deum absque me nescies, et Salvator non est praeter me.”’

20 Elisabeth Gössmann, *Metaphysik und Heilsgeschichte: Eine theologische Untersuchung der Summa Halensis* (Munich: Max Huber Verlag, 1964) briefly discusses Hugh of St Victor’s influence on the notion of the subject matter of theology in the *SH*, but not at the level of detail pursued below.

works a greater symmetry of importance than Hugh did, thus reflecting a deeper interest in a doctrine of creation.

However that may be, this Hugonian interest in the works of creation and restoration, coupled with the Halensist's additional attention to the Agent of both, becomes the organizing conceit of the entire *SH*, which the Halensist explains as he concludes the 'Prologue':

The Catholic inquiry, therefore, concerning those things which pertain to the faith is four-part: [Book I] pertains to the cognition of the substance of the divine Trinity and Unity; [Book II] pertains to] the works of divine creation; [Book III] pertains to the person of the Savior in his divinity and humanity; [Book IV] pertains to the sacraments of salvation and the work of future glorification.²¹

While it is true that Peter Lombard's *Four Books of Sentences* is also roughly divided in a similar way (on which a Hugonian influence is certainly possible if not probable), the Halensist's own explanation of the structure in terms of two fundamental salvation-historical theaters of activity, with their common divine Agent, is strikingly redolent of Hugh. Slightly later, the Halensist uses even more explicit Hugonian language in returning to the equally Hugonian accent on the work of human restoration:

From the aforesaid it is clear that the doctrine of theology is about God accomplishing the work of human restoration through Christ. Thus the parts of the first inquires of theology are concerned with the excellence of the divine sublimity, but the following parts concern Christ and pertain to the work of repair.²²

In short, the concern with the works of both creation and salvation reflects the Hugonian approach; the interest in linking works back to their Agent adumbrates an emerging concern of the *SH*'s general approach to theology.

The 'Works of Restoration' and the Subject Matter of Theology

After the 'General Prologue' just discussed, there follows an 'Introductory Treatise', which takes up a variety of issues related to the basic question: 'What is the nature

²¹ *SH* I, 'Prologus Generalis': 'Inquisitio igitur catholica de iis quae pertinent ad fidem quadripartita est: prima pars pertinet ad cognitionem substantiae divinae Trinitatis et Unitatis; secunda ad opera divinae conditionis; tertia ad personam Salvatoris in natura divinitatis et natura humanitatis; quarta vero pertinet ad sacramenta salutis et opera futurae glorificationis.'

²² *SH* I, TrInt, Q1, C 4, Ar4 (n. 7), Ad obiecta 1–2, p. 13: 'Ex praedictis manifestum est quod doctrina Theologiae est de substantia Dei efficiente per Christum opus reparationis humanae. Ideo partes primae inquisitionis theologiae sunt circa excellentiam divinae sublimitatis, consequentes vero erunt de Christo et pertinentibus ad opus reparationis.'

of theology?’ The analysis divides into four sub-questions: 1. Is theology a science? 2. How is it like or unlike other ‘sciences’, namely, philosophy and the liberal arts? 3. What is its proper object, its subject matter? and 4. What is theology’s mode of proceeding?

The *SH* is anxious to affirm the scientific status of theology as much as possible in comparison with Aristotelian canons for what counts as such. In particular, it pursues an extended comparison with Aristotelian metaphysics. At present, it is theology’s subject matter, what theology is about, that is of interest.

To begin, the *SH* considers three 12th-century answers to this question. Is its subject matter ‘signs and things’ as Peter Lombard, following Augustine, has it in his *Sentences*? Is it ‘the whole Christ, both Head and Body, Christ and the Church, the groom and the bride’, as apparently suggested by the *Glossa Ordinaria* and taken up by Robert of Melun, Gilbert of Poitiers, Robert Grosseteste and Robert Kilwardby?²³ Or is it ‘the works of restoration’ as Hugh of St Victor argued?

Initially, in light of a comparison with metaphysics, the *SH* sets all three proposals aside, including Hugh’s:

the subject matter which [first philosophy] is about is everything—whence it is said to be about (*de*) all things, since it treats being (*ens*), according to its every difference, according to the different divisions of being, namely, being in potency, being in act, being as one and many, being as subject and accident, and so on—but principally its subject matter is being as one in act, which is the first substance, on which all beings depend.²⁴

That is, even though in one sense the science of metaphysics considers everything that is, its primary or principal subject matter is being (*ens/esse*) itself, the first substance, the cause of causes. To the extent that it also treats all other beings it treats these, not with respect to their distinctive natures (as the other sciences do), but simply in so far as they exist.

The *SH* follows suit here. It is anxious to assert that the principal object or subject matter of theology is God. So, singling out Hugh’s proposal in particular, its response is to object:

²³ See James A. Weisheipl, ‘The Meaning of *Sacra Doctrina* in *Summa Theologiae* I, q. 1,’ *The Thomist* 38 (1934): 75.

²⁴ *SH* I, TrInt, Q1, C3 (n. 3), Ad obiecta 3, p. 7: ‘Quemadmodum est dicere de Philosophia Prima quod materia circa quam est sunt omnia—unde et dicitur esse de omnibus, quia est circa ens secundum omnem sui differentiam, secundum. differentes divisiones entis, scilicet ens potentia, ens actu, eris unum et multa, ens substantia et accedens, et huiusmodi—materia vero de qua intentio, est ens actu unum, quod est substantia prima, a qua omnia dependent.’

To the contrary (...) theology is a science about (*de*) God; thus, it is a science about *the cause of* the works of both creation and restoration. Thus, the subject of sacred Scripture is not the works of restoration, but rather their very cause, which is God.²⁵

In sum, the principal subject matter of theology must thus be God; Hugh's proposal seems to be set aside.

But here the similarity between theology and Aristotelian metaphysics breaks down, as the *SH* well knows. For Aristotle had also claimed that: 'A single science is one whose domain is a single genus, whose parts and essential properties it considers *per se*.'²⁶ Any genuine science, accordingly, must not only have a single subject matter, but it must also have essential knowledge of that object, and then be able to analyze it according to its essential properties and parts. The *SH* recognizes, though, that the theologian does not have the benefit of an essential definition of God, 'with respect to the mystery of the Trinity'. Citing this very text from Aristotle, it thus argues that theological science must take a different tack: with respect to 'the very divinity and trinity of persons', in theology 'there is another way of knowing'.²⁷ In fact, it is the inverse of the Aristotelian way. Rather than beginning with a known essence and analyzing its essential characteristics, the theologian must begin with revealed characteristics and reason back to the divine essence. Citing Rom. 1:20 to its purpose, the *SH* puts it thus: 'theology must proceed from knowledge of divine action to knowledge of divine power, and then to knowledge of the divine substance itself.'²⁸

With these preliminary affirmations regarding the nature of theology squarely in view, the *SH* now proceeds to its resolution:

The subject "about which" (*de qua*) can be taken in three ways, according to the words of Dionysius in *The Angelic Hierarchy*: "All understanding of the divine is divided by the heavenly intelligence into three: essence, power, and operation." According to this, if we take the subject of sacred Scripture in the sense of 1. "operation", we can say that it is the works of restoration of humankind. If, however, we take the subject of sacred Scripture in the sense of 2. "power", we shall say that it is Christ, who is "the power and wisdom of God" (1 Cor. 1:24). If, finally, we take the subject of sacred Scripture in the sense of 3. "essence", we shall say that it is God, or the divine substance. Whence, according to this, theology is a science about the divine substance

²⁵ *SH* I, TrInt, Q1, C3 (n. 3), Contra 2, p. 5: 'Item, Theologia est scientia de Deo; ergo est scientia de causa operum conditionis et reparationis; non igitur materia divinarum Scripturarum erunt opera reparationis, sed magis ipsa causa, quae Deus est.'

²⁶ *SH* I, TrInt, Q1, C1 (n. 1), Ad obiecta 4, p. 4, citing *Posterior Analytics* I: 'Item, adhuc obiciet aliquis sic: "Omnis scientia est alicuius generis subiecti, cuius partes et passiones per se considerat", sicut dicit Philosophus.'

²⁷ *SH* I, TrInt, Q1, C1 (n. 1), Ad obiecta 4, p. 4: 'Velut est ipsa divinitas et trinitas personarum, est modus cognoscendi alius.'

²⁸ *SH* I, TrInt, Q1, C1 (n. 1), Ad obiecta 4, p. 4: 'Ut per operationem cognoscamus virtutem, per virtutem ipsam divinitatis substantiam.'

which must be cognized through Christ in the work of restoration (*de substantia divina cognoscenda per Christum in opere reparationis*).²⁹

Strikingly, the *SH* seems here to fuse Hugh and Aristotle, with a little help from Dionysius. As with Aristotelian metaphysics, the primary and principal subject matter of theology is God *in se*. Yet, in light of theology's necessarily distinctive 'way of knowing', which must begin with the divine works, the *SH* has made the Hugonian 'works of restoration', the Trinity's salvation-historical activity *ad extra*, integral and indeed crucial to its notion of theology. (In fact, since Hugh's 'works of restoration' are profoundly Christocentric—'the work of restoration is the Incarnation of the Word with all its sacraments'³⁰—the reference to the power of Christ in Alexander's formula is arguably Hugonian too.)

Replying to the objections, accordingly, the *SH* explicitly 'rehabilitates' the Hugonian proposal about the proper subject matter of theology. Conceding that theology is indeed about the cause of the work of restoration and creation, the *SH* nonetheless insists that: 'it does not follow from this that the subject matter of theology is *not* the works of restoration,' since 'the highest cause, which is God, is revealed through the work of restoration, through the power of Christ.'³¹

In short, the *SH* has adopted fully Hugh's definition of theology, but has situated it within a theological framework deeply indebted to Aristotelian metaphysics, wherein theology must ultimately—indeed speculatively—be about God *in se*.³²

29 *SH* I, TrInt, Q1, C3 (n. 3), Respondeo, p. 6: 'Materia dupliciter accipitur in scientiis 'de qua' et 'circa quam'. 'Materia de qua' potest assignari tripliciter, secundum illud B. Dionysii, in Hierarchia angelica: "In tria dividuntur supermundana ratione omnes divini intellectus: in essentiam, virtutem et operationem." Secundum hoc ergo, si assignemus materiam divinarum Scripturarum secundum rationem operationis, dicemus quod materia divinarum Scripturarum sunt opera reparationis humani generis. Si vero assignemus materiam divinarum Scripturarum secundum rationem virtutis, dicemus quod materia divinarum Scripturarum est Christus, qui est Dei virtus et Dei sapientia, I Cor. I, 24. Si vero assignemus materiam divinarum Scripturarum secundum rationem essentiae, dicemus quod materia divinarum Scripturarum est Deus sive divina substantia. Unde secundum hoc Theologia est scientia de substantia divina cognoscenda per Christum in opere reparationis.'

30 Hugh of St Victor, *Sacr.*, I.Prol.2 (Deferrari, 3; PL 176:183 A-B): 'Opus restaurationis est incarnatio Verbi cum omnibus sacramentis suis.'

31 *SH* I, TrInt, Q1, C3 (n. 3), Ad obiecta 2, p. 6: 'Ad secundum vero quod obicitur contra eundem, quod "Theologia est de causa operum recreationis et conditionis" concedendum est. Non tamen ex hoc sequitur quod materia divinae Scripturae non sint opera reparationis, quia summa causa, quae Deus est, declaratur per opus reparationis, per virtutem Christum, sicut dictum est, ut in operatione cognoscamus virtutem et in virtute divinitatem (...).'

32 Gössmann, *Metaphysik und Heilsgeschichte*, 25–6, observes: 'Theology, according to the *Summa Halensis*, deals thus with the knowledge of the divine being (*Wesenserkenntnis*) of the Trinitarian God, known through Christ in his saving work (*Erlösungswerk*), though one must take the *opus restaurationis* more in the broad sense that Hugh of St Victor gave it (...) Thus the salvation-historical dimension is taken directly into the definition of theology (*Gegenstandsbestimmung*). It provides divine essence, not in the modest way of Aristotelian *prima philosophia*, but rather in its Trinitarian fullness. There is an emphasis on the fundamental difference between the remaining-hiddenness (*Verborgenbleiben*) of

That is, theology is like first philosophy or metaphysics, which is also about the 'cause of causes', but unlike metaphysics, theology is 'about God' (*de Deo*) 'insofar as God is the mystery of the Trinity' and 'according to the sacrament of restoration' (*secundum mysterium Trinitatis vel secundum sacramentum humanae reparationis*)³³—an unmistakable allusion to Hugh's signature notion.

The Practico-Affective Orientation of Theology and the Nature of Scripture

It is well-known and oft-noted that the medieval Franciscans stressed the ultimately practical character and orientation of theological endeavor. This follows naturally from the foregoing. If theology is about 'God accomplishing the work of human restoration through Christ', or, as we might paraphrase, about God's activity in 'salvation history', it surprises not that theology's goal is to provide human beings with the knowledge necessary for salvation and also to facilitate their arrival thereto. In short, theology intends a saving effect on its practitioners. The Halensist refers to this last aspect as the *mode* of theology. How does theology bring about this goal? This leads to the last dimension of Hugonian influence on the *SH*, and again it fuses a deep Hugonian instinct with an Aristotelian interest in divine causality.

Chapter 4, the last in the Introductory Question on the nature of theology, asks about this modality in relation to Scripture (*de modo sacrae Scripturae*). Here the challenge of blending Victorine and Aristotelian is readily apparent as the Halensist asks a series of Aristotelian questions about the nature of Hugonian Scripture: In Article 1, if Scripture's mode is scientific (*artificialis vel scientialis*); in Article 2, what kind of certitude attends it; in the third, whether Scripture is *uniformis vel multiformis*, and in the fourth and last, because Scripture is indeed multiform, how is it so?

These questions all come from the new scientific way of thinking emerging in the early 13th century, which sets the framework and the lexicon for what counts as an answer. But the answers attempt to maintain the traditional (Augustinian, monastic, Victorine) understanding of theology, now expressed in new terminology. The result is something intriguingly hybrid.

Consider Article 1: Is theology's mode scientific? Well, yes, but 'not according to the comprehension of human reason', but 'as ordered by divine wisdom for the in-

the Trinitarian mystery in the old metaphysics and the present possibility of the theological knowledge. Nevertheless, in the definition of the subject matter of theology in the *Summa Halensis* the salvation-historical dimension does not stand on the same level as with Hugh of St Victor, since the *divina substantia* as such stands now in the forefront of knowledge, while before [with Hugh] it had primarily to do with the knowledge of God's salvation-historical action toward human beings' (my translation).

33 *SH* I, TrInt, Q1, C2 (n. 2), Solutio, p. 5.

struction of the soul in matters pertaining to salvation'.³⁴ Scripture has a scientific mode (*modus scientiae*), but not 'according to the comprehension of truth through human reason', but 'according to the affect of piety through divine instruction'. Accordingly, Scripture uses not 'definition, analysis, and logical deduction', but rather 'precept, example, exhortation, revelation and prayer, which modes relate to the affection of piety',³⁵ or 'lead one toward the affections of piety'.³⁶

Consider Article 2: Aristotelian science has an intellectual certainty that arises from the fact that it begins with, and proceeds from, first principles that are self-evident (*per se manifestis*) to the human intellect and it uses terms in their proper, non-metaphorical, and univocal sense. In short, it has the certainty of intellectual speculation, the perspicacity of intellectual vision. What about theology? Here again, the Halensist gives no ground, but insists on a distinct sort of certitude, namely, that of the *affectus* not the *intellectus*; that coming from direct experience, not from speculation; that of taste, not of vision.³⁷ He even refuses to give up on self-evident first

34 SH I, TrInt, Q1, C4, Ar1 (n. 4), Respondeo, p. 8: 'Dicendum quod non est modus sacrae Scripturae artis vel scientiae secundum comprehensionem rationis humanae, sed per dispositionem divinae sapientiae ad informationem animae in iis quae pertinent ad salutem. Unde Augustinus, XIV *De Trinitate* 2: "Non quidquid sciri ab hominibus potest in rebus humanis, ubi vanitatis vel noxae curiositatis est, huic scientiae tribuo, sed illud tantummodo quo fides saluberrima, quae ad veram beatitudinem ducit, gignitur, nutritur, roboratur": quae scientia est in rebus quae ad salutem pertinent.'

35 SH I, TrInt, Q1, C4, Ar1 (n. 4), Ad obiecta 2, p. 8: 'Ad secundum dicendum quod alius est modus scientiae, qui est secundum comprehensionem veritatis per humanam rationem; alius est modus scientiae secundum affectum pietatis per divinam traditionem. Primus modus definitivus debet esse, divisivus, collectivus; et talis modus debet esse in humanis scientiis, quia apprehensio veritatis secundum humanam rationem explicatur per divisiones, definitiones et ratiocinationes. Secundus modus debet esse praeceptivus, exemplificativus, exhortativus, revelativus, orativus, quia ii modi competunt affectui pietatis; et hic modus est in sacra Scriptura: unde ad Titum I, dicitur scientia "secundum pietatem". Praeterea, modus praeceptivus est in Lege et Evangelio, exemplificativus in historiographis, exhortativus in libris Salomonis et Epistolis, revelativus in Prophetis, orativus in Psalmis.'

36 SH I, TrInt, Q1, C4, Ar1 (n. 4), Ad obiecta 2, p. 4: 'Nota etiam quod alius modus debet esse scientiae quae habet informare affectum secundum pietatem; alius scientiae quae habet informare intellectum solum ad cognoscendam veritatem. Ille qui erit ad informationem affectus, erit per differentias quae dictae sunt, quia praecepta exempla, exhortationes, revelationes, orationes introducunt pietatis affectiones. Est autem pietas "cultus Dei", sicut dicit Augustinus, XII *De Trinitate*, introducens illud Iob 28, 28, alia littera: "Ecce, pietas ipsa est sapientia". Est autem 1 cultus Dei, "quo nunc desideramus eum videre, credimusque et speramus visuros"; desideramus caritate, credimus fide, speramus spe, secundum quas tres virtutes pietatis disciplina formatur.'

37 SH I, TrInt, Q1, C4, Ar2 (n. 5), Respondeo, p. 9: 'Est certitudo speculationis et est certitudo experientiae; praeterea, est certitudo secundum intellectum et est certitudo secundum affectum; item, est certitudo quoad animum spiritualem et est certitudo quoad animum animale. Dico ergo quod modus theologicus est certior certitudine experientiae, certitudine quoad affectum quae est per modum gustus, in Psalmo 2: "Quam dulcia faucibus meis eloquia tua" etc., quamvis non certior quoad speculationem intellectus, quae est per modum visus. Item, certior est homini spirituali,

principles, arguing that theological science proceeds according to principles of truth that are perceived as self-evidently good (*per se notis ut bonitatis*), even as they remain not self-evidently true (*occultis ut veritatis*).³⁸

But despite these attempts to go toe to toe with Aristotelian science, the Halensist now concedes:

This science is thus more of virtue/power, than of art, more wisdom than science; for it consists more in virtue and effectivity, than in contemplation and concept. I Cor. 2:4: "For our speech was not in the persuasive words of human wisdom, but in the demonstration of the spirit and of power."³⁹

In short, the theological science that 'perfects the soul according to the affection by moving it to the good through the principles of fear and love, is properly and principally called wisdom.'⁴⁰

Not once in the forgoing has the Halensist mentioned Hugh or any other Victorine by name, and yet the whole ethos of this practical, affective, sapiential theology is fragrantly redolent of the Victorine's. The lexicon is high scholastic/Aristotelian—*scientia*, *principia per se nota*, *ut veritas*, *ut bonitas*—but the content is basically an Augustinian sensibility flowing through the Abbey of St Victor into the *SH*.

The proof of this claim comes in the last two articles of Question 4, as the focus now turns to the nature of Scripture itself and how it accomplishes this goal. Article 3 straightforwardly argues that Scripture must be manifold because the personal conditions and historical states of humans are also manifold, and thus Scripture must adapt itself to these diverse circumstances if it is to succeed: 'the teaching of Holy

quamvis incertior animali, I Cor. 2, 14: "Animalis homo non percipit ea, quae sunt spiritus Dei; spiritualis autem omnia diiudicat."

38 *SH* I, TrInt, Q1, C4, Ar2 (n. 5), Ad obiecta 2, p 9: 'Dicendum quod sunt principia veritatis ut veritatis, et sunt principia veritatis ut bonitatis. Dico ergo quod aliae scientiae procedunt ex principiis veritatis ut veritatis per se notis; haec autem scientia procedit ex principiis veritatis ut bonitatis et per se notis ut bonitatis, quamvis occultis ut veritatis.' Cf., *SH* I, TrInt, Q1, C2 (n. 2), Ad obiecta 1–4, p. 5: 'In aliis vero scientiis, speculativis scilicet, est acceptio veri ut veri et etiam boni ut veri; in practicis autem moralibus, etsi sit acceptio veri ut boni, non tamen ut boni gratuiti sed moralis (...).'

39 *SH* I, TrInt, Q1, C4, Ar2 (n. 5), Ad obiecta 2, p. 5: 'Unde haec scientia magis est virtutis quam artis et sapientia magis quam scientia; magis enim consistit in virtute et efficacia quam in contemplatione et notitia, I Cor. 2:4: "Sermo noster non in persuasibilibus humanae sapientiae verbis, sed in ostensione spiritus et virtutis."'

40 *SH* I, Q1, C1 (n. 1), Solutio, p. 2: 'Theologia igitur quae perficit animam secundum affectionem, movendo ad bonum per principia timoris et amoris, proprie et principaliter est sapientia.' See also *SH* I, Q1, C2 (n. 2), Contra f, p. 5: 'Scriptura sacra traditur secundum ordinem informationis practicae principiorum ad operationes, ut moveatur affectus secundum timorem et amorem ex fide iustitiae et misericordiae Dei' [Sacred Scripture proceeds, according to the order of instruction, from practical principles to actions, so that our affection could be moved, by fear and love, on the basis of faith in God's justice and mercy]. See Oleg Bychkov, 'The Nature of Theology in Duns Scotus and his Franciscan Predecessors,' *Franciscan Studies* 66 (2008): 5–62.

Scripture, which has been ordained for human salvation, must employ a manifold modality, so that the mode matches the objective.⁴¹ Article 4 then asks what precisely this manifold nature of Scripture is. At first, the answer seems straightforward: the different scriptural senses, i.e. the literal, allegorical, and so forth. But the *SH* knows of different traditions on this matter. Hugh of St Victor had proffered three: the literal-historical, the allegorical, and the tropological, while centuries earlier the Venerable Bede had included a fourth, the anagogical, along with the three that Hugh names. The *SH* strives to reconcile the two authorities and the result is telling, highlighting again the fusion of Victorine theology with newer modes of thought.

Bede's anagogical sense is added to Hugh's literal, allegorical, and tropological easily enough. The challenge is to offer a rationale for how they all fit together. The Halensist offers several options, the most interesting of which, at present, invokes the Aristotelian interest in causality, a move that is reminiscent of Part 2 above:

we say that the understanding of holy Scripture concerns either the cause or the effect. Concerning the cause, which is eternal, namely, God, there is the anagogical understanding. Concerning the effect, it can be twofold: either of things done (*de facto*) or of things to be done (*de faciendo*). If the latter, there is thus the moral or tropological understanding. If the former, [there is either the literal or the allegorical, which Hugh had defined (...)].⁴²

So, in a unique move in relation to medieval exegesis generally, the Halensist distinguishes Bede's anagogical sense from Hugh's other three senses, according to the distinction between uncreated cause and created effects, as he proceeds to say explicitly:

Note, therefore, that Hugh of St Victor, who said that the subject-matter of divine Scripture is the work of restoration, set down only three understandings of Scripture, which are founded on that work [of restoration], namely, the historical, the allegorical, and the tropological. But Bede, who understood the subject-matter of divine Scripture to be not only the work of restoration, but rather the [C]ause [of that work], added the anagogical sense, which understanding indeed looks to the [C]ause, just as the other three look to the effect.⁴³

⁴¹ *SH* I, TrInt, Q1, C4, Ar3 (n. 6), Respondeo, p. 11: 'Relinquitur quod instructio sacrae Scripturae, quae est ordinata ad hominis salutem, debet habere modum multiformem, ut modus respondeat fini.'

⁴² *SH* I, TrInt, Q1, C4, Ar4 (p. 7), I. Respondeo, p. 12: 'Alio modo possunt accipi, ut dicamus quod intellectus sacrae Scripturae aut est de causa aut de effectu. De causa, quae aeterna est, Deus, est anagogicus intellectus. De effectu dupliciter potest esse: aut de facto aut de faciendo. Si de faciendo, sic est moralis intellectus sive tropologicus. Si de facto, hoc est dupliciter: aut enim intelligitur in prima facie litterae, hoc est per significationem verbi, et sic est litteralis sive historicus: "historia enim est rerum gestarum narratio quae in prima facie litterae continentur", sicut dicit Hugo; aut intelligitur per significationem facti, et sic est allegoricus, secundum quod dicit Hugo, quod "allegoria est cum per id quod factum dicitur, aliquod aliud factum sive in praesenti sive in futuro sive in praeterito significator."'

⁴³ *SH* I, TrInt, Q1, C4, Ar4 (p. 7), Ad obiecta 1, p. 12: 'Nota ergo quod Hugo de S. Victore, qui posuit materiam divinarum Scripturarum opera restaurationis, posuit tantum tres intellectus sacrae Scripturae, qui quidem fundantur in opere, scilicet historicum, allegoricum et tropologicum. Beda vero,

The basic distinction here is again that between God and God's works in history, especially the work of restoration. Just as the subject matter of theology is not only the works of restoration, but the very Agent of those works, so here in parallel fashion, *Scripture's* different senses refer not just to the divine effects in history (described by the literal, allegorical, and tropological senses), but to the divine Cause of those effects (found in the anagogical sense). Now, the interesting thing about all this is that Bede in fact said nothing about the divine Cause as the meaning of the anagogical sense. His account is innocent of any reference to causality. The Halensist is, so to speak, putting venerable Aristotelian words in the Venerable Bede's mouth, for his own purposes. In short, the Halensist has once again taken the Hugonian material and situated it within a new framework, a framework especially attentive not only to divine activity in history, but to the agential Cause of that activity.

Conclusion

As conceded above, Hugh's influence on the *SH* is by no means limited to the 'General Introduction'. He is cited frequently throughout the first Franciscan *Summa* and especially dominates the discussion of the unedited Book 4, which treats the sacraments. Important as those material uses of Hugh's thought are, the operative assumption at present is that even more significant for appreciating the founding Victorine's influence on the foundational Franciscan *opus* are the more formal aspects. Hugh's deepest influence is architectonic: structural and organizational; and modal: providing an ethos and an orientation to the whole endeavor. In Hugh himself, the earliest Franciscans intellectuals found 'the model of the complete theologian, who does not separate argumentative analysis from a concern for persuasion and edification';⁴⁴ that is, one who integrates the speculative, the mystical, and the moral. Arguably, as indicated at the outset, this Hugonian influence flows through the Halensist on to Bonaventure. It seems, however, to end there. Shortly after the Seraphic Doctor, 'the Victorines went out of fashion in the elaboration of Franciscan theology',⁴⁵ such that one can rightly style Bonaventure *le dernier victorin*.⁴⁶

qui intellexit materiam divinarum Scripturarum non solum opus reparationis, immo causam, addidit anagogicum, qui quidem intellectus respicit causam, sicut alii tres effectum.'

⁴⁴ Piron, 'Franciscains et victorins,' 522.

⁴⁵ Piron, 'Franciscains et victorins,' 523.

⁴⁶ Piron, 'Franciscains et victorins,' 522.

Part 2: **The Historical and Intellectual Context**

Ayelet Even-Ezra

The *Summa Halensis*

A Text in Context

Abstract: The *Summa Halensis* was unprecedented in its size and complexity, realizing in many ways the full potential of the summa genre. The chapter assesses the *Summa* as an organic whole by examining the project in its intellectual and cultural context, and demonstrating several principles of organization that reflect its doctrinal commitments. The chapter further discusses the cultural meaning of writing a summa in early 13th century Paris and the specific circumstances of the authorship of the *Summa Halensis*, which was written during a time of external and internal pressures for the Franciscan *studium*. It then considers the size and structure of the text compared with earlier summae, and briefly examines the enormous work of compilation which was invested in its composition, demonstrating the way ideas and doctrines guided structural choices in the text and vice versa.

Medieval theological Summae like the *Summa Halensis* are so rich and modular, that there is plenty of scope for any and every scholar to delve in and deeply study one specific topic or another, as it is presented in an individual treatise or even a *quaestio*, and to situate their discussion in relation to the history of the relevant doctrine, whether it be baptism, angelic speech, creation, or the vice of avarice. I shall not provide here any focused, topical study of this sort. What I rather aim to do, is to look at the *Summa Halensis* project from a distance, to assess its overall historical, cultural and intellectual context, and to shed some light on the threads that hold this massive text together, weaving an intricate relationship between its form and its matter.

It is a difficult task to evaluate the Summa genre to which the *Summa Halensis* belongs, insofar as it had developed by the first half of the 13th century, for we have only partial evidence of the works produced during this period. For a work of this kind to survive into the modern era, it had to be popular enough in its time, and later continuously copied and promoted by an interested, committed line of copyists. In this regard, almost nothing has come down to us of the writings of the majority of the masters—especially the secular masters – we know were active in this period in Paris.¹ In the case of those whose works are extant, we have a handful of questions or a fragment of a commentary only by virtue of the survival of unique manuscripts

¹ For lists and biographical accounts of masters who worked in the first half of the 13th century, see Nathalie Gorochov, *Naissance de l'université: Les écoles de Paris d'Innocent III à Thomas d'Aquin (v. 1200–v. 1245)* (Paris: Champion, 2012), and the appendix to Spencer E. Young, *Scholarly Community at the Early University of Paris: Theologians, Education and Society, 1215–1248* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2014), 212–31.

which contain them. The titles that have been given to certain texts such as the *Summa Douacensis* are an instant reminder that while a few anonymous specimens of the genre reached us in a single manuscript like the aforementioned, others were probably lost.²

Until the time of Alexander and Hugh of St Cher's commentaries on Peter Lombard's *Sentences*, theology masters mostly expressed their views either in commentaries on the sacred page, or in the format of *quaestiones*.³ The task of compiling a Summa is a challenging one. Most medieval masters of theology were engaged in writing *quaestiones*, either as part of their engagement with a specific text like the Bible or Peter Lombard's *Sentences*, or in an isolated fashion. There was a long way to go, however, from producing numerous questions on various topics to their formation into an awe-inspiring, organized, monumental Summa. Some masters—perhaps only the minority—made this effort. Peter Lombard's *Sentences* provided general ideas for thematical principles of organization.⁴ Yet while the genre of *Glosses* and commentaries on Lombard evolved at the same time as Summa literature, and in time also included questions, as well as topics, that surpassed a close reading of the Lombard, the Summa genre was different. The authors of such texts did not even pretend to follow in the master's steps: the Summa was a magisterial act in its own right, subject to its own structural, doctrinal, and organizational principles.

In the times of Alexander, Summae had two conflicting aims: to be as comprehensive and as concise as possible. As a comprehensive text, a Summa could, at least in theory, make other texts redundant. Works such as the *Filia magistri* (1232–1245), a summary of the *Sentences*, chose the latter over the former, treating length as the 'mother of disgust'.⁵ Others chose the opposite approach. To hold everything together, meant to create a kind of a mirror of the field, thereby exploring its limits. The flexibility of the genre enabled compilers to expand the horizons of the theological project, and to richly embed it with philosophical notions. To compile

² Glorieux argued that a large cluster of questions in MS Douai 434 comprise a Summa, which he edited in *La "Summa Duacensis" (Douai 434): texte critique avec une introduction et des tables*, ed. Palémon Glorieux, Textes philosophiques du Moyen Âge, 2 (Paris: Vrin, 1955).

³ Alexander of Hales, *Magistri Alexandri de Hales Glossa in quatuor libros Sententiarum Petri Lombardi*, 4 vols, Bibliotheca Franciscana Scholastica Medii Aevi, 12–5 (Quaracchi: Collegium S. Bonaventurae, 1951–7). Hugh of St Cher's commentary is extant in multiple manuscripts but has not been yet edited. A list of manuscripts is available in Barbara Faes de Mottoni, 'Les manuscrits du commentaire des *Sentences* d'Hugues de Saint-Cher,' in *Hugues De Saint-Cher (†1263): Bibliste et theologien*, ed. Louis-Jacques Bataillon, Gilbert Dahan, and Pierre-Marie Gy, Bibliothèque d'histoire culturelle du Moyen Age, 1 (Turnhout: Brepols, 2004), 273–95.

⁴ For an introduction to the tradition of commenting on the *Sentences*, see Philipp W. Rosemann, *The Story of a Great Medieval Book: Peter Lombard's Sentences* (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2007).

⁵ Rosemann, *The Story*, 33–7; Franklin Harkins, 'Filiae Magistri: Peter Lombard's *Sentences* and Medieval Theological Education "On the Ground",' in *Medieval Commentaries on the Sentences of Peter Lombard*, ed. Philipp W. Rosemann (Leiden: Brill, 2015), 26–78.

such a Summa was to narrate the world and history anew: neither following the narrative of Scriptures, nor hiding behind the Lombard, but to become masters in the full sense of the word.

The influential and significant masters of the 1220s, such as William of Auxerre, in the *Summa aurea*, and Philip the Chancellor, in his *Summa de bono*, employed this potential of the Summa genre in a manner more sophisticated and innovative than their predecessors.⁶ William of Auvergne, first a master and then an influential Parisian bishop, executed a gigantic, comprehensive theological project of a different sort, the *magisterium sapientiale et divine*.⁷ In the 1230s, Roland of Cremona, the first Dominican master, compiled his Summa. None of these authors left, as far as we know, a commentary on the *Sentences*. Alexander of Hales, and later Hugh of St Cher, composed such a commentary, developing the genre as a means of expressing his own brief opinions and questions about issues posed by the Lombard, and as a basis for both the written and oral presentation of systematic thought. Like Hugh and other masters, Alexander also wrote long, highly elaborated disputed questions on a range of themes. Such writings, however, were not magisterial works. They were insufficient in size and scope both as a vehicle for delivering fully developed arguments, and as a symbol of magisterial maturity and prestige.

This was a time of ambitious, collective projects in all spheres of Western European civilization. In architecture, cathedrals were planned and constructed, which were ever bigger, higher, and more complex. In literature, from the 1210s to the 1230s, several narrators took it upon themselves to complete the first immense prose cycle of the Arthurian legends (the 'Vulgate' cycle), masterfully weaving a myriad of scenes, intersecting plot lines and characters together.⁸ In the Dominican Parisian school, Hugh of St Cher and his colleagues aspired to write extensive commentaries or *postillae* upon the entire Bible and fashion innovative scholarly tools like *correctoria* and concordances. Vincent of Beauvais began working on his monumental 'mirrors': a series of encyclopedic works summarizing knowledge of nature (*Speculum naturale*), doctrine (*Speculum doctrinale*) and history (*Speculum historiale*).

The more ambitious the plans were, the more difficult it was to fulfill them. Towers collapsed; stories of eventful adventures were left unfinished. The authorship of the mirror of morals Vincent planned to write is doubted, and it exists in rare copies.

⁶ William of Auxerre, *Summa Aurea*, 7 vols, ed. Jean Ribailier, *Spicilegium Bonaventurianum*, 16–20 (Paris: Editions du Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique (CNRS); Grottaferrata: Editiones Collegii S. Bonaventurae, 1980–7); Philip the Chancellor, *Summa de bono*, 2 vols, ed. Nikolaus Wicki (Bern: Francke, 1985).

⁷ Only a small segment of the *Magisterium* is edited. The old print version is flawed in many places but is still the most convenient way to consult the work: William of Auvergne, *Guiljelmi Alverni Opera Omnia*, 2 vols (Paris: Johannes Dupuis, 1674).

⁸ On the prose vulgate cycle, see the introduction and essays in *The Lancelot-Grail cycle: text and transformations*, ed. William W. Kibler (Austin: University of Texas Press, 1994).

Many of the Summae of this and the next generation remained incomplete. Philip the Chancellor's *Summa de bono* ends before addressing 'the good of glory'. Many questions promised in prologues for further sections were never actually written. Thomas Aquinas famously left his *Summa* incomplete after having a vision in which he suddenly perceived all his work 'as straw'.⁹

Masters in the schools of the friars, with their abilities to organise collaborative projects, were better equipped than secular masters to execute such massive endeavors. But even then, it was a challenge to complete them. Pope Alexander IV's bull ordering the Franciscan *studium* in Paris to complete the *Summa Halensis* clearly illustrates the amount of assistance a master needed just to complete such a project. William of Melitona was ordered to gather all of the expert, sedulous assistants he might need from different provinces of the order.¹⁰ Between 1240 and 1248, Adam Marsh wrote a letter to William of Nottingham, the minister of England. He and another friar named William of Madelle spoke, he relates, about a certain order calling for friars from foreign provinces to come to the aid of the Parisian *studium* 'in this time of urgent necessity' (*studio Parisiensi in presenti urgentia*). The editors of the *Chartularium Universitatis Parisiensis* posed the possibility that this may refer to the state of the *studium* after the deaths of both Alexander and John in 1245. Yet the exact nature of the task discussed by the two—*de investigandis expositionibus sacre scripture in libris originalibus Sanctorum*, that is, to look through Patristic Biblical expositions—fits much better to the work on the *Summa*.¹¹

But why invest so much energy? Thirteenth-century systematic theological works, such as commentaries on the *Sentences* or theological Summae, usually explicitly address the purpose of the theological enterprise as a whole. William of Auxerre, the distinguished author of the most influential *Summa* in the decades prior to the compilation of the *Summa Halensis*, and Godfrey of Poitiers, his contemporary Parisian master, listed three reasons for undertaking a reasoned discussion of the content of faith: 1. to strengthen the faith with arguments; 2. to be able to refute heretics; and 3. to confirm the faith of simple believers.¹² An anonymous commentary in Vat. Lat. 691, which comes from the circle of John of La Rochelle and his contemporary Dominican master, Guerric of St Quentin, focuses only on the second aspect.¹³

⁹ *Fontes vitae S. Thomae Aquinatis: notis historicis et criticis illustrati*, ed. Domenicus Prümmer (Toulouse: Apud Ed. Privat, 1912), 43–4, 120, 193.

¹⁰ *Chartularium Universitatis Parisiensis* (henceforth CUP), 4 vols, ed. Emile Chatelain, Charles Samaran, and Émile A. van Moë (Brussels: Culture et civilisation, 1964; reprint of Paris: Ex typis fratrum Delalain, 1889–91), 1:328–9, #286.

¹¹ CUP 1:216, #188.

¹² William of Auxerre, *Summa Aurea*, Prol. (Ribaillier, 1:15); Godfrey of Poitiers, *Summa* (Avranches, Bibliothèque Municipale 121, fol. 2r).

¹³ On the attribution of this commentary, see Albert Fries, 'De commentario Guerrici de S. Quintino in libros sententiarum,' *Archivum Fratrum Praedicatorum* 5 (1935): 326–41; Jacques Guy Bougerol, 'La glose sur les Sentences du manuscrit Vat. Lat. 691,' *Antonianum* 55 (1980): 108–73; Jean-Pierre Tor-

The warriors in this context are the doctors of theology, fighting for, and defending the faith against heresy, armed with the swords of authorities and the sharp spears of arguments.¹⁴ They rarely however addressed the motives for choosing a specific genre for their work, such as a *Sentences* commentary versus a *Summa*. Hugh of St Cher, following earlier authors, saw before his eyes students who were overwhelmed by the thought of reading the Bible and the fathers. The brevity of his *Sentences* was intended to ease the way for those who feared the enormous task of considering the large number of sacred books, and for those who lacked the strength to undertake it.¹⁵ The *Filia Magistri*, a short *Summa* which borrows its material from both William of Auxerre and Hugh of St Cher, and was contemporary with the *Summa Halensis*, emphasized, as mentioned earlier, its brevity and utility for students specifically.¹⁶

Philip the Chancellor took a different approach in his *Summa de bono*, by turning to the psychological context of learning and describing theological reasoning as key to perfecting the mind. The perfection of the practical intellect, he asserts in his prologue, belongs to the part of theology that deals with *sapientia morum*, while the perfection of the speculative intellect relates to the *intelligentia questionum*. His *Summa*, essentially a collection of questions, is of the second sort, and aims therefore for the perfection of the speculative intellect.¹⁷ A similar approach was taken by the anonymous author of a prologue to a commentary on the *Sentences*, which seems to come from the circle of Alexander. While the Bible perfects the affective parts of the soul, questions and arguments such as those found in the *Sentences* perfect the speculative aspects thereof.¹⁸

The authors of the *Summa Halensis* did not attach a prologue to this work: the general prologue found at the beginning of the Quarrachi edition is thought to be in fact the prologue for the third part. However, they devoted an entire introductory treatise to the status of theology and knowledge of God in Book 1. Curiously, this section does not address its general purpose, namely, the *finis theologiae*. As it discusses the Biblical style or mode of conveyance of knowledge, it gives the reader a strong impression that the modus of the sacred page is far from scientific. Unlike the human sciences, the sacred page does not employ divisions and definitions. As a sci-

rell, 'Introduction,' in *Guerric of Saint-Quentin: Quaestiones de quolibet*, ed. Walter H. Principe and Jonathan Glenn Black (Toronto: Pontifical Institute of Mediaeval Studies, 2002), 6–9.

¹⁴ Vatican City, Biblioteca Apostolica Vaticana, Vat. Lat. 691, fol. 1r.

¹⁵ Hugh repeats the Pseudo-Peter of Poitiers *Gloss*, whose text is translated at Rosemann, *The Story*, 43–51, see esp. 49.

¹⁶ Rosemann, *The Story*, 37.

¹⁷ Philip the Chancellor, *Summa de bono*, Prol. (Wicki, 1:4).

¹⁸ The text, intended as a prologue to a commentary to the *Sentences*, is edited in Jeanne Bignami-Odier, 'Le manuscrit Vatican latin 2186,' *Archives d'histoire doctrinale et littéraire du Moyen Âge* 11 (1937): 133–66.

entia aimed at informing the affective parts of the soul, or desires, Scriptures or some parts of theology must use precepts, examples, narratives, exhortations, etc.

With such forms of knowledge, certitude is the result of personal experience.¹⁹ But it is not a coincidence that these questions speak about the sacred Scriptures rather than theology: in fact, they evade the problem. The hundreds of questions that follow this introductory discussion are written, without exception, in the first mode: they employ divisions and definitions, and stay away from precepts, narratives, exhortations, and the like. To explicate what the authors, perhaps intentionally, were not explicit about: while theology as a whole involves both the true and the good, the *Summa* does not. It aims at the perfection of the intellect alone, just as did that of Philip the Chancellor.

Alexander IV's idea regarding the utility of the work was more practical, if quite general. He wanted the work completed in order to provide a resource for advanced students, which was able to help them crush falsity with the weight of truth and irrefutable arguments. Aware perhaps of the overall cry for brevity in academic circles, he assured 'delicate readers' who might abhor its length, that its ongoing utility would make it seem short (*prolixitatem quippe, si quam in eadem summa lector delicatus abhorret, studiosis vobis in ea sic reddit continua partium suarum utilitas brevem*).²⁰

But there were more immediate political reasons to command the completion of the *Summa Halensis*. The existing contemporary testimonies, as well as the state of current research, cannot provide a certain, unbiased picture of Alexander's true standing among the masters before taking the habit. But, certainly, the *studium* could provide him with all the resources he needed to engage in this task, and to enhance his and the order's prestige. The renowned master William of Auxerre died in 1230. The 'great cleric of France',²¹ Philip the Chancellor, died in 1235. Authoring such a *Summa* positioned Alexander as the unmatched heir to this line of philosophically informed, sophisticated Summists.

The *studium* definitely needed such a boost. The years in which the first parts of the *Summa* were written were a time of escalating tensions between the friars and the secular masters in the faculty and beyond it, tensions which would soon come to a head. Ten years earlier, a major strike of the masters and students tore apart the faculty, with most masters supporting the university's cause against the crown, the city and Bishop William of Auvergne, while others refused to suspend lectures. The Dominican master Roland of Cremona incepted during this crisis, giving the Preachers their first chair.²² In the beginning of the 1240s, during the work on the *Summa Ha-*

¹⁹ Alexander of Hales, *Doctoris irrefragabilis Alexandri de Hales Ordinis minorum Summa theologica (SH)*, 4 vols (Quaracchi: Collegium S. Bonaventurae, 1924–48), Vol I, TrInt, Q1, C4, Ar1 (n. 4), pp. 7–8.

²⁰ CUP 1:328–9, #286.

²¹ Henri d'Andeli, *Les dits d'Henri d'Andeli: Suivis de deux versions du Mariage des Sept arts*, ed. and trans. Alain Corbellari (Paris: Champion, 2003), 65.

²² For a recent account summarizing these events, see Gorochov, *Naissance*, 397–459.

lensis, ten opinions were condemned by a committee of masters including Alexander. Similar views could easily be found in Alexander's own writings.²³ Matthew Paris believed the event was mainly meant to hold the mendicant orders in check, although the reasons for it have been debated.²⁴ In this time of escalating tensions, compiling a *Summa* which demonstrated both the intellectual vigor and orthodoxy of the *studium* was a wise and indeed strategic move.

This was all the more true regarding its completion, as the tensions erupted a few years after Alexander and John's deaths in 1245. Already in 1250, Pope Innocent IV had to order the reluctant chancellor to give monks and friars the license to teach after they passed their exams.²⁵ In 1253 the secular masters obligated the friar masters to subject themselves to the union's decisions, and to suffer exclusion from it if they would not do so, as they had done previously during the teaching strike.²⁶ In July 1253, Pope Innocent IV had to demand once again that the friars be re-admitted to the union of masters and scholars that was the university.²⁷

The constant papal attempts during the years between 1254 and 1256 to enact compromise and cooperation did not put an end to the conflict between the seculars and the mendicants, and accusations of heresy added fuel to the quarrels. The views of some Franciscans on the central place of their order in salvation history—Gerardo of Borgo San Donnino's eternal gospel in particular—put them under strong suspicions of heresy; Dominicans purged all their works once again of any residue of the opinions condemned in 1241 and renewed the condemnations in all provinces of the order.²⁸ Less than a week after one of these Dominican orders was issued, Pope Alexander IV, a constant supporter of the friars, ordered William of Melitona to secure all the help he required and complete the *Summa Halensis*. Clearly, its completion was part of the strategy for defending the mendicants and especially their right to teach in this time of conflict. By a work such as the *Summa*, the friars would be able to reassert their full participation in the university's ideal of learning and their pure orthodoxy, pursuing Alexander's heritage. If Alexander of Hales is indeed the same Alexander who represented the university's cause back in 1230, the effect would be even stronger.

23 For an account of these condemnations and of Alexander's view concerning the first one, see Ayelet Even-Ezra, *Ecstasy in the Classroom: Trance, Self and the Academic Profession in Medieval Paris* (New York: Fordham University Press, 2019), 81–110.

24 Mathew Paris, *Chronica maiora*, vol. 1, ed. Henry Richard Luard (London: Longman, 1872); Mathew Paris, *Matthew Paris's English History from the year 1235 to 1273*, 3 vols, trans. John Allan Giles (New York: AMS Press, 1968), 1:476.

25 CUP 1:219, #191.

26 CUP 1:242–4, #219.

27 CUP 1:247–8, #222.

28 On Gerardo de Borgo San-Donnino affair and condemnation of his writings see the literature cited under the entry of his name in Maarten van der Heijden and Bert Roest, 'Franciscan Authors, 13th – 18th Century: A Catalogue in Progress,' last modified 23 March 2019, <http://users.bart.nl/~roestb/franciscan>.

Internal affairs of the order played a role in the decision to compile a *Summa* as well. The conflicting requirements of simplicity versus learning may not have plagued the order from its beginnings, and the break with the spirituals was still far in the future when the *Summa* was written.²⁹ But these tensions were definitely felt, and they came to the fore only few years after Alexander took the habit. In 1239, after Elias' rule as minister general of the order, dominant friars promoted the clericalization and institutionalization of the order. The Parisian masters, particularly Alexander, were an integral part of this process, which provoked a sharp counter-response by many who saw this as ruining Francis' legacy of poverty and simplicity. A group of masters from the Parisian *studium*, including Alexander and John, was asked to provide a *Gloss* on the Rule, and handed it to Haimo of Faversham in 1241–2. At this time, Francis' Testament was only few years old. Well aware of his insistence in his text that nothing—*Glosses* included—should be added to his rule, they emphasized in the prologue that they had not added 'any new exposition or *gloss* to the rule, as suspected by "some condemners of pure intention who are overwhelmed by their zeal, to the danger and scandal of the friars".³⁰ Members of this very group had just started working on the *Summa*.

In 1244, while the masters were working hard on the *Summa* in Paris, Thomas of Celano was commissioned to write the second *legenda* or *Life of Francis*. In it he devoted a cluster of chapters to the conflict between learning and simplicity. One anecdote ascribes to Francis the statement that a great cleric who wishes to join the order should, in a sense, get rid of his knowledge just like the rest of his possessions, and devote himself naked to Christ.³¹ Alexander must have seemed for several friars like a vivid example of one who did just the opposite, for the *Summa* splendidly showed off his prior knowledge. Its complex structure and subtle arguments are anything but simple: a blunt demonstration of the changing winds.

Whether or not one faction or the other was truer to the original spirit of the order's founder is not the issue here. There are different ways to be true to a vision. The more interesting question is whether Alexander, his collaborators and his immediate successors attempted to make a work that mirrored Francis' vision and the values of the order, or just be the best standard academic theologians they could be. They certainly say nothing explicit about these matters, a noteworthy absence in its own right. But are any distinctly Franciscan objectives intertwined in the fabric of the

²⁹ On these historical processes and tensions, see Rosalind B. Brooke, *Early Franciscan Government: Elias to Bonaventure* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1959); Bert Roest, *A History of Franciscan Education (c. 1210–1517)* (Leiden: Brill, 2000); Bert Roest, *Franciscan Learning, Preaching and Mission c. 1220–1650* (Leiden: Brill, 2015). On the particular stand of Franciscan theology masters, see Even-Ezra, *Ecstasy in the Classroom*, 151–6.

³⁰ *Expositio quatuor magistrorum super regulam fratrum minorum (1241–1242)*, ed. Livarius Oliger (Rome: Storia et letteratura, 1950), prol.

³¹ Thomas of Celano, *Vita Secunda*, #146, in *Legendae S. Francisci Assisensis saeculis XIII et XIV conscriptae*, *Analecta Franciscana*, 10 (Rome: Quaracchi, 1887), 241.

text, in the views presented, and in the choice of subjects? To what extent does the *Summa* of Alexander, the converted master, bear a ‘Franciscan character’, and what does that exactly involve? In this connection, some topics come to mind more immediately than others: questions on voluntary poverty in the fourth part, as well as questions about Adam and the pre-lapsarian state in the second part, especially regarding property. The questions on beauty may echo an aesthetic sensitivity common amongst Francis and his followers. According to Parisoli, the treatise on laws forms the basis for articulating a distinctively Franciscan political theory.³²

The fact that many views, tendencies and foci of interest are shared by the early Alexander and non-Franciscans like Philip the Chancellor, or rely heavily upon the Victorine tradition, should not be considered as a counter-argument to the notion of a distinctive Franciscan tone in the *Summa*. The character of a text is never only a matter of innovation: it is also a choice regarding whom to follow and whom to associate with. There was perhaps a reason why the formerly secular master Alexander took the habit, and Philip the Chancellor asked to be buried with the Franciscans.³³ Alexander could follow William of Auxerre as many of his generation had, but on many occasions, he chose frequently a path closer to Philip and the second generation of the Dominican *studium*, Hugh of St Cher and Gueric of St Quentin.³⁴ That said, a discussion of the Franciscan character of the *Summa* exceeds the scope of this essay, and requires a close examination of a series of issues in the *Summa* compared with its contemporaries. Lydia Schumacher devotes her recent book to argue for a decisive positive reply, and we hope it will stimulate discussion.³⁵

Compilation and Writing

To truly understand the ambitious scope of the *Summa*, one should first look at its unprecedented number of questions-units. The chart below (Figure 1) compares it with two Summae of the same genre from earlier generations, which share its character and format, by contrast to works that display a different organizing principle, such as Philip the Chancellor’s ‘the good’, or that are written in a different style, such as William of Auvergne’s *Magisterium*, which was not composed of questions. The first is that of Praepositinus of Cremona, a master and chancellor in Paris at the be-

³² Luca Parisoli, *La Summa fratris Alexandri e la nascita della filosofia politica francescana: riflessioni dall’ontologia delle norme alla vita sociale* (Palermo: Officina di studi medievali, 2008).

³³ According to Alberic de Troix-Fontaines, Philip was buried in the Franciscan chapel. Robert Lerner, ‘Weltklerus und religiöse Bewegung im 13. Jahrhundert: Das Beispiel Philipps des Kanzlers,’ *Archiv für Kulturgeschichte* 51 (1969): 94–108.

³⁴ On Alexander and Philip sharing many views see Even-Ezra, *Ecstasy in the Classroom*, 196 and passim.

³⁵ Lydia Schumacher, *Early Franciscan Theology: Between Authority and Innovation* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2019).

ginning of the 13th century. The other is the ‘Golden’ *Summa* of William of Auxerre mentioned above, composed roughly a generation later. The numbers below represent the approximate count of question-units (unit defined as cluster of question-arguments-objections-solution-replies).³⁶ The count provided is necessarily inaccurate in the first two *Summae*, however, because sometimes it is difficult to determine when a new unit begins, especially in the earlier two cases; this itself shows a growing awareness order in itself. Nevertheless, the chart below gives the general idea of the relationship between the works in terms of size.




Figure 1

While the general picture is clear, it is more difficult to compare the relative volume of specific treatises or subjects, for many issues were transferred from one category to another in the endless play of scholastic authors with principles and forms of organization. Let us, therefore take also as an exemplary case study the subject of ‘God’s knowledge’ and compare its inner division in the *Summa aurea* and in the *Summa Halensis*. The prologue of the *Summa aurea* announces 12 questions without specific sub-divisions. In practice, there are seven questions; the third, on predestination and reprobation divides into five sub-questions. We may also add one question about providence. The *Summa Halensis* has a total number of 109 questions, ar-

³⁶ Numbers are necessarily approximate and inaccurate regarding the first two cases, but the tendency is clear enough. For Praepositinus, I have relied upon the list of questions attached to Paris, Bibliothèque Nationale de France, Lat. 14526, fol. 1v. For William of Auxerre’s estimation, I used the list of contents of the critical edition, which is usually accurate, except for few cases, mostly due to William’s style flowing freely from one question to another and the manuscripts’ titles.

ranged in a seven-tiered hierarchy of *sectio-quaestio-titulus-membrum-capitulum-articulus*-[unspecific roman number].

How did such expansions occur? Questions relating to the subject were gathered from the productive masters of the *studium*: Alexander, Jean of La Rochelle and others. Some were copied verbatim (the questions on the eternal word, for instance into 1:419–26); some went through thorough redaction, or were used only partially. Others were not included at all. Indeed, even when there were relevant Alexandrian materials, they were not always chosen to be included.³⁷ Entire treatises originating in early, independent contexts, such as *de fato* or *de libro vitae* were incorporated into the program. Furthermore, the *Summa* reproduced large sections of John of La Rochelle's works like the *Summa de anima*. Yet at the same time, many new sections were written especially for this occasion, to put flesh on the larger outline and architectural plan.

Another form of expansion was the result of minute analysis of one question into separate aspects by means of subtle distinctions. Where William of Auxerre asks one question: 'How God knows everything', the *Summa Halensis* proposes four: 'How God knows everything *praesenter, simul, perfecte, immutabiliter*.'³⁸ The hierarchical organization, which categorised subjects anew, also invited examinations of a general nature, *absolute spectatis* or *in communi*. Common features of a group of subjects were then each examined in turn. Dealing jointly with the common features of a group has a great advantage, as Aristotle already taught us, for then there is no need to repeat and address the same problem for each separate question. But it also generates new questions of a higher order. Thus, while earlier Summae discussed created beings with little attention to the problem of creation in general, the *Summa Halensis* has an entire cluster of such general questions. Regarding angels, rather than asking only about their movement or cognition, we have an introductory section on their potency as such. Another example, as I have pointed out elsewhere, was the decision to arrange topics gathered from here and there under a discussion of freely given, non-sanctifying grace, which resulted in new questions about the nature of this type of grace.³⁹ Such processes bring us to the intriguing issue of systematic schemes of inquiry and the way architecture influences the production of many new building blocks.

³⁷ Victorin Doucet, 'Prolegomena in librum III necnon in libros I et II "Summae Fratris Alexandri",' in *Doctoris irrefragabilis Alexandri de Hales Ordinis minorum Summa theologica*, vol. 4 (Quaracchi: Collegium S. Bonaventurae, 1948), 307; cf. 167.

³⁸ William of Auxerre, *Summa Aurea*, l. 1, t. 9, c. 1 (Ribaillier, 1:177); *SH* I, P1, In1, Tr5, S1, Q1, C3–6 (n. 177–80), 261–5.

³⁹ Ayelet Even-Ezra, 'The Conceptualization of Charisma in the Early Thirteenth Century,' *Viator* 44 (2013): 151–68.

The Architectural Plan: Structure and Doctrine

The most challenging aspect of the work of compilation involved ensuring that the enormous quantity of questions and materials were not merely piled one on top of the other but organized into a highly complex and well-thought out hierarchical structure. The *Summa Halensis* represents a fully-fledged stage in the transformation of the genre from a collection of questions, the links between which are either not explained at all or only in a few words, to the *Summa* with a carefully reasoned structure that is also explicitly revealed to the reader in the form of titles and prologues. This is evident in an increasing number and volume of introductory remarks and prologues, and in the number of layers major texts entailed. Master Martin (ca. 1200) sometimes justifies the order of his questions, in formulas such as ‘Cum nomina effectuum transumantur ad causam, et quolibet fuit a deo, queritur an omnium nominibus (...)’ or ‘Cum nomina creaturarum ad nominandum creatorem transumantur, queritur quomodo vel in qua significatione de deo predicentur. Solutio (...)’. Occasionally, there are comments about the common theme of several questions, like ‘duo sunt dumtaxat predicamenta theologica, substantia scilicet et relatio. Nonnullas autem quaestiones quae tuta hec fieri solent prout nobis occurrent prosequuntur. Deo autem idem est prescientia et scientia et essentia.’⁴⁰ A similar use of linking phrases is attested in Geoffrey of Poitiers’ *Summa*, which includes only three levels (book-question-subquestions), and which sometimes has introductory sentences such as, ‘nunc redeamus ad illa que circa ecclesiam aguntur et primo de symonia dicamus (...)’.⁴¹

By the time we arrive to the *Summa aurea* of William of Auxerre, attention to structure becomes more evident and the structure itself more complex. Ribailier suggests that ‘l’auteur de la *Summa aurea* a pris soin lui-même de regrouper ces questions en sections et en sous-sections aisément discernables, chacune d’entre elles étant en effet précédée d’introductions et de sommaires où sont énumérées les questions qui en font partie.’⁴²

Subdivision or grouping became an integral part of the work of editing, and groupings differed greatly between different recensions, while the order of the units remained the same.⁴³ Samples show that the maximum number of subdivisions in the *Summa aurea* is around five: *liber-tractatus-capitulum-capitulum(2)-articulus*. The structure and order of questions are always reasoned, with introductory phrases linking one to another, like: ‘since angels look at the mirror of eternity as do prophets, we shall now discuss prophecy,’ and offer a detailed plan of the issues to follow.

⁴⁰ Toulouse, Bibliothèque Municipale 209, fols 3ra, 4ra and 10va, respectively.

⁴¹ Godfrey of Poitiers, *Summa* (Avranches, BM 121, fol. 153rb).

⁴² Jean Ribailier, ‘Introduction,’ in William of Auxerre, *Summa Aurea* (see above, n. 6), 1: 10.

⁴³ Ribailier, ‘Introduction,’ 1:9–10.

Philip the Chancellor's *Summa de bono*, a source of inspiration in terms of both doctrine and style for the *Summa Halensis* team, provides reasoned linking phrases and detailed prologues as well. The number of layers rises to more than seven towards the end of the work, according to the modern edition. The question, *De distinctione symbolorum*, for instance, is located thus in the general structure: *De bono gratie* => *de bono gratie in homine* => *de gratia gratum faciente* => *de virtutibus theologicis* => *de fide* => *de symbolis* => *de distinctione symbolorum*. Looking at the prologues, rather than their fulfillment in the text, further subdivisions are revealed. The *Summa Halensis* follows this growing complexity with an average of ten such layers.

The super-scheme of the *Summa* followed the basic fourfold structure of *exitus-reditus*, addressing 1. God, 2. creation, 3. Christ and grace, and 4. sacraments and last things. But a systematic investigation of theology as any other topic usually does not proceed in one line: it is more like a web, each subject connected to many others. One line of inquiry raises a throng of related questions that could nevertheless be raised on another occasion as well. The editors had to decide on the best place to discuss a matter, then labored to refer readers to the places where such a question could also be assessed. 'Consequenter quaerendum esset X sed istud reservabimus inquirendum, cum quaretur de Y.'⁴⁴ Cross-references in sources should have been removed; links were removed and added; a diligent effort was needed to avoid repetitions and tell that to the reader 'omissa vero Q. utrum (...), eo quod ipsa satis datur intelligi ex praemissa'. Some subjects indeed recur but received different treatments in different contexts,⁴⁵ at times unintentionally, at times seemingly knowingly. The style should have been unified, and the doctrinal positions coherent.⁴⁶ Each of the endless details of editing left marks, in the forms of undeleted references, incorrect ones, or textual or thematic repetitions. References for planned tractates were inserted, but these were never written. Prologues delineating a plan were sometimes not reedited and updated according to the actual fulfillment of that plan.

Apart from the aesthetic attraction such complex structures afford the intellect, they embody doctrine. It is beyond the scope of this short article to explain in detail all the doctrinal ideas behind structural schemes that dictate the intricate structure of the *Summa Halensis*. I will limit myself therefore to two detailed examples and mention briefly two others.

The first case pertains to a constant emphasis on the distinction between reality and language, as historically linguistic-oriented theology is moved to the background in favor of new metaphysical theology. This is exemplified in the approach to the divine realm which is taken in the first book of the *Summa Halensis*. In Summae of the first decades of the century, a linguistically-oriented approach dominates the discussion, which develops through questions about the applicability of names, adjectives

⁴⁴ For examples, see Doucet, 'Prolegomena,' 320.

⁴⁵ Doucet, 'Prolegomena,' 321.

⁴⁶ On style coherence see Doucet, 'Prolegomena,' 326–32; on doctrinal coherence see 332–7.

and other predicates to God. Master Martin, for instance, deals with the Manichean doctrine of two principles at the beginning of his first book, but then turns to the meaning of names. He sets off from the predicate *ubique*, for instance, to engage in a discussion of the divine presence in the world and in sinners' hearts.⁴⁷ The author of *Ne ad mensam*, an anonymous Summa of the beginning of the 13th century turns just after his prologue to consider 'names' that relate to the divine unity and to the different persons of the Trinity.⁴⁸ Godfrey of Poitiers includes in his prologue proofs for God's existence and simplicity, but then moves on to a series of questions inspired by language, interspersed with more thematically-arranged titles: essential adjectives and relative adjectives; then to a question on whether the Father and the Holy Spirit are one; to *dictiones*; the name Jesus, essential names; the proposition 'God generates god'; etc. William of Auxerre's *Summa aurea* also mixes names and issues, but names and adjectives appear later. First, that God is one and immutable, 2. the number of persons, 3. the names that are being said about God, including essential names 4. adjectival names 5. the name 'persona' 6. *notiones* 7. and then again essential names, under the auspices of which issues such as omnipotence and predestination are considered.

The *Summa Halensis*, however, proposes a clear-cut distinction between heart and mouth, between divine reality itself and the names we use to describe it. The introduction to the first inquiry of the first book reads thus:

Cuius inquisitionis duae sunt partes, secundum verbum Apostoli, Rom. 10:20: "Corde creditur ad iustitiam, ore autem confessio fit ad salutem." Est igitur inquisitio bipartita de Unitate et Trinitate deitatis: prima de ipsa re, quae est Unitas Trinitatis ordinata ad credulitatem cordis; secunda de nominatione ordinata ad confessionem oris, ut sciamus quod credimus, confiteri locutionibus catholicis et veris.⁴⁹

And the introduction to the second part of the first book of the *Summa Halensis*:

Inquisitis in praecedentibus iis quae spectant ad fidem divinitatis et Trinitatis, procedimus ad inquisitiones eorum quae pertinent ad confessionem eiusdem sacratissimae Unitatis et Trinitatis; ad quod prosequendum ipsius adiutorium invocamus. Modum autem inquisitionis eius erit talis: Ut primo ponamus inquisitiones quasi introductorias circa divina nomina in generali; se-

⁴⁷ For a list of his questions, see Richard Heinzmann, *Die "Compilatio quaestionum theologiae secundum Magistrum Martinum"* (Munich: Hueber, 1964).

⁴⁸ *Ne ad mensam* (Florence, Biblioteca Medicea Laurenziana, Plut. 20.38), the capitula of the introductory section on the Scriptures end in fol. 3r. For a list of the questions and an introduction to the text, see François Henquin, 'La Summa Florentina Ne ad mensam du début du XIII^e siècle,' *Antonianum* 22 (1947): 125–76.

⁴⁹ *SH I*, P1, In1, prol., p. 39: [Concerning this inquisition there are two parts, according to the word of the Apostle in Roman 10:20, "by the heart one believes and is justified, by the mouth one confesses and is saved." There is therefore a bi-partite inquiry concerning the unity and Trinity of the deity: first of that matter, which is the Unity of the Trinity leading to the belief of the heart; and second is the naming [of the Trinity] leading to the confession of the mouth, so that we know that we believe, and confess by true and catholic words].

cundo descendamus ad inquisitionem nominum in speciali; tertio vero colligamus nominum differentias simul, suppositis regulis quibus universaliter absque errore possimus enuntiare quod de sancta Trinitate credimus locutionibus catholicis et veris.⁵⁰

Naturally, such a distinction involved the repetition of arguments and topics, but it drew a clear line between addressing the divine essence on the one hand, and topics like the name *qui est* on the other. The separation of the topics resulted in further the proliferation of questions to fill out the categories of names designating the divine essence, power or knowledge, and to further clarify whether the name in question refers to the actual divine object. This same structural tendency to address the *res* before its verbal representation is repeated in discussions of smaller scale. Earlier questions on faith started from Paul's definition of faith in Heb. 11:1. But the treatise on faith in the *Summa Halensis* changes the usual order of earlier treatises by dealing first with faith *secundum rem*, that is, its essence as a mental, grace-given and meritorious habit and virtue, and only then *secundum diffinitionem*, explaining its various definitions.⁵¹

Another case of structure according with doctrine is seen as the *Summa Halensis* employs a three-fold method of treating cognition, studying it first in itself; then in terms of its object—God, the unchanging truth; then in its different subjects. The latter category may discuss the relevant potency of the soul in which knowledge is located, as well as subjects like Christ, children, Adam, etc. This subject-habitus-object triad deeply resonates with Alexander's general view of cognition and the soul, as well as his doctrines about the real object of faith (divine truth rather than the articles of faith), and on mediation in the beatific vision. This understanding of faith and cognition in general, including that of beatified souls, as a habit distinct from the potency of the soul, had strong implications regarding the hotly disputed issue of the immediate vision of God in heaven.⁵²

The compilation of the *Summa Halensis* was a significant cultural act in the intellectual, religious and political climate of the early 13th century. It aimed to supersede earlier Summae by offering a spectacle of scholasticism and to establish the status and legitimacy of the burgeoning Franciscan *studium* at Paris in difficult times,

50 SH I, P2, In1, Tr1, p. 491: [From the proceeding inquiry concerning those things which pertain to faith in the divinity and in the Trinity, we produced to an inquiry concerning those things which pertain to the confession of that most holy unity and Trinity. This [inquiry] must be pursued with the help we will invoke. The mode however of this inquiry will be such that we must first undertake certain introductory inquiries concerning the divine name in general; secondly, we will descend to consider the name in particular; third we will gather different names together in one place, laying down rules by which we can universally and without error speak of the Holy Trinity in which we believe with words that are true and catholic]. This third part was never written.

51 For a detailed discussion of the distinction *secundum rem/diffinitionem* in its intellectual context see Ayelet Even-Ezra, 'Blind Men Speaking of Colors: Paul's Recollection and the Self-Image of Early Thirteenth-Century Theologians,' *Harvard Theological Review* 107 (2014): 425–46.

52 Even-Ezra, *Ecstasy in the Classroom*, 81–110.

during which the order was subject to external and inner pressures. Its significance for the history of scholastic writing methods and textual approaches cannot be underestimated. The wealth of materials from the Franciscan *studium*—the *Gloss*, questions in different levels of redaction—as well as many minor errors resulting from the editing process, allow for tracing the process of its construction. Studying these materials, one can enter the scholastic laboratory and understand the meaning of such a collective scholarly effort, and perceive the beauty of its compilation, as doctrines dictate structural decisions, and those decisions in turn support the development of new ideas and the clarification of others.

Stephen F. Brown

Praepositinus of Cremona and William of Auxerre on *Suppositio*

Their Influence on the *Summa Halensis*

Abstract: Early medieval discussions of supposition begin with reflections on an early passage of the first chapter of St Augustine's *De Trinitate*. Here Augustine is criticizing Sabellius and his followers who claimed that the Father had begotten himself, i.e. God begets deity, which gave rise to a kind of modalism. These words of Augustine show up in Peter Lombard's *Sentences*, Book I, Distinction 4, and gave rise to a larger debate about the words that can properly apply to God which engaged the minds not least of Abelard and Alberic of Reims, culminating in Gilbert of Poitiers. Praepositinus (1135–1210) and William of Auxerre (1140–1231) are the sources of a new trajectory in interpreting the supposition of the name 'God', which directly influences the *Summa Halensis*. This paper examines the nature of that influence and provides a translation of brief texts from Praepositinus and William that form its background.

Early medieval discussions of supposition begin with reflections on an early passage of the first chapter of St Augustine's *De Trinitate*:

As for those who think that it is in God's power to generate himself, they err the more because not only is it not so in the case of God, but it is not so even in the case of a spiritual or bodily creature. For there is not a thing which generates itself into existence.¹

Here Augustine is criticizing Sabellius and his followers who claimed that the Father had begotten Himself. These words of Augustine show up in Peter Lombard's *Sentences*, Book 1, Distinction 4, which opens with the question: *Utrum Deus genuit Deum?* ('Whether it is to be granted that God generated Himself?').² Even though Peter Lombard does not go into any historical detail, if we examine the *Theologia Christiana* or the *Theologia 'Scholarium'* of Peter Abelard we realize that the criticism of Sabellius by Augustine had for Abelard a later medieval application by Alberic of Rheims.³ Augustine had asked what kind of human knowledge could help us in our discourse about God and he warned us that those who are weighed down by the burden of believing only in their own human powers fail in their statements about God in three

¹ Augustine, *De Trinitate* I, c. 1, n. 1 (PL 42:820).

² Peter Lombard, *The Sentences* 1, d. 4, c. 1, vol. 1, trans. Giulio Silano, *Medieval Sources in Translation*, 42 (Toronto: Pontifical Institute of Mediaeval Studies, 2007), 27.

³ Peter Abelard, *Historia Calamitatum*, ed. Jacques Monfrin (Paris: Vrin, 1959), 84–5.

ways. One group, dominated by their bodily senses and interpreting everything in terms of them, imagine God as white or red. Another group, rising above the tyranny of the senses, anchors itself in the nature and operations of the human soul, and thus portrays God now as forgetting, now as remembering. Finally, a third group, the one to which Abelard attaches Alberic of Rheims, is the collection of

Those who strive indeed to transcend the whole of creation, which is certainly changeable, in order to fix their attention on the unchangeable substance which is God, but weighed down by the burden of their mortality—since they wish to appear as knowing what they do not know, and cannot know what they wish to know—they insist all the more boldly on their preconceived ideas, and thus shut themselves off from the roads of understanding, and would rather hold on to their own opinion, even when it is erroneous, than to change that which they have once defended.⁴

In what sense can this citation be connected to Alberic? When Augustine spoke of this third group, he seemed to have in mind Sabellius, who claimed that the Father had begotten Himself. Is Alberic one of the followers of Sabellius? If we were to put this report of Abelard into the later language of signification and supposition, we would say that if Alberic were interpreting the propositions *Deus genuit Deum* or *Pater genuit Filium*, he would say that *Deus* and *Pater* signify and supposit for the divine essence and that *Deum* and *Filium* also signify and stand for the divine essence. Both of the previous sentences would be equivalent to *Deitas genuit deitatem* ('The divine substance begot the divine substance'). Alberic doubtlessly would have denied any association with the Trinitarian modalism of Sabellius, but, according to Abelard, Alberic's confusion of grammatical terms like *Deus* and *Deitas* forced him to join the ranks of Augustine's third class of those who wrongly applied natural knowledge to their speech about God.

Augustine's *De Trinitate* concern with the terms we apply to God had in Abelard's time been closely associated to the grammatical theory of Donatus. Just prior to his discussion of the problem with Alberic's grammatical position (1120s), Abelard reminds his readers of the caveat of Gregory the Great in the prologue of his *Moralia in Job*: 'I judge it an extremely unworthy act to force the words of Sacred Scripture to follow the rules of Donatus.'⁵

The debate of Abelard and Alberic made the readers of Scripture aware that they needed to develop a way of reading about the God of Scripture, that is, the Triune God and the God who became man. Nor was Abelard's conflict with Alberic the only stimulus for studying the meaning and referent of 'God'. Gilbert of Poitiers had similar difficulties with Pope Eugene III at the Consistory of Paris (1147) and the Council of Rheims (1148). Among Gilbert's propositions which were under scru-

⁴ Saint Augustine, *The Trinity* I, c. 1, trans. Stephen McKenna, Fathers of the Church, 45 (Washington, DC: The Catholic University of America Press, 1963), 3–4.

⁵ Gregory the Great, *Moralia in Job* (*Morals on the Book of Job*), I: The Epistle (The Lectionary), #5.

tiny was one that claimed ‘that the divine nature, which is called divinity, is not God, but is the form by which God exists, just as humanity is not man, but is the form by which a man exists.’ Once again, the confusion about the meaning and referent of terms in these theological contexts was showing the need for a more consistent set of rules about words, especially words connected with the Christian doctrines of the Trinity and the Incarnation. Questions arose in these theological contexts demanding greater precision and consistency, e.g. do terms like ‘God’ and ‘divinity’ signify the same thing? Or do they signify different things? Or, perhaps, do they signify the same thing but do so in different ways? As Gilbert of Poitiers’ example of ‘humanity’ and ‘man’ indicate, the solution one might give to the problem of universals could have serious impact on how one answers the questions concerning the meaning (*significatio*) and referents (*supposita*) of concrete and abstract terms.

The Development of ‘Theories’ of *Suppositio*

Our introduction to the treatment of *suppositio* began with the opening discussion of Book 1 of St Augustine’s *De Trinitate*. That discussion focused on a challenge brought forth by Augustine against the way in which some dealt with a problem speaking about ‘God’ and ‘generation’. In the early medieval world, Peter Lombard restated Augustine’s challenge in Distinction 4 of Book 1 of his *Sentences*:

Now let us return to the earlier question, where it was asked whether God the Father generated himself as God or another God. To which we say that neither of these is to be granted.—But Augustine says, in his letter *To Maximinus*, that God the Father generated himself as another; these are his words: “The Father, in order to have the Son from himself, did not diminish himself, but so generated another self from himself that he remained entirely in himself, and yet was as great in the Son as he is alone.”—This may be understood as follows: that is, he generated another from himself, and not at all another God, but another person; or he generated another self, that is, he generated another who is also what he is. Indeed, although the Father is other than the Son, yet he is not another thing, but one thing.⁶

This Augustinian context, in Distinction 4 of Book 1 of the *Sentences*, served as the center of supposition discussions in theology for a very long time. If Augustine set the general context for supposition discussions, the individual who most influenced the actual discussion was Boethius. Not only had he translated Aristotle’s *On Interpretation* into Latin, but he also commented on that work twice. His commentaries were, on the whole, quite detailed, including the opinions of many other interpreters.⁷

⁶ Peter Lombard, *The Sentences* 1, d. 4, c. 2, n. 4 (Silano, 29).

⁷ Cf. Richard Sorabji, *Aristotle Transformed: the Ancient Commentators and Their Influence* (London: Duckworth, 1990).

The systematic influence of Boethius' *Commentaries on Aristotle's 'On Interpretation'* was slow in coming into the Latin West, since literary interpretation problems generally came out of concrete difficulties connected with the interpretation of particular Scriptural passages or declarations of Church councils and specific commentaries of the Fathers. In brief, in the time between Boethius and the 13th century there was no systematic treatise on supposition in the study of grammar and logic.⁸ In theology there were simply efforts to develop consistent rules for dealing with concrete problems arising from passages of Scripture or from theological sources or authorities, such as those we have seen in the Abelard-Alberic debate or Gilbert of Poitiers' troubles at the Consistory of Paris and the Council of Rheims.

The Sources of Supposition Development in the *Summa Halensis*

Gilbert of Poitiers⁹ is one of the chief contributors when the *Summa Halensis* studies the supposition of the name 'God'. For Gilbert, 'God' is an essential name that properly supposits for the Divine Essence. This is its natural supposition: when we say *Deus est*, in no way does 'God' supposit for a Person. *Deus* can supposit for a Person, but this is only when we add an adjunct, such as *Deus generat* ('God begets'). In such a case, the noun 'God', by the addition of this adjunct, is drawn outside its proper character as suppositing for the Divine Essence and is forced or drawn violently to supposit for a Person.¹⁰

Praepositinus of Cremona (1135–1210) and William of Auxerre (1140–1231) are the sources of a different interpretation of the supposition of the name 'God'. Of course, for them 'God' will at times supposit for the Divine Essence. However, the framework within which *Halensis* will discuss 'The Supposition of the noun "God"' is treated within a broader theme: *De nomine operationis* ('Concerning the name of the Divine Operation'). *Halensis* favors the opinion of these two authors who hold that

this name "God" signifies a nature, but it does so according to mode of its signification, which is to signify the nature as a what is—"what is", however belongs to the nature and also the thing

⁸ For a general portrait of the historical development in this period and the 14th century, see Stephen F. Brown, 'Sign conceptions in logic in the Latin Middle Ages,' in *Semiotik (Semiotics): Ein Handbuch zu den zeichentheoretischen Grundlagen von Natur und Kultur*, ed. Roland Posner, Klaus Robering, and Thomas A. Sebeok (Berlin/New York: Walter de Gruyter, 1997), 1036–46.

⁹ John Marenbon, 'Gilbert of Poitiers,' in *A History of Twelfth-Century Western Philosophy*, ed. Peter Dronke (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1988), 328–56.

¹⁰ Cf. Alexander of Hales, *Doctoris irrefragabilis Alexandri de Hales Ordinis minorum Summa theologia (SH)*, 4 vols (Quaracchi: Collegium S. Bonaventurae, 1924–48), Vol I, P2, In2, Tr1, Q2, M3, p. 535a. Also cf. *SH* I, P2, In2, Tr1, Q2, M3, C2, Ar7 (n. 365), p. 541.

that has the nature—therefore, this name “God” supposits sometimes for the nature, as when we say “God is three Persons” and sometimes it supposits for a Person, and this in different ways: sometimes for only one Person, as in “God begets”; sometimes for two Persons, as in “God spirates”; sometimes for three Persons, as in “To the invisible only God be honor and glory” (*I Tim.* <1. 17>).¹¹

However, even though *Halensis* gains most of his knowledge concerning supposition from Praepositinus and William of Auxerre, there is another source which he gains from both of them. This author is Alan of Lille (1128–1202), famous for his *Theological Rules*. Praepositinus does not mention the name of Alan, nor does he speak of his theological rules in his *Summa* ‘*Qui Producit Ventos*’. Still, when he considers some arguments, he evaluates them by this principle: ‘A distinction does not have a place where it is because of diverse causes that it has no union.’ In the *Summa Aurea*, William of Auxerre, represents this same principle as a theological rule:¹²

There is a theological rule that a distinction does not have a place where it does not have a union from diverse causes. Since all men are united in the species “man” from different causes and through diverse humanities, therefore a distinction has a place in the species “man”, and it can be rightly said that there is one man and another man. However, because the three persons are united in what I call “God” from one sole cause, namely, the one sole deity, therefore, a distinction does not take place here like the distinction found in natural things, for a distinction is extraneous in this matter. Nonetheless, in the proposition “God (*Deus*) begot another God (*alium Deum*)” if this distinction “other” (*alium*) is taken in a substantial way, and this word “God” (*Deum*) is joined to it as an apposition (unneeded addition), then that proposition is true.¹³

Praepositinus is cited in Tome I of the *Summa Halensis* 121 times, and 20 of them are explicit.¹⁴ The *Prolegomena* to the *Summa Halensis* informs us that William of Auxerre’s name is mentioned only twice in the text of *Halensis*, but that his *Summa aurea* is found everywhere and quite often in literal form. The opinion of all three

¹¹ Praepositinus, *Summa* ‘*Qui Producit Ventos*’, c. IV, ed. J.N. Garvin, in *Garvin Papers*; cf. Kent Emery, Andrew I. Irving, Stephen M. Metzger, and Cheryl M. Jones, ‘*Quaestiones, Sententiae* and *Summae* from the Later Twelfth and Early Thirteenth Centuries: The Joseph. N. Garvin Papers (II),’ *Bulletin de Philosophie Médiévale* 48 (2006): 69–70; trans. below, Appendix I (4.1), [3]. Cf. also *SH* I, P2, In2, Tr1, Q2, M3, p. 535: ‘Hoc nomen ‘Deus’ significat naturam, sed ex modo suae significationis, quae est significans naturam ut quod est—‘quod est’ autem convenit et naturae et rei naturae—ideo hoc nomen ‘Deus’ supponit quandoque naturam, ut cum dicitur ‘Deus est tres personae’; quandoque vero supponit personam, et hoc differenter: quandoque pro una tantum, ut ‘Deus generat’, quandoque pro duabus, ut ‘Deus spirat’, quandoque pro tribus, ut ‘invisibili soli Deo’ etc., *I Tim.* Ultimo.’

¹² Theological Rules, and the importance of Alan of Lille for their development, are portrayed extensively in G.R. Evans, *Alan of Lille: The Frontiers of Theology in the Later Twelfth Century* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1983).

¹³ Cf. below, Appendix II (William of Auxerre, *Summa Aurea*), n. 5.

¹⁴ The central location of these *Halesian* citations is *SH* I (nn. 350–493), pp. 520–697. The material dealing mainly with *suppositio* is located in *SH* I (nn. 358–65), pp. 535–41, beginning with the title: ‘De suppositione huius nominis ‘Deus’.’

regarding the theme of the supposition of 'God' is the same. So is the opponent: Gilbert of Poitiers. For Gilbert, as we have said using the description of William of Auxerre: 'The name "God", since it is essential, only supposits directly for the Essence, unless it is forced in a violent way by a conjectural verb or by a conjectural preposition to supposit for a Person.' Taking a more operational view of the name 'God', William, in one of his shortest arguments, contrasts well the position of him and his companions against the opinion of Gilbert:

A form or nature properly speaking does not act; rather it is the thing having the form <or nature> which acts. Creatures, however, are signs or images or indicators of an author; therefore, properly they are not signs of deity but rather signs of someone having deity. So, although creatures are properly speaking signs of God, this noun "God" more properly has to supposit for the one who has deity than for deity; so more properly it supposits for a Person than for the Divine Essence.¹⁵

The Treatment of Supposition in the *Summa Halensis*

The central treatment of supposition in theological contexts took place in Book 1, Distinction 4 of Peter Lombard's *Sententiae* or in various works which followed Lombard's pattern in that location. The *Summa Halensis* follows similar lines and gives attention to supposition matters in general under the heading: *De suppositione huius nominis 'Deus'*. Here *Halensis* is following Praepositinus, whose whole presence is limited to this same discussion; and it is also following William of Auxerre's parallel heading: *De suppositione huius nominis 'Deus'*. Under this overhall heading, *Halensis* divides his treatment into a general discussion and seven special areas of consideration. The general discussion is carried out by examining: 'Whether this name "God" supposits for the Essence or also for a Person?' The special areas of consideration fall under seven articles. Each article provides greater insights into the issues treated in the general discussion. If we look at Article 2 (*An haec sit vera: 'Deus genuit alium Deum'*) we encounter much the same material as we found in the discussion above of William of Auxerre and Alan of Lille's theological rule. However, the discussion here in Article 2 provides a statement offering a deeper understanding to that rule. The improved clarity comes as a counter-argument to the first response to Article 2's question (whether this is true: 'God begot another God?')

I respond to the first argument according to this rule: a distinction does not have a place where it does not have a union from diverse causes. For example, humanity is in Sortes and Plato from diverse causes. Wherefore, I can say that Sortes is another man than Plato, because the reason is other by which Sortes is a man and other by which Plato is a man, because the humanity of Sortes is other than the humanity of Plato. In divine things, however, this is not so, because

15 Cf. below, Appendix II (William of Auxerre, *Summa Aurea*), n. 9.

the Father is God and the Son is God by the same divinity. There is, then, one cause and reason why the Father is God and the Son is God. The union, then, in this name “God” is not from diverse causes; indeed it is from one cause, and therefore a distinction has no place in this case.¹⁶

The different discussions, even of the same materials, can bring a clearer understanding, and that is certainly the gain one can achieve from going back over the treatments of the same questions in the different authors covering the same subjects. But, as you read the *pro* and *contra* arguments in the discussions of the same central focus questions which make up the content of Halensis’ *De suppositione huius nominis ‘Deus’*, i.e. *Membrum III*, you will also find references going to non-central sources, such as the reference to the first argument against the opinion of Gilbert of Poitiers which is found in Lombard as he interprets Ps. 66:7.¹⁷ A like reference from Isa. 6:3, studied in the opening section of Praepositinus’ *Summa ‘Qui Producit Ventos’* is also interpreted in the same place in Lombard’s *Sentences*.¹⁸

* * *

We have limited ourselves in the study of theological supposition to the sources for Tome I of the *Summa Halensis*. Almost all of the discussion has been about the Trinity. There are, of course, other areas of theological study, since there are certain other subjects of study which deal with key issues which could be examined in regard to the Incarnation. A glance at the supposition-oriented questions which can be found in Praepositinus’ treatment shows that there is a lot more supposition material to be studied for a fuller portrait of the sources for the study of theological language in the full text of the *Summa Halensis*. Here are Praepositinus’ beginning invitations for future study:

- Quaestio 2a: Utrum hoc nomen ‘Deus’ aequivoce dicatur de homine assumpto et de Patre?
- Quaestio 10a: Quid praedicatur cum dicitur ‘Christus est duo?’
- Quaestio 11a: Utrum aliquod possit esse proprium nomen Filii Dei secundum quod ipse est homo?

16 *SH* I, P2, In2, Tr1, Q2, C2, Ar2 (n. 360), Respondeo, p.538: ‘Ad primum secundum hanc regulam: non habet locum distinctio ubi non est ex diversis causis unio. Verbi gratia, humanitas est in Sorte et Platone ex diversis causis; unde possum dicere quod Sortes est alius homo a Platone, quia alia est ratio qua Sortes est homo et alia qua Plato est homo, quia alia est humanitas Sortis, alia humanitas Platonis. In divinis autem non sic, quia Pater est Deus et Filius est Deus eadem divinitate; una ergo est causa et ratio qua Pater est Deus et Filius Deus. Unio ergo in hoc nomine ‘Deus’ non est ex diversis causis, immo ex una, et ideo non habet locum ibi distinctio.’

17 Peter Lombard, *The Sentences* 1, d. 2, c. 4, n. 7.

18 Peter Lombard, *The Sentences* 1, d. 2, c. 4, n. 7.

Quaestio 20a: Utrum dicendum sit quod divina natura assumpsit humanam naturam?¹⁹

Appendices

The following two appendices provide the central texts of Praepositinus and William of Auxerre concerning the central materials dealing with supposition used by the *Summa Halensis*.

Appendix I

Praepositinus, *Summa 'Qui Producit Ventos'*

<Chapter IV>

Concerning this noun 'God'

(4.1) There are nouns which indicate only what the noun expresses essentially, such as "essence" and "nature"; and there are also certain nouns which express what they say both essentially and personally, such as "God".

[1] In regard to this position, beginning from this text (Ps. 66:7): "May God, our God, bless us; may God bless us, <and may all the ends of the earth fear him>," we say: there is an authority that says "This word 'God', repeated three times, signifies the Trinity, and at the end of the text the word 'him', and not 'them', follows to indicate unity." Against this authority one can argue in the following way: this pronoun "him" is related to this noun "God", and the connection is a proper one. Therefore, the connection links the second knowledge to the prior knowledge gained through this word "God". But through this word "God" the only knowledge that is brought forth is knowledge of a Person; so "God" does not refer to the Essence.

[2] Again: <Isa. 6:3>: "Holy, Holy, Holy, the <Lord> God, etc." This noun "Holy" which is presented three times in this text signifies the Trinity; and this name <"Lord"> signifies the Essence. Against this understanding we argue: these two nouns, "Holy" and "Lord", are intransitively joined together. Now "Holy" refers to a Person, so then does "Lord" refer to the same.

[3] Again: let it be granted that someone says "The Father exists" and someone else says "The Son exists". Whence it is said: "Both are speaking of God, for one is speaking of God and the other is speaking of God, so both are speaking of God." I ask: "How in this last proposition is the word 'God' to be understood?" Does it signify

¹⁹ On this topic, see Philip D. Jamieson, 'Praepositinus of Cremona's Understanding of the Divine and Human Nature in Christ' (PhD thesis, Boston College, 1993). These questions dealing with supposition are located on the following pages: q. 2 (pp. 170–3); q. 10 (pp. 179–84); q. 11 (pp. 184–97) and q. 20 (pp. 211–3).

a Person or does it signify the Essence? It does not signify the Essence, because neither speaker is talking about the Essence. It also is not speaking about a Person, because it is not about the same person that both are speaking. So, this is a false proposition: “Both of them are speaking of ‘God’”. Likewise, this one is speaking about God and that one is speaking about God, so they are speaking about God or about gods. But it is not about gods; therefore it is about God.” Then, one argues as above.

To this we respond that this name ‘God’ in each statement signifies the Divine Nature when it speaks of “God”. But sometimes it signifies the Divine Nature and supposits for it, as in “God is three Persons”; sometimes it signifies it but does not supposit for it but supposits for one Person, as when we say “God generates”, or it supposits for two persons, as when we say “God spirates”, or it supposits for three persons, as when we say (1 Tim. 1:17): “To the invisible only God be honor and glory.”

[To 1] To the first, therefore, when it is said “May God bless us”, etc.: we say that the name “God” in this passage signifies the Divine Essence and supposits for the three Persons, and that the pronoun “him” which is related to the invocation likewise supposits for the three persons and signifies the essence. Wherefore, for the sake of signification it is put in the singular form, but not for the sake of supposition.

[To 2] It is the same for the other “Holy, Holy, Holy” etc. authority: we say that “Holy” there supposits for the three Persons and signifies the Essence. And this holds for “Lord” as well.

[To 3] To the third we respond in this way: if you ask what does the word “God” signify when it is said: “Both of them are speaking of God”, I say that “‘God’ signifies the Essence”, as has been said in all cases. If you ask: “For what does it supposit?”, I say that in the predicate there is no supposition, but rather opposition. And when I say “Both of them are a man”, the noun “man” signifies the species, and does not supposit for any one man. But against this it is objected that “‘God’ is what they are speaking about.” In this case, this noun “God” supposits for the Essence or for a Person or for Persons. But it is not suppositing for the Essence, because they are not speaking about the Essence. Nor is it suppositing for a Person, because it is not about one sole Person that they are speaking. Therefore, it is about Persons.

Yet, this is not an objection that goes against us. We hold that the noun “God” here supposits for two Persons. To this we argue: “‘God’ is that concerning whom they are speaking”; therefore “God” is that concerning whom they speak, with the result that both so speak or either one so speaks or neither so speaks. But it is not the case that neither so speaks, nor that either so speaks; therefore it is the case that both do. Then we argue in this way: “‘God’ is that about which both speak; and this is not speech about the Essence, nor about a Person, nor about Persons, because they are not the same Persons concerning whom both speak.” It seems therefore that this proposition is false: “‘God’ is that concerning whom both of them are speaking.” Solution: For those who stick to the way that we spoke of before, that whoever speaks of a Person speaks of the Essence, there would be no question, because the two speak about the Essence and they do so together, for this one speaks

about the Essence that is the Father and the other speaks about the Essence that is the Son. We say therefore that this argument is false: “‘God’ is that about whom they are speaking; therefore ‘God’ is that about whom both or either or neither is so speaking.” Another example: “This man is speaking about the word *albus* and that man is speaking about the word *alba*; they are speaking about the noun *albus*; therefore, this noun *albus* is that about which they speak, so that both are speaking about it,” etc. Likewise, there is an example in the Sacrament. Or we can say that this is true: “‘God’ is that concerning which they are speaking, so that neither is.”

(4.2) [1] Again, someone asks about this proposition: “‘God’ generates and He is not the Son”, because “God” generates and He is not generated: for the same “God” does not generate and become generated, because “God” generates and He is not the Son. Therefore “God” is the Father and the same one is not the Son; therefore “God” is not the Son. For the same reason “God” is not the Father and “God” is not the Holy Spirit. And for the same reason “God” is not the three Persons.

[2] Again, it is asked what is the quantity of this proposition: “‘God’ spirates.” And the same question is asked in regard to this proposition: “‘God’ generates or is generated.” It seems that it is indefinite, because this noun “God” does not supposit in this proposition more for the Father than for the Son. On the other hand, it seems that it is singular, because the signification of the noun <“God”> is one and singular, namely, “deity”.

[To 1] To the first we respond that a relative expression in negative propositions refers to the significate and its opposite, and unless the predicate is removed from the significate and its opposite, the proposition is false. In affirmative propositions, however, it is sufficient to refer to what was previously supposed. Wherefore, this is true: “‘God’ generates and He Himself is not generated,” because this relative expression “He Himself” refers to the Divine Nature and the Person of the Father; but neither the Divine Nature nor the Person of the Father is generated. This proposition, however, is false: “‘God’ generates and ‘He Himself’ is not the Son, because this pronoun ‘He Himself’ not only refers to the Person of the Father but also to the Divinity which is the Son.” Wherefore, the aforesaid proposition is also true, namely, this one: “‘God’ is that about which they speak so that neither speaks of that ‘God’,” for this name “God” supposits there for two persons so that it supposits for neither God of which they speak. Therefore, to this argument “‘God’ generates and ‘He Himself’ is not generated, therefore ‘God’ generates and ‘He Himself’ is not the Son.” Let this be an example: “The Divine Essence is not generated; therefore the Divine Essence is not the Son.”

[To 2] To the second we say that this proposition “‘God’ generates or is generated” is neither singular nor indefinite, because this noun “God” is neither proper nor its opposite but has something proper and something opposite. For, it has the signification of the proper and the supposition of the opposite. So, this proposition is partly singular and partly indefinite.

(4.3) The opinion of others is that this noun “God” properly has to signify the Essence, but that at times because of an adjunct it signifies a Person, and it does so improperly. Wherefore, according to them, the noun “God” taken improperly is not able to have a relation, because to a word that is posited improperly, as they say, a relation cannot be made, because it immediately goes back to its proper signification. Thus, when I say “God generates and He Himself is not the Son”, this noun “God” signifies a Person and a relation is unsuitable, because immediately it makes it that “God” goes back to the signification of the Essence. But according to them all the prayers of the Church are of no worth in which a relation refers to the Father or Son.

Again, it can be objected to them in this way: “‘God’ generates.” This noun “God” both signifies and supposits in this proposition for the Father. And when I say “‘God’ is generated”, this noun “God” signifies and supposits in this proposition for the Son. Therefore, the noun “God” in these propositions either does not belong to the Father and Son or it belongs to them equivocally.

It should be noted, however, that this word “God” can everywhere supposit for the Essence, or for a Person or for Persons. But this is not something that can be converted, because where there is an adjunct it can only supposit for a Person. Whence, when I say “‘God’ generates”, “God” there supposits only for the Father, because “subjects are such as the predicates permit them to be”. This formula holds in the same way for a negative proposition. Wherefore, this is false: “‘God’ does not generate.” This also is false: “‘God’ generates and is generated”, because in this instance the word “God” cannot supposit for a Person, or for Persons or for the Essence.

Again, as often as an exclusive word is united to an essential noun, the noun makes it into a genus of thing, not into a thing of a genus. Wherefore, this is false: “It only begets or is begotten.” This is pointless: “One sole God either begets or is begotten.”

(4.4) From the aforesaid materials a solution for an argument that is found in the *Sentences* can be attained, namely, this argument: “The Father begot God (*Deum*); therefore the God (*Deum*) who is the Father or the God (*Deum*) who is not the Father.” Neither is true, for this is false: “The Father begot God (*Deum*) who is the Father”, because this noun “who” refers to the Person of the Son, for whom this noun “God” supposited; and the Son is not the Father. And this is false: “The Father begot God (*Deum*) who is not the Father”, because in negative propositions a relation refers to the significate and the opposite. Therefore, this is the meaning: “He begot God (*Deum*) who is not the Father”, that is, He begot God, and the Son is not the Father, and deity is not the Father.

Likewise, another argument is false, namely, this one: “The Father begot God (*Deum*); therefore He begot Himself as God or another God.” “That He begot Himself as God” is manifestly false, because this pronoun “Himself” refers to the Person of the Father. “He begot another God”: this is also false, because just as a relation refers to the significate and is opposite, so distinctive and differential words, such as *alius*-

alia-aliud, make a difference between a significate and an opposite. For, a distinction does not have a place where it does not have a union from diverse causes. For this is true: "Socrates is a different white thing than Plato", because here it is shown that Socrates is a different thing from Plato and that the whiteness of Socrates is a different thing than the whiteness of Plato. Likewise, here is the meaning: "The Father begot someone different, that is, from Himself and God by another deity." Example: (Ps. 110:1): "The Lord said to my Lord", therefore to Himself as Lord or to another as Lord.

But against this there is something offered in opposition to us: "The Father is not begotten; therefore, he is not the God who is begotten; and the Father is God; therefore He is God who is not begotten; therefore He is God who is not the Son." The solution to this was given above: because if "begotten" is <taken> as an adjective the proposition is <true>; if it is taken as a substance, it is false, as was said above. Because these: "God generates and He is not generated" is true; "God generates and He is not the Son" is false: It is for the same reason in each case.

Examples of the last point: "The Divine Essence is not generated; therefore the Divine Essence is not the Son." In the *Sentences* it is well enough argued that propositions of this kind are false: "Essence begot essence", "Essence begot the Son", and like propositions.

(4.5) However, it is asked whether this proposition is to be conceded: "The Essence is the Father of the Son"? That it is to be conceded is proved in this way: "The Father of the Son is the Essence, therefore the Essence is the Father of the Son." Again: "The Essence is the Father, therefore it is the Father of someone or no one." If it is said that the Essence is the Father of no one, then the Essence is not the Father. If it is said that the Essence is the Father of someone, then the Essence is only the Essence of the Son. Again, when I say: "The Essence is the Father", this is the meaning: "The Essence is the generating Person, and the Essence is the Person generating the Son; therefore, the Essence is the Father of the Son."

On the contrary: "The Essence is the Father of the Son, therefore the Son is the Son of the Essence, therefore, the Son is begotten by the Essence."

Solution: Many deny this: "The Essence is Father of the Son"; for they say that when I say "The Essence is the Father" this noun "Father" is taken somewhat as a substance and it is equal to saying "The Essence is the Generating Person". But when I say "The Essence is the Father of the Son" in this instance the noun "Father" is understood as an adjective, and this would be equivalent to saying "The Essence generates the Son." We say that this is true: "The Essence is the Father of the Son" just as this is true: "The Essence is the Father." This is so because in both places this noun "Father" is taken somewhat like a substance and signifies a Person with a property. So these are equal: "The Essence is the Father of the Son" and "The Essence is a Person generating the Son." This argument is false: "The Essence is Father of the Son, therefore the Son is the Son of the Essence." <Another> instance: "The Essence is the Son of the Virgin, therefore the Virgin is the mother of the Essence." Or you

could present it in an expository way, that is: “The Essence is the Person generating the Son, therefore the Son is the Person generated by the Essence.”

Appendix II

William of Auxerre, *Summa Aurea*

Book I

Chapter IV: Concerning the Supposition of the Name “God”

1. Concerning the fourth chapter we have to speak about the supposition of this noun “God”. But first we must note that in regard to the essential names spoken about God certain ones are substantive, such as “God” and “Creator”, and certain ones are adjectival, such as “Sublime” and “Eternal” and similar words.
2. We must first speak of substantive nouns. Certain of these nouns are apparently concrete, such as “God” and “Creator”; and certain are abstract, and certain ones are midway between these two. The apparently concrete ones are those which are like concrete natural nouns: they signify “deity” as an apparent form in a supposit, as the name “God” does. The abstract nouns are those which signify “deity” alone, not as “deity in a subject”, such as: “deity”, “power”, “essence” and the like. The middle terms, however, are those which sometimes are understood in one way or sometimes in another, words such as “light” and “wisdom”.
3. It is therefore generally true that an abstract noun in no way can be forced by some kind of violence to supposit for a person. Wherefore, all of these propositions are false: “Deity begets deity”, “Power begets power”, “Nature begot nature”, “Essence begets essence.” However all apparently concrete nouns, provided that they are essential, can be forced to supposit for a Person. Wherefore, such propositions as these are true: “God begets God”, “The Creator generates <a creature>”, because such nouns by using conceptual words or conceptual <prepositions> force them to supposit for persons, as does “God begot God”, or “God from God”. This likewise happens with nouns which are middle-type words between apparently concrete nouns and apparently abstract nouns, so that is why we have “Light from light”, and “Wisdom from wisdom”. Nevertheless, this noun “wisdom” is naturally abstract; yet due to frequent use it is taken by custom to be apparently concrete. Therefore, nonetheless, apparently concrete nouns are preferably forced to supposit for a person than abstract nouns, and this is because a person is a thing which is distinct by its property, and therefore it has to be signified by the subject that is marked by a form, and therefore it has to be supposit for by a noun that is apparently concrete than through an abstract name.

4. This position, however, is opposed in this way: "God (*Deus*) begot God (*Deum*), therefore He begot God (*Deum*) that is Himself or another God (*Deum*)."
If it is said that He begot a God (*Deum*) who is Himself, then God (*Deus*) begot Himself and therefore some Person begot Himself; and this is clearly false. If it is said that God (*Deus*) begot another God (*Deum*), therefore one God (*Deus*) exists and so does another, so there are many Gods (*Dii*).
5. Solution: The first argumentation is not valid: "God (*Deus*) begot God (*Deum*), therefore He begot a God (*Deum*) that is Himself or another God (*Deum*)", and this is because the things supposed for through the nominative case and the accusative case in the first proposition, and which in part are the same and in part are diverse or distinct, conclude to either a universal identity or an universal distortion when I say: "God (*Deus*) begot, because when I say: "God (*Deus*) begot God (*Deum*)", this word "God" (*Deum*) supposits for a different Person than this word "God" (*Deus*), and therefore a reciprocal relative or a relative of identity cannot be placed there, and this is because of the other supposed Person. Because, indeed, the proposition supposits for that Person under the same deity or under the same nature which the supposed for Person had before, now a relation of diversity cannot truly be posited, because that points to a diversity. However, there is not a distinction in the nature; and therefore this is false: "God (*Deus*) begot another God (*Deum*)" insofar as this word "another" is taken as an adjective. For, there is a theological rule: "That a distinction does not have a place where the union is not from different causes." Since all men are united in this species "man" from different causes and through their diverse humanities, therefore a distinction has a place in this species "man", and it can be rightly said that there is one man and another man. However, because the three Persons are united in what I call "God" from one sole cause, namely, from the one sole deity, therefore a distinction does not have a place here to speak of one God and another God. Thus, otherness or distinction of nature is extraneous in this matter. Therefore, it is clear that there is a fallacy according to accident here: "God begot God, therefore a God who is Himself or another God", for a distinction does not have a place here like the distinction found in natural things, for a distinction is extraneous in this matter. Nonetheless, in this proposition: "God (*Deus*) begot another God (*alium Deum*)" if this distinction "other" (*alium*) is taken in a substantive way, and this word "God" (*Deum*) is joined to it as an apposition (unneeded addition), then that proposition is true.
6. There are two opinions concerning the noun "God". Certain ones say that this noun "God", when it is essential, supposits by itself for the Essence, unless it is forced in a violent way by a conjectural verb or by a conjectural proposition to supposit for a Person. Thus, they say that this noun "God" supposits only for the Essence when we say: "God exists", and in no way does it supposit here for a Person.
7. There are many objections against this opinion. First, in this way: This noun "man" supposits naturally for all those in whom humanity is present, and in

a similar way this noun “donkey” supposits for all those in whom donkeyness is present, and the noun “white thing” likewise, and for all like things. Therefore, this noun “God” supposits naturally for all those in whom deity is present; therefore, it supposits for the Father, Son and Holy Spirit. Note, however, that it has its natural supposition when I say “God exists”. Therefore, it supposits in this natural context for the Father, Son and Holy Spirit, and so it supposits for the three Persons, and so it supposits here for a Person.

8. Another objection: this noun “God” is imposed from “deity”. We ask, then: “When this noun was imposed, was it imposed for the Essence alone, or for a Person alone, or for the Essence and Person?” If it was for the Essence alone, then “God” is precisely the same as “Divine Essence”. But this is false: “The Essence begot the Essence”; therefore, this is false: “God begot God”. For, if this term “God” is precisely equivalent to this term “Divine Essence”, and this term “Divine Essence” cannot be used to supposit for a Person, it follows that this noun “God” cannot be used to supposit for a Person. If, however, one says that this noun “God” is imposed for a Person alone or for a Person and the Essence, it follows from this that the noun “God” by its imposition supposits for a Person. Therefore, it naturally supposits for a Person, and if it has its natural supposition when I say “God exists”, then it supposits in this instance for a Person.
9. A further objection: a form or nature properly speaking does not act; rather, it is the thing having the form which acts. Creatures, however, are signs or images or indicators of an author; therefore, properly speaking they are not signs of deity but rather signs of Someone having deity. So, although creatures are properly speaking signs of God, this noun “God” more properly has to supposit for the one who has deity than for deity; so more properly it supposits for a Person than for the Divine Essence.
10. This is what Hilary seems to want when he says that an effect of the Father, Son <and Holy Spirit> appears in creatures and in this effect is seen the Father, Son <and Holy Spirit>, and so a creature is a sign of the Father, Son and Holy Spirit. Since, then, this noun “God” is a noun expressing <divine> activity, it is a sign of the Father, Son and Holy Spirit, and so it supposits for the Father, Son and Holy Spirit.
11. Those who hold the aforesaid opinion also say that when I say “God begets”, I say that the noun “God” supposits only for the Father. For they say that it does not supposit for the Essence, lest they be forced to concede that it is for the Essence <when they say>: “God does not generate.” But by them it is asked: what cause takes away from the term “God” supposition for the Essence when I say “God begets”, namely, <is it> either the suitability or the truth of the statement? One could not say that suitability demands it, because this is suitable: “The Essence begets.” If it is said that the truth of the statement demands it, then when I say: “A man is running” this term “man” supposits only for those who are running; therefore, this is true: “Every man is running, while certain of them are run-

ning and certain are not.” It is clear, therefore, that the aforesaid opinion is worth nothing.

12. The opinion of others, to which we assent, is that the name “God” has natural supposition both for the Essence and a Person, since it received its natural supposition both from its Essence and a Person, since it received its name from deity and the name was given to someone having divinity, in the same way as this name “man” was given because it is a name derived from humanity and is given to someone having humanity. Someone having divinity is understood to be a Divine Person. The case is similar for the Divine Essence, for just as in natural beings the form is the principle of acting for the one who has the form, so deity is the principle of acting in the Father, Son and Holy Spirit. For, whatever the Father, or the Son, or the Holy Spirit does, He does by His deity as His form or nature. Also, the Divine Essence acts by itself. So, when we say “Divine Essence”, this is as it were, the form or nature of itself, and therefore it gets its name from Itself. Therefore, we say that this name “God” supposits both for the Essence and Person when we say “God is”.
13. However, against this position there are objections. For according to this opinion it is proved that this is true: “God is not the Father, because this name ‘God’ can there be taken truly for the Son”, just as this is true: “A man is not Socrates, because Plato is not Socrates.” From this position it also follows that this is true: “God is not the Trinity, because the Father is not the Trinity” (...) or “because the Son is not the Trinity.” This seems problematic.
14. Solution: We say that this is false: “God is not the Father.” And this also is false: “God is not the Trinity”, because although this noun “God” supposits for each of the three Persons, nevertheless because it supposits for them indistinctly, namely, under the unique singular deity, so the negative particle that follows removes for each supposit what would have been proposed. Wherefore, these two propositions are equivalent: “God is not the Father” and “A non-God is the Father”. However, this argumentation is not valid: “God is and He is not the Trinity, therefore God is not the Trinity.” For in the first part of this argument the denial takes place for one Person because the nature of the pronoun whose property it is to be posited for the proper noun and to signify certain persons, and therefore it holds for one certain person when I say “God is and He is not a Trinity”. Wherefore, in this way the negation is meant for a unique person; in the conclusion, however, the negation is made for each person and even for the Divine Essence. Thus, there is here a fallacy of univocation.

Neslihan Şenocak

Alexander's Commentary on the Rule in Relation to the *Summa Halensis*

Abstract: The earliest commentary on the Franciscan Rule, known as the Commentary of the Four Masters, was written by five Franciscan friars, four of whom were masters at the University of Paris. The leader of this group was Alexander of Hales, who was the first Doctor of Theology of the Franciscan Order. The Commentary has been generally regarded as one of the most influential texts in the early history of the Franciscan Order. However, the possible connections between this text and *Summa Halensis*, the major theological work of Alexander of Hales and his colleagues, has not been hitherto studied. This study looks at the question of how and whether the legal principles established in the Commentary of the Four Masters with respect to the Franciscan Rule have a precedent in the *Summa Halensis*. The resulting analysis shows, in fact, a great degree of convergence between the two texts, in particular on the subjects of religious law, obedience to law and the religious poverty.

The *Commentary of the Four Masters* is the first known commentary on the Franciscan Rule of 1223. Although known in the literature as the *Commentary of the Four Masters*, this work, written in 1241–42, lists the names of five friars in its prologue as authors: friar Gaufredus (custodian of Paris), Alexander of Hales, John of La Rochelle, Robert of Bascia, Odo Rigaldus, the last four being masters.¹ Due to his seniority and his status at the time as the only regent Doctor of Theology in the Order, it might be assumed that Alexander of Hales was the leader of the group.² There is no way of knowing what parts of the commentary actually constitute or are inspired by the ideas of Alexander of Hales, but since he gave his approval and declared him-

1 The Latin text of this commentary has been edited by Livario Oliger, *Expositio Quatuor Magistrorum Super Regulam Fratrum Minorum (1241–1242): accedit eiusdem regulae rextus cum fontibus et locis parallelis* (Roma: Edizioni di storia e letteratura, 1950). Its English translation has been published in *Early Commentaries on the Rule of the Friars Minor*, vol. 1, *The 1242 Commentary*, Hugh of Digne, David of Augsburg, John of Wales, ed. David Flood (St. Bonaventure, NY: Franciscan Institute Publications, 2014). I have chosen to use the Latin text. The translations throughout this article are my own, since the precise wording of a legal text is rather crucial to the understanding of its meaning. In the rest of the text, I will refer to this work as 'Commentary' with the capital C.

2 Sophie Delmas, 'Alexandre de Halès et le *studium* franciscain de Paris: Aux origines de la question des chaires franciscaines et de l'exercice quodlibétique,' in *Die regulierten Kollegien im Europa des Mittelalters und der Renaissance/Les collèges réguliers en Europe au Moyen Âge et à la Renaissance*, ed. Andreas Sohn and Jacques Verger, *Aufbrüche: Interkulturelle Perspektiven auf Geschichte, Politik und Religion/Ouvertures: Perspectives interculturelles en histoire, politique et religion*, 4 (Bochum: Winkler, 2012), 37–47.

self as one of the authors, it would not be unreasonable to treat the commentary as one of his works. The relation of this text to the *Summa Halensis* is even stronger, if we think that John of La Rochelle, who is an author of the *Commentary*, has also contributed to the completion of the *Summa Halensis*.

How the Commentary Came into Being

Writing in 1258, Thomas of Eccleston, the medieval English chronicler of the Franciscan Order, states that during the ministry of Haymo of Faversham, ‘a mandate was issued by the chapter ordering each province to elect friars, who would collect and write down any points of doubt among the friars concerning the Rule and send them to the minister general.’³ From this we can infer that there was a substantial number of friars who had doubts and questions about the Rule, and the general chapter wanted to somehow settle these doubts. It looks like there was some anxiety about this mandate. Eccleston tells us that the English province entrusted the job of collecting *dubitabilia* to educated friars in the province. (‘For this purpose, in England, Brother Adam Marsh, Brother Peter, the custodian of Oxford, Brother Henry of Boreford, and some others were elected.’) Then one night, as the story goes, Francis appeared to an English friar in his dream. The friar said, ‘Father, our superiors want to explain the Rule, certainly, you can do it so much better’, to which the saint replied, ‘If you want the Rule to be explained, go to lay brothers.’⁴ This story gives us further information about the conditions surrounding the making of the *Commentary*: the general chapter asked the provinces to collect questions on the Rule, it was also communicated in advance that the purpose of this collection was to produce an explanation of the Rule. This story is a testimony that the English friars had an unease about this decision of the general chapter. So, they scribbled a few lines on some parts of the Rule and sent it back to the chapter with a note saying that since the Holy Spirit had dictated the Rule to Francis, it should not be changed.⁵

3 A.G. Little, *Fratris Thomae vulgo dicti de Eccleston Tractatus De Adventu Fratrum Minorum in Angliam* (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1951), 71: ‘In diebus suis venit mandatum a capitulo, ut eligerentur fratres per singulas provincias ordinis, qui dubitabilia regulae annotarent et ad ministrum generalem transmitterent.’ I have already discussed my revisionist theory concerning how the *Commentary of Four Masters* was written in my book. Here I will largely rely on that account. See Neslihan Şenocak, *The Poor and the Perfect: The Rise of Learning in the Franciscan Order, 1209–1310* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2012), 71–4.

4 Little, *Fratris Thomae*, 71: ‘In ipsa vero nocte apparuit sanctus Franciscus fratri Johanni de Banastre et ostendit ei puteum profundum; cui cum diceret: “Pater, ecce patres volunt exponere regulam, immo tu potius expone nobis regulam”; respondit sanctus: “Fili, vade ad fratres laicos, et ipsi exponant tibi regulam tuam.” Igitur annotatis aliquibus articulis, mittunt eos fratres ad generalem, in cedula sine sigillo, obsecrantes per aspersionem sanguinis Jesu Christi, ut regulam stare permittat, sicut a sancto Francisco, dictante Spiritu Sancto, tradita fuit.’

5 Little, *Fratris Thomae*, 71.

In his edition of the *Commentary*, Livarius Oliger, without taking the evidence from Eccleston into consideration, suggested that the French province responded to the general chapter's mandate by submitting not only doubts or questions but also answers to them; hence came about the text known as the *Commentary of Four Masters*.⁶ This suggestion has been subsequently adopted without scrutiny in the Franciscan literature, most recently by David Flood, the author of the 2014 English translation of the *Commentary*.⁷ But there are certain questions that arise here. According to Eccleston's testimony, the mandate was only to collect questions and doubts about the Rule. If that is the case, then how can we explain that the French province of its own accord charge five of its friars to write answers to the questions? And why would the text produced by the French province survive in so many copies (27 full, 9 partial), which suggests a much wider circulation than within a province? In light of the evidence, I have suggested a different version of events that led to the production of this commentary.⁸ I think the provincial ministers found themselves at a loss to answer friars' questions about the Rule, and raised this concern in the general Chapter of 1240, when Haymo of Faversham was elected. So, the general chapter decided to collect questions that friars have about the Rule and to produce a text that answered them. In the Chapter of Diffinitors of 1241, the general minister and provincial ministers decided to entrust the task of writing a definitive text to settle doubts and questions to the theologians of the Order who were active in the Paris *studium*. It should not come as a surprise that the general minister Haymo of Faversham, himself a highly educated man who studied at Paris, assigned this task to friars connected to the Paris *studium*, which was by then already the intellectual powerhouse of the Order. I have, in fact, suggested that this decision of the chapter in itself is indicative of a certain mentality. The task of extracting the meaning of the Rule and the intention of Francis could have been entrusted to the very first-generation friars like Giles or Leo who had been with Francis from the beginning and who were still alive at this point, but instead the Order's top administration thought that the scholars would do a better job.

The Prologue

The *Commentary* starts with a prologue. Reading it, one gets the clear impression that Alexander of Hales and his brothers see a need to explain, one might even say to justify, why they have taken up this task. The reason for their anxiety is that Francis, in his Testament, had expressly said that he did not want any of his broth-

⁶ Oliger, *Expositio Quatuor*, 13.

⁷ Flood, *Early Commentaries*, 2.

⁸ Şenocak, *The Poor and the Perfect*, 73–4.

ers, clerical or lay, to write a gloss on his Rule and to explain its meaning.⁹ So, in the opening sentences, Alexander of Hales and his brothers state that they produced this *Commentary* in obedience to an order they received from the provincial chapter in connection with what was determined at the previous Chapter of Diffinitors. 'We did not produce a new commentary or a gloss against the Rule, as some condemn our pure intentions and pervert their zeal to endanger their souls and to the scandal of other friars.' We know already through Eccleston's story that there was anxiety about the production of this commentary, but here, with these words, we have further testimony that some friars objected to the writing of this commentary. So, the masters go on,

rather, we have simply and purely extracted the meaning of the Rule, which binds us all, and the ignorance of it does not excuse anyone, and we extracted it as best as we can, not from our own perception but from the very words of the Rule, and under the obedience put on us by our superiors (*secundum iniunctam nobis obedientiam*).¹⁰

There are a number of points to consider here. First, the masters suggest that what they did was not a gloss or a new commentary. Second, they say that the Rule binds them all and if a friar commits a sin out of ignorance of the Rule, this sin cannot be excused. Therefore, the precepts of the Rule should be understood clearly by the friars. And third, the masters wrote this commentary because they were ordered to do so by their superior: it was not a spontaneous initiative on their part.

Concerning the first of these points, strictly speaking, the masters are right, and this was not a gloss. From a technical point of view, this text does not fit the description of a medieval gloss, which offers a line-by-line commentary on the entirety of a given text. The masters' *Commentary* does not engage with the whole Rule: several chapters of the Rule receive no attention at all. Moreover, this *Commentary* does not even try to explicate the Rule; rather, it poses a number of questions coming from the friars with regard to particular parts of the Rule, and goes on to answer those questions. The key point here is this: the actual text with which the masters are concerned is not the text of the Rule but the collection of questions and doubts forwarded to them by all the provinces. They use the Rule as a means to answer these doubts. Before the masters comment on any part of the Rule, they first tell us what was the question that prompted this clarification. The reason why certain chapters of

⁹ Kajetan Esser, *Opuscula Sancti Patris Francisci Assisiensis* (Grottaferrata: Editiones Collegii S. Bonaventurae, 1978), 316.

¹⁰ Oliger, *Expositio Quatuor*, 124: 'Novam autem expositionem vel glosaturam contra regulam non astruimus, sicut a quibusdam intentionis purae damnatoribus et zelum suum in animarum suarum periculum et fratrum scandalum pervertentibus praedicatur. Immo simpliciter et pure intellectum ipsius regulae, quae omnes nos ligat, et eius ignorantia nullum excusat non ex nostro sensu, sed ex ipsa littera, ut potuimus, extrahentes, secundum iniunctam nobis obedientiam, arbitrio vestro dirigimus iudicandum, vestrae sententiae plusquam nostro sensui in hiis et in aliis innitentes, interpretationem, si alicubi necessaria, sedi apostolicae reservantes.'

the Rule are not covered in this commentary is presumably because the masters received no questions about them, or perhaps they did, but chose not to write about them. The surviving medieval manuscripts refer to the *Commentary* with titles such as *sententia de regulae*, *intellectus regulae* or *declaratio*. They do not use the word *glossa*, which is often translated into English as 'commentary'. I will continue to use the word 'Commentary' to refer to this text to keep with the modern tradition, but with the caveat that this is not a commentary in the medieval scholastic sense.

Concerning the second point that the ignorance of the Rule would not excuse a sin committed in defiance of the precepts of the Rule, this was certainly a point of anxiety for the masters. Violating the precepts of the Rule, which each and every friar makes a solemn oath to observe, is a mortal sin; therefore an incorrect understanding of these precepts or simply not understanding that something is a precept could lead to mortal sin, and thus to the condemnation of one's soul.¹¹ So the masters state in the prologue that friars cannot be ignorant of the meaning of the Rule, because such ignorance does not excuse them in the eyes of God.¹² This is the first major point of conversion between the *Commentary* and the *Summa Halensis*. The *Summa Halensis* contains the discussion of whether ignorance of law, be it natural, divine, or man-made, such as canon law, can be an excuse for a sinful act. The answer given by the authors of the *Summa* is a clear, resounding 'no'. Drawing on Gratian's *Decretum* and St Augustine, the *Summa* suggests that a priest, particularly a bishop, is bound to know the canon law and everything else that pertains to his office. If he commits a sin or an evil act because of his ignorance of the law, there is simply no excuse.¹³ Here we can draw a parallel in their thinking that a friar is bound

11 Concerning the idea that the violation of the Rule constitutes mortal sin, see David Burr, *The Spiritual Franciscans: From Protest to Persecution in the Century after Saint Francis* (University Park, PA: Pennsylvania State University Press, 2001), 54–5.

12 Oliger, *Expositio Quatuor*, 124: 'Immo simpliciter et pure intellectum ipsius regulae, quae omnes nos ligat, et eius ignorantia nullum excusat, non ex nostro sensu, sed ex ipsa littera, ut potuimus, extrahentes, secundum iniunctam nobis obedientiam, arbitrio vestro dirigimus iudicandum, vestrae sententiae plusquam nostro sensui in hiis et in aliis innitentes, interpretationem, si alicubi necessaria, sedi apostolicae reservantes.'

13 Alexander of Hales, *Doctoris irrefragabilis Alexandri de Hales Ordinis minorum Summa theologica* (SH) (Quaracchi: Collegium S. Bonaventurae, 1924–48), Vol III, In3, Tr5, S2, Q2, C3 (n. 679), Solutio, p. 660: 'Per ignorantiam autem iuris humani acfus perpetrates sacerdotibus quidem est peccatum; dico autem sacerdotibus summis, scilicet episcopis. Unde Caelestinus: "Nulli sacerdotum liceat Canones ignorare"; et 38 dist., ubi dicitur: "Inquiratur diligenter a metropolitano si in promptu habeat legere e et sacros canones et sanctum Evangelium et librum Apostolicum." Actus enim malus per ignorantiam eorum quae pertinent ad sacramentorum communium distributionem et ad canones poenitentiales et ad sanctorum legendas est peccatum illis. Onde Augustinus: "Sacerdotibus sunt necessaria ad discendum sacramentorum liber, lectionarius, antiphonarius, canones poenitentiales, psalterium, homiliae. Ex quibus omnibus si unum defuerit, vix sacerdotis nomen in eo constabit." Ignorantia vero eorum quae publice promulgantur de iis quae pertinent ad statum laicorum, non excusatur peccatum in illis quod per ignorantiam perpetratur: nulli enim ignorare permittitur ea quae publice fiunt.'

to know and understand everything that pertains to his office and to the Rule to which he professes, lest he commits a sin out of ignorance. We also understand better why the masters agreed to undertake writing this *Commentary*. Beside having received a command to do it, they must have seen this undertaking as a means to saving their fellow friars from committing a sin based on ignorance.

Another point that supports this argument that the masters took up this task to save their fellow friars from committing a sin appears when they discuss how to deal with papal privileges that override precepts in the Rule. Is it alright for friars to act in accordance with the papal privilege and ignore the Rule? This question falls under one of the sections in the *Summa Halensis* which concerns the perplexity of conscience. In this section, the authors of the *Summa* inquire as to what one is supposed to do if one finds oneself in such a perplexing situation. 'There are two types of perplexity of conscience which are said to make sinning unavoidable,' they say. One stems from law, the other from facts. 'With regard to law, no one should be in doubt. Because no one is in such a state that it would be impossible to dispel his/her doubts concerning the law (*dubietas iuris*).'¹⁴ As the Rule of a religious order is akin to law for those who profess to it, there should be no doubts about the way friars understand it. Those doubts should be removed and friars' consciences should not be confused. Such confusion in conscience can lead to sin. As will be discussed below, the papal privileges seem problematic to the masters writing the *Commentary*, precisely because they introduce confusion into friar's understanding of law.

The third point, namely, that this was written in obedience to superiors, also has parallels with ideas propagated in the *Summa Halensis*. In the *Summa Halensis*, under the section on the sins of the heart, the authors discuss the role of conscience with regard to sin. One of the questions they pose here is: 'whether conscience is more binding than the command of a prelate.' Their reply is that the command of a prelate supersedes one's conscience. They say that this is particularly valid for the regular religious, because the religious, having renounced their own will, are bound to follow their superiors in everything, provided that the command received is not a precept against God, against the Rule which they profess, against the laws the Church, or against the constitutions passed in the General Chapter with the consent of prelates. The *Summa* adds that the prelates, however, should be discreet in their commands because of the danger to their consciences.¹⁵

¹⁴ SH III, In3, Tr3, S1, Q3, C4, Ar1 (n. 393), Solutio, p. 392: 'Ad quod dicendum quod duplex est perplexitas, id est dubietas, ex qua dicitur inevitabilitas peccati, perplexitas scilicet iuris et facti. Quantum ad ius nullus debet esse perplexus: nullus enim est in tali statu quin possit ab eo amoveri dubietas iuris.'

¹⁵ SH III, In3, Tr3, S1, Q3, C3, Ar2 (n. 389), Solutio, p. 389: 'Religiosi vero, qui renuntiaverunt propriae voluntati et proprio sensui, tenentur sequi mandatum superioris in iis quae non sunt praecepta vel prohibita e contrario a Deo vel in Regula quam profitentur vel in constitutionibus obligatoriis ad cul-

Precept, Counsel, and Instruction

The Prologue of the *Commentary of the Four Masters* reveals what was at stake. Friars should understand precisely what the precepts of the Rule are so that they do not commit a mortal sin. One of the significant exegetical moves that the masters make in the *Commentary* involves dividing the various requirements in the Rule into three categories: instruction, counsel and precept.¹⁶ Throughout the *Commentary*, a lot hinges on the difference between these three categories.

The first chapter, for example, replies to questions seeking to understand the exact boundaries of the Rule in terms of legal precepts. What exactly binds the friars and what does not? This chapter starts with the first sentence of the Franciscan Rule, which states that friars are to follow the example of the life of Christ. Thus the very first question on the list of the masters is: 'does this clause therefore mean that anyone who professes to follow the Rule also professes to follow all the precepts in the Gospel?' The answer of the masters is that the friars are not bound to follow all the precepts of the Gospel through their profession to the Rule, but only those that are mentioned within the Rule. However, the masters also add that even if the profession of the Rule does not bind friars to follow the evangelical precepts, as Christians, they are bound to follow all evangelical precepts regardless.¹⁷

An example of how the masters employ these categories of precept and instruction concerns the clause in the Rule about the reception of friars into the noviciate. The Rule states that, 'If there are any who wish to accept this life and come to our brothers, let them send them to their provincial ministers, to whom alone and not to others is permission granted to receive the brothers.'¹⁸ Some friars raise the question of whether this is a precept and an instruction. Are they committing a sin by not sending such people to the ministers? The masters' response is that if this is a precept, then it means that the friars would be committing a mortal sin by not sending postulants to the minister. And no one dares to say something like that. It seems therefore that this is an instruction, not a precept.¹⁹ 'We need to be careful', say the masters, 'what is said as an instruction (*instructio*), what is said as a counsel (*consilium*) and what is said as a precept (*praeceptum*).' Another example is when they are commenting on the clause in the Rule that friars should say, 'peace to

pam, quae fiunt ab Ecclesia super ipsos vel a Capitulo generali cum consensu praelatorum. Cavere autem debent praelati ne indiscrete praecipiant propter periculum conscientiarum.'

16 Oliger, *Expositio Quatuor*, 127: 'Attendendum est ergo in regula, quae dicuntur secundum instructionem, quae secundum consilium, quae secundum praeceptum.'

17 Oliger, *Expositio Quatuor*, 125.

18 Francis of Assisi, *Early Documents*, 3 vols, ed. Regis J. Armstrong, J.A. Wayne Hellmann, and William J. Short (Hyde Park: New City Press, 1999–2001), 1:100.

19 Oliger, *Expositio Quatuor*, 127: 'Quod si dicatur esse praeceptum, fratres peccare mortaliter convinctur, si quemlibet religionem nostram petentem non mitterent ad ministrum, quod nullus dicere ausus est. Videtur ergo secundum instructionem dici, non secundum praeceptum.'

this house' every time they enter a house. The masters explain that this is an admonition or instruction, but not a precept. Hence, failure to say, 'peace to this home' is not a mortal sin.²⁰

This approach of analyzing the Rule in terms of precepts, counsels and instructions has parallels in the way the authors of the *Summa* discuss the will of God. In the section of the *Summa* entitled, 'On the Distinctions of the Divine Will', the authors introduce a five-fold division. Concerning good things, the divine will presents itself by way of precepts, counsels and service (*operatio*); concerning bad things, it is signified in prohibitions and permissions.²¹ The precept concerns good things which are necessary for salvation, the counsel (*consilium*) those that are not necessary for salvation but lead one towards salvation (*conferens salutem*).²² That means, since precepts are necessary for salvation, not following a precept entails damnation, but not following counsel does not automatically lead to damnation. We see that these two categories of precept and counsel are employed in both texts, and considering the way they are defined, one can tell how important it is to ensure the correct understanding and identification of a precept and a counsel to avoid committing a mortal sin.

If it is not possible at all to tell whether a command in the Rule is a precept or a counsel, then the papacy as the highest superior should be consulted. One such issue is the clause in the Rule that, 'the ministers should examine the postulants on the orthodoxy of their faith'. The masters think that the papal authority should be sought to determine whether this is a counsel or a precept.²³ Similarly, Chapter 9 of the Rule strictly prohibits friars from entering the nunneries, and the papal bull, *Quo Elongati* upholds this prohibition. However, some friars ask whether they can enter a monastery of nuns during a general procession accompanied by people, in order to preach in the company of bishops or to hear confessions. The masters reply that, on this point, papal exposition is required.²⁴ There are also instances where a strict following of the Rule might conflict with the decrees of canon law. One such instance regards Chapter 2 of the Rule where it states that no one will be given licence to leave the Order. Some friars raise the question of whether this means that they can-

20 Oliger, *Expositio Quatuor*, 139: 'Sequitur: in quamcumque domum intraverint primum dicant: pax huic domui. Iste articulus videtur dici secundum admonitionem, vel instructionem, non secundum praeceptionem.'

21 SH I, P1, In1, Tr6, Q3, Ti1 (n. 272), II. arg. 2, p. 367: 'Item, tres sunt differentiae respect boni: praeceptum, consilium, operatio; prohibitio, permissio respectu mali: prohibitio respectu mali ne fiat. Cum pluris divisionis sit malum quam bonum, quia bonum uno modo, malum multifariam: ergo deberent poni plures differentiae respect mali quam respectu boni.'

22 SH I, P1, In1, Tr6, Q3, Ti1 (n. 272), Ad obiecta II, p. 369: 'si bonus: aut igitur necessarius est ad salutem, et sic praeceptum illius est voluntatis divinae signum; aut non est necessarius, sed tamen conferens saluti, et sic consilium illius est signum voluntatis divinae.'

23 Oliger, *Expositio Quatuor*, 131: 'Determinandum esset auctoritate apostolica, utrum hoc esset consilium, vel praeceptum.'

24 Oliger, *Expositio Quatuor*, 168: 'Unde super hoc esset apostolica expositio requirenda.'

not expel the unruly and the perverse (*perversi*). Expulsion is allowed, the masters claim; however they point to a statute in the canon law, that commands the abbots and priors to make an effort to receive the expelled and the fugitive and to impose on them penance. They demand therefore that the Order seeks a clarification from the papal curia whether this clause binds the Franciscans.²⁵

Intellectum regulae and intentio regulae

Two important concepts that the masters regularly employ throughout the commentary are *intellectum regulae*, which can be translated as the meaning of the Rule; and *intentio regulae*, i.e. the intention of the Rule. The masters seem to be anxious to establish and follow the sense and the intention of the Rule.

Several times they employ these terms when criticizing Pope Gregory IX's exposition of the Rule as given in the 1230 papal bull, *Quo Elongati*. For example, concerning the reception of postulants into the novitiate, *Quo Elongati* upholds the precept of the Rule, but the masters say that the apostolic exposition 'constricts the meaning of the Rule'.²⁶ Similarly, concerning the clause in the Rule that states that only the minister general can examine friars wishing to obtain the licence to preach, the masters are not satisfied with the interpretation of *Quo Elongati*, which upheld that clause. Again, they argue that the papal interpretation constricts the intention of the Rule.²⁷ They object to this narrow interpretation by posing the question that if bishops examine those to be ordained through others, or the Chancellor of the University of Paris examines postulants for the master's licence through others, why cannot the Franciscan minister general do the same when it comes to granting preaching licences?

Again, on the question of what exactly constitutes *vilitas* in clothing, the masters state that according to the intention of the Rule, *vilitas* is established by the price and color of clothing, according to the estimates of the men of that region where the friars are residing.²⁸

As observed in this last example, the masters are keen on dissolving friars' doubts not by providing a certain, absolute answer valid throughout the Order, but instead, they strive to take into account the context and circumstances of each clause so that friars do not violate the intention of the Rule. First, they want to understand what was Francis' purpose or intention in introducing a precept or counsel in the Rule, then they deliberate about how that clause needs to be implemented in ac-

²⁵ Oliger, *Expositio Quatuor*, 134: 'Unde necessarium esset ut apostolica interpretatio quaereretur, utrum illa decretalis nos liget (...).'

²⁶ Oliger, *Expositio Quatuor*, 129: 'In quo articulo videtur expositio intellectum regulae coartare.'

²⁷ Oliger, *Expositio Quatuor*, 163: 'In qua expositione videtur intentio regulae coartari.'

²⁸ Oliger, *Expositio Quatuor*, 136: 'Et, secundum intentionem regulae, vilitas attenditur in pretio pariter et colore secundum aestimationem hominum regionis, in qua fratres commorantur.'

cordance with Francis' intent. This model of determining a question according to the physical conditions, habits, and customs of a particular region comes up in several parts of the *Commentary*. For example, concerning fasting, friars ask whether they are to abstain from meat during fasts. The masters reply that the kind of food, on which one can fast, is to be determined regionally according to the custom of the people—above all of the religious—of that region. On the question of how to determine the condition when it is permissible to break the fast, the masters reply that this can be understood in more than one way. One has to take into account the friar's age, sickness or weakness, and even lack of endurance (*defectus sustentationis*) which is admittedly very subjective.²⁹ A similar method of argumentation is employed concerning what constitutes necessity when it comes to wearing shoes (*non in uno modo, sed multis*).³⁰

The Papal Privileges

The *Commentary of the Four Masters* is highly interesting in the way it shows how a young religious order engages with papal directives and interventions. Here, some historical context can be helpful. Within the first seven months of Haymo's reign, no less than nine bulls were issued that gave certain privileges to the Order. Only a month after Haymo's election, on December 12, 1240, Pope Gregory IX issued *Prohibente regula vestra*. With this bull, the authority to examine preachers, which had belonged solely to ministers general according to the Rule, was delegated to provincial ministers. The specific wording of the bull said that in each province, friars were to be examined by those 'learned in sacred theology', when the diffinitors were gathered in the provincial chapter. In June 1241, a similar bull, *Gloriantibus vobis*, relaxed the article in the Rule concerning the reception of postulants. According to the Rule, only the minister general or provincial ministers could authorize the entry of new friars into the Order. By 1230, this particular statute in the Rule was still so strictly enforced that not even the vicars of the provincial ministers were allowed to accept novices when the ministers were away. *Gloriantibus vobis*, however, permitted the provincial ministers to delegate the authority to receive postulants to custodians and guardians alike.³¹

The *Commentary* of Alexander of Hales and his colleagues constitutes a testimony that such privileges were not welcome to friars universally. 'Many fear that simi-

²⁹ Oliger, *Expositio Quatuor*, 139: 'Quaeritur hic, quae dicatur illa necessitas quae a ieiunio nos absoluit? Et intelligenda est haec necessitas non uno modo, sed multis. Contingit enim necessitas comedendi aliquando ratione aetatis, aliquando ratione infirmitatis vel debilitatis, aliquando ratione laboris, aliquando ratione defectus sustentationis.'

³⁰ Oliger, *Expositio Quatuor*, 135.

³¹ For a more detailed discussion of these papal privileges, see Şenocak, *The Poor and the Perfect*, 70–1.

larly by way of other privileges to be obtained, the thorough perfection of the Order will be relaxed in the future. Besides it seems troubling to friars' conscience to recede from a Rule that they professed, by way of certain privileges.'³² Probably the masters included this statement in the *Commentary* as a cautionary note to those in the General Chapter. They make a point of communicating the friars' anxiety about the papal privileges. The papal privileges given to a religious Order that allow its members to modify the precepts of the Rule they profess, have a rather ambiguous and controversial canonical and legal status. A papal privilege is not a papal precept, hence it is not binding on the friars. They can choose to ignore it. When a papal privilege does not concern an item of the religious Rule but simply gives the friars the possibility to engage in some additional religious activity (such as the privilege to hear confessions), it causes no trouble to a friar's conscience. But when the privilege expressly allows for the possibility of overriding a precept of the Rule (such as allowing others than the minister general to accept postulants), it creates confusion and uneasiness. Can the friars go against a Rule they made a solemn oath to just because the papacy allows them to do so? This has been a thorny issue in Franciscan history, which eventually led to the division of the Order. The masters, looking at the issue from a legalistic perspective, seem to have sympathized with the concern of the friars. They argue that, if a papal privilege relaxing a precept of the Rule is to be tolerated, friars first need to be certain that such a privilege will enhance and not damage the purity and spirituality of the Franciscan way of life.³³

I have mentioned before that the authors of the *Commentary* suggest that friars should obey their prelates, but also that the prelates should be careful not to give an order that would pose a danger to the friars' consciences. Papal privileges that overrode some of the precepts in the Rule indeed constitute such danger. In a long discussion concerning conscience and its link to sin, the authors of the *Summa Halensis* consider a number of possible cases when one could find oneself in doubt. One such case occurs when a religious who has abandoned the secular life by professing to a Rule is ordered by his superior to take up a secular office. Such a person is torn between disobedience to his superior and the contagion that would come from a secular life and dreads both options. What should he do?³⁴ Such a command, the au-

³² Oliger, *Expositio Quatuor*, 164: 'Timetur autem a multis, quod similiter per alia privilegia impetranda posset tota perfectio ordinis in posterum relaxari. Praeterea non videtur conscientis securum a regula quam voverunt, recedere per aliqua privilegia impetrata (...).' Similar lines also on page 130.

³³ Oliger, *Expositio Quatuor*, 164: '(...) nec occurrit propter quid privilegia impetrata contra articulum receptionis et praedicationis debeant tolerari, nisi qua per illam relaxationem, nihil carnale aut temporale religioni accrescit, sed solum quod est pure et simpliciter spirituale.'

³⁴ *SH* III, In3, Tr3, S1, Q3, C4, Ar2, Pa1 (n. 394), V. arg, p. 394: 'Item, alium casum proponit B. Gregorius de illo qui, renuntians saeculo, obligat se voto et professioni quod sequetur voluntatem sui superioris per obedientiam in omnibus quae non sunt contra Deum, superior autem suus praecipit ei agere quae sunt mundi, sicut est in iis qui sunt in officiis saecularibus. Subditus ergo, pensans quae sit culpa inobedientiae et quod sit contagium saecularis vitae, et obedire trepidat et non obedire

thors of the *Summa* suggest, might not be directly against a precept of God but it does go against everything the religious person vowed. While previously it was a counsel, now it is a precept as a result of the profession to a Rule. If therefore, he is ordered by his superior to do something that is against the purpose of his Rule or his religious vocation, then he is not to obey his superior. The prelate does not come before the Rule, the Rule comes before the prelate.³⁵

Because the legal status of a papal privilege is not clear, the masters in fact propose the solution in suggesting that the content of a papal privilege should be legalized by proclaiming it within the statutes at the General Chapter. One such case is the confusion among the friars concerning the reception of postulants, i.e. whether friars can admit a novice when the minister is away. The Rule allows only the provincial ministers to admit a postulant.³⁶ *Glorantibus vobis*, the papal bull containing privileges mentioned above, allows custodians and guardians to admit postulants without recourse to the provincial minister. Concerning the acceptance of novices, the masters state that sometimes when very useful people (and by that it is meant people who are nobles or otherwise possessing skills that can be useful to the friars, such as educated people) are interested in entering the Order, it might not be possible to send them to the minister at once, if the minister is away. And such people would not wait until the minister comes to them. So if they are not at once accepted, they might change their mind about entering the Order and an opportunity would be lost. To this end, some friars in the Order seem to have developed a *sophisma*: they concede the Franciscan habit to such would-be novices if the minister is absent. But then, some ill-intentioned people outside of the Order point out the inappropriateness of this practice and the Order gets a bad reputation. At this point, Alexander of Hales and his colleagues urge the general chapter to find a suitable solution and legalize this practice by integrating it into the statutes of the Order.³⁷

Poverty and Property

Perhaps the most lasting impact of this *Commentary* on Franciscan history is its role in the making of the concept of Franciscan poverty. This *Commentary* belongs to a

formidat, ne aut illicitis obtemperans hoc, quod pro Deo appetit, contra Deum exercent, vel non obtemperans eum, quem suum iudicem quaesierat, suo iudicio supponat.'

35 *SH* III, In3, Tr3, S1, Q3, C4, Ar2, Pa1 (n. 394), V. Solutio, p. 394: 'De tali autem dicendum est quod, licet non sit directe contra praeceptum Domini, potest tamen esse contra illud quod vovit: quod prius fuit ei consilium, nunc autem est ei praeceptum ex professione Regulae. Si ergo praecipiat ei a superiore aliquid quod sit contra metas Regulae suae vel religionis, non est superiori obediendum: non enim praeest Regulae praelatus, sed Regula praeest ei, quam profitetur (...).'

36 Francis of Assisi, *Early Documents*, 1:100.

37 Oliger, *Expositio Quatuor*, 130: 'Propterea discretio vestra attendat, qualiter sit circa istum articulum quantum ad conscientiam et quantum ad famam ordinis providendum.'

particular discourse amongst Franciscan schoolmen of the 13th century, that defined the nature of Franciscan poverty and carved for it a new place in the theology of salvation.³⁸ In many ways, the answers and explanations provided here by the masters set the tone for the intellectual discourse on Franciscan poverty.

The questions on issues related to poverty are discussed throughout Chapters 4, 5 and 6, which are the longest sections in the *Commentary* and as such stand as proof of how much the friars were preoccupied with poverty. The commentary on Chapter 4 of the Rule opens with Francis' famous precept that friars will in no way accept money (*pecunia*) or cash (*denarius*) themselves or through an intermediate person. Thus, the friars ask: 'what is money (*pecunia*) because here it seems something different from cash (*denarius*)?' Then they ask: 'what does it mean by themselves or through an intermediate (*persona interposita*)?'³⁹

The reply of the masters reveals the confusion within the Order with respect to receiving material goods. Within the Order, some friars say that cash is simply a form of counted money (*pecunia numerata*), and money is anything that can be used as currency to buy things. Others say that friars cannot accept anything at all, if they do not have the need for it. Yet, others suggest that friars can receive stuff as long as they do not intend to sell it (like clothing etc.), but if necessity arises, they can exchange what they have for things they need. So, how to solve the dilemma of what exactly friars can accept?⁴⁰ The answer of the four masters reveals a very strict understanding of poverty. They cite the constitutions of the Order, which defines money as anything that is accepted in order to be sold. Therefore, even books and chalices, if they are accepted to be sold, are considered money. Plus, accepting anything in order to pay for something else is prohibited.⁴¹

Another important defining moment for Franciscan poverty comes along in the discussion of future providence. The Rule says that ministers should provide for the needs of the friars through spiritual friends who possess a protective and affectionate care (*sollicita cura*). Some friars therefore ask whether such supervision entails an allowance for ministers to provide for the needs of the friars in the immediate future. Masters reject such an interpretation and assert that the Gospel life knows no provi-

38 On this discourse see Neslihan Şenocak, 'The Making of Franciscan Poverty,' *Revue Mabillon, revue internationale d'histoire et de littérature religieuses*, n.s., 24 (2013): 1–22.

39 Oliger, *Expositio Quatuor*, 141: 'Praecipio firmiter fratribus universis, ut nullo modo denarios vel pecuniam recipiant per se vel per interpositam personam. Hic est quaestio necessaria quid dicatur pecunia? Nam constat quod pecunia (...) Quid etiam sit recipere per se vel per interpositam personam.'

40 Oliger, *Expositio Quatuor*, 141–2.

41 Oliger, *Expositio Quatuor*, 143: 'Sed secundum iura pecunia est quidquid appretiat numerata pecunia ad hoc ut aliquid ematur (...) videtur igitur hic prohiberi receptio denariorum et quarumlibet rerum, quae acciperentur ad pretium rerum emendarum.'

sion for tomorrow. And the Rule of the friars is to observe the Holy Gospel.⁴² Friars can be provided for tomorrow only in dire necessity (*exigente necessitate*), and even then, such provision should not exceed the form of poverty (*forma paupertatis*) in quantity, quality or duration.⁴³

In the fifth chapter of the Rule, there is the important clause that friars should work. Concerning the doubts whether this is a precept, the masters reply in the affirmative and add that this was the intention of Saint Francis. They cite Francis' *Testament* as a proof of his intention.⁴⁴ In this chapter, they also discuss the question of whether the friars could accept raw materials to make goods to sell or exchange in order to acquire necessary items, such as parchment to make books or leather to make shoes. Some friars think this is not permissible. If these were allowed, the friars could similarly accept gold or silver with which they could make money to buy necessities. After going through various opinions in the Order, the masters conclude that friars cannot accept anything that can be appraised such as leather, hides, wool etc. in their possession, because accepting these would imply owning property.⁴⁵

The sixth chapter of the Rule that prohibits ownership (*fratres nihil sibi appropriant nec domum nec locum nec aliquam rem*) contains key passages on the making of the Franciscan poverty. The masters say that this passage raises a lot of questions with the friars who ask what exactly ownership means, whether friars are allowed to buy, sell, exchange, or donate things. The core argument of the masters is that the appropriation of a thing means being able to do whatever one wants with that thing, i.e. exercising one's will over that thing. Friars, not having their own will, cannot exercise any ownership. Friars cannot buy anything by paying money for it; they have to arrange for the payment (*procurare solutionem*). They cannot sell anything. Many other economic activities mentioned here, including exchange, adoption, donation etc. can only be done by the authority of the Lord Cardinal, who concedes his authority to the procurators, but even these should only be done in the case of vehement necessity.⁴⁶

When faced with the fundamental question of what exactly is the poverty to which friars are held, the masters say that there are two types of evangelical poverty: one is imperfect poverty, where one holds nothing temporally superfluous, but only

⁴² Oliger, *Expositio Quatuor*, 147: 'Ergo non debent in crastinum providere. Item peregrini non provident in posterum in locis per quae transeunt, victualia. Sed sicut dicitur infra, VI capitulo, *fratres tanquam peregrini* (...).'

⁴³ Oliger, *Expositio Quatuor*, 148.

⁴⁴ Oliger, *Expositio Quatuor*, 149: 'et videtur quod sic, ex forma dicendi et ex intentione sancti Francisci quam in suo Testamento expressit, ubi dixit: Omnes fratres firmiter volo, quod laborent de laborio, quod pertinent ad honestatem. Gratiam vero laborandi dicit artem vel idoneitatem quam quilibet velut donum gratis datum a Deo habet.'

⁴⁵ Oliger, *Expositio Quatuor*, 150: 'Materiam autem appetibilem, sicut sunt pelles et coria et lanae et huiusmodi, non possunt recipere, quia horum receptio proprietatem inducit et importat.'

⁴⁶ Oliger, *Expositio Quatuor*, 152–6.

retains what is necessary; and then there is perfect poverty, which retains nothing superfluous nor even the necessities of life. This latter is the Franciscan poverty. Two things follow from this poverty, one is that they cannot have any fixed income, and the other is that they have to have poverty with regard to use, that they are poor as well as mendicants.⁴⁷

It is rather striking that in the index of the *Summa Halensis*, there is no entry for *paupertas*, despite the fact that the edition was done by the modern Franciscans, and one would think that Franciscan scholars would be interested in what the *Summa* had to say about poverty. But the absence of this poverty in the index does not mean that the authors of the *Summa* do not talk about poverty. They do discuss the judicial laws governing property. Among various biblical quotations they discuss under this heading is, 'there will be no mendicants and needy among you'. They explain this refers to those who are destitute for help and go door to door asking for bread, and this precept is made regarding the imperfect state of the people who are drawn to salvation by way of temporal goods. When Christian people achieve the state of perfection, the poverty and the abdication of temporal goods will be a blessing for them. Referring to Jesus' Sermon on the Mount, 'Blessed are the poor', the authors of the *Summa* state that in the Christian life, being needy and a mendicant is not a state of misery, but one of blessing.⁴⁸

Similarly with respect to making savings or accumulating goods (*thesaurizare*), the authors of the *Summa Halensis* say that any savings made out of avarice or cupidity are prohibited. One can only save money out of consideration of necessities or consideration of public utility. For example, parents can save towards a dowry of their daughters or their sons' education; similarly princes can save to defend their reign or to support the worship of God. The ecclesiastical personnel, on the other hand, are never allowed to save money, nor to keep money with the intention of guarding it.⁴⁹

⁴⁷ Oliger, *Expositio Quatuor*, 158: 'Haec videtur paupertas fratrum minorum, quae hic determinatur. Unde attenditur in duobus: unum est, ut non recipiant fixum aliquid, sicut redditum; et hoc est quoniam tanquam peregrine et advenae in paupertate debent Domino famulari. Aliud est, quia debent habere paupertatem quantum ad usum, ut taliter sint pauperes quod etiam sint mendici.'

⁴⁸ SH IV, P2, In3, Tr2, S2, Q2, Ti2, C3 (n. 489), Respondeo, p. 719: 'Item, praeceptum, quo dictum est quod "non erit indigens et mendicus inter vos", id est destitutus auxilio et quaerens panem per ostia, perfectum est quantum ad statum imperfectionis illius populi, qui per bona temporalia ad salutem attrahebantur; unde eis fiebat promissio temporalium, Isai. 1, 19: "Si audieritis me, bona terrae comedetis." Adveniente vero perfectione maiori populi christiani, quibus paupertas et abdicatio temporalium beatitudo est, Matth. 5, 3: "Beati pauperes" etc., cessat istud praeceptum, quia in vita christiana esse indigentem et mendicum non est esse miserum, sed beatum.'

⁴⁹ SH IV, P2, In3, Tr2, S2, Q2, Ti2, C1 (n. 487), Respondeo, p. 716: 'Thesaurizat aliquis ex affectu avaritiae et cupiditatis, absque omni intentione necessitates propriae vel alienae, et hoc modo thesaurizare omnibus est prohibitum (...) Item, thesaurizat quis ex solertia providentiae, et hoc vel consideratione necessitatis vel consideratione publicae utilitatis. Consideratione necessitatis conceditur parentibus saecularibus ob necessitatem filiorum educandorum vel filiarum coniugio tradendarum,

Conclusion

To conclude, the *Commentary of the Four Masters* is a pivotal text in the history of Franciscanism, insofar as it is the first text that is very much preoccupied with establishing a strict observance of poverty. There is no anxiety whatsoever, for example, concerning questions about studying, learning, about what kind of preaching to do, how to behave in public etc. Similarly, other quintessential virtues exalted by Francis and early Franciscans, such as joy, simplicity, humility are absent. For a long time, in the historiography, the early intellectuals of the Franciscan Order have been charged with distancing the Order from the initial vision of Francis. In this *Commentary*, however, we see a sincere effort to dispel doubtful points by establishing the meaning of the Rule and to understand the intention of Francis. But we also see that the masters writing the *Commentary* treat the Franciscan Rule as a text of law, for it is the law of the friars. So they apply all the conventions and techniques of understanding a legal text to the Rule, observed preeminently in the way they try to understand what is a precept and what is a counsel, and in this domain, we see a great deal of convergence with the *Summa Halensis*. On close inspection, the Franciscan character of the *Summa Halensis* becomes clearer particularly in its consideration of poverty and mendicancy as a state of perfection, and in the strong opposition it takes against property holding or saving among the ecclesiastical persons. The *Summa Halensis* deserves a bigger place in the future studies of Franciscan Order and theology.

non autem ditandarum, sed servato modo et statu personae. Consideratione publicae utilitatis vel regni defendendi vel cultus Dei ampliandi, concessum est regibus thesaurizare (...) Personis vero ecclesiasticis proprie nunquam thesaurizare licet, quia non licet eis accumulare pecunias, nec etiam pecuniam tenere intentione servandi.'

Sophie Delmas

Odo Rigaldi, Alexander of Hales and the *Summa Halensis*

Abstract: Odo Rigaldus had close ties with Alexander of Hales, who was at once his model, his master and his closest collaborator. He joined the Order of Friars Minor around 1230, possibly following the example of Alexander of Hales. However, Alexander was above all the teacher of Odo: the latter's commentary on the Sentences is a major work that testifies to links with Alexander. But Alexander is above all the master of Odo: the commentary on the Sentences of the latter is a major work that testifies to the links with Alexander. The two often worked as a team in the context of the *studium* in Paris, as evidenced by the commentary on the rule of the four masters and the *Summa Halensis* itself. Notably, it is in book three of the *Summa* that the influence of Odo is most prominent. At the death of Alexander, in 1245, Odo took his place as regent master of the Franciscan school.

Odo Rigaldus is one of the earliest Franciscan masters of the 13th century, that is, the founders of the Parisian *studium*, who are increasingly attracting the interest of historians. In 2006, Adam J. Davis published a book on Odo in which, following a brief outline of his education, he gives an account of the activities of this 'holy bureaucrat', of his role as archbishop in his diocese of Rouen and of his relations with the King of France, Louis IX. Furthermore, in 2013, a conference was organised at Rouen by Elisabeth Lalou and Alexis Grémois around the theme of 'Odo Rigaldus and his time', at which the contributions (in the process of being published) focused on the period in which he lived, his register of pastoral visits as well as his role in the church in Normandy.¹ Much work, however, remains to be done on the studies and intellectual activities pursued by Odo in the early years of the Franciscan *studium* in Paris which were marked by the entry of Alexander of Hales into the order in 1236. What impact did Alexander of Hales have on Odo Rigaldus? We shall seek to determine, through a close reappraisal of the source material and the most recent scholarship, the extent to which Alexander was a model for Odo before becoming his master. We will then go on to give an account of their various intellectual collaborations.

¹ Élisabeth Lalou, 'Eudes Rigaud en son temps: Compte rendu du colloque international, Université de Rouen, 30–31 mai 2013,' *Etudes franciscaines* 7 (2014): 207–9.

Alexander: A Model for Odo? Entry into the Franciscan Order

Odo Rigaldus was born about 1205 at Brie Comte-Robert, in Île-de-France. Alexander of Hales, for his part, is reckoned to have been born around 1185 at Hales, in Gloucestershire. The two men were thus 20 years apart in age, which leads one to think that the former, in his thirties, could well have followed the example of the latter, by then in his fifties. Odo Rigaldus' entry into the Franciscan order is traditionally assigned to the year 1236, since that is the date suggested in the 17th century by Luke Wadding in his *Annales minorum*.² To my knowledge, however, no confirmation of this suggested date can be found in any source. It is nevertheless the date adopted by Robert Ménindès in his landmark article, and taken up in turn by Adam J. Davis in his biography of Odo.³

In order to understand the origin of this dating, which has found acceptance since the early modern period, one has to go back to earlier documents. In fact, it derives from a reconciliation of two sources. The first of these is the *Chronica XXIV generalium ordinis minorum* written by Arnaud de Sarrant in the mid 14th century. Odo is referred to there, according to Adam J. Davis, 'as a member of the order at the time Elias was minister general', i.e. from 1232 until 1239.⁴ The few lines devoted to Odo Rigaldus can indeed be found in the chapter of the chronicle entitled *Tempora fratris Helie*. A reading of the passage in Latin from this text provides more detail:

There was also after him [Alexander of Hales] in the same place [Paris] a venerable master, father and brother Odo Rigaldus, of renowned family heritage, but even more renowned morals, who having been suddenly drawn and even compelled to become the Archbishop of Rouen, was an outstanding preacher whose life and teaching shone throughout his reign so that he was counted as the exemplar of bishops.⁵

This extract tells us that Odo Rigaldus became regent master (*magistratus*) in Paris after Alexander of Hales, but it nowhere refers to his entry into the order. No chronological indication is given. The date of 1236 appears not in the passage from Arnaud de Sarrant but in the accompanying footnote by the Quaracchi editors. What

² Luke Wadding, *Annales minorum [1221–1237]*, vol. 2 (Quaracchi: Ad Claras Aquas, 1931), 419.

³ Robert Ménindès, 'Eudes Rigaud, frère mineur,' *Revue d'Histoire Franciscaine* 8 (1931): 157–78; Adam Jeffrey Davis, *The Holy Bureaucrat: Eudes Rigaud and Religious Reform in Thirteenth-Century Normandy* (Ithaca, NY/London: Cornell University Press, 2006), 15.

⁴ Davis, *The Holy Bureaucrat*, 15.

⁵ *Chronica XXIV generalium ordinis Minorum*, *Analecta Franciscana*, 3 (Quaracchi: Ex Typographia Collegii S. Bonaventurae, 1897), 220: 'Fuit etiam post ipsum [Alexander of Hales] ibidem [in Paris] magistratus venerabilis pater frater Odo Rigaldi genere clarus, sed clarior moribus, qui tractus postmodum et coactus ad archiepiscopatum Rothomagensis fuit famosissimus praedicator et sic vita et doctrina postmodum in regimine fulsit, ut forma praesulum censeretur.'

one can take from the extract is a *terminus ad quem*: Odo Rigaldus was a Franciscan by 1239, the end of Elias' period of office.

The second source which is used is the *Chronicle* of Salimbene. This author states that Odo Rigaldus 'was a member of the order of Friars Minor and archbishop of Rouen' (*erat autem frater Regaldus ex ordine fratrum minorum et Rotomagensis archiepiscopus*), that he was a master and titular holder of a chair in Paris and 'taught (or was a reader of theology) for many years in the house of the Franciscans' (*multis annis legit theologiam in domo fratrum*).⁶ In the view of Robert Ménindès, these 'many years' as reader cannot correspond to the brief three-year period running from 1245, that is, the date of the death of Alexander of Hales, to 1248, the date at which Odo was appointed archbishop. This leads him to the conclusion that one must look at the years before 1245, and thus place the entry of Odo into the Franciscan order much earlier. But is he not confusing the title of reader in a monastery and that of regent master?

Whatever the case may be, given these uncertainties in the chronology, it is difficult to ascertain whether Odo followed the example of Alexander of Hales who, for his part, entered the order in 1236, as Adam Davis affirms.⁷ It is probable that Odo was one of a large number of clerics who became friars minor after 1236. It would, however, be more prudent to postulate that Odo joined the order in the 1230s and that his reputation grew during Elias' time as minister general.

What one can state with more certainty is that Odo Rigaldus succeeded Alexander of Hales as regent master in 1245. According to Adam Davis, Odo succeeded Jean de la Rochelle, but I have recently shown that there is no source indicating that Jean de la Rochelle was regent master in Paris.⁸ One therefore needs to revise and update the work of Palémon Glorieux concerning the succession of Franciscan regent masters at the University of Paris:⁹

6 Ménindès, 'Eudes Rigaud,' 157–78. The translation follows that of Salimbene di Adam of Parma, *Chronique*, vol. 2, ed. Gisèle Besson and Michèle Brossard-Dandré (Paris: Honoré Champion, 2016), 792.

7 Davis, *The Holy Bureaucrat*, 15.

8 Sophie Delmas, 'Alexandre de Halès et le *studium* franciscain de Paris: Aux origines de la question des chaires franciscaines et de l'exercice quodlibétique,' in *Die regulierten Kollegien im Europa des Mittelalters und der Renaissance/Les collèges réguliers en Europe au Moyen Âge et à la Renaissance*, ed. Andreas Sohn and Jacques Verger, *Aufbrüche: Interkulturelle Perspektiven auf Geschichte, Politik und Religion/Ouvertures: Perspectives interculturelles en histoire, politique et religion*, 4 (Bochum: Winkler, 2012), 37–47, esp. 38–9.

9 Palémon Glorieux, 'D'Alexandre de Halès à Pierre Auriol: la suite des maîtres franciscains de Paris,' *Archivum Franciscanum Historicum* 26 (1933): 257–81.

Alexander of Hales	1236–45
Odo Rigaldus	1245–48
William of Melitona	1248–53
Bonaventure	1253–57
Guibert of Tournai	1257–63 (or 1259–61?) ¹⁰

Alexander, Master to Odo

Whether Odo became a Franciscan at the same time as Alexander of Hales or followed his example later, the difference in age between the two makes him a pupil of the Englishman.

Odo Rigaldus as a Student of the *Sentences*

In accordance with the normal course of study in Paris, Odo spent two years engaged in biblical commentary, but none of his exegetical manuscripts has been preserved or identified.¹¹ Thereafter, he turned to commenting on the *Sentences* of Peter Lombard.¹²

His *Commentary* can be dated to the early 1240s, indeed between 1240 and 1242, according to L. Sileo and A. Oliva.¹³ This text was widely circulated; some 20 manuscripts are extant. Several of these are worthy of mention. For instance, Paris, Bibliothèque Nationale de France, Latin 15652 is of particular interest as it corresponds to the notes taken by an anonymous student regarding the first and second books of the *Sentences*: Folios 32–63 bring together the readings of the various bachelor students, Pierre l'Archevêque, Etienne de Poligny, Jean le Page, master Adam and of course

¹⁰ Sean Field, 'Gilbert of Tournai's Letter to Isabelle of France: An Edition of the Complete Text,' *Mediaeval Studies* 65 (2003): 57–97, esp. 59, n. 8. On Guibert, cf. Marjorie Burghart, 'Remploi textuel, invention et art de la mémoire: les Sermones ad status du franciscain Guibert de Tournai (†1284)' (PhD thesis, University of Lyon 2, 2013).

¹¹ I am grateful to Gilbert Dahan for this verification.

¹² O. Lottin, 'Un commentaire sur les *Sentences* tributaire d'Odón Rigaud,' *Recherches de théologie ancienne et médiévale* 7 (1935): 402–5.

¹³ Leonardo Sileo, *Teorie della scienza teologica: Quaestio de Scientia Theologicae di Odo Rigaldi e altri testi inediti (1230–1250)*, vol. 1, Studia Antoniana, 27 (Roma: Pontificium Athenaeum Antonianum, 1984), 90–3; Adriano Oliva, *Les débuts de l'enseignement de Thomas d'Aquin et sa conception de la sacra doctrina: Avec l'édition du prologue de son commentaire des *Sentences**, Bibliothèque thomiste, 58 (Paris: J. Vrin, 2006), 261.

Odo Rigaldus, probably from the academic year 1240–41.¹⁴ Another Parisian manuscript, Paris, Bibliothèque Nationale de France, Lat. 3434, corresponds to an anonymous mid 13th century commentary: its author draws often quite literally in every *solutio* on the commentary of Odo Rigaldus. We might add that it was also a great source of inspiration for Albert the Great.

Odo Rigaldus' commentary on the *Sentences* occupies a fundamental place in 13th-century theology and philosophy, on both the formal and the doctrinal level. As Adam J. Davis points out, Odo is doubtless the earliest Franciscan student to write such a commentary, following the one written by Alexander of Hales in the 1220s when he was a lay brother, and another written by the Dominican Hugh of Saint-Cher in the 1230s.¹⁵ This work is a testimony to the increasing importance of the *Sentences* in the study of theology and in the investigation of certain questions. It bears witness also to the influence of the master, Alexander, on his pupil Odo Rigaldus. Some recent studies have helped us to understand in what respects Odo follows his senior colleague and where he diverges from him.

On the formal level, Odo's work, designated as a commentary, moves steadily away from Alexander's, which is generally categorised as a *Gloss*. Marta Borgo recently outlined the major strands in the evolution of the genre of commentary on the *Sentences* from the 1220s to the early 1250s, as they emerged from her survey of some Parisian works.¹⁶ Hence, building on the work of Russell Friedman and Olga Weijers, it is possible to state that Alexander's work corresponds to the first stage in the evolution of the genre, i.e. that of the *Glosses*, or explanations of specific points made in the *Sentences* of Peter Lombard. The commentary by Odo marks the beginning of the second phase, which was characterised by the introduction of questions, and led to commentaries based on 'argument-centered questions'.¹⁷ Our two Franciscan authors are therefore key figures in a transitional period. For his part, Odo's prologue to his commentary on the *Sentences* is of great importance in relation to previous commentaries: in his *Gloss*, Alexander of Hales had restricted himself to a brief presentation of the 'substance' of his work.¹⁸ Basically, the structure of Odo's commentary is al-

¹⁴ Nathalie Gorochoff, *Naissance de l'université: Les écoles de Paris, d'Innocent III à Thomas d'Aquin, c.1200- c.1245*, Etudes d'histoire médiévale, 14 (Paris: Honoré Champion, 2012), esp. 482–3; Marie-Dominique Chenu, 'Maîtres et bacheliers de l'Université de Paris vers 1240: Description du manuscrit Paris, Bibl. Nat. Lat. 15652,' in *Etudes d'histoire doctrinale et littéraire du XIII^e siècle* (Paris: Vrin; Ottawa: Institut d'études médiévales, 1932), 11–39.

¹⁵ Davis, *The Holy Bureaucrat*, 16.

¹⁶ Marta Borgo, 'L'enseignement des *Sentences* pendant la première moitié du XIII^e siècle,' in *Les débuts de l'enseignement universitaire à Paris (1200–1245 environ)*, ed. Jacques Verger and Olga Weijers, *Studia Artistarum*, 38 (Turnhout: Brepols, 2013), 295–314.

¹⁷ Russell L. Friedmann, 'The *Sentences* Commentary, 1250–1320: General trends, the impact of the religious orders, and the test case of predestination,' in *Medieval Commentaries on the Sentences of Peter Lombard*, vol. 1, ed. R.G. Evans (Leiden: Brill, 2002), 84–97, and Olga Weijers, *Queritur utrum: Recherches sur la 'disputatio' dans les universités médiévales* (Turnhout: Brepols, 2009), 20–1.

¹⁸ Sileo, *Teorie della scienza teologica*, 1:99.

ready comparable to those of Bonaventure and Thomas Aquinas, while the contents remain similar to those of Alexander and Hugh of Saint-Cher.¹⁹

Another possible point of comparison between Alexander and Odo concerns the sources they used. Following in the footsteps of his masters Alexander of Hales and Jean de la Rochelle, Odo draws particularly on Anselm, and especially on his *Cur Deus homo*, as Michael Robson has recently pointed out. These Anselmian references occur with notable frequency in the passages involving the incarnation and the redemption: in the 21 distinctions in Book 3 of Odo's *Commentary on the Sentences*, one can list at least 87 quotations. This increasing influence is such that, in both the *Glossa* of Alexander and the *Lectura* of Odo, *Cur Deus homo* surpasses Augustine's *De Trinitate* in terms of the number of quotations deployed.²⁰

As regards content, some past research which focuses on particular points of theology has on occasion served to bring out the links between Alexander of Hales and his younger contemporary.

In his voluminous work entitled *Psychologie et morale aux XIIe et XIIIe siècles*, Odon Lottin emphasized more than once the links between Alexander and Odo's commentary on the *Sentences*. Odo's explication of the existence of original sin in the descendants of Adam, for example, echoes at several points the disputed question which Alexander devoted to the same subject.²¹ Similarly, the arguments which Odo develops on original sin in his commentary on Book 2 are reminiscent of the position taken up in the *Summa*.²²

While following his master Alexander, Odo on occasion marks himself out as an innovator, as for instance in Distinction 22 of the first book which deals with the naming of God. It appears to be Odo who first introduces the question *Utrum Deus sit nominabilis* which subsequently recurs in all the commentaries on the *Sentences*. His reasoning is based on certain lines of argument of his predecessors, particularly those of Alexander of Hales in his *Glossa*.²³

By the same token, Odo is capable of distancing himself from his master. In 2010, Carlos Mateo Martínez Ruiz published an article on the question of power.²⁴ In it he

19 Borgo, 'L'enseignement des Sentences,' esp. 311.

20 Michael Robson, 'Odo Rigaldi and the Assimilation of St Anselm's *Cur Deus homo* in the School of the Cordeliers in Paris,' in *Saint Anselm of Canterbury and His Legacy*, ed. Giles E.M. Gasper and Ian Logan, Durham Medieval and Renaissance Monographs and Essays, 2 (Durham: Institute of Medieval and Renaissance Studies; Toronto: Pontifical Institute of Medieval Studies, 2012), 155–73.

21 Odon Lottin, *Psychologie et morale aux XIIe et XIIIe siècles*, vol. 4/1 *Problèmes de morale* (Louvain: Abbaye du Mont César, 1954), 212.

22 Odon Lottin, *Psychologie et morale aux XIIe et XIIIe siècles*, vol. 1, *Problèmes de psychologie* (Louvain: Abbaye du Mont César, 1942), 150.

23 Leonardo Sileo, "'Utrum deus sit nominabilis': Da Guglielmo d'Auxerre a Odo Rigaldi,' in "*Ad Ingenii Acuitionem*": *Studies in Honour of Alfonso Maierù*, ed. Stefano Caroti et al., *Textes et Etudes du Moyen Âge*, 38 (Turnhout, Brepols, 2006), 437–62, esp. 449.

24 Carlos Mateo Martínez Ruiz, 'Odón Rigaud y la cuestión del poder: *Lectura super II Librum Sententiarum*, d. 44,' *Archivum Franciscanum Historicum* 103 (2010): 339–58.

analyses the argument of Odo Rigaldus in Distinction 44 of his commentary on the second book of the *Sentences*, which makes a significant contribution to discussion of the nature of power, its scope and its limits. This distinction takes as its theme the ‘power of domination’ (*potentia dominandi*) and especially its limits: the question is whether one must in all things obey the existing power structures (*utrum in omnibus sit obediendum potestati ordinate*). Mateo Martinez Ruiz has shown that Odo categorically rejects the distinction proposed by Alexander of Hales. The latter draws a distinction between, on the one hand, what concerns ‘the prince’s throne’ (*thronum principis*) and, on the other, what corresponds to one’s ethical responsibility as an individual (*statum merendi vel demerendi*). In the first case, one must obey precepts, but this is not necessarily so in the second. Odo rejects this distinction, and considers that there is neither *obedientia* nor *potestas* in any precept which would contradict what is ordained by God.

Odo, Alexander and the *quaestiones*

Once he had completed his reading of the *Sentences*, Odo Rigaldus turned his attention to disputed questions. These writings, still largely unpublished, have links with the *Summa* and with the disputed questions of Alexander of Hales which are found alongside them in the manuscripts, in particular in Toulouse, Bibliothèque d’Etude et du Patrimoine, 737. This is the case in the matter of the knowledge of God. In the early 13th century, many theologians concur on the view that God does not have a different idea or concept for each creature: there is therefore one single divine idea. Rega Wood has laid stress on the new position taken up by Richard Rufus in his *De ideis*, according to which there are on the contrary a great multitude of individual ideas. Odo Rigaldus broached this subject in his own disputed question, *De ideis*, which Rega Wood dates between 1245 and 1248. Odo’s position is taken literally from number 272 of the *Summa*.²⁵ This question by Odo thus shows his links with the *Summa* attributed to Alexander. Likewise, at the start of the 1240s, Odo Rigaldus broached the question *De erroribus circa durationem verum exeuntium*. This question bears the marks of the influence of the questions of Alexander of Hales, entitled *De eternitate, evo, et tempore* and *De duratione mundi*.²⁶

²⁵ Rega Wood, ‘Distinct Ideas and Perfect Solitude: Alexander of Hales, Richard Rufus, and Odo Rigaldus,’ *Franciscan Studies* 53 (1993): 7–31, esp. 22.

²⁶ Odo Rigaldus, ‘The text of Odo Rigaldus’s *De erroribus circa durationem Rerum exeuntium*,’ in *Medieval Latin Texts on the Eternity of the World*, ed. Richard C. Dales and Omar Argerami (Leiden: Brill, 1991), 45–53.

Collaborative work: The Rule of the Four Masters and the *Summa*

Odo Rigaldus, in the 1240s, is thus one of the founders of the Franciscan *studium* in Paris who remembered for their intense collaborative work.²⁷

In his connection, he belonged to a group of brothers who drew up a commentary on the Rule, known under the title *Expositio quatuor magistrorum super regulam fratrum minorum* and composed around 1241–42. The group comprised not only Alexander of Hales and Odo Rigaldus but also Jean de la Rochelle and Robert of Bas-sée.²⁸ According to Thomas of Eccleston, at the time when Haymo of Faversham was minister general, an order (*mandatum*) was issued by the chapter of Montpellier that in each province brothers should be nominated to identify doubtful points in the Rule so that these could be passed on to the minister general. The view generally accepted by historians assumed that the commentary on the Rule by the four masters was a response to this order on behalf of the province of France. If one follows what is stated in the *Chronica XXIV generalium ordinis minorum*, four esteemed masters of theology responded to the order of the minister general and produced a very useful document regarding the Rule, which was passed on to the minister general and to the other diffinitors. In the view of Neslihan Şenocak, however, the *Expositio* cannot correspond to the consultation reported by Thomas of Eccleston. Rather, it was a com-

27 On collaborative work, cf. Yves Congar, “In dulcedine societatis quaerere veritatem”: Notes sur le travail en équipe chez saint Albert et chez les prêcheurs, au XIII^e siècle, in *Albertus Magnus Doctor Universalis: 1280/1980*, ed. Gerbert Meyer and Albert Zimmermann (Mainz: Matthias-Grünwald-Verlag, 1980), 47–57; Jacques Verger, *Les Universités françaises au Moyen Âge*, Education and Society in the Middle Ages and Renaissance, 7 (Leiden: Brill, 1995), 61; Alain Boureau, ‘Peut-on parler d’auteurs scolastiques?’, in *Auctor et auctoritas: Invention et conformisme dans l’écriture médiévale: Actes du colloque tenu à l’Université de Versailles-Saint-Quentin-en-Yvelines, 14–16 juin 1999*, ed. Michel Zimmermann, Mémoires et documents de l’Ecole des chartes, 59 (Paris: École des Chartes, 2001), 273; Gorochov, *Naissance de l’Université*, 511; Sophie Delmas, ‘Le travail en équipe chez les intellectuels du Moyen Âge,’ in *Les Intellectuels au Moyen Âge: Destins et fécondité d’un anachronisme fondateur: Actes du colloque international d’Arras (19–20 octobre 2017)*, ed. Antoine Destemberg (Brussels: Peter Lang, forthcoming).

28 *Expositio quatuor magistrorum super regulam fratrum minorum (1241–1242): accedit eiusdem regulae textus cum fontibus et locis parallelis*, ed. Livarius Oliger (Rome: Edizioni di storia e letteratura, 1950). On this text, see the studies by Andrea Tabarroni, ‘La regola francescana tra autenticità ed autenticazione,’ in *Dalla ‘Sequela Christi’ di Francesco d’Assisi all’apologia della povertà: Atti del XVIII Convegno internazionale, Assisi, 18–20 ottobre 1990*, ed. Enrico Menesto (Spoleto, Centro Italiano di Studi sull’Alto Medioevo, 1992), 79–122, esp. 103–15, and Pietro Maraseni, *Nescientes litteras: l’ammonezione della Regola francescana e la questione degli studi nell’ordine (sec. XIII–XVI)*, Bibliotheca seraphico-capuccina, 61 (Rome: Istituto Storico dei Cappuccini, 2000), 95–7.

missioned work, intended for circulation, as the number of manuscripts (27) testifies. Moreover, it does not contain questions, but instead supplies answers.²⁹

The greatest example of collaboration between the brothers can be found in the *Summa*. No one today disputes the compilatory nature of the *Summa*. In fact, as early as 1750, the Dominican Bernardo of Rubeis had highlighted the gaps and duplications which exist in this work.³⁰ The history of the authenticity of the *Summa* was thoroughly investigated by Victorin Doucet in a long article published in 1947, from which I am here drawing on some observations concerning Odo Rigaldus and his involvement in the production of this work.³¹ In his article Doucet is severely critical of the position advanced in the 1930s by Gorce and Mandonnet, according to whom the *Summa* is not only not authentic, but had no doctrinal influence. In particular, Doucet criticizes them for putting forward the idea (wrongly attributed to Longpré) that Odo Rigaldus' work was 'a kind of supplement to the *Summa*'. Most importantly, Doucet surveys the various articles devoted to the *Summa* and its links with authors contemporary to Alexander. In 1891, Ehrle asserted that the *Summa* is a compilation of texts by John of La Rochelle, Bonaventure and Odo Rigaldus. In 1936, Pelster argued that Odo Rigaldus' style is in evidence in the *Summa*, for example in the final question (Question 74) of Book 1. In 1939, Henquinet emphasised the complexity of the links between the *Summa* and the question *De creatione* of Odo. At about the same time, Pergamo argued that Odo had the *Summa* in front of him when he was writing his commentary on the first book of the *Sentences*. Englehardt, for his part, contended that Book 3 derives from Odo.

How can one analyse the complex relationship between the works of Odo Rigaldus, notably his commentary on the *Sentences*, and the *Summa Halensis*? In order to arrive at a better understanding of the links which exist between this commentary on the *Sentences* and the *Summa*, I decided to look again at the list of these links in the light of two sources of information: the *Prolegomena* of Victorin Doucet, published in 1948, and the indexes of the *Summa*, published much later, in 1979, and in my view underused.

In Doucet's view, expressed in 1948, the *Summa* does not derive from Odo Rigaldus' work. Rather, the evidence suggests that Odo draws on the *Summa* or on its sources. He cites several examples of this, which I present below in the form of a table. In the first instance cited, the source common to both Odo and the *Summa* is the *Gloss* of Alexander of Hales on Book 1, and particularly Distinction 3. In the second example, according to Victorin Doucet, the source for both Odo and the

²⁹ Neslihan Şenocak, *The Poor and the Perfect: The Rise of Learning in the Franciscan Order, 1209–1310* (Ithaca, NY/London: Cornell University Press, 2012), 71–2.

³⁰ Matthieu Maxime Gorce, 'La Somme théologique d'Alexandre de Halès est-elle authentique?', *New Scholasticism* 5 (1931): 1–72, esp. 16.

³¹ Victorin Doucet, 'The History of the Problem of the Authenticity of the *Summa*,' *Franciscan Studies* 7 (1947): 26–41; Victorin Doucet, 'The History of the Problem of the Authenticity of the *Summa* (Continued),' *Franciscan Studies* 7 (1947): 274–312, esp. 289 and 302–4.

Summa is Alexander's question *De sacrificiis*. In the case of the third example, a similar passage is found in manuscript Vat. Lat. 691, *Sentences*, Book 1, Distinction 23 which is itself a compilation of several commentaries: all three doubtless share a common source. Finally, in the fourth example, Victorin Doucet contends that the common source is John of La Rochelle and his question *De sanctificatione*.³²

Examples, <i>Prolegomena</i> , Doucet (1948)	Odo Rigaldus	<i>Summa Halensis</i> ³³
Example 1	I <i>Sent.</i> , d. 3	SH I (n. 113), p. 179
Example 2	IV <i>Sent.</i> , Prologue	SH IV (n. 526), p. 799
Example 3	III <i>Sent.</i> , d. 23	SH IV (n. 684), p. 1086
Example 4	III <i>Sent.</i> , d. 3	SH IV (n. 82), pp. 124–5

Doucet has also demonstrated that Odo cast doubt on some of the viewpoints adopted in the *Summa*. One might surmise that he was in fact taking issue with a source he shares with the *Summa*. However, if Odo's commentary on the *Sentences* antedates the *Summa*, then Odo's own viewpoints would on occasion be subject to refutation in the *Summa*, something which Doucet did not find to be the case. In Victorin Doucet's view, Odo's commentary on the *Sentences* cannot be included among the sources of the *Summa*. Odo's *Commentary on the Sentences* postdates the *Summa*.

To extend the analysis further, I turned to Odo's *Lectura* of the typology of solutions presented in my book on the Franciscan master of theology Eustache d'Arras. This typology lent itself well to the investigation of Eustache's links with other masters, such as Gérard d'Abbeville.³⁴ The study of Eustache's quodlibets and disputed questions enabled me to identify four categories of *solutiones*. 'Simple responses' do no more than refer briefly to a question under debate, 'responses of the *licet* type' make brief mention of a contrary opinion, while 'neutral responses' present one or more opposed views, without passing judgment. The most fascinating type of response is the 'critical response' in which one or more opposing opinions are not only cited but also criticised (such criticisms may focus on the basis for the opinion, on its content or on its consequences).³⁵

On the one hand, one can list the discussions in Odo's commentary on the *Sentences* which correspond to a 'neutral response'. This means that he refers to a view

³² Victorin Doucet, 'Prolegomena in librum III necnon in libros I et II "Summae Fratris Alexandri"', in *Doctoris irrefragabilis Alexandri de Hales Ordinis minorum Summa theologica*, vol. 4 (Quaracchi: Collegium S. Bonaventurae, 1948), CCXXX–CCXXXI.

³³ Alexander of Hales, *Doctoris irrefragabilis Alexandri de Hales Ordinis minorum Summa theologica* (SH), 4 vols (Quaracchi: Collegium S. Bonaventurae, 1924–48).

³⁴ Stephen M. Metzger, *Gerard of Abbeville, Secular Master, on Knowledge, Wisdom and Contemplation*, 2 vols, *Studien und Texte zur Geistesgeschichte des Mittelalters*, 122 (Leiden: Brill, 2017), for example 1:203.

³⁵ Sophie Delmas, *Un franciscain à Paris: Le maître en théologie Eustache d'Arras (o.f.m.) au milieu du XIIIe siècle* (Paris: Éditions du Cerf, 2010), 81–6.

presented in the *Summa*, but without openly expressing his own opinion. For example, in his reading of Book 2, Odo raises the question of whether there is a distinction between the act of free will, on one hand, and acts of reason and of will on the other. Odo presents two opinions. The first is prefaced by the words *quidam ponunt quod*: at issue here is the view presented in the *Summa* that free will is ‘a faculty that is composed of both reason and will; its characteristic action is to aspire to discernment and choice’.³⁶ Odo then goes on to present a second opinion, that of Philip the Chancellor, which he seems to prefer (*alia est opinio et videtur probabilior*).

On the other hand, several solutions in the *Summa* are contested by Odo Rigaldus in ‘critical responses’. I cite here two examples to which Doucet has drawn attention.³⁷

<i>Summa Halensis</i>	Odo Rigaldus
SH IV (n. 13), pp. 29–30	III Sent., d. 1
SH IV (n. 57), pp. 83–4	III Sent., d. 7

These passages correspond to what I have called ‘critical responses’. The first of them concerns the Incarnation (Book 3, Distinction 1). Odo Rigaldus quotes the opinion which is contrary to his own, the one presented in the *Summa*. According to this view, when one speaks of ‘one single, self-same man’, one takes this to mean one single self-same person or individual. In reporting this opinion, Odo prefates it with the words *quidam dicunt*. He then qualifies this opinion: it is ‘not tenable’, it is literally ‘impossible’ (*impossibilis*), and it cannot even be understood (*non intelligibilis*). He adds that this opinion is inadmissible (*non admittendam*) according to what is affirmed by Anselm. In the second passage (Book 3, Distinction 7), the argument presented in the *Summa* on Christology is likewise attributed by Odo to those he calls *quidam*. But since this opinion is not supported by the authority of the saints, it cannot be accepted, since it can with equal ease be approved or rejected (*auctoritatem non habet a sanctis, eadem facilitate contemnitur qua probatur*).

Are there other solutions in the *Summa* which are criticised by Odo in ‘critical responses’? To verify this, I took as my starting point the index of the *Summa*, retaining only the references to Odo Rigaldus which occurred in the responses (indicated by the term *solutio* in the index).³⁸

³⁶ Lottin, *Psychologie et morale*, 1:156–7.

³⁷ Doucet, ‘Prolegomena,’ CCXXXI–CCXXXII.

³⁸ *Doctoris irrefragabilis Alexandri de Hales Ordinis minorum Summa theologica: Indices in tom. I–IV* (Grottaferrata: Collegium S. Bonaventurae, 1979), 163–4.

<i>Summa Halensis</i>	Odo Rigaldus	Type of solution in the Commentary on the Sentences
<i>SH</i> I (n. 507), pp. 721–2	I <i>Sent.</i> , d. 17	Neutral response
<i>SH</i> II (n. 435), pp. 526–8	II <i>Sent.</i> , d. 17	Neutral response
<i>SH</i> II (n. 506), pp. 733–5	II <i>Sent.</i> , d. 24	Neutral response
<i>SH</i> II (n. 510), pp. 744–8	II <i>Sent.</i> , d. 24	Neutral response
<i>SH</i> II (n. 514), pp. 756–7	II <i>Sent.</i> , d. 29	Neutral response
<i>SH</i> IV (n. 13), pp. 29–30	III <i>Sent.</i> , d. 1	Critical response
<i>SH</i> IV (n. 57), pp. 83–4	III <i>Sent.</i> , d. 7	Critical response

What emerges from these tables and from a reading of the manuscripts are major divergences as between the books of the *Summa*. Initially, textual links can be found between the *Summa* and Books 1 and 2 of the *Sentences*: either Odo has borrowed passages from the *Summa*, or he has collaborated in that work by inserting his own texts into it, or there exists a common source. By contrast, in Book 3, the links between the two works change radically.

It is true that one could argue that these examples are few in number. But a consultation of the indexes drawn up in 1979 gives clear confirmation of the influence of Odo Rigaldi in Book 3 of the *Summa*.³⁹ Further evidence is found in some occasional criticisms relating to the arguments set out in this same Book 3 of the *Summa*. One can thus justifiably contend that Odo Rigaldus did not agree with all the solutions proposed by his collaborators in Book 3.

Conclusion

Odo Rigaldus is one of those many intellectuals who, at the end of the 1230s, joined the Franciscan order, in the wake of Alexander of Hales' conversion, and also of the criticism the university strike of 1231, and the criticisms secular masters around this time levelled against the mendicant orders for the privileges they were being granted in the university context by the Holy See.⁴⁰ Through his participation in university life, whether by composing his commentary on the *Sentences* or engaging in formal disputations. Odo, like his master Alexander, draws on new sources, and establishes a dialogue with the positions commonly held in his time. Within the Franciscan *studium*, within the monastery then under construction, bonds were forged between the brothers and collective projects developed, which were fostered by a regular mode of life together. This enables Alain Boureau to speak, with reference to the *Summa*, of 'a veritable division of labour according to the skills acquired'. John of La Rochelle, a

³⁹ *Doctoris irrefragabilis Alexandri de Hales Ordinis minorum Summa theologica: Indices in tom. I-IV*, 163–4.

⁴⁰ Spencer E. Young, *Scholarly Community at the Early University of Paris: Theologians, Education and Society, 1215–1248* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2014).

specialist in Greek and Arabic sources, is involved particularly with Book 2. Similarly, William of Melitona, a specialist on the sacraments on which subject he has himself produced a *Summa*, concerns himself with Book 4.⁴¹ It seems undeniable that Odo, for his part, took partial responsibility for Book 3 on Christ, redemption and salvation. It is doubtless no accident that the *Commentary* on Book 3 of the *Sentences* is the one which circulated most widely, either in its complete form (20 manuscripts) or in abridged form (six manuscripts).⁴²

Appendix: List of Manuscripts

The manuscript tradition of the writings of Odo Rigaldus has been enriched by several studies, notably those of Franz Pelster and of François-Marie Henquinet in the 1930s.⁴³

Commentary on the Sentences⁴⁴

Manuscripts:

Assisi, Biblioteca Comunale, 138 [fragments: dd. 33, 34, 39]
 Assisi, Biblioteca Comunale, 182, fols 10ra-58vb [book III]
 Breslau, Univ. 619 (I F 588), fols 53–181 [book II]
 Bruges, Royal Library 177 (Dunes), fols 52r-122r [book III]
 Bruges, Royal Library 208, fols 1r-193r [books I], fols 193r-351r [book II], fols 351r-488r [book III]
 Bruxelles, Bibliothèque Royale de Belgique, 1542, fols 74r-131v [book II]
 Bruxelles, Bibliothèque Royale de Belgique, 1547 (II. 1140), fols 4r-126v [book I]
 Bruxelles, Bibliothèque Royale de Belgique, 1548 (II. 1009), fols 1–115 [book I]
 Charleville-Mézières, Bibliothèque Municipale 193 [book III]
 Città del Vaticano, Biblioteca Apostolica Vaticana, Vat. Lat. 5982
 Douai, Bibliothèque Municipale, 462, fols 10r-71v [book III, dd. 1–39]
 Innsbruck, Universitäts- und Landesbibliothek Tirol (ULBT) 270, fols 3ra-75rb [book III]
 Paris, Bibliothèque Nationale de France, lat. 14910, fols 1r-107r [books I], fols 109r-198r [book II]
 Paris, Bibliothèque Nationale de France, lat. 15652, fols 33va-b [introitus]
 Torino, Biblioteca Nazionale Universitaria, K V 24, fols 3ra-110vb [book II]
 Trier 897 (1124), fols 1r-118r [books II], fols 119r-222r [book III]
 Troyes, Bibliothèque Municipale, 824, fols 1r-108v [book I], fols 109r-195v [book II], fols 196r-251r [book III]

⁴¹ Boureau, 'Peut-on parler d'auteurs scolastiques?', 273; Alain Boureau, *L'empire du livre: pour une histoire du savoir scolastique (1200–1380)* (Paris: Les Belles Lettres, 2007), 41.

⁴² François-Marie Henquinet, 'Les manuscrits et l'influence des écrits théologiques d'Eudes Rigaux O.F.M.', *Recherches de théologie ancienne et médiévale* 11 (1939): 324–50, esp. 346–7.

⁴³ Franz Pelster, 'Beiträge zur Erforschung des schriftlichen Nachlasses Odo Rigaldis,' *Scholastik* 11 (1936): 518–42; Henquinet, 'Les manuscrits et l'influence,' 324–50.

⁴⁴ I acknowledge with thanks that this list was established in collaboration with Riccardo Saccenti.

- Troyes, Bibliothèque Municipale 825, fols 111v-297r [books I, d. 35–III]
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- d. 19, q. 1:** Sofia Vanni Rovighi, *L'immortalità dell'anima nei maestri francescani del secolo XIII* (Milan: Vita e pensiero, 1936), 241–9.
- dd. 23–26:** Jacques-Guy Bougerol, *La théologie de l'espérance aux XIIe et XIIIe siècles*, 2 vols (Paris: Etudes augustinienes, 1985), 2:421–3 and 552–72.
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Basilio Pergamo, 'Il desiderio innato del soprannaturale nelle questioni inedite di Oddone Rigaldo, O.F.M., Arcivescovo di Rouen († 1275),' *Studi francescani* 32 (1935): 414–46.

De modo essendi Dei in creaturis et rerum in Deo

Toulouse 737, fols 167ra-172vb

Klosterneuburg 309, fols 35ra-43ra

ed. Leonardo Sileo, 'Dalla *lectio* alla *disputatio*: Le *Questioni De Modo Essendi Dei in Creaturis, De Existencia Rerum in Deo* e *De Voluntate Dei* di Odi Rigaldi,' in *Editori di Quaracchi, 100 anni dopo. Bilancio e prospettive*, ed. Alvaro Cacciotti and Barbara Faes de Mottoni, Medioevo, 3 (Rome: PAA/Edizioni Antonianum, 1997), 109–31.

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Toulouse 737, fols 172vb-178va

Klosterneuburg 309, fols 43ra-49rb

ed. Rega Wood, 'Distinct Ideas and Perfect Solitude: Alexander of Hales, Richard Rufus, and Odo Rigaldus,' *Franciscan Studies* 53 (1993): 32–46; Leonardo Sileo, *De rerum ideis: Dio e le cose nel dibattito universitario del Tredicesimo secolo. I. Editio textuum Odonis Rigaldi et aliorum, Saperi testi contesti*, 1 (Città del Vaticano: Urbaniana University Press, 2011)

De voluntate Dei

Toulouse 737, fols 178va-188va

Klosterneuburg 309, fols 49rb-59vb

De penis parvulorum decedentium sine baptismo

Toulouse 737, fols 189ra-191ra

Padua, Biblioteca Antoniana 152, fols 147va-149b

De peccato veniali

Toulouse 737, fols 192rb-207rb

⁴⁵ For the Toulouse manuscript, see François-Marie Henquinet, 'Frère Gérardin de San Giovanni in Persiceto, O.F.M., usager du Manuscrit Toulouse 737,' *Archivum franciscanum historicum* 31 (1938): 522–8; Jeanne Barbet, 'Notes sur le manuscrit 737 de la Bibliothèque municipale de Toulouse: Quaestiones disputatae,' *Bulletin d'information de l'Institut de Recherche et d'Histoire des Textes* 5 [1956] (1957): 7–51; Jacek Mateusz Wierzbicki 'Introduzione,' in *Alexandri de Hales Quaestiones disputatae de peccato veniali et de conscientia*, ed. Jacek Mateusz Wierzbicki, Bibliotheca Franciscana scholastica medii aevi, 32 (Grottaferrata: Editiones Collegii S. Bonaventurae, 2016), 15–6. For the manuscript in Klosterneuburg, see Hermann Pfeiffer, *Catalogus Codicum Manuscriptorum, qui in bibliotheca canonice claustroneoburgensis, venit in libraria Guillelmi Braumüller, 1931*, vol. 2 (Vienna: sumptibus Canonice claustroneoburgensis, 1931), 70–3. A description of the manuscript is accessible online at <http://www.vhmdl.us/research2014/catalog/detail.asp?MSID=532>.

De gratia

Toulouse 737, fols 208ra-220vb

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Toulouse 737, fols 221ra-231va

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Toulouse 737, fols 231vb-242rb

Klosterneuburg 309, fols 59vb-60vb

ed. Odon Lottin, 'Une question disputée d'Odon Rigaud sur le libre arbitre,' *Revue thomiste* 36 (1931): 886–95.

De dotibus corporum glorificatorum

Toulouse 737, fols 243ra-254ra

Padua, Biblioteca Antoniana 152, fols 103ra-110vb

Città del Vaticano, Biblioteca Apostolica Vaticana, Vat. Lat. 869, fols 234a-242b

De angelis lapsis

Toulouse 737, fols 255ra-273v

De eo quod est psallere sive de psalmo

Assisi, Biblioteca Comunale 138, fols 211va-213vb

ed. Aurelianus van Dijk, 'Quaestiones quaedam scholasticae de officio divino et cantu ecclesiastico,' *Ephemerides Liturgicae* 56 (1942): 3–47, esp. 20–43.

De providentia

Assisi, Biblioteca Comunale 186, fols 7r-8r

De creatione

Assisi, Biblioteca Comunale 138, fols 210va-211va

De scientia theologiae

Assisi, Biblioteca Comunale 186, fols 36ra-38va

Città del Vaticano, Biblioteca Apostolica Vaticana, Vat. Lat. 4263, fols 43b-51r

Sermons⁴⁶

RLSM IV, 510, n° 1⁴⁷

Arras, Bibliothèque Municipale 691 (759), fols 112rb-114rb

In die parasceve. collatio fratris Rigaldi [On the day before the Sabbath, a word of brother Rigaldi]

⁴⁶ Sophie Delmas, 'Eudes Rigaud prédicateur,' *Collectanea franciscana* 83 (2013): 107–18.

⁴⁷ Johannes Baptist Schneyer, *Repertorium der Lateinischen Sermones des Mittelalters für die Zeit von 1150–1350* (hereafter, RLSM), 11 vols, Beiträge zur Geschichte der Philosophie und Theologie des Mittelalters, 43/1–11 (Münster: Westfalen, 1969–1990).

Paris, Bibliothèque Nationale de France, lat. 15962, fol. 35b; Erlangen, Universitätsbibliothek 322, fol. 126vb; Oxford, Bodleian Library 4, fol. 202r; Padova, Biblioteca Antoniana 517, fol. 135va; Todi, Biblioteca Comunale Lorenzo Leoni 147, fol. 242va

RLSM IV, 510, n° 2

Arras, BM 691 (759), fols 120va-122ra

In octabis pasche sermo fratris Rigaldi [On the eighth Sunday of Easter, a sermon of brother Rigaldi]

RLSM IV, 510, n° 4

Arras, BM 691 (759), fols 228vb-231ra

In purificatione s[er]mo f[ratris] Rigaldi [On purification, a sermon of brother Rigaldi]

RLSM IV, 511, n° 10

Arras, BM 691 (759), fols 260rb-261vb

In annuciatione, sermo fratris Rigaldi [On the annunciation, a sermon of brother Rigaldi]

One sermon was overlooked by Schneyer (it should be placed between n°196 and n°197, RLSM VI, 105). It is however attributed to frater Rigaldus. Langlois had indeed indicated the attribution to Odo.⁴⁸

Arras, BM 691 (759), fols 250rb-va

Eodem die (dominica iiiia Quadragesimae) [For the first Sunday of Lent]

RLSM IV, 511, n° 11 (cf. RLSM IX, 225, n° 267)

Sermon for saint Nicholas, preached on 6 December 1242

Paris, Bibliothèque Nationale de France, lat. 16502, fols 157ra-158ra

De beato Nicholao, fr. Rigaudus [On blessed Nicholas, Br. Rigaldi]

Beatus vir qui inventus est sine macula [Blessed is the man who is found without stain]

Bruxelles, Bibliothèque Royale de Belgique, II.1142, fols 134ra-135rb:

In die beati Nicholai, sermo fratris Rigaldi [On the day of blessed Nicholas, a sermon by brother Rigaldi].

(Cf. RLSM VII, 198, n° 158)

Sermon for Saint Catherine (edited by Bougerol)⁴⁹

In festo sancte Catarine a fratre Rigaldo Rothomagensi archiepiscopo. [On the feast of Saint Catherine by Friar Odo Rigaldus, Archbishop]

Città del Vaticano, Biblioteca Apostolica Vaticana, Vat. Lat. 1265, fols 54vb-58ra⁵⁰, Bordeaux, Bibliothèque Municipale 402, fols 285rb-288ra

⁴⁸ Charles-Victor Langlois, 'Sermons parisiens de la première moitié du XIIIe siècle, contenus dans le manuscrit 69 d de la bibliothèque d'Arras,' *Journal des savants* 14 (1916): 488–94 and 548–59.

⁴⁹ Jacques-Guy Bougerol, 'Un sermon inédit d'Eudes Rigaud,' *Archives d'histoire doctrinale et littéraire du Moyen Age* 62 (1995): 343–58.

⁵⁰ Cf. Marie-Hyacinthe Laurent, *Codices Vaticani Latini: Codices 1135–1266* (Vatican City: In Biblioteca Apostolica Vaticana, 1958), 539.

Lesley Smith

Slippers in Heaven

William of Auvergne Preaching to the Brethren

Abstract: When he somewhat unexpectedly found himself installed as Bishop of Paris in 1228, the philosopher-theologian William of Auvergne had to adjust his way of life. A university master who had never taken priest's orders, William found himself having to organize and take the leading role in the pastoral ministry of his diocese. A reformer, William welcomed the arrival of the Mendicant Orders in Paris, and their part in its spiritual life. Indeed, when the University went on strike in 1229, not only did William not side with his former colleagues, he supported the Mendicants to the extent of giving them their first university chair. In addition, he took his own individual responsibility as bishop seriously, becoming known as a singular preacher. This paper will look at William's sermons to the Paris Mendicants, and his ideas of what the Mendicant life should be.

This essay does not directly concern Alexander or the *Summa*. Instead, it focuses on one of Alexander's almost exact contemporaries in Paris, William of Auvergne. William was both a secular teaching master in the cathedral school at Notre Dame and bishop of the city from 1228. His career, and especially the 21 years of his episcopate, encompassed the coming of the mendicant Orders to Paris and their establishment in its university—the foremost centre for theological research in Europe. William's relationships with the mendicants and the university demonstrate his importance for their acceptance into the Paris schools system; and his extant sermons—some of which were preached to the Paris friars—illustrate the affinity he shared with the brethren, both in preaching style and in pastoral and theological emphasis. William was a key player in the story of the mendicants in the city; indeed, without William, the Franciscan and Dominican trajectory in the university would have been very different.

William was Bishop of Paris from 1228 until his death in 1249. Before 1228, dates are somewhat hard to come by, but we know that by 1223 he was a teaching master and a canon of Notre Dame.¹ From his name, and some asides in his writings, we

1 The standard biography of William remains Noël Valois, *Guillaume d'Auvergne, évêque de Paris (1228–1249): Sa vie et ses ouvrages* (Paris: Picard, 1880). *Autour de Guillaume d'Auvergne (†1249)*, ed. Franco Morenzoni and Jean-Yves Tilliette (Turnhout: Brepols, 2005), has a good bibliography and recent research. Roland Teske's many translations, with notes, of William's philosophical works are always useful; for a brief overview of William's life and works see his 'William of Auvergne,' in *A Companion to Philosophy in the Middle Ages*, ed. Jorge J.A. Garcia and Timothy B. Noone (Malden, MA: Blackwell, 2002), 680–7.

believe that he was born and grew up in the Auvergne. He is said to have been born around 1180, but the date is really only reached by counting back a biblical 70 years from the date of his death. So like many important medieval people, we know virtually nothing of more than half his life, and especially about the formative period of his upbringing.²

He became bishop unexpectedly. On the death of the previous incumbent, Bartholomew, in 1227, the canons of Notre Dame (of whom William was one) elected Nicholas the Chanter as his successor. But the election was not unanimous, and William was unhappy with the process, which he said had violated the rules laid down in the decrees of Lateran IV. Nicholas stood aside, claiming that he had never wished to be bishop, and a second election was held. This gave the post to the Dean of the Cathedral, Philip. Again, William argued that the process had been uncanonical. At this point, Gregory IX intervened and instituted a local enquiry, which upheld William's objections. William was so exercised by the matter that he travelled to Rome to speak to the pope; and here, using Canon 24 of Lateran IV as his authority, Gregory decided to take the election into his own hands, and made William himself bishop. 'A man of eminent learning, without a stain on his character', was his judgement—one that Gregory was soon to regret and retract, when William did not act as he ordered.³

Was William made bishop by mistake, as it were, or had he gone to Rome with this precise intention? Perhaps he himself did not know. Certainly, he was still only a deacon when he was appointed by Gregory, who had to ordain William priest before he could consecrate him bishop.⁴ In order to teach theology in Paris, it was necessary to be a clerk in holy orders; being a deacon was sufficient, and William seems to have shown no sign of wanting to go further. But of course, being a priest and being a bishop—being in charge—are two very different things. We might even speculate that it was only when he saw the other possibilities on offer—when he saw the other possible candidates—that he decided he would have to try to do it himself.⁵

2 The more I have worked on William, the more I have come to think that he was older than the standard biographies suggest, and I am inclined to put his birth date closer to 1170 than 1180; but so far this remains an unsubstantiated opinion.

3 Valois, *Guillaume d'Auvergne*, 8–16. Gregory's letter to the chapter at Paris (10 April 1228) reads: 'Ceterum ne dicta ecclesia pro defectu pastoris dispendium pateretur, nos praenominatum magistrum Wilhelmum, virum eminentis scientiae, vitae ac conversationis honestae, ac opinionis praeclarae, zelum Dei et animarum habentem, ex officio nostro, de consilio fratrum nostrorum, in antistitem vobis providimus et ecclesiae supra dictae, quem tandem in presbyterem ordinatum et in episcopum consecratum a nobis cum plenitudine gratiae nostrae duximus remittendum,' in M.B. Hauréau, 'Quelques Lettres de Grégoire IX,' in *Notices et extraits des manuscrits de la bibliothèque impériale*, vol. 21/2 (Paris: Imprimerie Impériale, 1865), 208.

4 See previous note.

5 For a comparison of the election after William, see Pascal Montaubin, 'Les chanoines de Notre-Dame de Paris à la mort de l'évêque Guillaume d'Auvergne (1249),' in *Notre-Dame de Paris 1163–*

What is clear is that William took to being bishop like a duck to water. Rather like Hildebrand becoming Gregory VII, I think he had an agenda before he started; and his consecration as bishop gave him the chance to carry it out. After all, by this time he was probably at least 48 years old, observing the workings of the Church for decades. Although he does not appear to have had personal ambition—if the opportunity at Paris had not arisen, I do not think he would have pursued ecclesiastical preferment elsewhere—he did have strong and serious ideas about what the Church should be; and suddenly, he had the means to bring them about. William was a confident man—confident enough, in fact, that he can talk about doubt; confident enough to go his own way. But though full of original and striking ideas, his faith in God was in its way simple and very deep.

Let us move, then, to the mendicants. Dominic sent the first group of seven friars to Paris in 1217.⁶ Their task—to study, to preach, and to found a priory. Dominic himself was in Paris for the first General Chapter of the Order in 1220. As already noted, William was a master of theology and canon of Notre Dame by 1223, and so must surely have been studying in Paris at this time. In all the discussions of Dominic as an organizational genius, it is often forgotten that he was also a person of great charisma, and I think it very likely that William heard him speak. From Notre Dame, William would have watched as the Dominicans, followed by the Franciscans, worked to establish their houses of study in the city. For both orders, the decade from 1220 to 1230 must have been filled both with enormous exhilaration and enormous trepidation, as they fought for a place within the Church. In addition, each had to weather the death of a magnetic founder, whose loss might easily have spelled the end of the experiment—certainly for the Franciscans, and perhaps even for the Dominicans, whose numbers had intentionally grown more slowly, with potential brothers often picked out by Dominic himself. It was crucial to the success of both that they be accepted within individual dioceses—Francis makes it plain, for instance, that his brothers should not attempt to preach except with the agreement of the local authorities. Since both Orders were quick to establish themselves in Paris, the attitude of the city's bishop was a make or break issue. Paris was the city of serious theology and biblical studies, but it was also the city of serious *students* and teachers; both Orders were as keen to poach as they were to learn.

It was not obvious that the mendicants would be welcomed either into the diocese or the university; both had much to lose. A letter of August 1231 from Gregory to William details the bad treatment the friars were receiving in France.⁷ The brethren

2013: *Actes du colloque scientifique tenu au Collège des Bernardins, à Paris, du 12 au 15 décembre 2012*, ed. Cédric Giraud (Turnhout: Brepols, 2013), 195–216.

⁶ William A. Hinnebusch, *The History of the Dominican Order*, 2 vols (New York: Alba House, 1966–73); M. Michèle Mulchahey, 'First the Bow is Bent in Study...': *Dominican education before 1350* (Toronto: Pontifical Institute of Mediaeval Studies, 1998).

⁷ Valois, *Guillaume d'Auvergne*, 102–3 and nn. Gregory's text can be accessed through the Brepols *Ut per litteras apostolicas* (LITPA) database.

were not permitted to have the sacrament in their chapels; they could not celebrate mass every day; they could not have a church or bell tower; they could not have a sanctified cemetery within the convent walls; they had to attend parish processions, say their first mass there in the parish church, and be buried there. Their candles, lamps and ornaments were all taxed by the secular clergy, who demanded tithes of their kitchen garden produce and levied duty on the construction of their convents. The bishop obliged the brothers to come to synod, and made their ministers and guardians take an oath of fidelity, when he had not appointed them himself. Those who refused were driven out.

Gregory wrote to three prelates—to William, to the Archbishop of Tours and to the Archbishop of Rouen, appointing them as his agents for making sure this treatment stopped. ‘The Franciscans’, he says, ‘would now turn to them whenever they sensed a cloud on the horizon in a diocese; they would rely on them for support, help and consolation.’ Two years later, in 1233, Gregory wrote to the three men again: ‘Your care in the matter has been praiseworthy. Zealous of the interests of the faith, you have fulfilled our expectations in completing the mission we gave you. You have defended the Order of Friars Minor, beloved of God, from attack and insult.’⁸

Why did Gregory chose these three prelates for this particular mission? William, notably, was only a bishop between two archbishops. But Paris was already alive with anti-mendicant feeling, and William, as we shall see, had already proved himself sympathetic to the friars. It is ironic that Gregory turned to William as his delegate, as it was precisely at this time that the pope was re-thinking his earlier good opinion, following a situation when William defied his orders and went his own way.

The *causus belli* was the university strike and dispersal from Paris of 1229.⁹ During the pre-Lenten Carnival, a drunken student attack on a publican and his neighbours was countered by the forces of the Queen Regent, Blanche of Castile: riot police always ready for action in Paris. According to a contemporary (pro-university) source, Matthew Paris, Blanche was acting on the advice of the bishop—William—

⁸ Valois, *Guillaume d'Auvergne*, 103–4. Gregory's letter of 3 June 1233 is given in full by Valois as *pièces justificatives* no. 38.

⁹ Hastings Rashdall, *The Universities of Europe in the Middle Ages*, vol. 1, *Salerno, Bologna, Paris*, ed. and rev. F.M. Powicke and A.B. Emden (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1936), esp. 334–43; Valois, *Guillaume d'Auvergne*, ch. 5; Matthew Paris, *Chronica majora*, vol. 3, ed. H.R. Luard, *Rerum Britannicarum medii aevi scriptores*, 57 (London: Longman, 1876), 166–9; P. Mandonnet, ‘De l'Incorporation des Dominicains dans l'ancienne université de Paris,’ *Revue Thomiste* 4 (1896): 133–70; A. Masnovo, ‘Guiglielmo d'Auvergne e l'università di Parigi dal 1229 al 1231,’ in *Mélanges Mandonnet: études d'histoire littéraire et doctrinale du Moyen Age*, vol. 2 (Paris: Vrin, 1930), 191–232; Pearl Kibre, *Scholarly Privileges in the Middle Ages: the rights, privileges, and immunities, of scholars and universities at Bologna, Padua, Paris, and Oxford* (London: Medieval Academy of America, 1961), ch. 4, esp. 92–7; Gordon Leff, *Paris and Oxford Universities in the Thirteenth and Fourteenth Centuries: An Institutional and Intellectual History* (New York/London: Wiley, 1968), 27–47; Lindy Grant, *Blanche of Castile: Queen of France* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2016), 97–9.

and the papal legate, Romano, Cardinal of St Angelo. The fracas had occurred on land belonging to the abbey of St Marcel, and the prior had appealed to William and the legate to restore order; instead of acting on his own, William turned to the Queen. Several students were killed. The university masters protested the proportionality of the response; and since students were at least nominally clerks in holy orders, they questioned the interference of the state in matters where jurisdiction belonged to the Church. Their protests were ignored—a turn of events the masters would not have been expecting, since William had until so recently been one of their own; they must have imagined that he would take their side. In an effort to bring things to a head, the masters suspended their lectures; but when by Easter, their strike had proved less than effective—*o tempora, o mores*—the majority of masters upped and left, some going to Oxford and Cambridge, some to other French schools. Pope Gregory and the new king, Louis IX, sided with the masters, but William and the legate held their ground. Gregory was annoyed. He wrote to William in November, telling him off for failing to mediate and for allowing things to get to this state. William was to make sure the masters and scholars were pacified and satisfied, so they would return to Paris. His view of William, so recently golden, had changed:

Believing that we had found a man after our own heart and that we exulted and rejoiced in you as one rightly beloved, we poured the oil of sacred anointing on your head (...) But see—and we report this in sorrow—bearing a wound from an unexpected foe, and frustrated in the hope we had conceived, we are so confounded by your actions that we are forced to say, albeit unwillingly, “We regret having made this man” (...) With what great shame do you think we are covered when some can mock us, saying, “Behold the man (*Ecce homo*) you have set over the church of Paris”.¹⁰

Gregory tried all ways to get the university to return, but the masters were not so easily appeased. He even called William and Philip of Grève, the cathedral Chancellor, to the papal court.¹¹ But it was not until April 1231, more than two years after the initial event, that the situation was resolved, when Gregory issued the bull *Parens scientiarum*, confirming and extending the scholars’ privileges, which were to be overseen by the Chancellor, and laying out the areas of jurisdiction for each of the parties.¹² In practice, this was not to prove as simple as it seemed, and on at least one other occasion, the masters complained to the pope that William was acting beyond his jurisdiction. William responded, as he had in 1229, that it was the masters who were ignoring the rules, and were behaving in ways mainly designed to line their own pockets.

¹⁰ Translation quoted from William of Auvergne, *The Trinity, or The First Principles (De trinitate, seu de primo principio)*, trans. Roland J. Teske and Francis C. Wade (Milwaukee: Marquette University Press, 1989), 2; the Latin text is in Valois, *Guillaume d’Auvergne, as pièces justificatives* no. 18.

¹¹ Heinrich Denifle and Emile Châtelain, *Chartularium Universitatis Parisiensis*, vol. 1, *Université de Paris* (Paris: Ex typis fratrum Delalain, 1889), no. 75.

¹² Denifle and Châtelain, *Chartularium Universitatis Parisiensis*, vol. 1, no. 82.

Masters and pope alike were clearly surprised and disappointed by William's independent stance; but undoubted winners in the affair were the *studia* and teachers of the mendicant orders. Dominican students in Paris were taught in-house by their own master, Roland of Cremona. Not surprisingly, the friars were not inclined to side with the university party and go out on strike; they stayed on in Paris, under royal protection, teaching as usual. So it was perhaps as a pragmatic interim solution that William, who had a duty to provide teaching for students in the diocese, in 1229 granted Roland the general licence to teach—making Roland the first Dominican Master licensed in the Paris schools, and, conversely, giving the Paris schools their first Dominican professor. In response to his licence, Roland of Cremona opened up the Dominican school to non-mendicants, giving the city's students an alternative to their missing masters. The following year (1230), Roland's own teacher, the secular master John of St Giles took the Dominican habit mid-sermon (a story that will be familiar to students of Alexander of Hales), and was allowed by William to keep his teaching chair.¹³ Shortly afterwards, Alexander of Hales took the same route to the Franciscans, again being allowed by William to keep his teaching post. So by 1231, when the striking masters returned, of the 12 chairs of theology in Paris, the mendicants now held three. As we know, this was the beginning of a trend that would lead, by 1254, to mendicants occupying 12 of the 15 teaching chairs in theology.

Documentary evidence tells us that William continued his relationship with the mendicant masters, and it is clear he thought of mendicant teachers as more than just a way to plug an unfortunate gap; he clearly shared their reforming instincts. Like the Bishop of Lincoln, Robert Grosseteste, with whom he corresponded on the warmest terms, William saw the mendicants as a tool he could use to reform his diocese. We can see, for example, William acting in concert with mendicant theologians over the issue of the plurality of benefices. Pluralism had long been condemned, but was nevertheless pretty widespread, with popes and bishops making 'exceptions' to the rules when it seemed useful. But from his own accession as bishop, William seems to have been determined to do something about it. He discussed the matter with the university in a general assembly called in 1235; and when he renewed the discussion in 1238, he worked with the Franciscan John of La Rochelle and Dominicans Guerric of St Quentin and Geoffrey of Blèves, to determine that no-one could be saved if they held two benefices, when one was valued at 15 *livres parisis*.¹⁴

We know from a remark by Bonaventure that William knew Alexander of Hales, and that the two men found themselves on the same side of a theological dispute in

¹³ For the legitimacy of the award of these chairs see Mandonnet, 'De l'Incorporation'; Masnovo, 'Guglielmo d'Auvergne'; Mulchahey, 'First the Bow is Bent in Study...', 291.

¹⁴ Denifle and Châtelain, *Chartularium Universitatis Parisiensis*, vol. 1, no. 108; Ephrem Longpré, 'Guillaume d'Auvergne et l'École Franciscaine de Paris,' *La France Franciscaine* 5 (1922): 426–9.

1241.¹⁵ Bonaventure is also the source of a remark that bishop William determined a theological question on causality in a debate in the Franciscan school in Paris, with Alexander present.¹⁶ We cannot be sure from what Bonaventure says whether he himself took part on this occasion, but he does tell us that he heard William make theological judgements on another occasion. Roger Bacon mentions twice hearing William address university assemblies on the subject of the agent intellect.¹⁷

So these external references place William at the beginning of support for the intellectual life of the mendicants in Paris, welcoming them into the organization of teaching and learning, and sharing their reformist concerns. What might William's own writings—and in particular his sermons—tell us about his attitudes and links to them?

The first point to make is how strongly William shares with Franciscans and Dominicans a belief in the *importance* of preaching in the Christian life. Certainly, he did enough of it. More than 550 attributable sermons are still extant.¹⁸ A few of these may date from his days as a teaching master, but the vast majority seem to come from his 20 years as bishop. When he took on the job, he took on the responsibility that went with it. Anyone studying William must be deeply indebted to the sermons' modern editor, Franco Morenzoni who, against the advice of Louis Bataillon to just choose a few, decided he simply could not regard any as being of too little interest to print, so he edited them all. How right he was.

The largest number of sermons covers the Sundays of the liturgical year, and there are also sermons for the common of saints and for specific feast days and occasions. The state in which they have come down to us is rather unusual. They were not gathered together at the time and edited 'for publication' by William or someone close to him, to be read as models, as is often the case. Instead, the majority appear to be William's working notes for his own use. This gives us an amazing opportunity to catch the tone of William's preaching voice and to get a sense of his working methods. With texts or ideas he knows very well, for example, he does not write things out in full; he just reminds himself what to do next. For instance, at the start of a sermon on the Good Samaritan he writes, *Narra historiam*—'Tell the tale.' One such rubric is particularly ambitious: 'Tell the whole story of the Gospel.' As he moves through a ser-

15 Longpré, 'Guillaume d'Auvergne,' 427–28, citing Bonaventure, *Commentarius in IV Libros Sententiarum* III, d. 16, a. 1, q. 1, in *Doctoris Seraphici S. Bonaventurae opera omnia*, vol. 3 (Quaracchi: Collegium S. Bonaventurae, 1885), 346.

16 Bonaventure, *Commentarius in IV Libros Sententiarum* III, d. 40, d. 3, 895–96.

17 Roger Bacon, *Opus tertium*, in *Rogeri Bacon: opera quaedam hactenus inedita*, vol. 1, ed. J.S. Brewer, *Rerum Britannicarum medii aevi scriptores*, 15 (London: Longman, Green, Longman, and Roberts, 1859), ch. 23, 74–5.

18 Our gratitude must go to Franco Morenzoni for undertaking the mammoth task of painstakingly editing William's sermons: Guillelmus Alvernus, *Opera Homiletica*, 4 vols, ed. Franco Morenzoni, *Corpus Christianorum Continuatio Mediaevalis* (CCCM), 230, 230 A, 230B, 230C (Turnhout: Brepols, 2010–13); Morenzoni's introduction is CCCM 230, VII–XLVII. See also Franco Morenzoni, 'Le corpus homilétique de Guillaume d'Auvergne, évêque de Paris,' *Sacris Erudiri* 46 (2007): 287–369.

mon, William uses similar ‘notes to self’, such as ‘go through this point by point’, or ‘continue in this vein’.¹⁹ Some parts of a sermon, then, can be written out in detail, but elsewhere he just notes bullet points. This accounts in part for the varying length of the sermons—the longest being around 20 pages, while the shortest are barely half a page—with an average sermon four or five pages long. The length depends on the complexity of the argument—for bits of the Bible he can expound on autopilot, he hardly needs a note; for others with longer biblical passages, or where he is led from text to text, he is more careful to note the path of his argument and write out his ‘script’ in full.

But what makes William’s sermons so distinctive, and so peculiar to him, are his use of language and his employment of similitudes to draw spiritual lessons from everyday life. The sermons are extant in Latin, but many would have been preached in the vernacular, depending on his audience. We can be sure of this by the way William includes French words or phrases in the text, often introduced by something like *ut vulgo dicitur* or simply *gallice*. Elsewhere, he turns a French word into a Latin one, declining or conjugating accordingly. William must, I think, have been at least quadrilingual—at home in his native auvergnat dialect, in Occitan, in the French of Paris, and in Latin; and I believe this multilingualism is reflected in his constant interest in the power of language to make the world. Sometimes these gallicisms are a translation of what he is trying to say—reminding himself how he will express the Latin word when he comes to preach it—and sometimes they are words that he perhaps never had to say in his Latin life—types of horse or sausage.

On top of his ear for language, William often employs common proverbs and sayings—more than 100, according to his editor, and some we still use today: ‘those are just castles in Spain’, or one of my favourites, that he uses more than once: ‘love me, love my dog’. These are generally quoted in Latin, but surely all have French equivalents. This spontaneous shifting between languages is one of the things that makes the sermons striking, because of the strong impression it gives of the importance to him of communication. William wants to make contact with his hearers, and he will use every trick he can to do that. It is a way, as Morenzoni rightly notes, of establishing a kind of cultural complicity with his hearers—of breaching the fourth wall between the pulpit and the pew. Was he successful? Did the animal noises he makes at the end of a sermon to nuns delight them as much as it does me? Or did he come across as modern vicars do when they try to sound ‘in touch’ or ‘down with the kids’? Again, we cannot know.

¹⁹ *Narra hystoriam*: Morenzoni calculates that William uses this formula more than 70 times, e.g. Guillelmus Alvernus, *Opera homiletica*, CCCM 230 A, no. 282; *Narra totam hystoriam Euuangelii*: e.g. Guillelmus Alvernus, *Opera homiletica*, CCCM 230, no. 104; *Et narra de singulis*: e.g. Guillelmus Alvernus, *Opera homiletica*, CCCM 230, no. 27 (twice); *Ad hunc modum*: e.g. Guillelmus Alvernus, *Opera homiletica*, CCCM 230, no. 70; this formula and variations on it are also used more than 70 times.

No matter how many were in the audience, William addresses them in the singular form, *tu*. Just as the biblical ten commandments are framed in the singular form of the verb, so William uses the *tu* form to make it clear that the words he speaks, and the lessons of Christianity, are aimed at every single person who hears them. When he addresses the audience as a type—‘Oh, sinner’, ‘Oh, brother’, ‘Oh, Christian’—this too is in the singular form—the only common exception to this being his use of *fratres* which often appears in his concluding peroration.

I have dwelt on the *form* of the sermons because William’s way of preaching will, I hope, by now have reminded the reader of the mendicants’ own methods. Although he almost always starts with a biblical text, William’s strategy is to be vivid; to emphasise links with the everyday; to appeal to the common knowledge of his hearers; to speak in striking language of the love of God and the snares of the devil. Morenzoni goes so far as to suggest that it was William’s personal preaching style that influenced the Paris mendicants and set the course for their own well-documented use of proverbs, stories and colourful language. This may be so, but we know from contemporary sources that Francis of Assisi had his own unorthodox preaching style, whether it be the circle of ash he silently drew for the sisters at San Damiano, or his dancing in the open air proclaiming the love of God. This was preaching in a new way; so judging what influence William might have had on the brothers’ style is not so simple. What we *can* say is that both he and they recognised the importance of responding to an audience, and speaking to them in terms they would understand; they share an attitude to what preaching was for. It is a far cry from Hugh of St Cher’s complaint about clergy who insisted on preaching in Latin, to show off their knowledge, when few in the congregation would understand—or indeed of the congregation who wanted Latin sermons—whether or not they understood them—because it made them feel clever.²⁰

William’s only sermon that can be definitely dated (Tuesday 21 May 1241) was preached to the Paris Dominicans.²¹ Its text is 1 Macc. 14:9, ‘The ancient men of Judah sat in the streets and talked together of the good things of the land,’ and William’s treatment of it gives some idea of his approach. He starts with the ‘good things of the land’, making it clear that for religious—such as his Dominican congregation—the ‘good things of the world’ are not the goods that *they* should be pursuing. Rather, the perfect *claustralis* has seven goods of his own, far removed from the world’s ambitions. These are poverty, chastity of mind, obedience, bodily discipline, improving reading, prayer, and assiduous attention to confession, which is the prerequisite to good preaching. William deals with each in turn:

²⁰ See, for instance, Hugh of St Cher, *Postilla in totam bibliam*, on Ps. 18 (19): 1–3. Unfortunately, there is no modern edition or facsimile of Hugh’s *Postilla*, but there are many early printed editions: see Bruno Carra de Vaux, ‘La Constitution du Corpus Exégétique,’ in *Hugues de Saint-Cher († 1263): Bibliste et Théologien*, ed. Louis-Jacques Bataillon, Gilbert Dahan, and Pierre-Marie Gy (Turnhout: Brepols, 2004), 56–7: Annexe I: Éditions de la *Postille*.

²¹ Guillelmus Alvernus, *Opera homiletica*, CCCM 230C, no. 113.

1. Poverty is not simply the abandonment of temporal property and wealth. You cannot say you have done this if you merely exchange one sort of property for another—as for example, those people do who enter a monastery in order to have a guaranteed roof over their heads and to be provided for. These men give themselves to the cellarer, not to God! There are others who exchange personal riches for a certain kind of childishness—by which he means, I think, that you cannot abdicate the responsibilities of wealth by entering religion and being looked after.

2. Chastity of mind, his second ‘good’, is very often corrupted among religious, because these are the people who like the officialdom of a religious community, for its own sake—whose heads are turned by holding office or by sucking up to those who do.

3. Similarly, obedience has to be considered from much more than a literal angle. Many religious are disobedient *in spirit* because they only follow their own directions. They are the people in charge and they only order what they themselves want: ‘these people are archabbots.’ This is a joke! Baldly written on the page, in English, out of context, I admit that it falls flat—but I am convinced that it is meant to make his hearers laugh. Jokes are not unusual in William’s text, although (as so often with past humour) it can be very hard for us to catch them, because we need to be certain of the tone and the register of the language. But William employs a range of humorous strategies, from ironical asides to slapstick. And generally, as here, he uses a joke to make a serious point.

4. William takes discipline to mean the physical discipline of the body; but once again, he speaks up for a subtle approach. He leaves no doubt that the flesh should be scourged—like Francis, William often refers to the body as a donkey or an ass. But he does not think the body is somehow separate from the rest of the person. Some people practise discipline on their bodies like a chariot-driver who takes out his anger on the horses, he says; but just whipping it is not what discipline means. Instead, you need to say, ‘It is *I* who has sinned; *I* who has done wrong.’ The whole person cannot be reduced to the flesh.

5/6. Improving reading and prayer are treated together (an approach he justifies with biblical references) because they form a virtuous spiral—in fact William uses the nice word *impinguare*—they ‘fatten each other up’. But he also wants to make the point that neither reading nor prayer are simple; both require training. This is especially true of prayer, which can too easily turn into ‘clatter and chatter’.

7. And so the seventh good must be thorough confession, which he likens to visiting the *lavatorium*—here meaning the monastic washing place, though the *latrina luxurie* is also one of his favourite metaphors. The importance of confession here, however, is that without it, preachers simply cannot do their job. Michelle Mulchahy memorably employed Hugh of St Cher’s phrase, ‘first the bow is bent in study and then the arrow is loosed in preaching’ as the title of her book on Dominican education. The bow and arrow (taken from the story of Esau the hunter, in Gen. 27) make regular appearances in William’s sermons, although employed with a slightly different exegesis. For William, the preacher is the bow and doctrine is the arrow. No

matter how true in itself, the arrow cannot fly straight unless the bow is sound. 'You expend many arrows in preaching', he says—in the *tu* form; surely looking straight at his hearers—'how many wild beasts have you brought back to the Father?' A preacher, then, needs to have washed his lips in confession, so that his sin can be corrected, although the individual man behind the sin can be treated with compassion. The preacher needs to have the fear of God. He must be serious and mature, so he won't be laughed at. He must be free from the poison of gossip and speaking ill of others. And when he has these personal qualities, he must be trained—for some men wish to shoot without a bow (which may well be a reference to sects where laymen could preach). The figure of the bow is itself then taken apart: the bow is the preacher's intention, his heart, made up of the wood of rectitude and the string of compassion. Without these, the bow will fire the arrow backwards towards the archer, because preaching will simply be vainglory. But when all is ready, then the preacher burns with fire, shooting shining sparks—for the holy spirit is given in tongues of fire.

This is a sermon we know was preached to Dominicans; but a number of others seem appropriate to either mendicant Order, and all lay particular stress on poverty and preaching in unusually strong terms. Over and again, William speaks of the preacher as the mouth of God.²² For the mouth to speak well, it must be filled by God, which requires humility and learning. To be filled by God is to be filled with love; and the nature of the human heart is that its size is only restricted by the amount of love it contains. Without love and compassion, the preacher becomes the mouth of the devil. But it is impossible for the love of God to be without joy—a note surely no Franciscan would miss. The bow metaphor is reworked in several ways: God's bow is the preacher's heart, which must go regularly and willingly to God for renewal. Without this renewal, in confession, the arrows will be like the toy arrows children fire—unable to do any damage to the old enemy, who will seize the bow for his own use. But in the hands of God, a proper preacher will terrify the evil one and put him to flight.

Finally, we return to poverty. This is certainly not a topic William highlights only when he is preaching to friars; not at all. But its centrality and reiteration as a theme in the sermon texts is very striking. Poverty is probably the most common and recurrent motif in the sermons as a whole. Over and over, he claims it to be the first part of the trinity which God has provided for humanity to illuminate the certain path to salvation, that is, poverty, troubles, and shame (*paupertas, molestiae, ignominiae*). Anyone living with this trinity can know they have been blessed by God—for what is not valued in the world is valued by God. William never minimalizes the problems of poverty, he never pretends that hardships are not hardships; but he asks his hearers to try to think of them in different ways, as a down payment on future joy. The influence of Augustine of Hippo and the City of God here is clear.

22 See for example, Guillelmus Alvernus, *Opera homiletica*, CCCM 230B, no. 50.

Poverty is hidden riches—following the words of Matthew, ‘the kingdom of heaven is like treasure buried in a field’ (1:44). In a sermon on this text, which seems to have been intended for friars minor, William again states that the simple lack of individual ownership—as in the monastic way of life—is not poverty, ‘because if you have even one penny of your own, neither God nor all heaven can accept you, not if you have clothes or a bowl or food of your own.’²³ Those such as *fratres minores*, who have this extreme form of nothing, are truly rich, because they have sent their riches before them into heaven, and God is their treasurer. They have filled their storerooms with tears and good works. After all, he says, no merchant carries his wealth with him; he sends his goods home in advance, travelling like a pauper, so as not to attract thieves. These mercantile metaphors are one of William’s regular usages, and again, they take us right to the linguistic world of the friars.

On a couple of occasions outside of his sermons, William mentions Francis of Assisi directly, drawing I assume from contemporary Lives. Speaking in the voice of Lady Poverty, he has her say:

That holy father preferred my nothing to all riches. For when a disciple said to him that he had books from which he edified the brethren and from which the brethren profited and for that reason he wanted to keep them, he replied: By no means shall you do so, because to have nothing is worth more than all of them.

Poverty continues:

On my account, the Order of Friars Minor has surpassed all others. If this is self-evident, it is supported by the testimonies to them. My nothing has endowed these Orders with outstanding persons.²⁴

Just like Francis, William uses a variety of sensual words to describe riches: they are foul and smelly; the world of temporal goods is a midden which can only be purified by a pure heart. God sees those who care for them as reptiles, moles, toads and serpents—all noticeably earthbound, ground-dwelling animals. Instead, God has respect for the humble, the *pauperculum*—the *poverello*. You can tell God looks upon you as a friend when he sends you poverty, troubles and shame from his own table, and cools the fires of excessive desire with your tears of tribulation.²⁵

Another sermon on the theme of poverty begins with Matt. 5:3, ‘Blessed are the poor in spirit.’²⁶ It assumes an educated audience, with references to Aristotle, Seneca and Juvenal, and there is one open reference to Franciscans at the end, and another oblique one, I think, at the very beginning. No animal, says William, is as stu-

²³ Guillelmus Alvernus, *Opera homiletica*, CCCM 230B, no. 5.

²⁴ William of Auvergne, *On Morals*, trans. Roland J. Teske (Toronto: Pontifical Institute of Mediaeval Studies, 2013), 133. William devotes an entire chapter of the work to the praise of poverty.

²⁵ E.g. Guillelmus Alvernus, *Opera homiletica*, CCCM 230C, nos 69–71.

²⁶ Guillelmus Alvernus, *Opera homiletica*, CCCM 230C, no. 43.

pid as mankind, because animals obey the laws of their nature: ‘the donkey doesn’t give up the “robe” that nature has given him, for any amount of money’—and that word ‘robe’—which can mean skin or fleece—can also be used to mean the Franciscan habit. No wise man, in other words, would give up the Franciscan Order for a richer life. This sermon gives another definition of poverty: a man is only genuinely poor not when he has nothing, but when he does not want what he could have; the difference is a matter of the heart, which God understands. Moreover, riches give no security: William reminds himself to tell the tale of the priest who collected money in order to cross the sea, but was then the target of his chaplain who plotted to kill him for the cash. Yet another tale concerns a rich man who had his servant tell him every time he spent something—beating his brow when he heard money going out of the account: he was soon bald! The moral of the story is: you can’t take it with you. A corpse even in a golden grave is not spoken of as rich—so give away your goods and put your faith in heaven. Even if you have little actual money to give away, the intention will still be recognised by God. Once again William uses the metaphor of the merchant sending his profit home ahead of him: it may look as though he has nothing to spend at the market, but in reality he is a rich man. So it is with the religious who has stored up treasure in heaven, although he has nothing to live on in this life. ‘I asked a certain man what he was,’ William says, and he answered, ‘a poor monk.’ ‘No such thing, brother! On the contrary, you’re the rich merchant.’ From which you should know, he adds, that friars minor shall all have slippers in heaven.

Slippers in heaven. No better way, I think, to sum up William’s preaching to the brethren than with this glimpse of warmth and gentle humour. It comes from his discussions of the serious business of true poverty; it is an everyday situation that nevertheless signals a deeper truth; it’s expressed as a joke, but in language carefully calculated to be both memorable and accurate: a tiny slice of this world to illuminate his abiding belief in the next. William may have come to preaching late, but he was not the least of the labourers in the vineyard.

Giles E. M. Gasper

Creation, Light, and Redemption

Hexaemeral Thinking, Robert Grosseteste,
and the *Summa Halensis*

Abstract: This paper will explore the evolution of Robert Grosseteste's thought on creation, in particular as presented in the *Hexaemeron*, the commentary on the six days of creation, and the theme of light in particular. The background to Grosseteste's thought amongst patristic and twelfth-century authors will be explored in some detail, as well as contemporary mystical theology, clerical and lay. Interest in light will be overlain with questions of how scientific thought is presented in exegetical theology, as well as more speculative theological issues connected to redemption, the essential counterpoint to creation, and its fulfilment. In particular comparison will be made to Franciscan thought on the matter, notably that of the *Summa Halensis*, composed between 1236–45 under the direction of Alexander of Hales and John of La Rochelle.

On his return from Lyons, probably in September or October of 1245, Robert Grosseteste then Bishop of Lincoln (1235–53), wrote to William of Nottingham, minister of the English province of Franciscans, to explain some complications of his journey. Grosseteste, in company with Adam Marsh and John of Stamford had planned to travel down the Seine to Paris, and then on to Rouen, where John would have stayed with the Franciscan community there, and Adam would have moved on to the coast where he would meet Grosseteste. John's illness was so severe, however, that he and Adam only reached the town of Montes-la-Jolie, about 32 miles downriver from Paris. Grosseteste urged William of Nottingham to send out Peter of Tewkesbury and one or more friars to stay with John until his recovery. Anticipating his own arrival on the Isle of Wight as around 14 October, Grosseteste also asked that Peter should rendezvous with him there before travelling across the channel. John evidently did recover and became eventually provincial minister in succession to Peter of Tewkesbury in 1258.

Grosseteste had two further items on which to report. The first was that the Pope had come down in favour of the visitation of the Lincoln Dean and Chapter by their bishop, which they had resisted ever since Grosseteste's election. Second, the following piece of news:

Furthermore, you should know that it is not safe for Brother Adam to extend his stay in these parts, as there are many who very much want to keep him in Paris, especially now that Alexand-

er of Hales and John of La Rochelle are dead. If that were to happen, both you and I would be robbed of our greatest comfort—which God forbid!¹

Alexander had died in August 1245, John a little earlier in February of the same year; both had been co-regents in the Franciscan schools at Paris. Alexander joined the Franciscan order in 1236, arranged the appointment of John of La Rochelle in 1238, partly through the good offices of William of Auvergne (1180x90 – 1249), Bishop of Paris from 1228.

An earlier letter from Grosseteste to William of Auvergne implies a close relationship between the two men, the former addressing the latter as *amicus carissimus*.² The letter then introduces its bearer and, using the image of moisture filling the smallest of cavities to indicate the capacity of William's affection to infuse everyone, asks that he should extend the same affection shown to Grosseteste to the bearer of the letter, who is a small part of his master's equally small self. It was perhaps William who was the source of Grosseteste's information in addition to the Franciscan circles with which he and his travelling companions were familiar. The letter to William of Nottingham is the only one in Grosseteste's collection to mention Alexander or John of La Rochelle, nor are they the recipients themselves of any other known missive or message.

Nevertheless it is worth noting that Alexander of Hales, born in about 1185 was a near-contemporary of Grosseteste, born around 1170.³ Alexander and his family are associated with Hales, Shropshire, now Halesowen, and only some 45 miles from Hereford in which diocese the younger Grosseteste found employment at the episcopal court of William de Vere from c.1195–99, and later appears to have worked, according to an intermittent documentary record for Archdeacon Hugh Foliot, himself Bishop of Hereford 1219–34. Where Alexander can be placed more confidently amongst the ranks of scholars trained at the University of Paris, master of arts probably in 1210 incepting in theology two years or so later, and regent master in or around 1220, Grosseteste's institutional affiliations are more difficult to trace. He appears to have been in France during the English interdict of 1208–1213, though in

1 Robert Grosseteste, *Roberti Grosseteste Episcopi quondam Lincolniensis Epistolae*, Letter 114, ed. Henry Richards Luard (London: Longman, Green, Longman, and Roberts, 1861), 335: 'cum plures multum desiderent ipsum Parisius detinere, maxime mortuis fratribus Alexandro de Hales et J. de Rupellis; et sic tam vos quam nos maximo nostro solatio essemus destituti, quod absit.' English translation from Robert Grosseteste, *The Letters of Robert Grosseteste, Bishop of Lincoln*, trans. F.A.C. Mantello and Joseph W. Goering (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2010), 352.

2 Grosseteste, *Epistolae* 78 (Luard, 250; Mantello and Goering, 270–1).

3 On Alexander see C.H. Lawrence, 'Hales, Alexander of (c. 1185–1245), Franciscan friar and theologian,' *Oxford Dictionary of National Biography*, September 23, 2004. Retrieved December 18, 2018. <https://www.oxforddnb.com/view/10.1093/ref:odnb/9780198614128.001.0001/odnb-9780198614128-e-327?rskey=plhmwX&result=1>. The main biography of Grosseteste remains Richard W. Southern, *Robert Grosseteste: The Growth of an English Mind in Medieval Europe*, 2nd ed. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1992). See also James McEvoy, *Robert Grosseteste* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000).

what capacity is not known, and he may have visited Paris after in the late 12teens or early 1220s, with a longer visit possible in about 1225. Grosseteste's connections to Oxford are demonstrable, but only in the late 1220s, and his appointment as lector to the Franciscan community newly established in the city, the *nostrum* of his 'Chancellorship' of the university in 1215, whatever that entailed, being put to one side.⁴ When and where Grosseteste's regency in theology took place is difficult to establish, although, as Ginther suggests, the evidence points to the years 1229–1235.⁵ It is plausible that Grosseteste was teaching in the secular schools at Oxford a little before this date.⁶

Both Grosseteste and Alexander were, however, Archdeacons at the same time, and in contiguous districts. Grosseteste was made Archdeacon of Leicester in Lincoln diocese in 1229 until he resigned in 1232.⁷ Alexander was made Archdeacon of Coventry in the diocese of Lichfield and Coventry in 1231 which he held until early 1236 and his entry into the Franciscan order. He appears to have been active in England in 1231, adjudicating in a dispute between the abbeys of Combe and Leicester in 1232. Given these circumstances, it is possible that the two men were acquainted and highly likely that they were known to each other by reputation.

The connections grow stronger with Grosseteste's association with the Franciscans of Oxford. His appointment as lector to the community, coupled with his later eagerness for additions to his household as Bishop of Lincoln from the mendicant orders, and his long friendship with Adam Marsh, who took up the Franciscan habit in 1233/4, ensured a positive place for Grosseteste within English Franciscan historical memory. Thomas of Eccleston's account of the establishment of the order in England underlines the emphasis given to Grosseteste at Oxford, in a section on the appointment of lectors:

In that celebrated place, where the first learning flourished in England, and where the community of scholars was used to meeting, Brother Agnellus established a sufficiently worthy school at the Brothers' location [Greyfriars], and requested and secured agreement from Robert Grosseteste of sacred memory that he would lecture there for the brothers. Under him they made inestimable progress within a short period of time, both in questions and in subtle morality suitable for preaching. When he therefore was translated by divine providence from the magisterial [office] to an episcopal seat, Master Peter, who was later appointed as Bishop in Scotland, lectured to the Brothers at the same place.⁸

⁴ Southern, *Robert Grosseteste*, XXIX–XXXII.

⁵ James R. Ginther, *Master of the Sacred Page: A Study of the Theology of Robert Grosseteste, ca. 1229/30–1235* (Aldershot: Ashgate, 2004), 5.

⁶ Southern, *Robert Grosseteste*, 70–5.

⁷ Southern, *Robert Grosseteste*, 75. See also Grosseteste, *Epistolae* 8 and 9 (Luard, 43–7; Mantello and Goering, 75–80).

⁸ Thomas of Eccleston, *Tractatus De Adventu Fratrum Minorum in Angliam*, ed. A.G. Little (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1951), 48: 'Ampliato loco, ubi principale studium florebat in Anglia, et ubi universitas scholarium convivere consuevit, fecit frater Agnellus scholam satis honestam aedificari in loco fratrum, et impetravit a sanctae memoriae magistro Roberto Grosseteste, ut legeret ibi

Agnellus, to whom Grosseteste wrote between 1229 and 1232 commiserating with him, and the Oxford Franciscans, on the departure of Adam Rufus to preach to the Saracens, was the provincial minister of the order for England.⁹ Elsewhere in Eccleston's account Grosseteste's learning, wisdom, and gifts for pastoral care are stressed. The Lancercoast Chronicle, with its Franciscan core, is similarly laudatory of Grosseteste's formative role on the English Franciscans and his keen prosecution of the ideals of church reform, personal and institutional.¹⁰

By 1245 Grosseteste had been Bishop of Lincoln for a decade, and the recently deceased Alexander a Franciscan for a similar length of time. Alexander had retained his position in the faculty of theology within the University of Paris on moving to the Franciscans, creating an important precedent for the order in this respect. Grosseteste's letter to William of Nottingham is indicative of the personal and institutional networks that existed between Grosseteste, the English Franciscans and the circles of Alexander and John of La Rochelle. Connections can be made also in terms of theological interest. One overlap of considerable importance is thought about creation. The doctrine of creation takes centre-stage for Grosseteste from the mid-to-late 1220s, whenever his magistracy began, and into the period as lector to the Franciscans up to the first years of his episcopacy. Over these years he lectured on Genesis and drew together the complex threads of the *Hexaemeron*. Written up, probably in 1235, the *Hexaemeron* marks, alongside the commentary on Aristotle's *Posterior Analytics* one of Grosseteste's more finished pieces. The theology of creation is to be found in other of Grosseteste's works. *On the Cessation of the Laws*, dating to a similar period as the *Hexaemeron* and following a similar evolution from lectures to written text, raises the question of whether Christ would have become incarnate even without the sin of Adam and Eve. The Anglo-Norman poem *Le Château d'Amour* was probably composed in the same period, and probably in the context of his Franciscan lectorship. Grosseteste compiled, then, a triptych of treatises dealing with various aspects of creation, for various audiences over the period from the late 1220s to about 1235.

Chronologically these works emerge from Grosseteste's magistracy in theology and his duties at the Oxford Greyfriars, and also overlap with his mature writings on natural philosophy or science. Grosseteste's commentary on Aristotle's *Posterior*

fratribus. Sub quo inaestimabiliter infra breve tempus tam in quaestionibus quam praedicationi congruis subtilibus moralitatibus profecerunt. Ipso igitur ab cathedra magistrali in cathedram pontificalem providentia divina translato, legit fratribus ibidem magister Petrus qui postmodum in episcopum in Scotia promotus est.'

⁹ Grosseteste, *Epistolae* 2 (Luard, 17–21; Mantello and Goering, 49–53).

¹⁰ Joseph Stevenson, *Chronicon de Lanercost, 1201–1346* (Edinburgh: the Bannatyne Club, 1839); A.G. Little, 'The Authorship of the Lanercost Chronicle,' *English Historical Review* 31 (1916): 269–79. The original was known in the 16th century as the chronicle of Friar Richard of Durham, although it was the work of at least two separate Franciscans in the period of compilation and composition.

Analytics and the unfinished commentary on the *Physics* date from the mid 1220s, along with a number of scientific *opuscula*. These include the treatises *De luce*, *De colore*, *De iride*, *De motu supercelestialium*, *De motu corporali et de luce*, *De lineis*, and *De natura locorum*. Major themes amongst this corpus include the definition of science, motion—first motion, circular and rectilinear—and the role of light and light-rays in the physical universe. At some time between 1229 and 1232 Grosseteste's *Dicta* appear to have taken shape, although he edited them later in his episcopacy. A collection of disconnected pieces, short and long, the *Dicta* include commentary on the first 50 psalms, sermons, and reflections on various moral or scientific subjects. They represent the broadening of Grosseteste's interests and responsibilities in their mixing of science, exegesis and speculative theology, and pastoral theology. The *Cessation of the Laws*, *Château d'Amour*, and *Hexaemeron* operate in the same way. All of these works, it should be noted, pre-date Grosseteste's first-hand knowledge of Greek.

By the early 1230s, then, Grosseteste was intimately connected to the growing Franciscan community, in England and in the wider network to which it belonged. He was acquainted, it would seem, with William of Auvergne, moved in circles in which a further acquaintance with Alexander of Hales was possible, and had developed a particular theological interest in creation and redemption, alongside a long-standing interest in the physical universe, given greater depth through a systematic engagement with Aristotle and Ibn Rushd (Averroes). All of these experiences pre-date the compilation of the *Summa Halensis*, making Grosseteste's thought *prima facie* a possible source for the compilers. In what follows the themes of redemption and light will be traced in Grosseteste, and a longer arc taken through creation theology. This involves in particular the genre of the *Hexaemeron* focusing especially the place of light and its treatment within the tradition. This longer contextualisation allows the achievement of Grosseteste, and the Franciscans to be appreciated, both in terms of faithfulness to the tradition, but also in their development of more radical directions of thought. In the case of Grosseteste this includes the extent to which scientific ideas are explored, and these in turn form part of the consideration of hexaemeral writing from the Patristic period onwards. Light provides a unifying theme across the tradition, its literal and allegorical interpretation provoke a wide range of theological questions and positions, and it is of cardinal importance in particular to Grosseteste's cosmological and Christological thought. A survey of light and the hexaemeral tradition, will be followed by Grosseteste's thoughts on the matter, his position on redemption in the *Cessation of the Laws*, and the *Château d'Amour*, and comparison to the *Summa Halensis*.

Hexaemeronic Thinking on Light

Grosseteste composed his *Hexaemeron* towards the end of his regency in theology, a productive period of writing if the theological works are taken as the *Commentary on Psalms*, the extracts of *Glosses* on the Pauline Epistles and comments on Galatians, the *Hexaemeron* and the *De cessatione legalium* (preserving the lectures on Genesis, Daniel and Isaiah), the records of disputation, *De dotibus*, *De veritate*, *De ordine* and *De libero arbitrio*, a number of sermons from the *Dicta*, and the pastoral works *De decem mandatis* and the *Speculum confessionis* and the first ten letters of his collection.¹¹ The *Hexaemeron* draws, probably, on a series of lectures on Genesis, and to a more limited extent, Isaiah.¹² It is a treatise which involves Grosseteste in thinking about light on a number of different levels, in the context of the tradition, and his wider thinking about the relationship between creation and redemption. To examine Grosseteste's work is to see a yet more complex conglomeration of Patristic arguments and sources and original thought. Patristic sources are regularly cited, with due consideration to their arguments: Basil, Ambrose, Bede, Jerome, John of Damascus and Augustine, amongst others. As pertaining to light, the topics covered include familiar topics within the genre: the question of darkness over the deep, heresies which claim that power for darkness, the creation of light in the Word, the light of the world, the nature of the original light and how day and night were arranged without the sun, and detailed discussion of the luminaries.¹³ Grosseteste does not simply record proof texts, but quotes his authorities at length, and critically.¹⁴ He added sections as well, drawing on his own previous investigations of natural phenomena, for example, a lengthy section on the physical qualities of light which, as will be explored later, is closely related to the treatise *De luce*. No other hexaemeral author adds to the genre in quite the same way or to so great an extent. How Grosseteste interacted with the tradition of hexaemeral writing is perhaps best shown by exploring the material he encountered, and then tied, in this case, to thinking on light. In these circumstances it was Basil the Great, rather than Augustine, who took pride of place.

¹¹ Ginther, *Master of the Sacred Page*, 13–24.

¹² Giles E.M. Gasper, 'The Fulfillment of Science: Nature, Creation and Man in the *Hexaemeron* of Robert Grosseteste,' in *Robert Grosseteste and the Pursuit of Religious and Scientific Learning in the Middle Ages*, ed. Jack Cunningham and Mark Hocknull, *Studies in the History of Philosophy of Mind*, 18 (Heidelberg: Springer, 2016), 223.

¹³ Robert Grosseteste, *Hexaemeron* 1.18.1, 1.23.1–2, 2.1, 5.1–6, ed. Richard C. Dales and Servus Gieben, *Auctores Britannici Medii Aevi*, 6 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1982), 77, 82–3, 85–6, 158–63. For the history of earlier efforts to make a critical edition, see Gasper, 'The Fulfillment of Science,' 222.

¹⁴ See Neil Lewis, 'Robert Grosseteste and the Church Fathers,' in *The Reception of the Church Fathers in the West: From the Carolingians to the Maurists*, vol. 1, ed. Irena Backus (Leiden: Brill, 1997), 197–229, esp. 206.

Patristic Voices: Basil the Great and Ambrose of Milan

The genre of commentary on the six days of creation was created, to all intents and purposes, by Basil, a copy of whose *Hexaemeron* in the Latin translation by Eustathius Grosseteste borrowed from the monks at Bury St Edmunds.¹⁵ Probably delivered as Lenten homilies in or around 370, the nine homilies cover the six days of creation, except for the creation of man. This was left to Gregory Nyssen to complete in a text translated along with Basil's homilies, and well-known in the medieval West as *De conditione hominis* (occasionally recorded in catalogues as *De opificio hominis*). The basis of Basil's preaching in the homilies is the ability to perceive and apprehend the Creator from the wonder and mysteries of creation; an extension, in parts, of Origen's thought. Light played an important role. In the context of the abyss and the darkness hanging over it, Basil reassured his listeners that darkness is not an evil power, nor is it any form of positive entity. It is 'the detestable heresy of the Manichaeans' that lays emphasis on such interpretations, and as such they should be ignored.¹⁶ The connexion between light, darkness and Manichaean dualist heresy is a theme that will appear more fully later in the hexaemeral tradition. Another theme broached by Basil but not explored in detail is the question of angels, their generation and their dwelling place. He argued that they did not exist in darkness 'but enjoyed a condition fitted for them in light and in spiritual joy'.¹⁷ Heavenly light is a reward for virtue, and there should be no surprise that it was deemed fitting for angelic powers. This heavenly light was not the created light of Gen. 1:3 but was the reason for darkness. The shadow of heaven, its light unrevealed, forms the darkness of the world.

The creation of the first light and after that the luminaries also caused difficulties for Basil. On the issue of how day and night were measured before the sun and

15 Richard William Hunt, 'The Library of Robert Grosseteste,' in *Robert Grosseteste, Scholar and Bishop*, ed. D.A. Callus (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1955), 121–45, esp. 141–5. On Basil and the *Hexaemeron* see Andrew Louth, 'The Six Days of Creation According to the Greek Fathers,' in *Reading Genesis After Darwin*, ed. Stephen C. Barton and David Wilkinson (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009), 44–53.

16 The translation of Basil by Eustathius is followed here, taken from Eustathius, *Ancienne version latine des neufs homélies sur l'Hexaéméron de Basile de Césarée*, ed. Emanuel Amand de Mendieta and Stig Y. Rudberg, *Texte und Untersuchungen zur Geschichte der altchristlichen Literatur*, 66 (Berlin: Akademie-Verlag, 1958), as Basil-Eustathius, *Hexaemeron*, 2.4 (Mendieta and Rudberg, 22): 'exsecrabilis Manichaeorum secta'. For the Greek critical edition see Basile de Césaire, *Homélies sur l'Hexaéméron*, ed. Stanislas Giet (Paris: Cerf, 1968). A convenient English translation of the Greek is Basil the Great, *The Treatise De Spiritu Sancto, the Nine Homilies of the Hexaemeron, and the Letters of Saint Basil the Great, Archbishop of Caesarea*, trans. Blomfield Jackson (Edinburgh: T&T Clark, 1895).

17 Basil-Eustathius, *Hexaemeron* 2.5 (Mendieta and Rudberg, 25): 'sed in luce, et laetitia decentem sibi habitum possidebat.'

moon, he posited primitive light being dragged forward and back through God's mandate: 'following this primitive light spread abroad in the air or withdrawn in a measure determined by God, that day came and was followed by night.'¹⁸ Of the sun and moon's creation, Basil pointed out that they are not the origin of light, and thence come after its creation, the sun is a vehicle for that original light. A distinction is drawn between the brightness of the object and the body of light. Basil conceded this is difficult to conceive but argued that this does not prevent it from being possible for God.¹⁹ An analogy is also drawn between the light of the sun, and the true light of the world.

Basil's underlying principle and theme emerges here: the exaltation of the Creator in and through creation. Great weight is placed by Basil on the gift of light as the means through which the beauty of the universe might be perceived. Part of the beauty of light is its subtle quality, and Basil dismisses objections that so simple and homogenous an essence like light cannot be beautiful since there can be no symmetry of parts. It is a substance of beauty in its own right, and in terms of future advantage: there were no eyes around on the first day to perceive it anyway.²⁰ The physical properties of light, Basil expounds as follows:

The air was illuminated by the light with which it was mixed, and extended, by [the extension of] its outer limits, the sharp penetration of its proper brightness in every direction. [The light] was above in the aether and close to heaven. In its breadth it reached both the northern regions and the southern, the eastern as well as the western, for indeed the nature [of aether] is lucid and transparent, so that light suffers no delay or passage of time passing through it. In the same way that air directs our sight to the objects seen without a single moment of time, so also the procession of light, swiftly and participating in every speed, floods throughout every extent of what it encompasses. In an instant it lighted up the whole extent of the world (...) For the aether is such a subtle substance and so transparent that it needs not the space of a moment for light to pass through it. Just as it carries our sight instantaneously to the object of vision, so without the least interval, with a rapidity that thought cannot conceive, it receives these rays of light in its uppermost limits.²¹

18 Basil-Eustathius, *Hexaemeron* 2.8 (Mendieta and Rudburg, 28): 'sed diffusionem principalis luminis, modo se subducentis, modo denuo reducentis, secundum divinam praeceptionem dies fiebat, noxque sequebatur.'

19 Basil-Eustathius, *Hexaemeron* 6.3 (Mendieta and Rudburg, 72–3).

20 Basil-Eustathius, *Hexaemeron* 2.7 (Mendieta and Rudburg, 27).

21 Basil-Eustathius, *Hexaemeron* 2.7 (Mendieta and Rudburg, 27): 'Aer autem inlustrabatur ex ea luce quae sibi erat admixta, acutamque penetrationem proprii fulgoris, ubique per omnes suos terminos intendebat. Sursum enim aetheri erat coeloque vicinus; latitudine autem boreales simul et australes, easque partes, necnon et occiduas contingebat, quippe cuius natura lucida est atque perspicua, propter quod nullas moras aut tempora lux per eum commens sustinebat. Sicut enim obtutus nostros, sine ullo momento temporis, aer mox ad ea dirigit quae videntur; ita lucis accessum velociter, et omni celeritate perceptum, per omnes fines suae complexionis infudit.'

The instantaneous transmission of light is worth noting, for comparison with Grosseteste, although it should be noted also that it is not light by its own agency, in Basil's opinion, that spreads so far and so fast, but through the quality of the aether.

It is in the final analysis that physical creation provides the most interest for Basil. To his audience at the beginning of the sixth homily, on the work of the fourth day, he stated:

Therefore, if at some point on a clear night you had gazed, upwards at the inexpressible beauty of the stars, I believe that you would have inquired concerning the Creator of all things, who it was that dotted the heaven with such a variety of flowers, and how it is that more usefulness than beauty can be demonstrated in the things that can be; and moreover, if at some point, reasoning with a clear mind, you had considered the daily miracles, and by reasoning concerning visible things you had found your way in thought back to him who is held to be invisible, then you would have come immediately and eagerly to hear [about him], showing yourself worthy of this noble and blessed contemplation by your alacrity.²²

Basil's work remained an influence within the Greek theological tradition, in the immediate term on Gregory of Nyssa and Gregory Nazianzen, and in the longer term, well into the Middle Ages and beyond.

Basil's text became influential in the medieval west not only through the Latin translation produced by Eustathius in around 400 AD, but also through the *Hexaemeron* of Ambrose. The works of Basil and Ambrose are closely related.²³ The same balance of interest occurs, with heavy emphasis placed on the creation of plants, fish, birds and animals. Ambrose did get to finish his work, and the last section on the making of man includes a great deal of material derived from Galen. The same underlying insistence that creation is a work of God, and that the worker can be contemplated in his work pervades Ambrose's homilies as much as Basil's. Now common topics are discussed, for example, darkness is an accident, and the Manichees are wrong to attribute to it any form of independent power.

On the creation of light, Ambrose underscores the connection between light and beauty and the importance of its place in allowing God's creation to be perceived.

²² Basil-Eustathius, *Hexaemeron* 6.1 (Mendieta and Rudburg, 70): 'Itaque si quando sub serenitate nocturna, ineffabilem siderum pulchritudinem desuspexisti, credo te captum de rerum omnium conditore quaesisse, quis floribus ejusmodi coelum variaverit, et quomodo in iis quae cernuntur major delectatione probatur utilitas, itemque si interdiu, sobria mente discutiens, considerasti diurna miracula, per visibiliumque rationem, eum qui habetur invisibilis reputasti, omnino promptus ad audiendum venisti, dignum te demonstrans celebritate honesti hujus beatique spectaculi.'

²³ F.E. Robbins was unfair when, following Jerome, he stated that 'as an independent work the *Hexaemeron* [of Ambrose] has little value' in *The Hexaemeral Literature: A Study of the Greek and Latin Commentaries on Genesis* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1912), 58. On Ambrose see John Moorhead, *Ambrose: Church and Society in the Late Roman World*, *The Medieval World* (London: Longman, 1999), 72–3, and see also Rainer Henke, *Basilius und Ambrosius über das Sechstageswerk: Eine vergleichende Studie* (Basel: Schwabe, 2000).

There are however some differences of emphasis in what follows. Ambrose speaks of the immediate effulgence of light in this way:

Suddenly, then, the air became bright and darkness shrank in terror from the brilliance of the novel brightness. The brilliance of the light which suddenly permeated the whole universe overwhelmed the darkness and, as it were, plunged it into the abyss.²⁴

There is less here about the agency of aether, and a more straightforward statement of the instantaneous spread of light. Light is assessed with more specific attention by Ambrose, although he does pursue the line adopted by Basil, that light is valued, not only on account of its splendour but also as a result of its usefulness.

Grosseteste: *Hexaemeron*

Both Ambrose and Basil base their interpretations of light on the material world, and it is the world of creation that acts as the prism for their theological observations. In this they are followed by Grosseteste, who treats Basil, especially, in a respectful but critical manner, using the older thinker's ideas to stimulate fresh interpretation. In the course of remarks on the first day of creation and the earth as void and empty, with darkness upon the face of the deep, Grosseteste puzzles through a variety of positions. The face of the deep is the diaphaneity, transparency, and natural potency that allows it to receive illumination, but 'there was still darkness over this face, since there was no light yet which could be poured out and illuminate the deep'.²⁵ Or, as Basil says, the light of the first heaven existed but was projected outwards. In tropological and allegorical senses the interpretation offered is one of purification through rational process, the completion of which takes away the darkness. Grosseteste then introduces notions that are more original. The deep, he notes,

²⁴ Ambrose, *Exameron* 1.9, in *Sancti Ambrosii Mediolanensis Opera* IV, ed. C. Schenkl, Corpus Scriptorum Ecclesiasticorum Latinorum 32/1 (Leipzig: Verlag der Österreichischen Akademie der Wissenschaften, 1897), 33: 'Resplenduit igitur subito aer, et expaverunt tenebrae novi luminis claritate. Reppressit eas, et quasi in abyssos demersit repente per universa mundi fulgor lucis infusus.' English translation from Saint Ambrose, *Hexameron, Paradise and Cain and Abel*, trans. John J. Savage, The Fathers of the Church, 42 (New York: Fathers of the Church, 1961), 39.

²⁵ Grosseteste, *Hexaemeron* 1.18.1 (Dales and Gieben, 77): 'Super hanc faciem adhuc errant tenbre, quia nondum erat lux que superfusa abyssum illuminaret.' English translation from Robert Grosseteste, *On the Six Days of Creation*, trans. C.F.J. Martin, Auctores Britannici Medii Aevi, 6(2) (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1996), 76.

is said to be dark (...) because of the privation of forms, which is light, which it has not yet received from the higher thing that forms it. For every form is some kind of light, since every form shows itself forth.²⁶

An intimate connexion exists between light and creation; light lies at the basis of each form, it is the essence of creation. This is extended by Grosseteste in his remarks that the earth was invisible not because there were no human beings to see it, but because there was no light. Without light there are no forms, and formless things are invisible to the understanding, just as dark cannot be seen by the physical eye.

Part 2 of Grosseteste's *Hexaemeron* deals most closely with the subject of light, the verse for comment, 'God said be light made'. Grosseteste points out first that this was said 'in the Word that was co-eternal with him'. In other words, there is no other agency than God from whom light and creation springs, nor any other creature. Moreover, the association with the Word of God reveals, according to Grosseteste that creation is also a trinitarian action; the Holy Spirit has already moved over the waters, and now the Word, 'co-eternal with the Father, since he is the shining of the light' is included. These aspects established, Grosseteste then moves to consider the implications of the physical light created, light and beauty, and the spiritual senses of light especially in terms of knowledge.

In terms of the literal interpretation, Grosseteste covers the issue of the chronology of the creation of light: God orders light to be on the first day, but the sun and moon make no appearance until the third. Bede and Jerome are cited as proponents of the view that there were days and nights, days indicated by the presence of light, and night by its shadow. Nevertheless, in those three days the light of day was not as bright as now and had no power to warm or heat. By contrast Basil states that there were no days and nights during the first three days and posits, rather, that the original light poured out and was then pulled back, creating a form of day and night. Here Grosseteste is openly critical of his sources: seeing no reason why light should creep around the world following Bede and Jerome and no reason at all for Basil's suggestion.²⁷ Furthermore, Grosseteste is led from these conflicts within the sources to the observation that there was an instantaneous creation, including light, and that the measure of days as recorded in the Genesis narrative is not literal, all things were co-created. When he comes to deal with the creation of lights in the firmament, he once again refuses to offer hard and fast opinions on the matter, stating simply that, 'those shining bodies, then, whether they shine in virtue of the first light, or

²⁶ Grosseteste, *Hexaemeron* 1.18.2 (Martin, 77; Dales and Gieben, 78): 'Tenebrosa vero dicta est abisus (...) propter privacionem forme que lux est, quam nondum suscepit a superiore formante. Omnis enim forma aliquod genus lucis est, quia omnis forma manifestativa est.'

²⁷ Grosseteste, *Hexaemeron* 2.4–5 (Dales and Gieben, 88–92).

in virtue of a light co-created with them on the fourth day, as our authorities hold, were made to divide day and night.²⁸

Co-creation and the importance of instantaneous creation lie close to the heart of Grosseteste's thought on physical light, at the point in the *Hexaemeron* where he uses and adapts material from his scientific *opuscula*, in this case the *De luce*. A comparison of both works reveals how the adaptation is made, what is borrowed and in what context, and what is left out. Grosseteste introduces the topic by justifying why the physical properties of light are relevant, namely, that if these are understood, then the mystical signification of light will be better understood. The literal sense guides mystical understanding, the sensible leading to that which lies beyond sensation, science at the service of wisdom: *scientia* at the service of *sapientia*. Grosseteste goes on to describe the physical qualities of light in the following way:

The nature of light is such that it multiplies itself in all directions. It has what I might call a self-generativity of its own substance. For of its nature light multiplies itself in all directions by generating itself, and it generates all the time that it exists. For this reason it fills the place around it all at once: the light which is by nature first generates the light that follows it, and the light that is generated at the same time comes to be, and exists, and generates the light that next follows it, and the following light does the same for the light that follows it: and so on. That is why in one instant one point of light can fill a whole sphere. If light moved by local motion, as some have imagined, the lighting up of a dark place would have to be successive, not all at once. And perhaps it is because light is self-generative by its nature, that it is also self-manifesting. Perhaps its self-generativity is its manifestability.²⁹

This passage draws its inspiration from the *De luce*, but in a controlled and circumscribed manner. In the *De luce* light is given a clearer causative role in the material world, and the treatise describes in detail the implications of the self-replicating quality of light as the first form of the material universe. This position is summarised by Grosseteste:

So light, which is the first form in created first matter, by its nature infinitely multiplying itself everywhere and stretching uniformly in every direction, at the beginning of time, extended mat-

28 Grosseteste, *Hexaemeron* 5.6.1 (Martin, 163; Dales and Gieben, 161): 'Ipsa autem corpora lucentia, sive luceant ex illa luce primaria, sive ex luce in illis quarto die concreata, sicut nostri auctores, facta sunt ut dividant diem et noctem.'

29 Grosseteste, *Hexaemeron* 2.10.1 (Martin, 97–8; Dales and Gieben, 97–8): 'Est itaque lux sui ipsius naturaliter undique multiplicativa, et, ut ita dicam, generativitas quedam sui ipsius quodammodo de sui substantia. Naturaliter enim lux undique se multiplicat gignendo, et simul cum est generat. Quapropter replet circumstantem locum subito; lux enim prior secundum locum gignit lucem sequentem; et lux genita simul gignitur et est et gignit lucem sibi proximo succedentem; et illa succedens adhuc succedentem ulterius; et ita consequenter. Unde in instanti uno lucis punctus replere potest orbem lumine. Si autem lux esset lata locali motu, sicut ymaginantur quidam, necesse esset obscurum locorum illuminationem fieri non subito, sed successive. Et forte inde quod lux est naturaliter sui generativa, est etiam sui manifestativa, quia forte sui generativitas ipsa manifestabilitas est.'

ter (which it could not leave), drawing it out along with itself in a mass the size of the world machine.³⁰

Where the rest of the *De luce* explores the formation of the physical universe, the *Hexaemeron* does not. In a manner similar to Grosseteste's epistolary response to his pupil Adam of Exeter on the question as to whether God is first form, Grosseteste in the *Hexaemeron* deals with a theological question, using science as an analogy within an exegetical exercise.³¹

Having established the properties of light, Grosseteste proceeds to give a worked-up example of why this is useful, again drawing from the scientific *opuscula*, this time the *De colore*, with a similar process of extraction from and adaption of his source. Light, Grosseteste states, has two senses, the first is a bodily substance, but very subtle and close to non-corporeity, a substance that is self-generative; the second is an accidental quality that proceeds from the natural generative action of the substance of light. Light in this way is, as Augustine's *Confessions* records, the queen of colours, since, according to Grosseteste, it brings them into existence by being embodied and moving them by being shone on to them.³² This is summarised as follows:

For colour is light embodied in a transparent thing with the quality of humidity [containing the element of water]. This colour cannot generate its likeness in the air because it is slowed down by its embodiment, but when light is shone on to it, it moves to the act of generating its likeness in the air.³³

This is in fact an additive understanding of colour to the scientific treatise composed, probably, in the 1220s. There is nothing in that treatise about additional light being required to super-charge the embodied light, that is colour, which begins with the

30 Robert Grosseteste, *De luce*, edited by Cecilia Panti, 'Grosseteste's *De luce*: A Critical Edition,' in *Robert Grosseteste and His Intellectual Milieu: New Editions and Studies*, ed. John Flood, James R. Ginther, and Joseph W. Goering, Papers in Medieval Studies, 24 (Toronto: Pontifical Institute of Mediaeval Studies, 2013), 227: 'Lux itaque, que est forma prima in materia prima creata, seipsam per seipsam infinitas undique multiplicans et in omnem partem equaliter porrigens, materiam quam relinquere non potuit, secum distrahens in tantam molem quanta est mundi machina, in principio temporis extendebat.' English translation by Neli Lewis, 'Robert Grosseteste's *On Light*: An English Translation,' in *Robert Grosseteste and His Intellectual Milieu*, 240.

31 Grosseteste, *Epistolae* 1 (Luard, 1–197; Mantello and Goering, 35–49).

32 Augustine, *Confessionum libri XIII*, l. 10, c. 34, ed. Martin Skutella and Luc Verheijen, Corpus Christianorum Series Latina, 27 (Turnhout: Brepols, 1981), 182–4.

33 Grosseteste, *Hexaemeron* 2.10.2 (Martin, 99; Dales and Gieben, 99): 'Lux namque incorporata in perspicuo humido color est; qui color sui speciem in aere propter incorporationis sue retardacionem per se generare non potest; sed lux colori superfusa movet eum in generacionis sue speciei actum.'

simple statement that ‘Colour is light in a transparent medium’.³⁴ Grosseteste in the *Hexaameron* offers an account of the generation of colour that moves beyond the previous work. He concludes that without light all bodies are hidden and unknown, supporting the exegetical point that light reveals creation, manifests its beauty and allows order to be perceptible.

Light in its physical qualities is then an agent, or perhaps the agent, of order. The nature of light as Grosseteste sees it is also an explanation for his comments on the interpretations of Jerome, Basil, and Bede. A connection between order, knowledge and light is brought out fully in the *Hexaameron*. Grosseteste emphasises the position of light within the beauty and order of the universe. Basil is cited with reference to this line of thought, ‘The first utterance of the Lord made the nature of light and scattered the darkness, rid us of sadness, and at once brought forth every pleasant and happy appearance.’³⁵ By corollary the absence of light shows the lack of order and happiness. In this way ‘darkness means the vicious lack of ordering of love’, according to our author. Grosseteste emphasises the ordering of light which made light knowable, bringing form to formless matter with Eph. 5.13 to the fore: ‘All that is manifest is light.’ For Grosseteste, light is also made in the church and in any holy soul when rational knowledge engages in contemplation of what it should, namely the divine, and specifically the Trinity. Reason and rationality then are parts of created light: the vision of the truth through contemplation. If light is made in the church, as the vehicle for speculation on matters rational and spiritual, Grosseteste relates its propagation to another of his theological concerns, namely pastoral care. As he states,

in the allegorical sense the light is the wise and spiritual prelates of the church, who strive with the knowledge of truth, with love and with outward shining of good works. The darkness is their subjects who are wrapped in the darkness of ignorance, and are animal and carnal.³⁶

³⁴ Robert Grosseteste, *De colore*, edited in *The Dimensions of Colour, Robert Grosseteste's De colore*, ed. and trans. Greti Dinkova-Bruun et al. (Toronto: Pontifical Institute of Mediaeval Studies, 2013), 16–7.

³⁵ Grosseteste, *Hexaameron* 2.10.3 (Martin, 99; Dales and Gieben, 99): ‘prima vox Domini naturam luminis fabricavit ac tenebras dispulit, meroremque dissolvit et omnem speciem letam iocundamque subito produxit.’

³⁶ Grosseteste, *Hexaameron* 2.9.2 (Martin, 96–7; Dales and Gieben, 96–7): ‘Item allegorice lux ecclesie sunt prelate, sapientes et spiritales, qui lucent veritatis cognitione et amore bonorum operum exterior splendore. Tenebre vero sunt subditi tenebris ignorancie involuti et animales et carnales.’

Grosseteste: *Le Château d'Amour* and *De cessatione legalium*

Provision for pastoral care probably lies behind the composition of Grosseteste's *Château d'Amour*. A long and involved piece, the poem announces itself as written in *romanz* for those who have little learning and no knowledge of Latin. Given that the earliest manuscripts attribute the poem to Grosseteste as Master, a date before 1235 is likely; given the pastoral focus, composition for use by the Oxford Franciscans is possible.³⁷ As Evelyn Mackie points out, the poem is 'essentially biblical translation with commentary', rather than courtly literature.³⁸ The poem is structured around the creation story, the fall of humanity, and, following Anselm of Canterbury, the necessity of the God's incarnation as Jesus Christ.

I will tell of the world, why it was made, and then how it was given to Adam our first father. I will tell how paradise was also given, with so much joy and honour, and finally heaven too, then how it was lost, restored and given back again.³⁹

Grosseteste states that he will not dwell on the six days of creation since that is a familiar story, but chooses to emphasise the brightness of the luminaries as part of a longer argument that all creation had greater virtue before Adam and Eve's sin.

In the beginning when God, who knows and sees all things, had created heaven and earth with all their splendour; the sun was seven times brighter than it is at present, and the moon, illuminating the night, was as bright as the sun shines now. Do not think that this is foolish, for this is what Isaiah says.⁴⁰

Light, though not absent from the poem, is not its dominant theme. Creation, redemption and unity provide the main focus.

37 Evelyn A. Mackie, 'Robert Grosseteste's Anglo-Norman Treatise On the Loss and Restoration of Creation, Commonly Known as *Le Château d'Amour*: An English Prose Translation,' in *Robert Grosseteste and the Beginnings of a British Theological Tradition*, ed. Maura O'Carroll (Rome: Istituto Storico dei Cappuccini, 2003), 150–6; see also Andrew Reeve, *Religious Education in Thirteenth Century in Thirteenth-Century England: The Creed and Articles of Faith* (Brill: Leiden, 2015), 143.

38 Mackie, '*Le Château d'Amour*,' 151.

39 Robert Grosseteste, *Le Château d'Amour*, ll. 29–36, ed. J. Murray (Paris: Librairie Champion, 1918), 90: 'Del mund dirai pur quci fu fet, / E pus cornent donez est / A Adam nostre premer peere, / E par- aïs en teu manere, / Od tant de joie od tant d'onur, / E puis li ciel a chief de tur, / E cornent fu pus perduz/ Pus resterez e pus renduz.' English translation from Mackie, '*Le Château d'Amour*,' 160.

40 Grosseteste, *Le Château d'Amour*, ll. 44–54 (Murray, 90): 'Kant Deus a le comencement, / Ki tut bien set e tut bien veit. / Ciel e terre fet aveit / Od tuz lur aturnemens, / Li soleil fu a iceu tens / Set fez plus cler ke ne est ores, / E la lune si cler lores / Cume li soleil ore luit / Luseit adonke de nuit. / Ne le tenez pas a folie / Kar ce est le dit Ysaïe.' English translation from Mackie, '*Le Château d'Amour*,' 160–1.

The biblical story of the genesis of original sin is punctuated by a parable of a king and his four daughters, Truth, Justice, Mercy and Peace, which underlines the theme of unity that runs through the whole: the daughters united bring peace to the kingdom. Further discussion of the incarnation follows closely Anselm of Canterbury's reasoning on the necessity that God became human:

No angel could redeem or raise man from the dead. In every way it was necessary that God become man—man to suffer death, and God to rise again, else whatever was in the world would have perished. Hear now of such great love, such great mercy, such great gentleness, that God came down from heaven for the sake of his sheep which was lost.⁴¹

The well-known allegorising of Mary as a castle in which Christ was secure, a place of goodness and light suitable for God to shelter within, provides the stage for the dynamics of the incarnation. The centre of the castle includes a throne of ivory 'shining more brightly than daylight in midsummer' and cast about with a rainbow. The remainder of the poem gives an extended explanation of the names of Christ given in Isaiah, and a description of the atoning work of Christ. In this last work the Devil is given a full role to play, with rights that require to be overthrown, which runs counter to Anselm's arguments negating the rights of the Devil. For Grosseteste:

When the world was created and Adam had first sinned, then the evil one had so much power that he caused the world to do his will, for the one for whom the world was made had been snared into his power.⁴²

A set-piece debate between the Devil and Jesus plays out; the former fooled that the latter is human, asserts jurisdiction over sin and death. Christ, being divine and human, is able to pay the ransom owed, and wins humanity back. This is described by Grosseteste in terms reminiscent of Rufinus of Aquileia's *Expositio Symboli*, from a line of thought originating in Gregory of Nyssa. The purpose of Grosseteste's poem was similar to that of the *Expositio* in seeking a straightforward account of one of the principal articles of faith:

⁴¹ Grosseteste, *Le Château d'Amour*, ll. 475–86 (Murray, 102): 'Ne angle ne pot rechat. / Ne home de mort relever. / En tute fin donc covenist, / Ke Deus home devenist, / Home pur la mort souffrir, / E Deus pur de mort revenir; / Kar autrement peeri eüst / Tut kant ke en le siècle fust. / Oreioez de si grant duçur. / Si grant pité, si grant amur, / Ke Deus de le ciel descendi / Pur sa owaille k'il perdi.' English translation from Mackie, 'Le Château d'Amour,' 165. See Anselm, *Cur Deus homo*, l. 2, c. 6 which summarises the argument for necessity and the God-man in *S. Anselmi Cantuariensis archiepiscopi opera omnia*, 6 vols, ed. Franciscus Selesius Schmitt (Edinburgh: Nelson, 1946–61), 2:101. The edition was reprinted with new editorial material as *S. Anselmi Cantuariensis archiepiscopi opera omnia*, 2 vols, ed. Franciscus Salesius Schmitt (Stuttgart-Bad Cannstatt: Frommann, 1968–84).

⁴² Grosseteste, *Le Château d'Amour*, ll. 1295–1300 (Murray, 125): 'Kant le monde fu crié, / E Adam out primes pechié, / Donc out le Malfé tant poër / Ke de le mund fist sun voler, / Kar lui pur ki le mund fut fet / En sun poër out attret.' English translation from Mackie, 'Le Château d'Amour,' 174.

And so the adversary expected to gain everything by his death, but he was caught, the glutton, like a fish on a lure which swallows the worm and become impaled on the hook.⁴³

The end of the poem emphasises the unity of God in Christ, in the creative act and in the redemptive act. The use of Anselmian ideas by Grosseteste is curious; elements are taken on wholesale, such as the necessity of incarnation, where others, for example, the rejection of the rights of the devil, are not adopted.

A similar emphasis on unity, and a transformation of an Anselmian argument is to be found in *On the Cessation of the Laws* written probably in the early 1230s, drawing on older lectures in a similar fashion to the *Hexaemeron*. A four-part work with a complex structure, the treatise deals with an interpretation of the economy of salvation that moves through the relation of the Old and New Testaments and the person and role of Jesus. The theme of unity in creation and between Creator and creation emerges powerfully in Part 3, where Grosseteste moves beyond the arguments for the necessity of the incarnation proposed by Augustine and Anselm.

Instead, Grosseteste presses for the notion that the incarnation would have happened even without man's fall, to fulfil and unite creation. Human nature is both corporeal and rational. Grosseteste concludes with the chorus that:

If, then, God should assume man in a personal unity, all creation has been led back to the fullness of unity; but if he should not assume man, all creation has not been drawn to the fullness of unity possible for it. If, therefore, we leave aside the fall of man it is nonetheless fitting that God assume man into a personal unity, because he could do it and it would not be inappropriate for him to do it; but even more, it would be appropriate, because without this the created universe would lack unity. But if this were done all creation would have the fullest and the most fitting unity, and through this all natures would be led back into a circular fulfilment; because without God assuming man into a personal unity, one finds in the above-mentioned way a certain joining of angels and men.⁴⁴

⁴³ Grosseteste, *Le Château d'Amour*, ll. 1103–8 (Murray, 119): 'Adonk qui de li Adversier / Par sa mort trestut gaaignier. / Mes il fu pris li gluton / Cum est a le heim li peisson.' English translation from Mackie, 'Le Château d'Amour,' 172. Compare with Rufinus, *Expositio Symboli*, in Tyrannius Rufinus, *Opera*, ed. M. Simonetti, Corpus Christianorum Series Latina, 20 (Turnhout: Brepols, 1961), 16: 'Ut divina Filii Dei virtus velut hamus quidam, habitu humanae carnis obtectus (...) principem mundi invitare possit ad agonem: cui ipse carnem suam velut escam tradens, hamo eum divinitas intrinsecus teneret insertum' [So that the divine virtue of the Son of God, like a kind of hook hidden in the form of human flesh (...) could lure the prince of the world to a contest; that the Son of God might offer him his human flesh as bait, and that the hidden divinity might hold him fast with its hook].

⁴⁴ Robert Grosseteste, *De cessatione legalium* 3.1.28, ed. Richard C. Dales and Edward B. King, *Auctores Britannici Medii Aevi*, 7 (London: Oxford University Press, 1986), 131: 'Si igitur assumat Deus hominem in unitatem persone, reducta est universitas ad unitatis complementum. Si vero non assumat, nec universitas ad unitatis complementum sibi possibile deducta est. Circumscripso igitur hominis lapsu, nichilominus convenit Deum assumere hominem in unitate persone, cum et hoc possit facere nec dedecet ipsum hoc facere; sed multo magis deceat, cum sine hoc careat universitas unitate. Hoc vero facto, habeat universitas plenissimam et decentissimam unitatem, redacteque sint per hoc

The third book goes on to offer a vision of the universe in which Christ would have become incarnate even had Adam and Eve not sinned. The whole Christ, *Christus integer* stands then to unite creation and creator, a cosmic re-evaluation of the human-centred doctrines of incarnation developed in the 12th century by Anselm, Abelard and Hugh of St Victor. It is the figure of the *Christus integer*, it should be noted who stands at the head of the *Hexaemeron* as well, as the object of Christian thought, of theology, which is properly a wisdom rather than a science.

Summa Halensis

As Ginther has observed, the intensity with which Grosseteste approached the question of the incarnation without original sin inspired later-13th-century thinkers to their own views on the subject, amongst them Alexander of Hales, Albert the Great, Aquinas, and Bonaventure.⁴⁵ The issue emerges also in the *Summa Halensis*.⁴⁶ The position adopted here is similar to Grosseteste in its conclusions, that it is to be conceded without prejudice that, even if human nature had not fallen, even so there would have been a fittingness for incarnation, although the argumentative means are different. The notion that even had human nature not fallen, there would have been a fittingness for the incarnation, is argued on the basis of the blessedness in God and within humans. Human beings ought to be wholly made blessed in God, God ought to be corporeal and perceptible to the senses; but it is not fitting that God should assume any corporeal nature whatever, but only human nature.

It is fitting, therefore, that there should be a union of divine nature with human [nature] in a union of personhood, in order that there should be completeness in the entirety of things, that is, so that, as there are three persons in one nature and three persons in three natures, so should there also be three natures in one person, that is, divinity, body, and soul.⁴⁷

To the counter-position that the incarnation without redemption is pointless, the *Summa Halensis* moves to Bernard and the role of the devil, in particular his envy

omnes nature in complementum circulare; quia sine eo quod Deus assumat hominem in unitatem persone, est reperire modo supradicto concatenacionem quandam ab angelo usque ad hominem.’ English translation from Robert Grosseteste, *On the Cessation of the Laws*, trans. Stephen M. Hildebrand, *The Fathers of the Church: Medieval Continuation*, 13 (Washington, DC: The Catholic University of America Press, 2012), 167.

⁴⁵ Ginther, *Master of the Sacred Page*, 128.

⁴⁶ Alexander of Hales, *Doctoris irrefragabilis Alexandri de Hales Ordinis minorum Summa theologica* (SH), 4 vols (Quaracchi: Collegium S. Bonaventurae, 1924–48), SH VI, In1, Tr1, Q2, Ti2 (n. 23), pp. 41–2.

⁴⁷ SH VI, In1, Tr1, Q2, Ti2 (n. 23), p. 41: ‘Convenit ergo quod sit unio divinae naturae ad humanam in unitate personae ut sit in rerum universitate perfectio, ut sicut tres personae in una natura et tres personae in tribus naturis, ita tres naturae in una persona, scilicet divinitas, corpus et anima.’

for the blessed state of humanity. By tempting humans to sin, the devil would make them forfeit their unifiability to God. In so doing the devil revealed that he understood the union of human nature to God to be associated with a pre-lapsarian state. The fall in this way was an impediment to unity and the opening for the devil's temptations to be effective. The fall then, as impediment, does nothing to diminish the fittingness of the incarnation in a pre-sinful state.

Other ideas developed by Grosseteste over the course of his various treatments of the concept of creation, for example, on light find a similar, slightly dissonant resonance in the *Summa Halensis*. For instance, the *Summa Halensis* uses light as a sensible reality by which the mystical realities beyond sensation can be understood, in the same way as Grosseteste. Divine grace, a wholly mysterious agent far surpassing human perception, can be understood as resembling light, the *Summa* states, but only in a clearly defined sense.⁴⁸ Some understood light in the air to be a body, or in other words a substance; but in this sense the comparison breaks down, since grace, whatever it is, is not a substance.⁴⁹ On a different understanding, light was seen as a form bringing out the goodness and perfection of air; this perfection is to be transparent.⁵⁰

It should therefore be said that the comparison of light to created grace holds good in as much as light is said to be a form and following from the fact that grace is accidental to the soul itself and depends on it as the subject in which it exists, while depending on uncreated grace as that from which it is.⁵¹

The *Summa* subsequently goes on to discuss various ways in which an accident could depend on a substance, further specifying the ways in which this analogy can be helpful for the human understanding of grace. The salient point at present is that the idea of light as form is invoked to explain mystical realities, in a way that Grosseteste had pioneered in the Latin West.

This is not an isolated example in the *Summa Halensis*. A similar argument is also invoked in Book 2, concerning the question of what sort of perfection or completion is alluded to in the part of Genesis that speaks of the creation of the heavens and the earth:

⁴⁸ SH I, P1, In1, Tr3, Q1, M1, C2 (n. 73), p. 114.

⁴⁹ SH IV, P3, In1, Tr1, Q2, C1, Ar3 (n. 610), Ad obiecta 1, p. 962: 'Una est quod lux in aëre sit corpus, et hoc modo est substantia; sed secundum hoc non tenet illa comparatio, quia gratia non est substantia, sicut visum est.'

⁵⁰ SH IV, P3, In1, Tr1, Q2, C1, Ar3 (n. 610), Ad obiecta 1, p. 962: 'Alia opinio est quod lux est forma perficiens aërem quantum ad bene esse, quod est esse perspicuitatis.'

⁵¹ SH IV, P3, In1, Tr1, Q2, C1, Ar3 (n. 610), Ad obiecta 1, p. 962: 'Dicendum ergo quod comparatio lucis ad gratiam creatam tenet in quantum lux dicitur forma et secundum quod gratia accedit ipsi animae et dependet ab ea sicut a subiecto in quo est, a gratia autem increata sicut ab illo a quo est.'

'Perfection' refers to the creation of these [that is, the heavens and the earth] both as to matter and as to form. As to matter, when it is said: 'In the beginning, God created' etc.; as to form when it is said: 'Let there be light' etc.⁵²

This passage comes in the wider context of discussion on the six days of creation, inserted in a manner similar to that of Peter Lombard in the *Sentences*. A useful comparison may be made between Grosseteste and the *Summa Halensis* taking a particular example of the question whether the primordial light ceased to exist once the sun was made. In this connection Grosseteste notes varying opinions amongst the Fathers: whether the luminaries shine by virtue of the first light (Greeks) or as a result of light co-created with them on the fourth day (Latins).⁵³ He also goes on to explore the relation between sunlight and moonlight, and the dependence of the latter on the former. The moon receives its light from the sun and is diminished accordingly, though its power over the earth is still considerable.⁵⁴

The question posed by the *Summa Halensis* takes a different approach, again to a similar end—the conclusion of the discussion is that all luminous bodies were made from the division of the first light. The perfection and nobility of the first day also indicate that the light made then was perfect, not diminished, and fitted for the purpose for which it was made. In the course of coming to this conclusion, the *Summa* opens and addresses seven points, an argument of congruence—for God to have made something that ceased to exist so quickly would not be congruent with his wisdom; an argument of hierarchy—what is more complete does not give way to the less complete, and, with John of Damascus cited in support, the works of the first and seventh days were more noble than all others; similarly the 'day' of the fourth day must therefore have been less noble than the first day, so first light was more noble than sunlight; God as the most sufficient of craftsmen would produce from the start a perfected work rather than imperfect; whether if first light remained with the light of the luminaries would it change—answered by the notion that this light was divided for the sun, moon and stars; where the first light was in relation to the sun and stars; and, finally, why if light was divided to form the perfection of stars and sun Saturn moves more slowly than the other planets, when, as lighter, it would seem more logical for it to move faster.

Here then, albeit it in a different way to Grosseteste, a blend of scientific knowledge from questions posed in a theological frame. The more detailed response in the *Summa Halensis* extends the points made above and in the same vein. On Saturn's movement, the discussion concludes that the planet should not be thought to move slowly as a result of its greater density, but rather on account of the fact

⁵² SH II, In3, Tr2, Q3, Ti3, M2, C6, Ar3 (n. 305), Respondeo, p. 366: 'Perfectio designat conditionem horum et quantum ad materiam et quantum ad formam. Quantum ad materiam, cum dictum est: "In principio creavit" etc.; quantum ad formam, cum dictum est: "Fiat lux" etc.'

⁵³ Grosseteste, *Hexaemeron* 5.5–6 (Dales and Gieben, 160–3).

⁵⁴ Grosseteste, *Hexaemeron* 5.22 (Dales and Gieben, 181–3).

that it has the furthest of all of the planets to move. When it comes to the nature of light, the comparison to Grosseteste is more intriguing. The *Summa Halensis* states, as noted above, that all of the luminaries were made from the division of the first light, but goes on to the position that:

Yet one should not posit in it the nature of lightness and heaviness, because light of its nature extends and diffuses itself; therefore, it would diffuse itself in all directions unless it has an obstacle, in a straight line [that is, up and down] and in breadth and in a circle, as is evident from the light of a candle in a house.⁵⁵

The statement that light diffuses in all directions echoes Grosseteste's *De luce* and the adapted version that formed part of the *Hexaameron*. Straight, rectilinear, and circular motion are features too of Grosseteste's scientific *opuscula* from the description of vowel formation in *De generatione sonorum*, to the treatises *De motu corporali et luce* and *De lineis*, the latter two treatises dating from the mid to late 1220s.⁵⁶ The extent to which the *Summa Halensis* develops ideas from Grosseteste in this discussion, alongside others, is intriguing, speaking to the variety of sources that make an appearance in the compilation, and, perhaps, to the more direct influence of particular texts.

As seen earlier, Grosseteste certainly knew of Alexander of Hales, John of La Rochelle and the Franciscan school at Paris. His role as lector to the Oxford community from 1229 to 1230, and the continuing relationship with Adam Marsh from his conversion to the order, as well as a possible period in Paris in the mid 1220s, create the circumstances for exchange of ideas on the subjects of mutual theological interest. The lines of transmission on this score remain multiple, metaphorical as well as enacted in the world. In his letter collection Grosseteste frequently reserves lucent vocabulary for Franciscan brothers, emphasising in their radiation the essentially pastoral grounds for his theological vision. Interest in creation was a marker for early Franciscan thought too, established in the attitudes towards nature by Francis himself. From the *Canticle of the Sun*, with its basic cosmology and elemental exposition alongside the cycle of life and death, to the larks that sang above the hut where he lay dying, creation plays a vital and dynamic role in the presentation of Francis and his communities.⁵⁷ That the more worked out vision of creative theology

55 SH II, In3, Tr2, Q1, C5, Ar3–4 (n. 263), Solutio, p. 324: 'Non tamen oportet ponere in ea naturam gravis et levis, quia lux de natura sua est diffusive sui: unde diffundit se undique, nisi habeat obstaculum, secundum rectum et secundum latus et circulariter, sicut patet in lumine candelae in domo.'

56 For the *De generatione sonorum* see *The Scientific Works of Robert Grosseteste*, vol. 1, *Knowing and Speaking: Robert Grosseteste's De artibus liberalibus 'On the Liberal Arts' and De generatione sonorum 'On the Generation of Sounds,'* ed. Giles E. M. Gasper et al. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2019); for the *De motu corporali et luce* and *De lineis* see the edition, *Die Philosophischen Werke des Robert Grosseteste, Bischofs von Lincoln*, ed. Ludwig Baur (Münster: Aschendorff, 1912).

57 On the *Canticle of the Sun* see Brian Moloney, *Francis of Assisi and His "Canticle of Brother Sun" Reassessed* (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2013), xxi–xxvi. This prints the standard critical edi-

in the *Summa Halensis* can also be compared to Grosseteste, especially on the interlocking issues of creation and redemption, reveals both as part of the same inquiry into divine love, the consequences of sin, creation *ex nihilo*, and the unity of Creator with creation.

tion by Carolus Paolozzi (2009) and two English translations. For the *Vita Prima* by Thomas of Celano see *S. Francisci Assisiensis: et eiusdem Legenda ad usum chori*, Analecta Franciscana, 10/1 (Quaracchi: Collegium S. Bonaventurae, 1926). English translation from Thomas of Celano, 'The Life of Saint Francis,' in *Francis of Assisi: Early Documents*, vol. 1, *The Saint*, ed. Regis J. Armstrong, J.A. Wayne Hellmann, and William J. Short (New York: New City Press, 2011), 169–308.

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